
PLANNING AND
BUILDING CONTROL
30 APR 2012



Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

34 London Road, Manchester

330 Bedroom Hotel

For Hodder+Partners

Version A: 21st February 2012

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Not Protectively Marked

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Crime Impact Statement

34 London Road, Manchester

330 Bedroom Hotel

2012/0098/CIS/01

For Hodder+Partners
Version A: 21st February 2012

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

There are features of the area around the proposed development that make it potentially vulnerable to criminal activity. It is therefore essential that the scheme does not incorporate elements that would increase crime or the fear of crime in and around the site. In particular I would ask for further consideration of the following issues:-

- Ground floor internal arrangement of facilities and functions

In other respects the proposed scheme is generally consistent with the current principles and standards of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), and contains some positive features that would reduce opportunities to commit crime and other disorder.

Our support for this development is subject to the particular issues identified in this report being satisfactorily addressed.

Michael Craig *DipLD CMLI*
Consultant
e: michael.craig@designforsecurity.org

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Contents

1 Visual Audit 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 6

- 2.1 Crime Count
- 2.2 Burglary Other (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis
- 2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis
- 2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis
- 2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown
- 2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

3 Risk Factors 9

4 Design Considerations 10

- 4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London
- 4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

5 Design & Layout Appraisal 10

- 5.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal
- 5.2 Changes and Amendments Needed

6 Physical Security 12

- 6.1 Doors
- 6.2 Windows and Shutters
- 6.3 Glazing
- 6.4 Alarms
- 6.5 Access Control
- 6.6 Other Internal Features
- 6.7 Fit-Out (Basement)

7 External Features 13

- 7.1 Boundaries
- 7.2 Lighting
- 7.3 CCTV
- 7.4 Other

8 Management & Maintenance 14

9 Construction 15

Appendix

A Contact register 16

B Associated Documents 16


C CIS Version History 16


D Glossary 17

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1 Visual Audit


The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.





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
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- The site is in central Manchester, opposite Piccadilly railway station and tram stop.
- The area is busy at all times of day and night.
- Surrounding land uses include commercial, residential, car parking, hotel, leisure and licensed premises.
- The former fire station directly opposite the site on Whitworth Street is vacant, awaiting redevelopment.
- The undercroft car park off Store Street is occasionally used for entertainment / club events which attract large numbers of people to the area well into the night.
- The buildings on the proposed development site include licensed bar and club premises and a minicab base.
- The wider Piccadilly area is subject to significant levels of antisocial behaviour, much of which is alcohol related. There are also many rough sleepers in the area.

Pictures

1 London Road looking south, with the proposed development site on the right of the picture. The vacant fire station site is visible in the background – the uncared for nature of this site has a negative impact on surrounding environment, and failure to address vandalism or other abuse provides an impression that criminal behaviour is acceptable here.

2 The site viewed from London Road. The existing hotel premises on the corner of Whitworth Street will be directly adjoined by the proposed building. Note the tram lines directly in front of the building.

3 There is a gap between the site and the adjacent commercial buildings at Piccadilly Place, which contains a utility building. Gates / fencing are not intended for regular service access, due to proximity of tram lines.

4 Whitworth Street, showing the adjacent residential block and the proposed development site on the right of the picture.

5 Whitworth Street, showing the collection of buildings that will be demolished to accommodate the proposed hotel building. The ramp giving access to a large multi-level car park is just visible on the left of the picture.

6 The junction of Store Street and London Road, directly opposite the site. A car park under Piccadilly station approach is accessed here, and is used for occasional club / entertainment events. The streets to the east of Piccadilly Station have a reputation for prostitution-related activity, which can attract further criminal interest to the area.

7 The tram stop entrances are also located close to the site on London Road.

8 Concealed areas such as this doorway recess on London Road provide opportunities for antisocial / criminal behaviour.

9 Failure to care for infrastructure in the area leads to further abuse – this picture shows glass bottles in the telephone box on Whitworth Street beside the disused fire station, directly opposite the proposed development site.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2011 and 2012.

2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
20	203	213	716	817	186	34	234	<20	206

2.1.1 In the last 12 months the volume of crime in the local area has been very high and this reflects the site's location close to the city centre. In particular there have been a high number of robberies, thefts of bicycles and theft from motor vehicles.

2.1.2 Misc Theft (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against hotel premises, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.

Figure 2: Misc Theft – Day Range





Figure 3: Misc Theft – Time Range



2.1.3 Day Range: The risk of theft at hotels increases greatly during the weekend, with a higher risk experienced between Friday and Sunday than during the rest of the week. It is likely that the risk increases at the weekend when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday to Thursday when they are typically less busy and the risk of being caught or challenged is lower.

2.1.4 Time Range: The risk of theft during the day is greatest at midday and in the evening. It is likely that incidents of theft increase during these periods as guests are unlikely to be in their rooms and the levels of staff presence (particularly to bedroom floors) may be lower.

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2.2 Burglary Other (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against hotel premises, recorded in the Manchester city centre area

Figure 4: Burglary Other – Day Range





Figure 5: Burglary Other – Time Range



Figure 6: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.2.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary at hotels in Manchester is far greater at weekend than during the rest of the week, when more rooms are likely to be occupied by guests.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary at hotels is low in the morning/afternoon and increases in the evening, peaking between 7pm and 9pm. The risk of burglary is likely to increase in the evening, when guests leave their rooms and staff numbers may be reduced, allowing offenders to more easily access restricted areas unnoticed.

2.2.3 Point of Entry: A large number of hotel burglaries in the city centre area have been through doors, but in the majority of cases, the point of entry was not known. Offenders targeting hotel rooms have typically forced them open using bodily pressure and tools. There have been a number of burglaries when offenders have gained entry legitimately, posing as guests, before stealing property from various communal/staff areas such as bars, restaurants and gyms.

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2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range





Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: The risk of vehicle crime during the week does not vary much day to day and there are no clearly defined peak days. The number of vehicles in the city centre area is not likely to vary much between days of the week - with commuters parking in the area between Monday and Friday and shoppers and weekend workers on Saturday and Sunday.

2.3.2 Time Range: In the local area the risk of vehicle crime is greatest in the evening particularly between 8pm and 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time when it is dark and offenders perceive the risk of being caught as low.

2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Wounding – Day Range





Figure 10: Wounding – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people descend on the city centre area - attending licensed premises and often drinking for longer periods of time.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 4am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on the street, at taxi ranks/bus stops/train stations and at takeaways.

2.4.3 Antisocial behaviour is also a significant issue in the area. Incidents tend to be focussed on certain hotspot locations, and some of these are close to the site, for instance along London Road / Piccadilly areas and Ducie Street. The more secluded areas and door recesses tend to be used as informal toilets at night.

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2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets





Figure 12: Robbery Targets



2.5.1 Criminal Damage Targets: In the local area there is not a great difference between the level of vehicle crime directed at vehicles and property, with vehicles being marginally affected more frequently. The most common occurrences of criminal damage has been damage to glazing on buildings and graffiti.

2.5.2 Robbery Targets: In the area examined there have been a high number of robberies in the local area. The majority of the robberies in the local area have been against individuals rather than businesses. The risk of robbery increases when victims take more secluded routes through the area, alone at night.

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Hotel: Offenders forcing open doors to hotel rooms to commit theft

Possible Solution - Hotel room doors should be solid core with multi-point locking (see section 6.1). The internal layout of corridors should be such that hotel room doors are not concealed behind pillars or located in recessed areas where an intruder could operate without fear of detection.

2.6.2 Hotel: Offenders, posing as guests, accessing staff only / restricted areas to steal property

Possible Solution - The main reception should be located to have full view of everyone entering and leaving the premises and all routes to bedrooms and staff areas. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Access controls should be used to restrict access to vulnerable areas.

2.6.3 Hotel: Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic keycards or fobs

Possible Solution - Auditable electric locking systems (such as Vingcard or similar) should be used, which can be easily activated/disabled electronically by reception staff. Management culture should encourage staff and guests to report any loss of cards promptly.

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space / staff only areas

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- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Violence towards staff
- Offenders obtaining positions in hotel under pseudonym
- Theft of cutlery and linen by hotel employees and guests
- Theft of goods from service areas
- Impersonation of cleaning staff to gain access to bedrooms
- Theft of personal items in bar areas, dining rooms and meeting rooms

4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.1.1 The main hotel entrance is in an obvious location facing London Road. The secondary entrance off Whitworth Street is also clear from outside the premises.

5.1.2 The arrangement internal functions and provision of windows at ground floor level, will help to improve natural surveillance of and from Whitworth Street and London Road.

5.1.3 The reception desk has been located in a position where staff can see and be seen by people entering the building off London Road. A high, wide reception desk increases the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive visitors and aids surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby. A personal attack alarm should be provided at the reception desk, which activates a loud alarm at the scene – clearly signalling that assistance has been requested. Staff at reception should have a clear view of the ground floor lobby areas.

5.1.4 The luggage store is in secure location within direct control of reception / security staff.

5.1.5 The bar servery would provide staff with a good view of the customer seating areas.

5.1.6 The lifts for guest use are located within view of the reception desk. It would be preferable for these to be positioned behind access-controlled doors to reduce the opportunity for an intruder to gain access to

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upper floors. The door giving access to the stairs should operate with access controls, and restricted to staff and guests only.

5.1.7 Internal layout generally uncluttered with few obstacles to vision. Inclusion of chamfered corners in corridors would help to improve sight lines within the upper floors.

5.1.8 The internal areas of the building appear to have the capability to be zoned, so that access can be controlled within the building. Access controls within the hotel will be crucial to prevent unauthorised entry to restricted areas of the building.

5.1.9 At ground floor level there is a clear distinction between front and back of house areas.

5.1.10 The proposed hotel bedrooms are provided well above street level, reducing the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour on guests (particularly at night).

5.1.11 The basement health facility has a separate entrance for customers, thus reducing opportunities for unauthorised entry to either premises.

5.2 Changes and Amendments Needed

5.2.1 The building footprint should not include recesses at ground floor / street level that could provide hiding places for would-be criminals. Entrances should be obvious and clear of obstruction. The emergency exit / service and health spa entrance doors onto Whitworth Street could be abused in this way.

5.2.2 The entrance to the ground floor toilets is positioned very close to entrance off Whitworth Street, out of easy surveillance of staff. This arrangement could allow a potential intruder or offender to access the facilities without being witnessed.

5.2.3 The stair well in the north west corner of the building should be for staff use only, and not used for guest evacuation as they provide access to the back of house area at ground floor level. Internally, fire escape stairs must not allow access to other floors. Use of the fire escape stairs for general circulation should be avoided as it could compromise the security of the building, weakening the integrity of the access control system.

5.2.4 Vehicle crime is significant in the area around the site and the provision of vehicle parking for staff and customers should not put their security at risk. I would recommend that guests be directed only to local car parks currently accredited with the Park Mark safer parking award (see www.parkmark.co.uk for details).

5.2.5 The development should take into account the security of guests and staff approaching and leaving the building, particularly at quiet times and late at night. The areas outside the premises should be well illuminated without creating areas of shadow or pooling. A monitored CCTV system covering the frontages of the premises is also recommended.

5.2.6 Cycle storage. None is indicated. Cycles are particularly vulnerable to criminal damage and theft. Long stay cycle parking areas for staff and guests should be located within secure enclosures within the building where entry can be restricted to legitimate cyclists only. Short stay cycle parking should be located within sight of entrances and capable of surveillance by reception staff and CCTV.

5.2.7 Basement Level. No details of this level have been provided for assessment.

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6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 All external doors, including escape-only doors, must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2+. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.

6.1.2 Any doors or French windows opening on to upper floor terraces must also conform to the above standard.

6.1.3 Sliding doors at the entrances to the hotel should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

6.1.4 Any revolving doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

6.1.5 All individual hotel bedroom doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 (with door viewers and chain limiters), operable by Vingcard or similar.

6.1.6 All doors/frames to staff areas/stores should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

6.2 Windows and Shutters

6.2.1 Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.

6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights, including bedrooms with terraces, e.g. on floor 8 (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.2.3 Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

6.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible, e.g. off terraced on floor 8) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Alarms

6.4.1 All external escape doors should be fitted with alarm contacts linked to a 24/7 intruder alarm.

6.4.2 Alarm activation should be relayed to the hotel reception and / or security base, so staff can investigate or call the authorities as appropriate.

6.5 Access Control

6.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Main entrance doors (out of hours)
- All vulnerable back-of-house areas and the cash office in the hotel (for staff only).
- The lifts to all bedroom floors (for staff and residents).

6.5.2 The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any

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incidents. The cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated / disabled by staff to ensure that misuse is prevented.

6.6 Other Internal Features

6.6.1 Each bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.

6.6.2 Careful consideration should be given to the design of any cash office, which should have solid masonry walls, no false/suspended ceilings, a certified door-set and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover, certified to LPS 1183. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs.

6.6.3

6.7 Fit-Out (Basement)

Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:

- Internal access control
- Internal doors in to premises
- Alarm systems

These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

7 External Features

7.1 Boundaries

7.1.1 The proposed development should maintain / provide a secure boundary treatment between the new hotel building and the adjacent premises.

7.2 Lighting

7.2.1 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

7.2.2 Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

7.3 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

7.3.1 CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

7.3.2 Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

7.3.3 With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

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7.3.4 Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, lifts, stairwells, lobbies / reception areas, bars and till areas, entrances to staff only areas.

7.4 Other

7.4.1 There must be no features of the building envelope which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.

7.4.2 Any external mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

7.4.3 Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

8 Management & Maintenance

8.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made east for people to raise concerns or report observations.

8.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

8.1.2 The Crime Reduction Advisor for central Manchester has produced a best-practice guide to security management and operation of hotels, and it is recommended that the developer refer to this when refining their proposals. A copy can be obtained from John Sargeson on 0161 856 3046.

8.1.3 The hotel management should consider membership of the Manchester Hoteliers Association (MHA), who share best practice in security management and recruitment.

8.1.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, televisions, projectors, movable gym equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

8.1.5 Cash in transit has been a particular target in recent robberies around Greater Manchester. The developer should therefore consider how the risk to security staff can be reduced, and the distance they need to carry large amounts of cash between the safe and their vehicles should be minimised.

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9 Construction

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

For further information regarding site security, please contact your local Crime Reduction Advisor, **john Sargeson**, on **0161 856 3046**.

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
30/01/12	Hodder & Partners	CIS Instruction Received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
N/A	Design and Access Statement	Jan 2012	n/a

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☒	☐	

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at *www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted*)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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