

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Plot 4 of First Street North Site, Manchester

Serviced Apartments

For 5plus Architects

Version B: 10th December 2012

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Not Protectively Marked

Crime Impact Statement

Plot 4 of First Street North Site, Manchester

Serviced Apartments

2008/1058/CIS/03

For 5plus Architects
Version B: 10th December 2012

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

The nature and level of disorder in the immediate area could make the development vulnerable to abuse, and it is therefore essential that the scheme does not incorporate features that would increase crime or raise the fear of crime in and around the site.

Overall, this scheme is consistent with the current principles and standards of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), and contains many positive features that would reduce opportunities to commit crime.

Our support for the proposed development is subject to inclusion of the recommendations of this report, in particular the physical security measures highlighted in sections 6 & 7, and the continued effective management and maintenance of the premises.



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1 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.



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- The site is located on the southern edge of central Manchester, about 0.75km from Albert Square and close to the conference facilities at Manchester Central and the Bridgewater Hall.
- The area contains a mix of development types, comprising residential, commercial, hotel and hostel buildings. There are a number of vacant plots in the area that are used for car parking pending redevelopment.
- The development site forms part of a masterplan to regenerate the area between the Mancunian Way and Whitworth Street West. Proposals for the area to the west of the site include a cultural centre, hotels, retail, commercial development and student accommodation, together with a new public piazza and multi-storey car park.
- There is a utility installation adjoining the eastern boundary of the site, adjacent to the river Medlock. To the south there are large plots of open land, some of which is currently used for car parking (part of the area earmarked for future commercial developments). The nearby car parks are popular with concert-goers, conference delegates and commuters who work more centrally.
- A large office building is located to the west of the proposed development (no.1 First Street), currently occupied by staff of Manchester City Council while refurbishment of the Town Hall extension takes place.
- A concentration of licensed premises is present to the north west of the site (Deansgate Locks) which generates significant disorder issues.

Pictures

1 View of the site from Medlock Street showing the open areas around no.1 First Street – these are destined to be developed as a new “cultural quarter” containing theatre and cinemas.

2 The area of public realm to the south of no. 1 First Street, looking eastwards with the proposed development site in background.

3 The proposed development site as viewed from the southwest, showing the current cycle store used by staff at no. 1 First Street. Note the CCTV camera on the pole visible at the right of the picture.

4 The land to the southwest of the site is currently in use as a public car park with unrestricted access at all times of day.

5 View of the site from Hulme Street, showing the neighbouring residential development at Mackintosh Mill. The proposed building would occupy land in the centre background of the picture. This access road would form one of the principal vehicular routes to the site and proposed multi-storey car park beyond.

6 View of proposed site from Cambridge Street, showing vacant site, River Medlock, utility installation and no. 1 First Street in the background.

7 The existing cycle store adjacent to the proposed development site.

8 Land to the east of the site is occupied by a utility installation which does not have a large staff presence but does require regular access for vehicles.

9 Secluded areas around the site have been subject to criminal damage, as evidenced by the presence of graffiti on these walls adjacent to the riverside.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2011 and 2012.

2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
57	70	101	219	288	81	<20	156	<20	86

Figure 2: Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 3: Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 4: Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 5: Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



2.1.1 In the last 12 months the volume of crime in the local area has been very high and this reflects the site's location close to the city centre. In particular there have been a high number of robberies, thefts of bicycles and theft from motor vehicles.

2.1.2 The rate for burglary is **lower** than the average for Manchester, and **lower** than the average for Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.3 The rate for woundings is **higher** than the average for Manchester, and **higher** than the average for Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.4 The rate for criminal damage is **lower** than the average for Manchester, and **lower** than the average for Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.5 The rate for vehicle crime is **higher** than the average for Manchester, and **higher** than the average for Greater Manchester as a whole.

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2.2 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 6: Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Figure 7: Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Figure 8: Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.2.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary is greatest on Thursday and lowest on Sunday.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary in the area examined is concentrated in the evening. Offenders frequently target residential properties in the evening when it is dark and offenders perceive the risk of being caught as low.

2.2.3 Point of Entry: The majority of residential burglaries in the local area have been committed through front doors and rear windows. The majority of burglaries have been committed at flats and offenders have often gained access to communal areas by deception through insecure communal entrances – allowing front doors of flats to be forced open with tools or bodily pressure. Ground floor rear windows of flats have repeatedly been prised open and this has been particularly common when rear windows are easily accessible or adjacent to public space.

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2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 10: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of vehicle crime is greatest on Monday and Tuesday during the week, with the risk lower on other days.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime peaks during the day in the afternoon, between 3pm and 5pm.

2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to woundings committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 12: Wounding – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday a greater number of people descend on the city centre area, attending licensed premises and often drinking for longer periods of time.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 4am. At these times, those attending licensed premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, taxi ranks and takeaways.

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2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 13: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 14: Robbery Targets



2.5.1 Criminal Damage Targets: In the local area there is not a great difference between the level of criminal damage directed at vehicles and property, with property being marginally affected more frequently. The most common occurrences include windows or premises and cars being smashed and damage to car bodywork.

2.5.2 Robbery Targets: There have been a high number of robberies in the local area. Robbery against the person is much more prevalent than against businesses in this area. The risk of robbery increases when victims take more secluded routes through / from the city centre, alone at quiet times.

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Front doors of flats have been forced open after offenders have gained access to insecure communal areas

Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents and reception / security staff to vet visitors before allowing them access to the building. The main entrance should be located in a highly visible position and be well lit to deter offenders from trying to break-in.

Entrance doors to individual flats should be certified to BS PAS 24. In the case that offenders gain access to the building (or may be resident in a different part of the building) - this will reduce the vulnerability of the flat entrance to attack.

2.6.2 Rear windows of ground floor flats have been prised open

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see sections 6-8). The position of windows will also affect how vulnerable they are to abuse – avoid locating them where they could easily be targeted, and consider protection with internal / external shutters, gauze or blinds in the most exposed locations.

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Antisocial behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles

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- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.1.1 The general footprint of the building at ground floor is relatively simple and free of recessed areas that could provide cover and impede surveillance. All external doors appear to be located flush with the walls, thus removing potential hiding places.

5.1.2 The principal entrance to the building is located in a prominent position and is readily apparent from the public realm around First Street. Approaches to the front of the building for pedestrians are along routes that have good sightlines and few potential hiding places.

5.1.3 The proposed development will bring additional vitality to a currently under-used site. The building will present an active frontage to most of the public elevations which will enliven the street scene and help to provide useful natural surveillance of the public realm. The uses of ground floor rooms will accommodate activities that require routine occupation, such as communal and retail uses. The area to the east of the building containing the access road and utility installation will not be well overlooked and thus the surveillance / monitoring of this area will need to be enhanced with formal measures such as CCTV.

5.1.4 Apartments are all located above the ground floor, meaning that residents' possessions cannot easily be seen from outside, and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. However, many will overlook the public realm around the block which will help to improve natural surveillance around the sites.

5.1.5 The reception lobby provides staff with a view of all people entering and leaving the building – this should have a staff / security presence at all times. Further access to the lift lobby and stairs should require fob-activated access controls. Visitors to the building should be required to report to the management suite and it should not be possible for residents to admit visitors remotely from inside their apartments.

5.1.6 Upper floor corridors providing access to studio apartments contain no obstacles or recesses. Any doors within the corridors should contain glazed elements to allow people to see who else is present.

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5.1.7 Ancillary units are entirely separate from the main residential function of the building.

5.2 Changes and Amendments Needed

5.2.1 Arrangements for refuse disposal – arrangements for disposal of refuse and recycling for residents are not apparent from the supplied plans. This should not require regular use of the service entrance off the lift lobby to access the bin store as this will undermine the security of residential part of the building.

5.2.2 Operation and access to the cycle store at the north end of the proposed building. This should be a secure enclosure with access restricted to genuine cyclists only – entry permits and access controls should be distributed by the building managers. Any cycle stands for short-stay use should be located where they can be observed from routinely occupied rooms of adjacent buildings, and covered by CCTV. The choice of stand should enable cyclists to secure their bikes in at least two places.

5.2.3 This development forms part of an overall masterplan to regenerate the wider First Street area which will be implemented in a number of phases. Any interim or temporary arrangements must take full regard security implications as phases of redevelopment occur in the short and long term.

6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

6.1.2 Individual apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.

6.1.3 Any ground floor external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

6.1.4 Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.

6.1.5 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

6.1.6 External doors to service bays, plant rooms, bin storage should also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2 or LPS 1175 SR2.

6.2 Windows

6.2.1 Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.

6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 0.8mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.8mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Alarms

6.4.1 If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

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6.4.2 If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors in to garages).

6.4.3 If an alarm is installed, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

6.4.4 If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

6.5 Access Control

6.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- External communal doors
- Doors to lift and stair lobby
- Laundry room
- Gym
- Cycle Store
- Bin store

6.6 Fit-Out

Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:

- Internal access control
- Internal doors in to premises
- Alarm systems

These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

7 External Features

7.1 Landscaping

7.1.1 In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

7.1.2 Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

7.1.3 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

7.1.4 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

7.2 Lighting

7.2.1 External lighting must be provided above all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.

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7.2.2 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

7.2.3 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

7.2.4 Cycle store should have internal illumination to provide average levels of 65 lux with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.

7.3 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

7.3.1 CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

7.3.2 Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

7.3.3 With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

7.3.4 Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrance, service entrance, lifts, stairwells and lobbies, cycle stores.

7.4 Communal Areas

7.4.1 Any public open space or amenity areas should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7.5 Other

7.5.1 There must be no features of the building envelope which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.

7.5.2 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

7.5.3 The cycle store should be a secure, lockable enclosure. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf

7.5.4 Any external bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures and not provide potential hiding places. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

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8 Management & Maintenance

8.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter / graffiti removal
- Repair to security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

8.1.2 The on-going security of the development and its users will be dependent on effective management of the site, and in particular arrangements for the following should be carefully considered in relation to the building layout:-

- Admission of residents and visitors
- A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development, so that external and internal doors cannot be opened at the same time.

9 Construction

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

For further information regarding site security, please contact your local Crime Reduction Advisor, **John Sargeson**, on **0161 856 3046**.

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
07/11/12	5Plus Architects	CIS Instruction Received
30/11/12	N/A	Site Visit
06/12/12	5Plus Architects	CIS vA issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
MP_00_1000	Masterplan – Application Site Plan and Location Plan	Nov 12	A
MP_00_1003	Masterplan – Siteplan	Nov 12	A
P4_02_220M	Mezzanine Floor general arrangement plan	Nov 12	A
P4_02_2000	Ground Floor General Arrangement	Nov 12	A
P4_02_2201	1st Floor General Arrangement	Nov 12	A
P4_02_2202	2nd-10th Floor General Arrangement Plan	Nov 12	A
P4_02_2211	Roof (01) General Arrangement Plan	Nov 12	A
P4_04_2200	Elevation A	Nov 12	A
P4_04_2201	Elevation B	Nov 12	A
P4_04_2202	Elevation C	Nov 12	A
P4_04_2203	Elevation D	Nov 12	A
P4_05_1200	Section AA, BB & CC	Oct 12	A
P4_26_2201	1st Floor GA Furniture Layout	Nov 12	A
P4_26_2202	2nd-10th Floor GA Furniture Plan	Nov 12	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	
B	☐	☐	☒	Amendments to title pages

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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