Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Former Lancashire Dairies, Derby Street, Manchester

Erection of 8,456sqm. Wholesale Warehouses in 3 no. Blocks

For T & G Associates Ltd.

Version A: 28/09/12

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Not Protectively Marked

Crime Impact Statement

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2012/0707/CIS/01

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Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED) in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposal is acceptable in principle and, subject to the measures outlined in this report (see Sections 5.3, 6 and 7), will show due consideration of the potential risks posed for a scheme of this type in this location.



Bradley Hart *MTCP*

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.



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Photos 1 to 3

The site of the proposed development is bounded by Derby Street to the north, Woolley Street to the east, Knowsley Street to the south and Blackley Street to the west. It is the former site of Lancashire Dairies, which was demolished some time ago – leaving large areas of hardstanding and overgrown scrub vegetation, enclosed with temporary herras fencing. There is currently a large amount of fly-tipping around the site, which gives the impression that the site is not owned/cared for by anybody and that crime and disorder are tolerated in the area. Such loose material can also be used to commit crime or nuisance/anti-social behaviour, but this should be a temporary issue as the site is developed.

Photos 4 & 5

Cheetham Hill lies to the north of Manchester city centre. The area surrounding the site is commercial in nature – including a number of warehouse/distribution/storage buildings and wholesale retail units. There is a similarly derelict site to the east of the site, which also has a large amount of dumped waste material. If such signs of disorder are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse. The dis-used nature of the site has led to the streets to the east and north being used to park large HGV trailers – limiting surveillance opportunities and leaving them publicly accessible and potentially vulnerable to damage or theft.

Photos 6 to 9

There are wholesale retail warehouses to the north and east, overlooking the site itself. The streets in the surrounding area are busy with parked vehicles and vehicular traffic during the day, although they are much quieter at night and pedestrian footfall is particularly low – resulting in limited overlooking and surveillance opportunities and leaving the buildings vulnerable to attack and unauthorised access unseen. Many of the surrounding buildings have retro-fitted security measures (such as barbed wire, galvanised steel shutters, CCTV, high fencing/gates etc.), indicating that they have experienced problems with unauthorised access. Such unsightly overt measures can be visually intrusive and raise the fear of crime.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2011 and 2012.

2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	70	39	57	35	<20	<20	121	<20	<20

2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is not particularly high with the exception of vehicle crime and commercial burglary, which occur very frequently. In the local area, a high number of commuters park either on streets or on informal car parks – leaving vehicles vulnerable for long periods of time.

2.2 Misc Theft (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against warehouse premises, recorded in the Manchester city council area.

Figure 2: Misc Theft – Day Range



Figure 3: Misc Theft – Time Range



2.2.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of theft at warehouse premises in the North Manchester area is greater on Tuesday and Wednesday. In general, the risk of theft is greater between Monday and Friday than at the weekend, when the majority of warehouse premises are closed.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of theft in warehouse premises increase late in the afternoon and peaks at 11pm. Theft in warehouses in the North Manchester have generally been by staff, targeting stock or property belonging to other staff members. However, offenders have also stolen externally stored materials such as metal or plant. The theft of staff property/stock tends to occur during the day - when warehouses are operational, and the theft of externally stored metals/plant in the evening - when premises are closed and offenders perceive a lower risk of being disturbed or detected.

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2.3 Burglary Other (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against warehouse premises, recorded in the Manchester city council area.

Figure 4: Burglary Other – Day Range



Figure 5: Burglary Other – Time Range



Figure 6: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary does not vary greatly, with a slightly higher risk experienced on Monday and Sunday and a slightly lower risk experienced on Wednesday and Saturday.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary increases significantly in the evening, peaking at midnight. Offenders typically target premises such as these in the evening and at night when they are closed, commercial areas/streets are quiet, it is dark and offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed or disturbed.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: A high number of crimes at warehouse premises have been committed through shutters, which have typically been forced upwards by offenders before other entry points are targeted i.e. doors and windows behind. Offenders have typically forced open doors and windows with tools, or smashed glazing to gain entry.

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2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime does not vary greatly, but is slightly higher at the weekend and slightly lower on Monday and Thursday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is greatest in the evening, peaking at 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time when people park on streets and in informal car parks in the area for long periods of time, while attending events at the nearby Manchester Evening News Arena.

2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 10: Wounding – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of wounding varies greatly. The risk is greatest on Tuesday and lowest on Monday and Saturday.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases at midday and in the late evening peaking at midnight. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on streets, at taxi ranks and in/around takeaways.

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2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 12: Robbery Targets



2.6.1 Criminal Damage Targets: The makeup of the criminal damage incidents in this area shows that properties are almost twice as likely to be targeted as vehicles. Common incidents of criminal damage include graffiti, windows being smashed and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.6.2 Robbery Targets: Robberies in the local area have been against individuals more frequently businesses in the past 12 months. Individuals have frequently been targeted when walking alone in the area, particularly at night.

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Roller shutters have been forced upward by offenders

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 6.1) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

2.7.2 Doors and windows have been forced open with tools

Possible Solution - Although the location of doors and windows should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 6.1 & 6.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors/windows are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passersby.

2.7.3 Theft of externally stored materials and equipment

Possible Solution - The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Inappropriately parked vehicles/trailers and other externally stored items can obscure the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage, creating potential areas of intense shadowing and blind spots. It is recommended that this is considered in the external arrangement, and 'no store/park' areas specifically identified to avoid inadvertently blocking surveillance. Storage/parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing.

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3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1.1 The proposal is to erect 3 no. 2 storey buildings to form 8 no. independent wholesale warehouses, with associated first floor office/storage space and parking. The buildings will be located along the perimeters of the site, directly abutting Derby Street, Woolley Street, Knowsley Street and Blacklock Street. There will be parking areas (comprising of 56 no. spaces) and loading bays areas between the buildings, accessed via Derby Street, Blacklock Street and Woolley Street, as well as external bin stores. It is proposed to leave the vehicular and pedestrian gates open during operating hours, locking them at the end of each day to prevent unauthorised access.

5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.2.1 The development will bring a disused site back into use and bring greater levels of activity/surveillance to the area. It is also likely to put a stop to fly-tipping, which has established at the derelict site.

5.2.2 The principle elevations of the buildings will be well-overlooked from the surrounding streets/buildings.

5.2.3 The more hidden rear elevations of the buildings will be enclosed and secured out-of-hours to prevent unauthorised access to where they could be attacked unseen.

5.2.4 The proposed buildings will have relatively simple footprints that will provide few potential places of concealment and facilitate efficient surveillance of the external areas/parking areas. They will also be sufficiently tall enough to make unauthorised access to the roof difficult.

5.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

5.3 Points for Further Consideration



5.3.1 The sides/rears of the buildings (including the parking/loading areas) should be enclosed with 2400mm high railings/welded-wire mesh fencing. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. It is proposed to leave vehicular and pedestrian gates open during operating hours, locking them at the end of each day to prevent unauthorised access. If access is regularly required out-of-hours, the double vehicular gates on Blacklock Street and Woolley Street gates should be secured and the sliding gate on Derby Street should be operated by staff key fob/proximity reader system, with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape.

5.3.2 The internal layout of the units should be carefully considered so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Any internal aisles or product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrances of the units. All staff areas should be fitted with access controls to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 6.1).

5.3.3 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

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6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 All external doors should be compliant with and certified to LPS 1175 SR2+. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening), of steel construction and designed without visible external ironmongery.

6.1.2 Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

6.1.3 Any loading bay doors should also meet LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

6.1.4 Internal doors to any cash offices should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 or equivalent. Cash offices should also have solid masonry walls, with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings. All other internal doors to staff areas (including to first floor offices, stores, stock rooms etc.) should have solid-core doors/frames with proximity-reader or swipe card auditable access controls, to prevent unauthorised access. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

6.2 Windows & Shutters

6.2.1 All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS 7950. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of BS 7950, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.

6.2.2 All ground floor/accessible windows and doors should be fitted with external shutters, ideally with shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building, tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required).

6.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

6.3.1 All glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.3.2 There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any areas of cladding to the ground floor of the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.

6.3.3 Internal walls between units should be similarly robust to prevent unauthorised access from one unit into another.

6.4 Alarms

6.4.1 A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover each of the retail units, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team). The alarms themselves should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up). If either is interfered with by an intruder, the other continues to monitor for any further alarms and transmits them as ‘confirmed activations’ – extra confirmation that an intruder is on the premises and that the alarm isn’t false

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7 External Features

7.1 Landscaping

7.1.1 In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

7.1.2 Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

7.1.3 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

7.1.4 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

7.2 Lighting

7.2.1 External lighting must be provided to all pedestrian routes and parking areas within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.

7.2.2 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

7.2.3 Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

7.2.4 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

7.3 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

7.3.1 CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

7.3.2 Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

7.3.3 With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

7.3.4 Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

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The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, sales counters and internal/external circulation spaces.

7.4 Car Parks

7.4.1 Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.

7.4.2 Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

7.4.3 Where feasible, a one-way system should be implemented to reduce the likelihood of collisions and conflict.

7.4.4 Signage should be incorporated to inform users of who the car parks are intended to be used by and the hours of opening.

7.5 Other

7.5.1 There must be no features of the building envelopes which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.

7.5.2 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

7.5.3 Any communal cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf

7.5.4 Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

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8 Management & Maintenance

8.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the buildings must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made east for people to raise concerns or report observations.

8.1.2 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items in each of the buildings.

8.1.3 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the buildings, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.

8.1.4 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
- Trimming and pruning to any shrubs and trees

9 Construction

8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

8.1.3 For further information regarding site security, please contact your local Crime Reduction Advisor **John Sargeson**, on **0161 856 3046**.

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11th September 2012	T & G Associates Ltd.	Receipt of CIS instruction & plans

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
8406/001	Location Plan & Existing Site Plan	July 2011	B
8406/020	Existing Street Scene Elevations	Sept 2012	-
8406/101	Proposed Site Plan	June 2011	J
8406/110	Proposed Plans and Elevations – Unit 1	Aug 2012	B
8406/111	Proposed Plans and Elevations – Units 2-4	Aug 2012	B
8406/112	Proposed Plans and Elevations – Units 5-8	Aug 2012	B
8406/120	Proposed Street Scene Elevations	Sep 2012	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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