

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Land at the Rear of Laurel Court Nursing Home, 1A Candleford Road, Withington

17 Apartments

For Carless and Adams Partnership

Version A: 13.12.12

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Not Protectively Marked

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Crime Impact Statement

Land at the Rear of Laurel Court Nursing Home, 1A Candleford Road, Withington

17 Apartments

2012/0924/CIS/01

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Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

The proposals are generally consistent with the principles of CPTED, and will provide a sound foundation to a secure development, subject to the inclusion of the physical security measures in section 6. Section 5.3 outlines a number of minor considerations, which we would like to see incorporated, where possible, prior to submission of the planning application.

Subject to the above, I am happy to support the development.



Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*
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Contents

1 Visual Audit 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 6

- 2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison
- 2.2 Burglary: Risk Analysis
- 2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis
- 2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis
- 2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown
- 2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

3 Risk Factors 9

4 Design Considerations 10

- Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London
- Secured by Design (SBD)

5 Design & Layout Appraisal 10

- 5.1 The proposal
- 5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal
- 5.3 Changes and Amendments Recommended (see drawing at 5.1)

6 Physical Security 11

- 6.1 Doors
- 6.2 Windows
- 6.3 Glazing
- 6.4 Alarms
- 6.5 Access Control
- 6.6 Boundaries
- 6.7 Landscaping
- 6.8 Lighting
- 6.9 Car Park
- 6.10 Other

7 Management & Maintenance 13

8 Construction 13

Appendix

A Contact register 14

B Associated Documents 14

C CIS Version History 14

D Glossary 15

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1 Visual Audit

1.1.1 The plan and photographs below highlight the development site (edged in red on the plan) together with the adjacent care home to the west, surrounding apartment buildings and houses, pockets of open space and the surrounding highway network, including public footpaths.



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

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1.1.2 Candleford Road lies a short distance south of Withington district centre. The site forms part of the grounds of Laurel Court, an 86 bed care home. Currently, a large expanse of lawn, the site is overlooked by the front elevation of Laurel Court (the rear elevation of which overlooks Palatine Road). Access into Laurel Court is made from Candleford Road. Car parking space is limited at the site and with several cars parked on the service road.

1.1.3 Adjacent to the site, Candleford Road forms a cul-de-sac where it also serves several apartment buildings.

1.1.4 A public footpath connects the eastern end of Candleford Road with the housing estate to the west. This footpath joins a network of footpaths, which permeate the housing estate, including a footpath running along the western boundary of the site; a timber fence separates this footpath from the site.

1.1.5 The general lack of definition of ownership and permeability of the area has given rise to security issues: several properties, including Laurel Court, have barred windows;, access controls to the nearby apartment building have been damaged; graffiti and littering are apparent; and, some of the fencing has been damaged, whilst others are more industrial in appearance and do not present an appropriate method of space/ownership definition in a residential area. As shown in section 2, crime, particularly burglary is an issue, and the ease of access, particularly to the rear of buildings, facilitates offenders. The presence of industrial fencing and bars on windows is often a reaction to security breaches or wilful damage to property.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2011 and 2012.

2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
82	22	73	86	51	32	<20	44	<20	41

Figure 2: Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 3: Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 4: Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 5: Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



2.1.1 In the local area the volume of crime is relatively high and of particular concern is the high rate of burglary, which exceeds the rate experienced on average across the Manchester City Council area.

2.1.2 The number of domestic burglaries per dwelling is **higher** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.3 The number of woundings per dwelling is **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.4 Incidents of criminal damage per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.5 Incidents of vehicle crime per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

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2.2 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 6: Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Figure 7: Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Figure 8: Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.2.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary is higher between Thursday and Sunday than between Monday and Wednesday.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary in this area is greatest in the late afternoon and in the evening. Offenders often target residential properties at these times when it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.

2.2.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries have been committed through rear doors and windows. Rear points of entry are often targeted, as offenders can conceal themselves from view. Rear doors have been forced open with tools and rear windows have been prised open by offenders.

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2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 10: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of vehicle crime is concentrated between Wednesday and Friday, peaking on Thursday.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is greatest in the early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target vehicles in the early hours of the morning when it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.

2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to woundings committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 12: Wounding – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of violence is greatest on Saturday and Sunday. The risk of violence often increases at the weekend when more people attend license premises, often for longer and consuming more alcohol leading to conflict.

2.4.2 Time Range: During the day the risk of violence is greatest late in the afternoon and in the evening. The risk of violence often increases at these times when alcohol has been consumed in homes and licensed premises leading to violence.

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2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 13: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 14: Robbery Targets



2.5.1 Criminal Damage Targets: In the local area property has been affected more than vehicles. Windows have been smashed in a high number of incidents.

2.5.2 Robbery Targets: The majority of robberies in this area have been against individuals rather than businesses. Individuals walking alone through the area at night have been targeted most frequently.

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Rear doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

Solution *Prevent unauthorised access to rear of the building by use of high fencing and lockable gates, include attack resistant rear doors, which can withstand a 3 minute manual attack (same standard as the main entrance door). Install security light to rear doors.*

2.6.2 Rear windows have been prised open and glazing smashed by offenders

Solution *Use BS7950 windows, which include laminate glazing. Include opening restrictors limiting opening to 100mm.Prevent unauthorised access to rear of the building by use of appropriate fencing and lockable gates.*

2.6.3 Rear doors and windows have been targeted when left insecure

Solution *See 2.6.2, and insert a split spindle in the handle of rear doors so that the only way of entering the property from the outside is with a key. To avoid residents repeatedly locking themselves out of their properties a Secured by Design standard key safe placed in a suitably discreet location would resolve this issue.*

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Antisocial behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes

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- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

4 Design Considerations

4.1.1 Design for Security recommend that designers and developers refer to:

- ## Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London
    - Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

- ## Secured by Design (SBD)
    - Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 The proposal

5.1.1 This proposed 3/4 storey building comprises 17no. 1 and 2 bedroom apartments, with some element of care provided. The development will be served from the service road to Laurel Court and be similarly managed. The building faces Laurel Court with a single central, communal entrance door.

5.1.2 A communal lounge and staff office are located on the ground floor whilst the apartments on the ground and upper floors. A limited amount of car parking is proposed in front of the building.



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5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.2.1 The principal entrance to the proposed building is located on the eastern elevation facing the service road and Laurel Court.

5.2.2 Car parking though limited is located well within the site, some distance from the street.

5.2.3 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

5.2.4 Signage at the entrance to Laurel Court is prominent and suggests the space beyond is private, although this could be reinforced with physical improvements to the vehicle/pedestrian entrance to the site.

5.2.5 The boundaries to the site are defined (to a greater or lesser extent).

5.2.6 There is a staff presence on the site at all times.

5.2.7 The Laurel Court development is generally well maintained.

5.3 Changes and Amendments Recommended (see drawing at 5.1)

5.3.1 The entrance to the site should be enhanced to signify the private nature of the site and deter unwanted intrusion. Gate posts and a change in carriageway surfacing can help to define ownership without having to resort to gates and fencing. Such enhancements emphasise territorial control, and provides a psychological barrier to those motorists and pedestrians who have no reason to enter the development. Signage should emphasise the point. The scheme is in a location where there is a high risk of anti-social behaviour – including graffiti, youths causing annoyance, and trespass.

5.3.2 The main communal entrance to the building, as well all external doors, must be security-certified to an appropriate standard. The main entrance should be single-leaf, secured with an electrically operated multi-point lock and operated via an audio-video access control system.

5.3.3 The rear of the apartment buildings should be made secure with the introduction of appropriate fencing in order to prevent unauthorised access to the secluded elevations of the building, which are vulnerable to intruders/offenders..

5.3.4 Bin storage should take the form of a secure, fire resistant enclosure with fire resistant bins.

6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 The external, communal access door must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

6.1.2 Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, but are provided with door viewers instead.

6.1.3 The ground floor external French/double doors on the side and rear elevations must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

6.1.4 Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.

6.1.5 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

6.2 Windows

6.2.1 Ground floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.

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6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.3 Glazing

6.3.1 Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 0.8mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.8mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Alarms

6.4.1 Depending on the client group, an alarm should be installed to each apartment, which should comply with BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems, or BS 6799 for wireless systems. It should be linked to contacts on all external doors of each apartment and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

6.5 Access Control

6.5.1 Again, subject to the intended client group, remote access control system should be installed to the communal entrance door of the building, with an audio visual link to each apartment so that residents can vet visitors prior to allowing entry. Alternatively, there should be a Av link to the staff office in the building or at Laurel Court so that staff can vet visitors.

6.6 Boundaries

6.6.1 To improve the security of the site the western boundary of the site should be defined with an 2100mm high railing.

6.6.2 The rear gardens should be enclosed with a suitable fence 1500mm railing and or hedge of a similar height.

6.6.3 Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

6.6.4 Gates into the rear curtilage of the buildings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate a key operable deadlock.

6.7 Landscaping

6.7.1 In vulnerable locations such as at the communal entrances, within the parking areas and routes to entrance doors, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

6.7.2 Loose surface materials should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

6.7.3 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

6.7.4 There should be no hard landscaping or furniture that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots except within the private, rear gardens. These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

6.8 Lighting

6.8.1 External lighting must be provided to the front and rear doors of the building. Lighting should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible).

6.8.2 Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

6.8.3 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Continuing the theme of wall mounted lighting is preferred.

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6.9 Car Park

6.9.1 Lighting in the car park and access road should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.

6.9.2 Parking bays should be clearly demarcated.

6.10 Other

6.10.1 Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.

6.10.2 Rainwater pipes should be fixed back to the building fabric and, ideally, square in profile to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

6.10.3 Secure, fire resistant bin stores should be provided.

7 Management & Maintenance

7.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. A maintenance plan and contract should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Cutting and pruning lawns, shrubs and trees
- Repair to perimeter fencing

8 Construction

8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

For further information regarding site security, please contact your local Crime Reduction Advisor, **Gillian Price**, on **0161 856 6174**.

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20.11.12	ALAN MUNRO	REQUEST FOR CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT
04.12.12	UNACCOMPANIED	SITE VISITED
14.12.12	ALAN MUNRO	REPORT ISSUED

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
A-634 01	SITE LAYOUT	SEPT 12	P3
A-634 02	FLOOR PLANS	FEB 12	P2
A-634 03	ELEVATIONS	SEPT 12	P2
	AERIAL VIEW		
	SITE LOCATION AERIALS		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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