

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Xaverian College, Lower Park Road, Rusholme

Extension

For Pozzoni LLP

Version A: 19.04.13

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Not Protectively Marked

Crime Impact Statement

Xaverian College, Lower Park Road, Rusholme

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2009/0578/CIS/01

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Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

This development has been assessed against and is consistent with the principles of 'Crime Prevention through Environmental Design' (CPTED).

Crime levels at schools and colleges have tended to diminish over recent years, a result of a combination of better management practices and security awareness, an increasing number of new schools built to a higher security specification, closer liaison between the schools and Neighbourhood Police Teams, installation of secure boundary fencing and, on older school buildings, the adoption of retrofit security measures to address specific issues.

The new and refurbished elements of the College should adopt an approach which designs in security without resorting to crude retrofit measures (bars and shutters); the security standards highlighted in this report will assist designers to do this.

The proposed extension has been well designed from a security perspective and we are happy to endorse the scheme, subject to the adoption of the recommendations set out in sections 5, 6 and 7 of this report.



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1 Visual Audit

1.1.1 The plan and images below illustrate: the site edged in red; a mixture of College buildings to the south and south west of the site; University teaching and residential buildings to the northwest and eastern edge of the plan; housing immediately east of the site as well as to the southern edge of the plan; the Greygarth halls of residence immediately to the north; Rusholme district centre to the extreme west of the plan; and, the local highway network.



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1.1.2 Located on the edge of Rusholme district centre, Xaverian VIth Form College consists of numerous buildings situated either side of Lower Park Road. The campus is made up of a mixture of new and old buildings.

1.1.3 Dating from around 1840, Ward Hall, the subject of this report, is one of the teaching buildings, and is located on the eastern side of Lower Park Road. It was originally a place of residence and is grade II listed. The Hall is brick built with a stucco finish with sandstone dressings and a hipped, slate roof. It is two storeys high with a basement floor. The building has been extended twice – one to the rear and another to the south eastern corner. There is also a small house and associated outbuildings in the north east corner of the site.

1.1.4 The site is slightly elevated above Lower Park Road and the main entrance to the Hall is itself elevated. There is a detached temporary building sat within the grounds, the remainder of the grounds are given over to car and mini-bus parking. A gated vehicle and pedestrian access is located in front of the Hall entrance on Lower Park Road. The boundaries to the site are made up of low walls topped with railing to Lower Park Road, high walls to the rear boundary, with walls and high hedges to the Greygarth boundary. The Redclyffe building lies beyond the car park and temporary building to the south, given that it forms part of the College campus there is no defined boundary.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2012 and 31st March 2013.

2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
120	20	76	112	109	78	<20	87	<20	40

2.1.1 The volume of crime in the area surveyed is high, particularly the frequency of residential burglary, theft, criminal damage, robbery and violent crime.

2.2 Miscellaneous Theft (Education): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against school/college premises, recorded in the South Manchester area.

Figure 2: Misc Theft – Day Range



Figure 3: Misc Theft – Time Range



2.2.1 Day Range: The risk of theft at schools/colleges increases midweek, peaking on Tuesday and lowest on Saturday and Sunday, when schools are closed.

2.2.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated between midday and 5pm. The majority of theft takes place during lunch breaks, when pupils and teachers leave personal property in unlocked rooms where it vulnerable.

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2.3 Burglary Other (Education): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against school/college premises, recorded in the South Manchester area.

Figure 4: Burglary Other – Day Range



Figure 5: Burglary Other – Time Range



Figure 6: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary at education establishments is greatest on Sunday and Monday, the risk is lowest on Tuesday and Saturday.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk is greatest in the evening and in the early hours of the morning. Offenders typically target schools in the evening and early hours of the morning when they are closed, it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: In the majority of burglaries, offenders have gained access through windows, particularly rear windows. Other frequently targeted points of entry have included doors and roofs. The majority of offences have involved windows being prised open with either bodily pressure or tools. Glazing has also been smashed in a number of cases to gain access. Roofs, particularly when buildings or extensions are single storey, have been targeted with offenders either removing sections of roofing to gain access, or by using the roof to get into inner courtyards where doors or windows were forced.

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2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Friday and Sunday.

2.4.2 Time Range: It is greatest in the evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target vehicles in the evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.

2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 10: Wounding – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: The risk of violence is concentrated between Friday and Sunday. It often increases at the weekend when more people attend license premises, often for longer periods, and consuming large volumes of alcohol leading, to conflict.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of violence is greatest late in the evening and in the early hours of the morning. Violence typically occurs in the evening and early hours of the morning when alcohol has been consumed and arguments break out in licensed premises and within homes.

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2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 12: Robbery Targets



2.6.1 Criminal Damage Targets: Properties have been targeted more frequently than vehicles. Windows have been smashed in the majority of cases, both on properties and vehicles.

2.6.2 Robbery Targets: There have been a number of robberies and these have typically been against individuals rather than businesses. Individuals have frequently been targeted when walking alone through the area at night.

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Windows have been prised open with bodily pressure and tools

Solution *Although the location of windows and doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located at the rear of the building where they will benefit from little/no natural surveillance. The rear of the building should be enclosed to prevent unauthorised access during the day, as well as at night. All door sets and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, BS 7950), which are proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.*

2.7.2 Glazing smashed in acts of criminal damage.

Solution *An appropriate glazing specification should be used (incorporating at least one pane of laminated glazing) to adequately secure buildings. Any damage arising from vandalism should be repaired quickly in order to maintain a culture of care and respect; a lack of maintenance can often attract further abuse. In vulnerable locations, such as adjacent to publicly open space, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection. However, the layout of the buildings and position of windows should be designed to avoid this vulnerability as much as possible*

2.7.3 Single storey roofs have been climbed by offenders to access inner courtyards where doors and windows have been targeted

Solution *Ideally single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features (e.g. nearby boundaries, rainwater downpipes, trees, lighting columns etc.) that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration, and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access.*

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3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private space
- Antisocial behaviour
- Loitering groups (particularly out of hours)
- Internal theft
- Theft of staff/pupil belongings
- Bullying
- Staff, pupil and parent safety
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period.

4 Design Considerations

4.1.1 Design for Security recommends that designers and developers refer to:

- Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

- Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 The Proposal

5.1.1 The development involves the demolition of both of the extensions to Ward Hall and the construction of a three storey extension to the rear (eastern) and southern elevation. The extension projects southward towards the Redclyffe Building along the eastern boundary, leaving a narrow passageway between the boundary and the building for maintenance and escape purposes. A fire escape to the rear of the existing building will be replaced. The detached house and out buildings in the northeast corner of the site will be refurbished.

5.1.2 The extension will provide six modern classrooms, freeing up space within Ward Hall for uses more suited to the more intimate nature of the rooms.

5.1.3 The extension includes a ground-to-roof glazed link between the listed building and the extension. The main entrance will be located in the glazed link with circulation space on each floor between the classrooms and the old building. The only other external door on the extension is a fire door at the rear of the building.

5.1.4 When the extension is completed, the temporary building situated within the car park will be removed and the space reinstated for car parking.

5.1.5 Lighting to support existing and new CCTV cameras will be installed on the building, and the extension will be alarmed and linked to the existing security systems, which the College facilities team operate and monitor.

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5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.2.1 The location of the proposed main entrance is excellent, providing clarity to students and visitors, whilst encouraging surveillance of the site and approaches to the building.

5.2.2 The car park will be well-overlooked from classrooms on all three floors of the extension.

5.2.3 The rear of Ward Hall and the extension can be appropriately secured.

5.2.4 Boundaries are appropriately defined with walls, railings and locking gates to denote the private nature of the space.

5.2.5 The development of the site provides the opportunity to replace doors, windows and glazing to elements of the existing buildings, particularly at the rear of Ward Hall, to certified security standards, which will enhance the security of the buildings.

5.3 Recommended Security Enhancements

5.3.1 Fundamentally, the proposed extension is well considered from a security perspective, and the College have systems in place to reduce the risks of crime (lighting, CCTV and alarm systems). Ward Hall itself is more problematic to secure due to its age, listed status, intricate layout and secluded elevations. Nevertheless there are measures which can easily be implemented to improve the building security and these are set out below and in section 6.

5.3.2 Measures to secure the rear of Ward Hall and the extension should be developed in order to prevent unauthorised access to secluded parts of the site and to outside of normal College hours.

5.3.3 In addition, all aspects of building should be illuminated, with dusk til dawn lighting, to ensure the CCTV is effective at night as well as to deter any unauthorised presence on the site when the campus is closed. Cameras positions should be selected to ensure that all elevations are monitored.

5.3.4 The locking system to Ward Hall's main entrance should be reviewed. A minimum of two BS3621 mortice locks should be installed; a single key, multi-point lock (a Secured by Design approved system) would be better.

6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 All new external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

6.1.2 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

6.2 Windows

6.2.1 All new windows should be compliant with and certified to BS 7950 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of BS 7950, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.

6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.2.3 Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

6.3 Glazing

6.3.1 All new glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

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6.4 Intruder Alarm

6.4.1 A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room/patrol team. The alarm should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up), so that if either signalling path is tampered with by an intruder, or is faulty, the other continues to monitor for any further alarms and transmits them as 'confirmed activations' – extra confirmation that an intruder is on the premises and that the alarm isn't false.

6.5 Access Control

6.5.1 Any access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- The main entrance to the building (when/if required).
- Staff only areas/rooms.

6.5.2 All other internal doors/frames to classrooms, conference rooms, study areas, plant rooms and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortice deadlock (to BS 3621/EN 12209), so that the rooms can be secured when vacant.

6.6 Boundaries

6.6.1 When the College is closed for the day, the rear of the building should be enclosed with 2100mm high welded-wire mesh or steel railed gates, to prevent unauthorised access.



6.6.2 The gates should be fitted with panic mechanisms that should not be reachable/operable from the external face of the gate.

6.6.3 Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to prevent anyone crawling through.

6.6.4 The area set aside for minibus parking should also be made secure with a gate of a height (around 1800mm) compatible with the wall and gatepost, which partially encloses this space.

6.7 Landscaping

6.7.1 In vulnerable locations, such as the building entrances and the car park, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people and CCTV cameras to view the surroundings, and to any eliminate concealment spots. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

6.7.2 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

6.8 Lighting

6.8.1 External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes and parking areas within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.

6.8.2 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

6.8.3 Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

6.8.4 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments.

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6.9 CCTV

6.9.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
    - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
    - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

6.9.2 CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

6.9.3 Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack, either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required, or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

6.9.4 The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the car park, the main entrance, all building elevations, particularly the rear elevation.

6.10 Car Park

6.10.1 Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.

6.10.2 Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated.

6.10.3 Care should be taken to ensure that no hard/soft landscaping features impede surveillance opportunities, either from the street, the buildings or from CCTV coverage.

6.11 Other

6.11.1 Any new rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

6.11.2 Cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf

6.11.3 Any bin/skip stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

6.11.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

6.11.5 Toilets can give rise to problems within a college environment. The following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.

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- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

7 Management & Maintenance

8.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made east for people to raise concerns or report observations.

8.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

8.1.3 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.

8.1.4 Continued close liaison with the local police will be essential to the success of this development.

8 Construction

8.1.5 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

8.1.6 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

8.1.7 For further information regarding site security, please contact your local Crime Reduction Advisor, **Nicola Oldham**, on **0161 856 5912**.

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
15.04.13	Andrew Wilde, Pozzoni	Request for Crime Impact Statement
17.04.13	Simon Channell, Xaverian College	Site visit
19.04.13	Andrew Wilde, Pozzoni	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
P3599 - 201	Site plan – existing and demolition & proposed site plan	28.02.13	
P3599 - 202	Basement level – existing & proposed	28.03.13	
P3599 - 203	Ground floor levels – existing & proposed	28.03.13	
P3599 - 204	Mid floor levels – existing & proposed	28.03.13	
P3599 - 205	Top floor levels	28.03.13	
P3599 - 310	Proposed - elevations	28.03.13	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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