Fighting crime, protecting people

Greater Manchester POLICE

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FOR ACTION

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT



Burman Street
Droylsden

PREPARED BY

Greater Manchester Police
ARCHITECTURAL LIAISON UNIT

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PURPOSE OF A CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Crime prevention is a material consideration in the planning process. *'PPS1 makes clear that a key objective for new developments should be that they create safe and accessible environments where crime and disorder or fear of crime does not undermine quality of life or community cohesion'* (Para. 87, Page 15, DCLG Circular 01/2006 – Guidance on Changes to the Development Control System).

A Crime Impact Statement (CIS) clearly demonstrates that the applicant has considered the effect that their proposal may have on the locality.

A CIS should:

- Be produced by a competent individual/organisation independent of the design process.
- Highlight crime and disorder issues in the vicinity of the development.
- Assess the development in terms of its likely effect on crime and disorder in the area.
- Identify design solutions based on analysis of the crime issues in the area that will reduce the proposals vulnerability to crime (under three headings):
    - Design, layout and spatial relationships;
    - Management and maintenance; and
    - Target hardening.

A CIS will:

- Help an applicant to adapt a development to avoid/reduce the adverse affects of crime and disorder.
- Allow Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) to use the information to make better decisions and enable the planning process to run more smoothly.
- Help to allay public fears about a development that are often brought about by a lack of information and create goodwill on behalf of the developer.

Ideally, analysis of the crime issues should be taken at the earliest opportunity and certainly prior to detailed design. This will ensure that the planning application reflects the issues identified in the CIS.

PART A – CRIME IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Location: Burman Street, Droylsden

Proposal: Erection of 18 x dwelling houses and associated parking

Client: Roger White

Reference: 2007/1631

Date: 10th April 2008

Version: 1

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SITE & SURROUNDING AREA

The site is located along Burman Street, which is situated in Droylsden Manchester and has good access to Ashton Old Road (A635). The A635 is a main arterial route into Manchester city centre which is located approximately 3 miles away from the site.

College Avenue to the North, Burman Street to the West, The Bowling Green Inn Bowling Club to the East and the Toxteth Street to the South bound the site on 4 sides. The site has frontage onto Burman Street, however there are limited views into and out of the site.

A salvage company currently occupies the site.

The surrounding area is predominantly residential; however there is a large open grassed area, along with a bowling green along the eastern boundary of the site. The surrounding streets are typified by terraced housing which creates a linear street pattern.



CRIME ISSUES AT LOCATION

Crime Pattern Analysis (CPA)

The graph below illustrates the number of crimes recorded in the period between 28th March 2007 and 28th March 2008 in a grid area centred on the site, measuring approximately 1 sq km.



Major crimes on this site are against vehicles both theft of and from, people and property including miscellaneous theft and burglary.
In this area there is on average 2 acts of less serious wounding, 1 act of burglary dwelling and 3 acts of criminal damage per week.

Vulnerable Localities Index (VLI)

The scoring of the VLI draws together 6 areas of data which have an impact on crime – burglary; criminal damage; income deprivation; employment deprivation; educational attainment; and percentage of young people in the area. The VLI can be

calculated for each Census Output Area (CAO) and then be compared against the average VLI score for each Local Authority and Greater Manchester as a whole.

The VLI for this area is band 3 (100-150), which is above average for the Manchester Local Authority Area.

PROPOSED BUILDING TYPE/USE

The proposed development is a mix of 18 dwelling houses.
There architect has designed the scheme in order for each individual dwelling to have one parking space allocated. Parking is in either gated parking courts or incurtilage.
The proposed road layout is an L shaped cul-de-sac arrangement, with all houses having their own front and rear gardens.
The access into the development is via a new access road off Burman Street.

General Risk Assessment

The typical security issues for a development of this nature are:

1. Acts of criminal damage during the construction period
2. Burglary of dwelling
3. Criminal damage of property
4. Robbery and attacks on members of the public
5. Parked cars
    - Theft of cars
    - Theft of contents and components from cars
    - Damage to cars

Site Specific Risk Assessment

I conducted my site visit mid morning, and I could see that there seems to be a culture of groups congregating on the disused land at the end of Toxteth Street (dead end road). This disused land can be accessed off Toxteth Street or Ashton Old Road (A635).
I am concerned that the proposed development would have minimum surveillance from passers by other than visitors to the dwellings, and very little surveillance from the established adjacent terraced houses (no. 4-48 Burman Street). Due to limited surveillance, the public footpath that abuts the development will render the properties vulnerable as would be criminals can attack the properties unseen, and make good their escape in either direction (with easy access/exit along Toxteth Street to the previously mentioned disused land). Boundary treatments must be specifically addressed within this scheme, and be extremely robust.

Construction Site Risk Assessment

Careful consideration should be given to securing the site during construction, to prevent unauthorized access and theft of equipment. For more information, please contact the local Crime Reduction Adviser (details below):

Name of local CRA/s: Mr Denis Brogan
Contact Telephone No/s: 0161 856 3560

PART B – CRIME PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS

Design, Layout & Spatial Relationships

1. Entrance to the development- Where it is not possible or required to use physical barriers, the design should 'suggest' a change in ownership, for example, through a change in road surface or a narrowed entrance. Anyone crossing such a 'boundary' should know instinctively that they are moving from a public into a semi-private area and need to have a good reason for being there. I would strongly advise that a symbolic barrier is erected at the entrance of this development such as pillars with the name of the development, and a change in road surface and colour.
2. As burglary is a problem in this area the boundaries to the houses must be secure. The rear fences should be made up of heavy-duty close-boarded panels, to a min of 1800 mm high.
3. Sub divisional boundaries to the rear of individual plots must be to a minimum height of 1500 mm.
4. The boundaries that abut public space/open land (i.e. the public footpath and the public space along College Avenue) must be extremely robust. The fence should be made up of heavy-duty close-boarded panels, to a min of 1800 mm high with a 300 mm heavy-duty trellis topping. The fence must have close boarding on both sides of the fence in order that a ladder effect is not created.
5. Particular design attention should be given to the boundaries that abut public space. There should be no climbing aids (e.g. street lights, trees) along the public footpath or College Ave that will assist any would be criminal across a fence into the development.
6. I appreciate that the alley/footpath servicing the surrounding terraced houses is outside the applicants' boundary, however I would strongly recommend as there are plans afoot for a refurbishment of the alley/pavement area, that this be gated to prevent access to would be criminals; protecting the new houses and the established homes.
7. Front gardens- Design techniques can be used to clearly delineate the transition between public and private areas (front gardens), making it more readily apparent when someone enters an area where they don't belong. The front gardens of the properties should be clearly defined as private. In order to prevent unauthorised access, all boundary treatments to private space

abutting publicly accessible space should be to a minimum height of 900 mm. The front boundaries of the properties should be protected by some defensible space, defined by low-level fencing/walls/railings. A change in pavement type can also be used to signal the transition without an unpleasant, fortified appearance.

8. The rear of the dwellings should have pedestrian gates for the use of residents only. The gates should have the lock a minimum of 400 mm down from the top of the gate, and should incorporate a padlock bolt.
9. The front garden area to plot 15 must have a boundary that clearly defines ownership, to prevent this becoming an unkempt area of ambiguous space.
10. The plans show gable walls facing onto public space. There should be an area of defensible space between the gable wall and the public space in order to deter loitering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour. In order to prevent unauthorised access, all boundary treatments to private space abutting publicly accessible space should be to a minimum height of 900 mm.
11. If possible I would recommend that there is an upper level window installed in the gable of plot no's. 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, & 18, this will provide some surveillance and could deter would be criminals. The installation of a gable window in plot 18 will add some extra surveillance to the alley/footpath. There should be no climbing aids (such as fences, lights, or drainpipes) cited near to the proposed gable windows.
12. The drawings show proposed vehicular personnel gates into the courtyard parking areas. I would ask that the following recommendations are incorporated into the gate design:
    a. The gate should be electrically operated.
    b. The gates should be located as near to the front elevation of the houses (in line/as close to the building line of the buildings/walls), so that if someone tries to climb them, they can be seen from the street.
    c. The gates should have no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights etc.
    d. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom/top of the gate should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
    e. The gates should be robust, easy to maintain (e.g. steel that has been treated against rusting) and visually permeable to give a clear line of sight.

Processes & Procedures

1. Access control will be essential to the security of this scheme and it is most important that these systems are regularly maintained.

Target Hardening & Secured By Design (SBD)

Windows

1. All ground floor and easily accessible windows should be certificated to BS 7950 or made by a competent manufacturer with ISO 9001. Ironmongery should be from a Secured by Design supplier.
2. All glazing at ground floor level or easily accessible upper levels should be laminated to a minimum thickness of 7.5 mm (on at least one pane in a double-glazed unit).

Doors

3. Door sets to front and rear should be certified to BS PAS 24 or made by a competent manufacturer with ISO 9001. Front doors must have a door viewer or visual glazed panel.
4. If multi-point locking is used on the front entrances doors, a split-spindle will be required to the lock so that the external lever does not open the door. The only way to open the door from the outside should be with a key (e.g. the Winkhaus Cobra AV2 automatic multi-point lock).
5. Garage doors should be made by a secured by design manufacturer to LPS1175 (SR 1) please see www.securedbydesign.com for details. Secured by Design garage doors now come in a selection of RAL colours ideal for most applications.
6. French doors should be from a registered Secured by Design supplier and be to BS PAS 24.

Additional secured by design recommendations

7. There should be a dedicated fuse spur (to comply with BS 4737 or BS 6799) to each house so that the resident can install an intruder alarm.
8. Utility cupboards should be located externally on the front of the properties.
9. Any communal bin stores should be fully enclosed and lockable so that the bins are not vulnerable to attack.

10. Lighting should be provided to the front and rear of the properties, operated by photoelectric cell from dusk to dawn.

General landscaping advice

1. Proposals should incorporate good, consistent and well-designed lighting throughout the development to enhance natural surveillance at night. Lighting should be provided within the site to an adequate and uniform level (as defined within BS 5489) so as not to allow any areas of pooling/shadowing this should be to minimum of 10 lux and an average of 30.
2. Avoid plants with growth characteristics that may provide hiding places or hinder surveillance.
3. Any vegetation proposed at the site should be kept to a maximum height of 800 mm and any foliage to trees should be at a height exceeding 2000 mm, so as not to create potential hiding places for would-be criminals to exploit or impede natural surveillance.

   As shown in the example below



4. Avoid planting that may provide access across fencing.
5. Ensure hard landscaping features (coping stones, pavers etc.) are securely fixed and cannot be used for criminal purposes.

Conclusions

This scheme is consistent with the current principles and standards of SBD. Subject to the points above being included in the scheme, should the applicant apply in the future for SBD accreditation, it should achieve it.

Applications for the Secured by Design scheme can be found at www.securedbydesign.com.

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for the Architectural Liaison Unit to reassess the comments made above.

Signed

Susan Walker
Architectural Liaison Officer

APPENDIX – GLOSSARY OF CRIME TYPES (Source: Home Office)

Arson

Deliberately destroying or damaging property, by fire.

Burglary in a Dwelling

Burglary in a dwelling
Where an offender enters a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Aggravated burglary in a dwelling
Where an offender, armed with a firearm, weapon or explosive, enters a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Burglary in a Building other than a Dwelling

Burglary in a building other than in a dwelling
Where an offender enters a building other than a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Aggravated burglary in a building other than a dwelling
Where an offender, armed with a firearm, weapon or explosive, enters a building other than a dwelling to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Criminal Damage

Criminal damage to a dwelling
Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging somebody else's home.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a dwelling
Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging somebody else's home, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a building that belongs to someone else.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a building that belongs to someone else, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Criminal damage to a vehicle

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a vehicle that belongs to someone else.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a vehicle

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a vehicle that belongs to someone else, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Other criminal damage

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging items, excluding dwellings, buildings or vehicles that belong to someone else (not counted elsewhere).

Racially or religiously aggravated other criminal damage

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging items, excluding dwellings, buildings or vehicles that belong to someone else (not counted elsewhere), where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Threat or possession with intent to commit criminal damage

Threatening or causing someone to fear that his or her property might be damaged; or possessing anything, without lawful excuse, intended to cause damage.

Less Serious Wounding

Less serious wounding (including any minor injury)

Maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, with or without a weapon; also assaulting someone and causing him or her actual bodily harm.

Racially or religiously aggravated other wounding

Maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, with or without a weapon; also assaulting someone and causing him or her actual bodily harm, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Common assault (includes some minor injury)

Common assault (no injury)

Assaulting another person where the victim receives a minor injury or, as of 2002/03, no injury.

Racially or religiously aggravated common assault

Assaulting another person where the victim receives no injury and there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Miscellaneous Theft

Theft from the person

Stealing property from another person, with intent to permanently deprive him or her of it.

Theft from shops

Stealing, with intent to permanently deprive, from retail premises (i.e. shoplifting).

Theft by an employee

Stealing from one's employer, with intent to permanently deprive the employer.

Theft or unlawful taking of mail

Unlawfully taking away or opening a mailbag.

Proceeds of crime

Concealing, disguising, converting, transferring or removing property obtained through criminal activity (i.e. money laundering).

Abstracting electricity

Dishonestly using, wasting or diverting electricity, without authority.

Other theft or unauthorised taking

Stealing not classified elsewhere.

Handling stolen goods

Dishonestly receiving or handling goods, knowing or believing them to be stolen.

Robbery

Robbery of personal property

The actual or threatened use of force during or immediately before the theft of personal property.

Robbery of business property

The actual or threatened use of force during or immediately before the theft of property belonging to a business.

Serious wounding

More serious wounding or other act endangering life

Viciously intending to cause grievous bodily harm to another person.

Theft from a Motor Vehicle

Theft from a vehicle

Where there is intent to steal from a vehicle rather than drive it away.

Vehicle interference and tampering

Interfering with a vehicle, its contents or anything carried in it.

Theft in dwelling

Theft from an automatic machine or meter

Stealing money from a meter in a dwelling.

Theft in a dwelling other than from an automatic machine or meter

Stealing property from a dwelling where the thief has not trespassed to gain entry

Theft of a Motor Vehicle

Theft or unauthorised taking of a motor vehicle

Stealing a motor vehicle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it.

Aggravated vehicle taking

Stealing a motor vehicle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it, and driving that vehicle dangerously, or consequently causing injury or damage to property, including to the vehicle.

Theft of a Pedal Cycle

Theft or unauthorised taking of a pedal cycle

Stealing a bicycle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it.