

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Former Gamecock PH, Boundary Lane, Hulme

Student Accommodation

For S W Foulkes Architects

Version 1: 14th July 2011

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Not Protectively Marked

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Crime Impact Statement

Former Gamecock PH, Boundary Lane, Hulme

Student Accommodation

2007/1181/CIS/01

For S W Foulkes Architects
Version 1: 14th July 2011

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

There are significant crime and disorder issues in the vicinity of this proposed development, and it is therefore essential that security considerations play a major part in the design and management of the student accommodation.

The proposed scheme is generally consistent with the current principles and standards of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), and contains some positive features that would reduce opportunities to commit crime and other disorder.

There are certain detailed matters that should be reviewed as indicated in section 5.2 of this report, and in this respect I would encourage further dialogue with this consultancy throughout the design and construction process to ensure that security in the resulting development is optimised.

Subject to satisfactory consideration of these matters, we would be happy to give the proposed development our support.

Michael Craig *DipLD CMLI*
Consultant
e: michael.craig@designforsecurity.org

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- The site is located on the edge of Hulme, close to the university and college of music.
- The immediate area comprises low and medium rise social housing. The Manchester Foyer (facility for disadvantaged young people) and a medical centre are located close to the site on Booth Street West.
- At the junction of Booth West Street and Lloyd Street there are some licensed premises.
- Blossom Street leads directly to the university campus. Boundary Lane and Booth Street West have frequent bus services linking various parts of south Manchester with the university area and city centre – stops are located close to the site.
- The site is directly adjoined by public roads on three sides, with the eastern boundary abutting the amenity and parking area within the curtilage of Cooper Court.
- There is considerable demand for car parking in the vicinity from people using the nearby university facilities. A residents' parking scheme is in operation on the streets west of Boundary Lane.
- The site currently contains a disused public house, the upper floor residential element remains occupied. The frontage is openly accessible, and there is evidence of criminal damage and antisocial behaviour in and around the site.

Pictures

1 View of site looking south from Boundary Lane. The former public house is dwarfed by the multi-level block of maisonettes behind (Cooper House).

2 Looking north along Boundary Lane, with the proposed development site on the right of the picture. Another large block of maisonettes at Hopton Court is visible, across Booth Street West.

3 This short service road runs along the southern boundary of the site, providing pedestrian and vehicular access to the enclosed grounds of Cooper Court. Entry is controlled.

4 Booth Street West showing building accommodating licensed premises, medical centre and Manchester Foyer. The eastern boundary of the site is just visible on the right of the picture.

5 Picure showing the residential character along Boundary Lane, opposite the site. The proposed development would require removal of the existing trees.

6 The eastern side of the site adjoins the secure amenity and parking space attached to Cooper Court – enclosure is provided by a robust railing.

7 The vacant public house building has been subject to criminal damage. Note graffiti, window protection and CCTV camera.

8 Controlled entrance to Cooper Court, with southeast corner of site visible of left. The integrity of this boundary is compromised by the partly demolished wall and unmanaged vegetation.

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1 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.



1 

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2.2 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 6: Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Figure 7: Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Figure 8: Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.2.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary dwelling in this area is greatest, during the week, on Friday. The risk of burglary on all other days is significantly lower (with the exception of Monday). With the population in the locality likely to be predominantly students, it may be that they are targeted on Friday nights when they are likely to be out.

2.2.2 Time Range: During the day the risk of burglary is greatest in the evening, peaking between 7pm and 8pm. The risk of burglary remains through the evening and into the early hours of the morning.

2.2.3 Point of Entry: The points of entry in the majority of burglaries in this area were doors to the front and rear of properties and balconies. Offenders have frequently forced open doors using bodily pressure or tools to gain entry. In a number of cases offenders have scaled balconies to break into flats through doors that have been left insecure, or where doors can be forced using minimal pressure.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2010 and 2011.

2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
43	44	95	165	213	54	<2	40	<2	177

Figure 2: Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 3: Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 4: Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 5: Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



2.1.1 There have been a high number of crimes in the local area in the previous 12 months. Offences of particular concern for this area are acts of violence, robbery and pedal cycle theft. The rate of burglary is not as high as the average for Manchester but still exceeds the average rate experienced across Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.2 The number of domestic burglaries per dwelling is **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.3 The number of woundings per dwelling is **higher** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.4 Incidents of criminal damage per dwelling are **higher** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.5 Incidents of vehicle crime per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

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2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 13: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 14: Robbery Targets



2.5.1 Criminal Damage Targets: In the local area there is not a great difference between the level of vehicle crime directed at vehicles and property, with property being affected to a greater extent. The most common occurrences include windows of houses and cars being smashed and damage to car body work.

2.5.2 Robbery Targets: In the local area there have been few robberies and individuals have been targeted much more frequently than businesses. Individuals are generally targeted in the evening at night when walking through the area alone.

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Offenders climbing balconies to gain entry to flats

Possible Solution - If balconies form part of the proposal, there should be no external aids to climbing close by that could allow an offender to gain access - close proximity of features such as boundary fencing, lamp columns and drain pipes can assist unauthorised access. In particular, balconies at first floor level are especially vulnerable and should have glazing and doors to the same standards as ground floor premises.

2.6.2 Front and rears doors being forced open using bodily pressure

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 6), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Lighting to the front and rears of the properties can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime. Avoid locating doors in deep recesses.

2.6.3 Glazing on buildings being smashed

Possible Solution - The windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 6), with key operated locks and opening restrictors to all ground floor/accessible windows. The building footprint should be designed so that windows are not present in hidden areas where a potential intruder could operate for a considerable time without fear of detection. The position of windows will also affect how vulnerable they are to abuse – avoid locating them where they could easily be targeted, and consider protection with internal / external shutters, gauze or blinds in the most exposed locations.

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2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 10: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of vehicle crime is greatest on Tuesday and Friday. The risk of vehicle crime on average is greatest during the week between Monday and Friday than during the weekend.

2.3.2 Time Range: During the day the risk of vehicle crime is greatest at midday and in the early evening, between 5pm and 7pm. At this time staff (and local workers) and students who drive to university and park on residential streets and in informal car parks are likely to be targeted.

2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to woundings committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 12: Wounding – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week the highest levels of violence are experienced at the weekend. During the weekend people more frequently attend licensed premises, often for longer and drink more. This is when the risk of alcohol related violence is greatest.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of wounding peaks in the evening and remains high into early hours of the morning, peaking between 7pm and 9pm. It is at this time when alcohol will have been consumed and violence is more likely to break out in licensed premises and homes.

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would recommend that access from the external space should be via a self-closing door (incorporating a visibility panel) or full height gate, which locks on closing, in preference to a shutter.

5.1.5 The reception / concierge facility is located where staff can see and be seen by people entering the building via the main door, meaning that all residents and visitors can be effectively monitored. The door allowing further access to the residential part of the building is immediately adjacent to the concierge. A development of this size in this location would require a 24hour concierge presence.

5.2 Changes and Amendments Needed

5.2.1 Rear service yard. This area is not contained within a secure boundary, and the bays / recesses created by the building footprint could potentially provide some cover for criminal / antisocial activity. I would recommend that if the area is to remain open and unsecured, the design of the ground floor should be amended to remove some of this vulnerability.

5.2.2 Student bedroom windows opening directly on to the parking area and immediately adjacent to the cycle store entrance are particularly vulnerable and should be protected with additional reinforcement. This could take the form of a protective band of planting or railing, or installation of external grille / gauze or internal security blinds.

5.2.3 Parking provision – staff. The developer should ensure that adequate provision is made to accommodate the likely demand for vehicle parking, for staff primarily but also for and residents and their visitors. The area already experiences high demand and any additional pressure on neighbouring streets could lead to conflict, which often can escalate into criminal behaviour. Additionally, people may be tempted to park remotely in quieter locations, which could put them and their vehicles at risk.

5.2.4 Refuse / servicing. Proposals for refuse should not require any receptacles to be left outside or unsecured (see section 7).

5.2.5 Delivery / collection of property. The arrangements for delivery or collection of bulky items should not require unsupervised use of service corridors nor need for service doors to be left open. Vehicles involved in deliveries or collections should not be required to halt on restricted areas or cause obstructions to traffic.

6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 External communal access doors (including cycle store) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

6.1.2 Apartment cluster entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.

6.1.3 All individual bedroom doors and frames should be solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortise deadlock (to BS 3621/EN 12209), so that they can be secured.

6.1.4 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

6.2 Windows

6.2.1 Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.

6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights such as those adjoining the upper floor roof gardens (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

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3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Antisocial behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.1.1 The development presents an active frontage to most of the public elevations around the site, which will help to enliven the street scene and provide useful natural surveillance of the area. Windows from routinely occupied rooms will face outwards and be of particular benefit to Boundary Lane and Booth Street West.

5.1.2 The edge of the site is defined using low railings which will provide some defensible space and help to discourage access to the ground floor window areas and thus reduce potential for casual criminal damage. However, the windows of the lounge / kitchen facing Booth Street West appears very close to the back of footway and would require additional protection.

5.1.3 The principal entrance to the building is in a prominent corner location and is clearly evident from the street scene.

5.1.4 The cycle store for residents and staff is located within a room inside the building. Access to this area should be limited to legitimate cyclists only, and doors should have fob activated locking systems. I

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7.3.1 CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

7.3.2 Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

7.3.3 With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

7.3.4 Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, lifts, stairwells, cycle store, rear service yard / parking area.

7.4 Other

7.4.1 Any utility meters that require physical readings to be taken should be located outside the dwellings and not in the private areas.

7.4.2 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

7.4.3 Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf

7.4.4 Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development ensuring that external and internal doors cannot be opened at the same time.

7.4.5 Any expanses of blank wall at ground floor or otherwise accessible levels should have a graffiti resistant coating applied at the outset, to allow unauthorised markings to be removed easily.

8 Management & Maintenance

The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window effect'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- Removal of graffiti

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6.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Alarms

6.4.1 If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

6.4.2 If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including cycle store).

6.4.3 If an alarm is installed, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

6.5 Access Control

6.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Door from entrance lobby into hallway
- Door from bin store into hallway
- Doors into cycle store
- Doors from lift lobbies on to each floor

7 External Features

7.1 Landscaping

7.1.1 Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

7.1.2 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

7.1.3 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

7.2 Lighting

7.2.1 External lighting must be provided to all doors / entrances to the buildings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.

7.2.2 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

7.2.3 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

7.3 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
23/06/2011	S W Foulkes	CIS Instruction Received
14/07/2011	S W Foulkes	CIS v1 issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
611-08.2-102	Location Plan	08/2010	
611-08.2-200	Ground Floor Plan	08/2010	
611-08.2-201	First Floor Plan	08/2010	
611-08.2-202	Second Floor Plan	08/2010	
611-08.2-203	Third Floor Plan	08/2010	
611-08.2-204	Fourth Floor Plan	08/2010	
611-08.2-205	Fifth Floor Plan	08/2010	
611-08.2-206	Sixth Floor Plan	08/2010	
611-08.2-207	Seventh Floor Plan	08/2010	
611-08.2-208	Eighth Floor Plan	08/2010	
611-08.2-209	Ninth Floor Plan	08/2010	
611-08.2-210	Tenth Floor Plan	08/2010	
611-08.2-301	North Elevation	08/2010	
611-08.2-302	South Elevation	08/2010	
611-08.2-303	West Elevation	08/2010	
611-08.2-304	West Elevation	08/2010	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
1	☐	☐	☒	

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9 Construction

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

For further information regarding site security, please contact your local Crime Reduction Advisor, **Nicol Oldham**, on **0161 856 4148**.

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at *www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted*)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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