Crime Impact Statement

- Land at junction of Giltbrook Avenue & Rosewell Close, Miles Platting
  - Independent Hospital

Greater Manchester Police

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designforsecurity **Consultant**	Bradley Hart	

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Summarative Evaluation

This scheme is consistent with the current principles and standards of CPTED and SBD, subject to the points within this report being included in the scheme. Subject to the recommendations of this report being included within the scheme and the effective management arrangements remaining in place, we are happy to endorse this development.

Contact Register

Date of Contact	Summary of Contact
13th October 2009	Receipt of CIS instruction and plans.
14th October 2009	Telephone call & e-mail correspondence with Architect re: meeting.
19th October 2009	Meeting with Architect to discuss scheme.
21st October 2009	Receipt of meeting notes prepared by Architect and window specification.
23rd October 2009	Version 1 of CIS sent/e-mailed to Architect.
10th – 14th December 2009	Telephone/e-mail correspondence with Architect re: amendments to scheme.
15th January 2010	Response to planning consultation (received 12th January 2010) e-mailed to Planner.
5th March 2010	Telephone/e-mail correspondence with Architect re: details of scheme.
27th April 2010	Meeting with Architect to discuss new site.

Document Register

The analysis of the proposals is based on the following documents submitted by the developer:

Document/Drawing Reference Number	Document/Drawing Title
L – 0001 Rev A	Existing Site Plan
L – 0005 Rev -	Existing Site Plan with Proposed Community Car Park
L – 1000 Rev K	Proposed Ground Floor Plan
L – 1001 Rev K	Proposed First Floor Plan

Introduction

This Crime Impact Statement:

- Has been produced by the Greater Manchester Police Design for Security consultancy, a professional organisation independent of the design process.
- Highlights crime and disorder issues in the vicinity of the development.
- Assesses the development in terms of its likely effect on crime and disorder in the area.
- Identifies design solutions based on analysis of the crime issues in the area that will reduce the proposals vulnerability to crime.
- Helps an applicant to adapt a development to avoid/reduce the adverse affects of crime and disorder.
- Allows Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) to use the information to make better decisions and enable the planning process to run more smoothly.
- Helps to allay public fears about a development that are often brought about by a lack of information and create goodwill on behalf of the developer.

Part A – Analysis of the Site

1.0 The Proposal

The proposal is to erect a 1/2 storey building on the site to house a 14 no. bed independent hospital, with associated parking and landscaping.

2.0 Site Analysis



- The site is located on the south side of Oldham Road, adjacent to the junction of Giltbrook Avenue and Rosewell Close. The site is currently open space, adjacent to an enclosed playing field, overlooked by residential properties. Sawley Road runs around the site to connect Varley Street to the residential area to the east.
- There are residential properties, a high-rise block of flats and a derelict public house to the west of the site. To the south-west is a large Basilica and a fire damaged social club, as well as more open space/residential properties to the south. The area to the east of the site is residential in nature, with houses arranged in a Radburn style of layout and high-rise

flats. To the north is an area of open space (formerly residential properties), beyond which are a number of commercial units and a large events venue and car park.

- In terms of the wider area, there are Local Authority offices and a leisure centre to the south, as well as Park View Community School, beyond which runs the Rochdale Canal. The residential area of Collyhurst lies to the north of the site. Sports City lies approx. 1km to the south-east of the site and Manchester city centre lies approx. 2km to the south-west.

3.0 Crime Issues at this Location

The graph below illustrates the number of crimes recorded in the period 1st October 2008 and 1st October 2009 in a grid area centred on the site, measuring approximately 1km^2 (please see Appendix 1 for a description of each of the crime types).



As can be seen from the graph above, this is a high crime area. By far the most prevalent type of crime is criminal damage (167 – see breakdown opposite). There are also significantly high levels of vehicle crime (101 theft from and 28 theft of), less serious wounding (90) and burglary (31 dwelling and 52 other). The majority of crimes occur around/off the main arterial



route of Oldham Road and the streets to the east (around/off Sawley Road), south-west (around/off Farnborough Road/Winstanley Road) and north-west (around/off Thornton Street North/Whitley Road/Thornton Street/New Allen Street) of the site.





As can be seen from the graphs above, an analysis of the existing crime levels in the area over the last 12 months shows that the risk of burglary other in the area peaks mid-week and during late evening. A large proportion of the recorded burglary other offences in the area also relate to thefts from domestic sheds, outbuilding and garages (defined as 'property burglary' on the graph below).



The graph above shows that burglary other offences within the area have been carried out through a number points of entry, particularly through rear windows and doors (both front and rear). The graphs below show that the risk of theft from/of motor vehicle in the area is slightly higher towards the end of the working week. There is also a notably increased risk during the afternoon and through to the early hours of the morning.





In terms of the more immediate area around the site itself, there have been a number of recorded crimes within the last 12 months including, most notably:

- Criminal damage (mostly smashing windows of properties and vehicles);
- Less serious wounding;
- Theft of/from motor vehicle (mostly parked on street);
- Burglary other (including smashing windows/loosening glazing, forcing doors, forcing window, theft from sheds);
- Burglary dwelling (including theft of keys to steal vehicles); and
- Personal robbery.

There have also been a number of incidents of rowdy/inconsiderate behaviour and nuisance/inappropriate use in the surrounding area within the last 12 months, involving adults, juveniles and neighbours. The concentration of these incidents mirror the crime trends outlined above.

4.0 Security Considerations

The typical security issues for a development of this nature are:

- Acts of criminal damage/theft during the construction period.
- Burglary.
- Violence towards staff/residents.
- Theft of personal belongings of staff/residents.
- Other theft from premises.
- Theft of/from parked vehicles.
- Unauthorised access to staff/resident only areas.
- Nuisance/anti-social behaviour directed towards development.
- Criminal damage.
- Loitering groups of youths.

5.0 General Design Considerations

The seven attributes of safer places are contained within *'Safer Places – The Planning System and Crime Prevention'*, a planning guidance document issued by the Home Office and the ODPM (now the DCLG) for England and referenced by Planning Policy Statement 1. All seven general attributes, listed below, align with the general principles of CPTED and SBD. They should be considered and applied to the detailed design of the development:

Access & Movement

Places with well defined and well used routes with spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- Pedestrian routes are poorly lit, indirect and away from traffic;

- Streets, footpaths and alleyways provide access to the rear of buildings;
- There are several ways into and out of an area – providing potential escape routes for criminal activity;
- It is easy for people to become lost or disorientated; streets and spaces are unwelcoming or underused by capable guardians.

A good movement framework has direct routes that lead people safely to the places they want to go by whatever means – on foot, by bike or on public transport. Layouts based on main routes and shared spaces reduce the need for underused alleyways, shortcuts and minor access points that can become vulnerable to or facilitate crime. The consequences of the number and type of connections in this setting need to be carefully considered.

Structure

Places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- Buildings and private/communal spaces have a large number of sides exposed to the public realm;
- The way that buildings streets and spaces are laid out allow criminals to move around and operate undetected;
- A places tends to bring together people who are likely to offend and suitable targets;
- Capable guardians are not present;
- Places become derelict or underused;
- Under and unused buildings and spaces that have become vulnerable to crime are not remodelled or removed.

A safe and legible urban structure has a well-defined and clearly understood movement framework and good quality, well-used public spaces that support surveillance. Pedestrians need well-lit and clearly defined routes linking areas of activity and key destinations. A legible layout lessens the need to depend on signs to find one's way around. It enables people to read their surroundings and the way ahead in order to detect dangers and warning signs.

Surveillance

Places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- Criminals can operate, including travelling to and from the location, without fear of being seen;
- Criminals or their activities do not attract attention – or they are confident that no one will take any action;
- All sides of buildings and all parts of spaces are not overlooked by surrounding users or passers-by;
- Buildings and spaces are not designated to allow surveillance 'outside' from 'inside' and vice versa.

Clear sightlines and good visibility allow people to see where they are going and make a reasonable choice of routes. This has a significant impact on feeling and being safe. In areas designed for use after dark, visibility depends on effective lighting. Well-designed lighting increases the opportunity for surveillance at night, sends positive messages about the management of an area, and enhances the aesthetics of the night-time environment.

Ownership

Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- It is unclear whether space is public or private, and what behaviour is expected in each;
- Private space is easily accessible to people who have no right to be there;
- An offender's presence in the area does not attract attention;
- A place feels like it is not under supervision of local residents, businesses, organisations or other users.

Encouraging residents and tenants to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for their surroundings can make an important contribution to crime prevention. Uncertainty of ownership can reduce responsibility and increase the likelihood of crime and antisocial behaviour going unchallenged. Alternatively, when responsibility and ownership are high, there is a feeling that crime is more likely to be detected and responded to.

Physical Protection

Places that include necessary, well-designed security features. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- The target hardening measures (for example the doors, windows and gates recommended for 'Secured By Design' (SBD) accreditation) are not selected to be appropriate to the building and to the crime risk faced, or are not integrated, installed or used properly;
- It is easy to enter and exit properties illegally;
- It is easy to remove property.

Physical protection involves measures that make it more difficult to commit offences and instil a feeling of safety in users. It includes active security measures (such as locks, doors, windows, and glazing) that aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture. It is important that this is done in a balanced way by employing methods that reasonably secure a place without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

Activity

Places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- An area is either very quiet or very busy, depending on the local context and the type of crime;
- Different groups of people feel that there is nothing to do;
- Criminals can go about their business unnoticed;
- Places become devoid of activity at certain times of the day or night, whilst remaining accessible to offenders;
- Potential offenders and/or victims are concentrated in the same place at the same time, such as bus stops, taxi ranks, or fast food outlets after pubs close or areas of the town centre throughout the evening.

Crime can be deterred through the ‘eyes on the street’ of people going about their everyday business. However, too much activity risks anonymity and can also lead to increases in the opportunity to commit particular types of crime, such as pick-pocketing, and anti-social behaviour. Decisions about which levels and types of activity are appropriate need to be made for the local context.

Management and Maintenance

Places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- Places are untidy or unattractive, giving the impression of not being cared for or that crime and disorder is tolerated;
- Signs of disorder and neglect, such as broken windows, abandoned vehicles or graffiti are not removed at the earliest opportunity;
- An organised human presence (such as police, security guards, street wardens or concierges) is absent.

The overall quality of the environment and its upkeep can influence both the perception and reality of safety and security. A good quality, attractive public space that is perceived as well maintained and cared for by its owners and its users improves its overall image, encourages greater use, promotes greater respect for the environment and reduces the likelihood of crime or vandalism.

6.0 Site Specific Design Considerations

The above general measures/principles should be considered in the detailed design of the development. In terms of the layout of the development, the following site/development specific issues are highlighted at this stage and need to be addressed in the final design:

- Many of the existing buildings in the area have razor wire around the eaves/on top of boundary walls, indicating that unauthorised access is an issue in the area. The private areas of the facility need to be well defined and enclosed to deter and prevent unauthorised access and protect vulnerable residents.

- The open and accessible front elevation of the building (adjacent to the community car park) may be vulnerable to attack, as well as nuisance and anti-social behaviour. Care should be taken to ensure that windows are protected and loitering/gathering close to the building is discouraged.
- Given that the facility will be heavily supervised (i.e. a minimum of one member of staff to each resident), there is a very limited number of parking spaces within the car park. Any vehicles parked on-street or in the open car park at the front of the building would be vulnerable to attack.
- Building lines should be kept as simple as possible. Recesses and sheltered areas can create hiding places and congregation points which are a focal point for crime and anti-social behaviour, possibly leading to littering, graffiti, vandalism and arson.
- Any landscaping features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance of/from the building or reduce the effectiveness of any CCTV system. Future soft landscaping growth and maintenance must be taken into account at the design stage.
- A successful lighting scheme deters and reveals potential intruders and reduces the fear of crime. Lighting levels should be good, but not oppressive, evenly distributed, allow clear colour rendition (supporting any CCTV system) and avoid light spillage.

Given the existing crime levels in the area and the vulnerable nature of the development, it is highly recommended that the development is designed and constructed to 'Secured By Design' (SBD) standards (please see www.securedbydesign.com for more information and general design guides).

Part B – Assessment of the Development

1.0 Description of the Development

The proposal is to erect a 1/2 storey building to form a 14 no. bed supported residential facility for local people with learning disabilities, who are considered to have the potential to live independently. Following a 2 to 3 year period of 24 hour supported living, it is anticipated that these people will be able to live independently elsewhere without the need for 24 hour care.

The building will front onto a proposed community car park (part of a wider development, the first phase of which comprises of a Joint Services Centre at the junction of Varley Street and Oldham Road and a large car park). The front elevation of the building will be open/accessible and slightly elevated above ground level (with the main entrance accessed via steps/ramp. The building will be arranged around an enclosed private courtyard and the sides and rear of the building will be enclosed with high-level fencing. There will be a gated small staff car park/ambulance drop-off area to the rear of the building, off which will be a staff only entrance into the building.

2.0 Assessment Criteria

2.1 Design & Layout

- The open front elevation of the building may be vulnerable to attack, nuisance and anti-social behaviour. All of the ground floor front windows are to staff areas and offices, which will provide a greater level of activity/surveillance and give a greater level of protection to the windows of residential rooms. In order to deter access to accessible windows and blank walls, I would highly recommend wide beds of dense/mature defensive planting. Windows to this elevation should also be non-opening and have as high cills as possible.
- It is highly recommended that there are no canopies to the front of the building, which may encourage loitering/gathering.

- The sides and rear of the building will be enclosed by 2400-2100mm high walls/railings (due the ground levels changes). The private courtyard should be also be enclosed by 2100mm walls. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls/railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Any levels changes should also not inadvertently facilitate climbing into secure areas.

- I would prefer to see sliding or bi-folding vehicular gates to the staff car park (please see www.securedbydesign.com for SBD licensed companies/products), rather than double gates, as they are easier to secure. The gates themselves should operate quickly (with no lag that would allow tailgating) and be controlled by staff using a key fob/proximity reader system with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out') so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape. There should also be an intercom at the entrance to the car park (covered by CCTV) so that any ambulances can communicate with and be seen by staff before being allowed access.

- Any pedestrian gates to private space should be self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights etc. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.

- Any accessible single storey elements of the building may leave the roof vulnerable to unauthorized access. The eaves of the building at these locations should be a minimum height of 3500mm (preferably higher) to deter unauthorized access. There should be no features (such as windows cills or exposed rainwater down pipes) or recesses to the front elevation that would provide climbing aids.

- The administration offices adjacent to the main entrance should have full view of anyone entering the building. The entrance lobby should work as an 'air-lock' system, with the internal door released by reception staff only

when visitors have been vetted. The external entrance doors should be secured and controlled by staff at night. The design of the reception area is imperative to the safety and confidence of staff. A high and wide reception area allows a degree of space between staff and any potentially aggressive visitors. A personal attack alarm or easily reached panic button should be provided. All furniture to the lobby and visitor areas should be fixed.

- The layout of any consultation/interview rooms should omit obstacles between staff and the door. Panic alarms should be positioned where they are easily reachable by staff.

2.2 Physical Security

- The Architect has confirmed that all glazing will incorporate one pane of 10mm toughened glazing and one pane of 7.5mm toughened glazing. This should include all windows, doors and roof lights. The laminated pane should have a minimum 'pvb interlayer' thickness of 1.5mm – the material that bonds the glazing together.
- The windows specified are anti-ligature sliding windows, with integral mesh screens to secure the opening. These windows are specifically designed for such facilities and although they cannot be certified to BS 7950 (the standard requirement for a 'Secured by Design' scheme), I am satisfied that they are a suitable alternative in this instance. The rooms along the front elevation of the building should also have blinds to hide any items of high value from view (particularly at night, when some of the rooms are less likely to be occupied).
- Any roof lights should also be protected by integral mesh/internally fixed grilles.
- All external doorsets, where possible (see below), should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 (SR) 2 (with a BSI Kitemark tested and approved cylinder). Any fire doors/frames should be alarmed and designed without visible external ironmongery (with at least two-point locking to each leaf). The staff entrance should be self-closing, controlled by a fob/proximity

reader and secured using an electrically operated lock, such as the Winkhaus Cobra AV2E multi-point lock.

- The main entrance to the building is formed by sliding doors, which cannot be certified to the above standards. I would recommend that these doors (both external and internal doors to the entrance lobby) are secured by a multi-point locking system, with each leaf locking top and bottom to the frame (with hook bolts) and at least two hook-bolts locking the leafs together, to prevent sliding/lifting.
- Any louvered doors to plant rooms or bin stores can also not be certified to the above standards. However, these doors will be located within the secure perimeter of the site and will be to self-contained rooms. It is highly recommended that these doors/frames are of robust steel construction, with BSI locks (two-point locking to each opening leaf) and hinge bolts.
- There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding/rendering to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- All internal doors/frames should be solid core (minimum of 44mm thick). All staff areas, offices, stores etc. should be fitted with auditable access controls (operated by swipe card or proximity readers). All other rooms should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied.
- Lighting should be provided to the car park and entrances of the building to an adequate and uniform level (as defined within BS 5489), so as not to allow any areas of pooling/shadowing.
- A suitable monitored alarm system should be installed covering the entire building.

2.3 Management & Maintenance

- In addition to the above, CCTV is a sound addition to provide the means to deter and monitor occurrences. The siting and design of CCTV cameras should be carefully considered to ensure that their presence is known, with out being over-dominant within the development (covering the interior and exterior of the building). Any CCTV system should be maintained and operated in accordance with the relevant British Standard (BS 7958) and should be monitored on-site to allow an immediate response to any incidents recorded. Recording equipment should be stored in a secure area (i.e. a security office), with access restricted to authorised staff only.

- Keys and passes (which can be easily activated/cancelled electronically by staff) should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. There should be a comprehensive security regime in place for the day-to-day running of the facilities. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

- The access control, CCTV and alarm systems recommended above must be regularly maintained and immediately repaired/replaced if faulty, in order to ensure the safety and security of the development and it's users.

- All high value equipment (e.g. computers etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

- Cleaning, removal of graffiti and repair of damage arising from vandalism should be carried out quickly in order to maintain a culture of care and respect. A lack of maintenance often attracts further abuse. I would recommend that the publicly accessible elevations of the building are treated with a product such as 'Easy-On' protective coating (please see www.urbanhygiene.com for more information), which allows the easy and quick removal of graffiti.

- Any vegetation proposed at or around the site should be kept to a maximum height of 1000mm and any foliage to trees should be at a height exceeding 2000mm, so as not to create potential hiding places for would-be criminals to exploit or impede CCTV coverage or natural surveillance across the development.

2.4 Construction

Careful consideration should be given to securing the site during construction, to prevent unauthorized access and theft of equipment. For more information, please contact the local Crime Reduction Adviser (details below).

Name of local CRA(s):	Denis Brogan
Contact Telephone No(s):	0161 856 3560

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. We recommend the preferred contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme' (see Appendix 2), who maintain responsibility for a tidy area around their site.

3.0 Secured By Design (SBD)

SBD is a police initiative to encourage the building industry to adopt sensible security measures in the design and construction of developments to assist in reducing the opportunity for crime and the fear of crime, creating a safer and more secure environment. Developers who gain SBD accreditation also benefit from a significant marketing opportunity and are entitled to use the official SBD logo in their literature and advertising – the police award for incorporating design, layout and security measures that are conducive to community safety. More information about the application process and SBD licensed companies/products, as well as the application forms themselves, can be found at www.securedbydesign.com or www.designforsecurity.org.

4.0 Conclusions

This development has been assessed against and is consistent with the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED) and 'Secured by Design' (SBD), thus reducing the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. We are happy to endorse this development, subject to the above measures being incorporated/implemented. However, due to the nature of the proposed use, the overall security of the development is heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the scheme rather than just the physical measures recommended above.

Should the applicant wish to apply for the development to achieve SBD accreditation, it should achieve it.

designforsecurity
Consultant

Bradley Hart MTCP

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

Appendices

A1 Glossary of Crime Types

SOURCE: Home Office

Arson

Deliberately destroying or damaging property by fire.

Burglary in a dwelling

Burglary in a dwelling

Where an offender enters a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Aggravated burglary in a dwelling

Where an offender, armed with a firearm, weapon or explosive, enters a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Burglary in a building other than a dwelling

Burglary in a building other than in a dwelling

Where an offender enters a building other than a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Aggravated burglary in a building other than a dwelling

Where an offender, armed with a firearm, weapon or explosive, enters a building other than a dwelling to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Criminal damage

Criminal damage to a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging somebody else's home.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging somebody else's home, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a building that belongs to someone else.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a building that belongs to someone else, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Criminal damage to a vehicle

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a vehicle that belongs to someone else.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a vehicle

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a vehicle that belongs to someone else, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Other criminal damage

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging items, excluding dwellings, buildings or vehicles that belong to someone else (not counted elsewhere).

Racially or religiously aggravated other criminal damage

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging items, excluding dwellings, buildings or vehicles that belong to someone else (not counted elsewhere), where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Threat or possession with intent to commit criminal damage

Threatening or causing someone to fear that his or her property might be damaged; or possessing anything, without lawful excuse, intended to cause damage.

Less serious wounding

Less serious wounding (including any minor injury)

Maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, with or without a weapon; also assaulting someone and causing him or her actual bodily harm.

Racially or religiously aggravated other wounding

Maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, with or without a weapon; also assaulting someone and causing him or her actual bodily harm, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Common assault (includes some minor injury)

Common assault (no injury)

Assaulting another person where the victim receives a minor injury or, as of 2002/03, no injury.

Racially or religiously aggravated common assault

Assaulting another person where the victim receives no injury and there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Miscellaneous theft

Theft from the person

Stealing property from another person, with intent to permanently deprive him or her of it.

Theft from shops

Stealing, with intent to permanently deprive, from retail premises (i.e. shoplifting).

Theft by an employee

Stealing from one's employer, with intent to permanently deprive the employer.

Theft or unlawful taking of mail

Unlawfully taking away or opening a mailbag.

Proceeds of crime

Concealing, disguising, converting, transferring or removing property obtained through criminal activity (i.e. money laundering).

Abstracting electricity

Dishonestly using, wasting or diverting electricity, without authority.

Other theft or unauthorised taking

Stealing not classified elsewhere.

Handling stolen goods

Dishonestly receiving or handling goods, knowing or believing them to be stolen.

Robbery

Robbery of personal property

The actual or threatened use of force during or immediately before the theft of personal property.

Robbery of business property

The actual or threatened use of force during or immediately before the theft of property belonging to a business.

Serious wounding

More serious wounding or other act endangering life

Viciously intending to cause grievous bodily harm to another person.

Theft from a motor vehicle

Theft from a vehicle

Where there is intent to steal from a vehicle rather than drive it away.

Vehicle interference and tampering

Interfering with a vehicle, its contents or anything carried in it.

Theft in dwelling

Theft from an automatic machine or meter

Stealing money from a meter in a dwelling.

Theft in a dwelling other than from an automatic machine or meter

Stealing property from a dwelling where the thief has not trespassed to gain entry

Theft of a motor vehicle

Theft or unauthorised taking of a motor vehicle

Stealing a motor vehicle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it.

Aggravated vehicle taking

Stealing a motor vehicle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it, and driving that vehicle dangerously, or consequently causing injury or damage to property, including to the vehicle.

Theft of a Pedal Cycle

Theft or unauthorised taking of a pedal cycle

Stealing a bicycle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it.

A2 Considerate Constructors Scheme

SOURCE:

www.considerateconstructorsscheme.org.uk

Code of Practice for the Scheme

1. Considerate

All work is to be carried out with positive consideration to the needs of traders and businesses, site personnel and visitors, and the general public. Special attention is to be given to the needs of those with sight, hearing and mobility difficulties.

2. Environment

Be aware of the environmental impact of your site and minimise as far as possible the effects of noise light and air pollution. Efforts should be made to select and use local resources wherever possible. Attention should be paid to waste management. Reuse and recycle materials where possible.

3. Cleanliness

The working site is to be kept clean and in good order at all times. Site facilities, offices, toilets and drying rooms should always be maintained to a good standard. Surplus materials and rubbish should not be allowed to accumulate on the site or spill over into the surroundings. Dirt and dust from construction operations should be kept to a minimum.

4. Good Neighbour

General information regarding the Scheme should be provided for all neighbours affected by the work. Full and regular communication with neighbours, including adjacent residents, traders and businesses, regarding programming and site activities should be maintained from pre-start to completion.

5. Respectful

Respectable and safe standards of dress should be maintained at all times. Lewd or derogatory behaviour and language should not be tolerated under threat of severe disciplinary action. Pride in the management and appearance of the site and the surrounding environment is to be shown at all times. Operatives should be instructed in dealing with the general public.

6. Safe

Construction operations and site vehicle movements are to be carried out with care and consideration for the safety of site personnel, visitors and the general public. No building activity should be a security risk to others.

7. Responsible

Ensure that everyone associated with the site understands implements and complies with this code.

8. Accountable

The Considerate Constructors Scheme poster is to be displayed where clearly visible to the general public. A site's contact details should be obvious to anyone affected by its activities.