Greater Manchester POLICE

Crime Impact Statement

- **Varley Street**
- Collyhurst Nursing Home

Prepared by
Greater Manchester Police
Architectural Liaison Unit

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Location	former Apollo Public House, 2 Varley Street
Proposal	Creation of Nursing Home
Client	OPH Properties Ltd
CIS ref.	2008/1357
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Version	3

PURPOSE OF A CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Crime prevention is a material consideration in the planning process. *'PPS1 makes clear that a key objective for new developments should be that they create safe and accessible environments where crime and disorder or fear of crime does not undermine quality of life or community cohesion'* (Para. 87, Page 15, DCLG Circular 01/2005 – Guidance on Changes to the Development Control System).

A Crime Impact Statement (CIS) clearly demonstrates that the applicant has considered the effect that their proposal may have on the locality.

A CIS should:

- Be produced by a competent individual/organisation independent of the design process.
- Highlight crime and disorder issues in the vicinity of the development.
- Assess the development in terms of its likely effect on crime and disorder in the area.
- Identify design solutions based on analysis of the crime issues in the area that will reduce the proposals vulnerability to crime (under three headings):
  - Design, layout and spatial relationships;
  - Physical protection; and,
  - Management and maintenance.

A CIS will:

- Help an applicant to adapt a development to avoid/reduce the adverse affects of crime and disorder.
- Allow Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) to use the information to make better decisions and enable the planning process to run more smoothly.
- Help to allay public fears about a development that are often brought about by a lack of information and create goodwill on behalf of the developer.

PART A
ANALYSIS OF THE SITE

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SITE & SURROUNDING AREA
The site comprises the former Apollo Public House and associated parking area.
The surrounding area has a mixture of land uses; residential uses dominate, particularly to the south and west of the site, whilst on Varley Street there is multi-storey housing, care centres, offices, and a large redundant church. To the rear of the site is a small parking area and substation. Built to serve the neighbouring houses, this car park is now redundant due to the recent provision of in-curtilage parking at the rear of the houses.

CRIME ISSUES AT THIS LOCATION
Crime Pattern Analysis (CPA)

The graph below illustrates the number of crimes recorded in the period between December 2007 and December 2008 in a grid area centred on the site measuring approximately 1km^2.

The volume of crime in the area is high. The principle crimes are: criminal damage, theft from cars, and less serious wounding. Given the high level of car crime in the area, the provision of an access controlled, secure car park is considered essential.

Vulnerable Localities Index (VLI)

The scoring of the VLI draws together 6 areas of data which have an impact on crime – burglary; criminal damage; income deprivation; employment deprivation; educational attainment; and percentage of young people in the area. The VLI is calculated for each Census Output Area (COA) and then be compared against the average VLI score for Manchester (100) as a whole.

The VLI for the area in which the site lies is Band 3 (a score of 100-150), which is above the average VLI for Manchester.

THE PROPOSAL
The proposal includes the demolition of the public house and the erection of a 3-storey nursing home with associated parking.

RISK ASSESSMENT
General Risk Assessment
The typical security issues for a development of this nature are:

- Criminal damage of property, including cars
- Theft from cars
- Theft of cars
- Burglary
- Theft of personal belongings

Site Specific Risk Assessment
Several features in the area stand out as contributing to the crime pattern, they are:

- the number of commercial premises
- the network of streets and backstreets
- the lack of secure off street parking

- Varley Street is a busy trafficked street, which connects Oldham Road to Bradford Road
- the condition, design and layout of some of the properties in nearby streets which make them more vulnerable to crime
- high risk of offender/victim population living close-by.
- the proximity of the car park at the rear of the site on Thornden Road where car crime has been an issue. The boundary walls are in disrepair; loose bricks and other debris can be used to damage property and vehicles. This car park should be removed and landscaped or incorporated into the development site. Not treating the car park at the same stage as redeveloping the Apollo site is likely to lead to problems in the future.

Construction Site Risk Assessment
Careful consideration should be given to securing the site during construction, to prevent unauthorised access and theft of equipment. For more information, please contact the local Crime Reduction Adviser (details below):

Name of local CRA/s: Mr Dennis Brogan
Contact Telephone No/s: 0161 856 3560

DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The following advice provides a brief on which to base detailed designs so as to meet:

- the Secured By Design standard
- to reduce the risk of crime and anti-social behaviour
- to promote a safe and secure environment.

SURVEILLANCE AND SIGHTLINES

Buildings should overlook places that could be vulnerable to crime. Windows and activities in the development should be directed to overlook pedestrian routes and car parks.
Windows and doors should face onto the street, the more windows overlooking the street and other public spaces the better.
Providing visibility into spaces where there is a perceived risk to personal safety (e.g. car parks, and lobby entrances) is critical.
Barriers (e.g. landscape features, fences and walls) along principal pedestrian routes should be low or visually permeable.
Features and elements that inhibit sightlines should be avoided, such as:

- blind corners, especially on routes where movement is predictable
- sudden changes of grade on pathways that reduce sightlines

- concealment spots (unless they can be secured after-hours).

Dark areas next to designated pedestrian routes, dead-end alleyways and recesses in fencing or walls (e.g. entrances and doorways) can create opportunities for concealment and should be avoided. Where a concealment area is unavoidable, good vandal-resistant lighting should be provided.

- Physical elements such as continuous solid fences, blank walls or planting beside footpaths that impede sightlines and reduce opportunities for surveillance should be avoided.
- Access points should be clear.
- Public access to the private areas should be restricted.

Lighting
It is crucial that lighting:

- sends the right messages to the public about the safe and appropriate use of space at different times of day and night
- is an integral part of the overall design and considered in relation to the specific needs of the place
- is designed with management and maintenance in mind (e.g. lighting fixtures are vandal resistant and kept out of reach)
- is well maintained and bulbs are promptly replaced as part of a co-ordinated management strategy.

Lighting should:

- provide good visual guidance and orientation
- support visibility for pedestrians as well as for motorists
- be considered for places that are well used at night (e.g. car parks and building entrances).
- ensure visibility for a reasonable distance to improve perceptions of safety.

Lighting should be placed to ensure:

- uniformity of lighting levels over an area, avoiding glare and reducing the contrast between shadows and illuminated areas, except when highlighting a specific area or feature
- vegetation or other elements do not interfere with its effectiveness.

Lighting should not be provided in areas not intended for night-time use, therefore avoiding a false impression of safety.

Crime and antisocial behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- ***criminals can operate, and travel to and from the location, without fear of being seen***
- ***criminals or their activity do not attract attention, or they are confident that no action will be taken***
- ***the sides of a building and its surrounding spaces are not overlooked by surrounding users or passers-by***
- **buildings and spaces are not designed to allow surveillance 'outside' from 'inside' and vice versa.**
- ***pedestrian routes are poorly lit, indirect and away from traffic streets.***
- ***footpaths and alleyways provide access to the rear of buildings***

LAYOUT

The layout of a place affects its safety and the perception of safety. Unattractive and poorly maintained spaces feel unsafe and uninviting. A vibrant, high quality environment with good visibility and open familiar spaces attracts people, assists legibility, conveys confidence and helps to reduce fear.

Design should:

- enable people to find buildings and site entrances and exits.
- avoid locating car parking facilities and other vulnerable uses in isolated areas.

Site layout of areas and spaces should:

- have easily understood pedestrian networks to help with orientation and way-finding
- provide good quality public spaces overlooked by buildings with active frontages.

Building design

Building entrances should:

- be clearly visible, well-lit and, ideally, facing the street
- have lobbies visible from the outside
- have any ramps and lift entrances in visible areas that are connected to street activity to emphasise their presence and ensure safety for users
- not create concealment spots next to pedestrian routes or public spaces.

Signage

Signs should:

- be strategically located at entrances to areas of activity,

- be clearly visible and appropriately illuminated for night-time use
- be informative rather than restrictive (e.g. 'do not enter').

Crime and antisocial behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- ***buildings and spaces are laid out in ways that allow criminals to move around and operate undetected***
- ***a place tends to bring people who are likely to offend and suitable targets together***
- ***places become underused and lack natural surveillance***
- ***building entrances and exits and access to assistance are not clearly indicated***
- ***it is easy for people to become disoriented.***

SENSE OF OWNERSHIP

Uncertainty of ownership can reduce responsibility and increase the likelihood of crime and antisocial behaviour going unchallenged. Alternatively, when responsibility and ownership are high, there is a feeling that crime is more likely to be detected and responded to.
A clear distinction between public, communal, semi-private and private space should be provided by using design techniques and elements appropriate for the local context and the intended use of the space.
Common design techniques and elements to delineate ownership boundaries (that most people respond to) include:

- landscaping
- use of different ground surface treatment
- sensitive placement of low, appropriately selected physical barriers (e.g. gates, fences, walls, hedges, bushes)
- design features (e.g. gateway structures to mark or enhance entrances to public areas)
- signage
- lighting.

High fences and landscaping that actively impede access are most appropriate in places that are vulnerable to crime. The building should be used to frame public spaces, with active frontages bordering the public area.

Signage
Signage can be used to:

- identify the company responsible for monitoring the area
- indicate the location of entry and exit points.

Crime and antisocial behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- ***it is unclear whether a space is public or private and what behaviour is expected***
- ***private space is easily accessible to people who have no right to be there***

- ***an offender's presence in the area does not attract attention***
- ***a place feels as if it is not under the supervision.***

QUALITY ENVIRONMENTS

The overall quality of the environment and its upkeep can influence both the perception and reality of safety and security. A good quality development that is perceived as well maintained and cared for by its owners and its users improves its overall image, encourages greater use, promotes greater respect for the environment and reduces the likelihood of crime or vandalism. Long expanses of blank walls or fences should be avoided, especially those using light colours. Robust materials and elements and detail that are consistent with the character of the place are encouraged. Graffiti-resistant paints and finishes are desirable for easier maintenance and should be used where appropriate.

Crime and antisocial behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- ***places are untidy or unattractive, giving the impression of not being cared for or that crime and disorder are tolerated***
- ***signs of disorder and neglect, such as broken windows, abandoned vehicles or graffiti, are not removed at the earliest opportunity***

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

Physical protection involves measures that make it more difficult to commit offences and instil a feeling of safety in users. It includes active security measures (such as locks, doors, windows, glazing, closed circuit television and security staff) that aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture.
Measures such as security shutters and barbed wire are often unattractive and increase the fear of crime by suggesting that the area is unsafe. Some places need to be made secure. However, it is important that this is done in a balanced way by employing methods that reasonably secure a place without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.
Avoid using elements that create a poor image or a fortress-like appearance. Integrate any necessary security features into buildings or public spaces by designing them to be intrinsic, unobtrusive or a positive visual feature.
Possible design techniques include:

- making perimeter fences look attractive by allowing visibility through the fences, or combining them with a hedge (thorny shrub varieties)
- using open grilled designs or internal shutters instead of solid roller-shutter blinds
- using laminated glass as a design alternative to shutters.
- using other *Secured By Design* products.

The building design should:

- avoid design features that make access to the roof easier
- consider secure doors, windows and entry intercom systems to protect staff and residents out of hours

Use of closed circuit television (CCTV)
CCTV should not be considered as an alternative to getting the design right in the first place, but can be used retrospectively to compensate for poor design. While no substitute, CCTV can supplement 'harder' forms of security.

Crime and antisocial behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- ***the target hardening measures (e.g. for doors, windows and gates) are inadequate for the building and the crime risk faced; or are not integrated, installed or used properly***
- ***it is easy to enter and exit buildings unlawfully***
- ***it is easy to remove property***
- ***there is no indication of mechanical or organised surveillance.***

PART B

ASSESSMENT OF THE DEVELOPMENT

DESCRIPTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT

The proposed development comprises a four-storey, 34 bedroom care home for residents suffering dementia. A 13-space car park (including 1 ambulance bay) and landscaped garden are also included. The building will sit on the corner of Varley Street and Farnborough Road with two entrances; one facing the car park, the other facing Farnborough Road. Access into the car park is taken from Thornden Road. The communal lounge/dining area opens out into the garden. On the ground floor, the kitchen, laundry and admin area/reception overlook the car park; there are 4 bedrooms, a staff room and an office facing Varley Street; the remaining bedrooms are on the upper floors. The first and second floors each have a communal lounge located on the corner of the building overlooking Farnborough Road.

DESIGN CRITIQUE
Good points

- Re-use of a derelict site.
- Development addresses the street and has 'active' windows on the main elevation, which provides excellent natural surveillance.
- Given the nature of the development, I prefer the entrance at the rear of the building away from passers-by who may interfere with access controls or abuse the space around the entrance.
- 'Activity' rooms and reception overlook entry points.

Points for consideration

- Access controls for the car park and the both entrance doors should be considered
- Appropriately high, robust railings must be used to prevent unauthorised access into the development and to define public/private space
- The use of pedestrian entry gates further defines the private nature of the space within.

The drawing below illustrates the boundary definitions that I consider will make the development less prone to crime and anti-social behaviour as well as maintaining the security of vulnerable residents.

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

The following advice highlights Secured by Design standards, standards that have proven to reduce a development's susceptibility to crime:

- External doors should be certified to Loss Prevention Standard (LPS) 1175 Security Rating (SR) or to BS PAS 24-1: 1999 *'Doors of enhanced security'*.
- All glazing at ground level, in both doors and windows, must include laminated glass at least 6.8 mm thick.
- All ground floor windows should meet the BS7950 standard and include restrictors limiting opening to 100mm.
- Lighting should be provided within the site (all elevations and the car park should be lit) to an adequate and uniform level (as defined within BS 5489) so as not to allow any areas of pooling/shadowing.

- The landscaping areas to the elevations facing Varley Street and Farnborough Road should be low-growing (i.e. less than 1000mm) so as not to impede natural surveillance.
- Rear boundaries should be defined with 2000mm high railings. The front boundary to Varley Street and Farnborough Road should be defined with a railing or to a height of 1200mm.
- I would like to see the car park enclosed with a 2000mm high railing and a self-closing lockable pedestrian access gate connecting the car park to the main entrance.
- The car park should have gates which complement adjacent fencing. It would be beneficial if these gates were automated but should be closed and locked at appropriate times.
- The landscaped grounds at the 'rear of the building should be fully enclosed with 1800mm high railing and only be accessible externally via lockable gates.
- A suitable monitored intruder alarm system should be installed. The alarm should be in accordance with:
  - BSEN 50131 (wired system)
  - BS 6799 (wire free system)

Provision should be made for secure storage of refuse within the site but not adjacent to the building or perimeter fencing in order to reduce the risk or arson.

MANAGEMENT & MAINTENANCE

- The communal car park court must be maintained to a high standard.
- All verges and amenity areas should be dedicated to individual dwellings or maintained by a management company.
- Any vegetation proposed in the public areas of the site should be kept to a maximum height of 1000mm, and any foliage to trees should be at a height exceeding 2000mm so as not to create potential hiding places for would-be criminals to exploit or impede natural surveillance.

CONCLUSIONS

This is a challenging location. Discussions with the architects have demonstrated a keenness to consider the importance of security. The redevelopment of the site for the use proposed is welcomed. The development has been assessed against and is consistent with the principles of crime prevention through environmental design, CPTED, thus reducing the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. Subject to the above measures being included within the scheme, we are happy to endorse this development and should the applicant make an application for SBD accreditation, it should achieve it.

Please note In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for the Architectural Liaison Unit to reassess the comments made above.

Signed

Adrian Murphy
Architectural Liaison Officer

APPENDIX I
SECURED BY DESIGN

SBD is a police initiative to encourage the building industry to adopt sensible security measures in the design and construction of developments to assist in reducing the opportunity for crime and the fear of crime, creating a safer and more secure environment. Developers who gain SBD accreditation also benefit from a significant marketing opportunity and are entitled to use the official SBD logo in their literature and advertising – the police award for incorporating design, layout and security measures that are conducive to community safety. More information about the application process and SBD licensed companies/products, as well as the application forms themselves, can be found at *www.securedbydesign.com*.

APPENDIX II
GLOSSARY OF CRIME TYPES (source: Home Office)

Arson

Deliberately destroying or damaging property, by fire.

Burglary in a Dwelling

Burglary in a dwelling
Where an offender enters a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Aggravated burglary in a dwelling
Where an offender, armed with a firearm, weapon or explosive, enters a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Burglary in a Building other than a Dwelling

Burglary in a building other than in a dwelling
Where an offender enters a building other than a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Aggravated burglary in a building other than a dwelling
Where an offender, armed with a firearm, weapon or explosive, enters a building other than a dwelling to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Criminal Damage

Criminal damage to a dwelling
Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging somebody else's home.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a dwelling
Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging somebody else's home, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling
Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a building that belongs to someone else.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a building that belongs to someone else, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Criminal damage to a vehicle
Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a vehicle that belongs to someone else.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a vehicle
Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a vehicle that belongs to someone else, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Other criminal damage
Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging items, excluding dwellings, buildings or vehicles that belong to someone else (not counted elsewhere).

Racially or religiously aggravated other criminal damage
Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging items, excluding dwellings, buildings or vehicles that belong to someone else (not counted elsewhere), where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Threat or possession with intent to commit criminal damage
Threatening or causing someone to fear that his or her property might be damaged; or possessing anything, without lawful excuse, intended to cause damage.

Less Serious Wounding

Less serious wounding (including any minor injury)
Maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, with or without a weapon; also assaulting someone and causing him or her actual bodily harm.

Racially or religiously aggravated other wounding
Maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, with or without a weapon; also assaulting someone and causing him or her actual bodily harm, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Common assault (Includes some minor injury)

Common assault (no injury)
Assaulting another person where the victim receives a minor injury or, as of 2002/03, no injury.

Racially or religiously aggravated common assault
Assaulting another person where the victim receives no injury and there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Miscellaneous Theft

Theft from the person
Stealing property from another person, with intent to permanently deprive him or her of it.

Theft from shops
Stealing, with intent to permanently deprive, from retail premises (i.e. shoplifting).

Theft by an employee
Stealing from one's employer, with intent to permanently deprive the employer.

Theft or unlawful taking of mail
Unlawfully taking away or opening a mailbag.

Proceeds of crime
Concealing, disguising, converting, transferring or removing property obtained through criminal activity (i.e. money laundering).

Abstracting electricity
Dishonestly using, wasting or diverting electricity, without authority.

Other theft or unauthorised taking
Stealing not classified elsewhere.

Handling stolen goods
Dishonestly receiving or handling goods, knowing or believing them to be stolen.

Robbery

Robbery of personal property
The actual or threatened use of force during or immediately before the theft of personal property.

Robbery of business property
The actual or threatened use of force during or immediately before the theft of property belonging to a business.

Serious wounding

More serious wounding or other act endangering life
Viciously intending to cause grievous bodily harm to another person.

Theft from a Motor Vehicle

Theft from a vehicle
Where there is intent to steal from a vehicle rather than drive it away.

Vehicle interference and tampering
Interfering with a vehicle, its contents or anything carried in it.

Theft of a Motor Vehicle

Theft or unauthorised taking of a motor vehicle
Stealing a motor vehicle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it.

Aggravated vehicle taking
Stealing a motor vehicle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it, and driving that vehicle dangerously, or consequently causing injury or damage to property, including to the vehicle.

Theft of a Pedal Cycle

Theft or unauthorised taking of a pedal cycle
Stealing a bicycle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it.