

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

10 Minshull Street, Manchester

Change of Use to Backpackers Hostel

For Hourigan Connolly

Version A: 31st October 2011

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Not Protectively Marked

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Crime Impact Statement

10 Minshull Street, Manchester

Change of Use to Backpackers Hostel

2011/0796/CIS/01

For Hourigan Connolly
Version A: 31st October 2011

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

This proposal will not see major physical changes to the existing building, but the intended uses will have security implications, therefore I would strongly encourage the applicant to take on board the recommendations outlined in the report, especially the physical security measures and management protocols. Particular consideration should be given to how the hostel will be accessed during the night, how guests will access internal areas, and that adequate secure storage is provided and the overall management of the facility.

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1 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.



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1 Photograph 1 shows the main entrance to the building (Mindel House). The buildings previous use has been as offices, there is also a bar/nightclub at basement level (Madison Lounge, formerly Book Binders). The main entrance to the building and the basement entrance are both covered by CCTV. The basement entrance is protected by a roller shutter.

2 Opposite Mindel House, on Minshull Street, is rear elevation of Manchester Crown Court (Photograph 2). The building is covered by CCTV cameras at numerous points. The main entrance to the Crown Court is taken from Aytoun Street.

3 Opposite Mindel House, on Richmond Street, are the offices for the National Probation Service, Greater Manchester (Photograph 3). This building is also covered with CCTV at numerous points. There are also bars installed to basement level windows. It is understandable for a building of this nature to be covered with CCTV.

4 Photographs 4 and 5 show the NCP car park (Major Street). This pay and display surface car park is well used during the day. In addition to this parking facility there are additional facilities on Bloom Street and Aytoun Street, there are also numerous parking bays on Minshull Street and Bloom Street.

5 Photograph 6 shows the main entrance to Essentials nightclub. Mindel House is in close proximity to the Village area of Manchester City Centre and there are a number of nightclubs, bars and pubs in the close vicinity.

6 Photographs 7 and 8 show additional security features that have been installed onto buildings in the close vicinity, these include CCTV cameras (in anti-vandal cages) and barbed wire.

7 Photograph 9 shows the view down Richmond Street (which bounds the proposed development to the East. Along this street are the backs of a number of licensed premises that front onto Canal Street.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2010 and 2011.

2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
24	298	347	944	1287	236	45	270	23	349

2.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is very high, due to its location within the city centre. The volume of violent crimes, theft, robbery and vehicle crime are exceptionally high and the rate of burglary is much greater than is normally experienced. Many of the crimes are linked to the night-time economy and the risk of incidents of this nature occurring in and around this development should be considered high. In the following section the risk of crime at hotels and hostels in the area has been assessed (hotels have been included due to the small volume of hostels and due to the similar risks shared).

2.2 Misc Theft (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against hotels/hostels premises, recorded in the Manchester City Centre area.

Figure 2: Misc Theft – Day Range



Figure 3: Misc Theft – Time Range



2.2.1 Day Range: The risk of theft at hotel/hostels increases greatly during the weekend, with a higher risk experienced between Friday and Sunday than during the rest of the week. It is likely that the risk increases at the weekend when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday to Thursday when they are typically less busy and the risk of being caught/challenged is lower.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of theft during the day is greatest at midday and in the evening. It is likely that incidents of theft increase during these periods as guests are unlikely to be in their rooms and the levels of staff presence (particularly to bedroom floors) may be lower.

In hostels theft of personal property from communal areas and shared bedrooms is a common occurrence. Items such as handbags, wallets/purses, mobile phones and cameras have been targeted while guests have been sleeping, using shared bathrooms or when otherwise distracted.

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2.3 Burglary Other (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against hotels/hostels premises, recorded in the Manchester City Centre area.

Figure 4: Burglary Other – Day Range



Figure 5: Burglary Other – Time Range



Figure 6: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary at hotels in Manchester is far greater at weekend than during the rest of the week, when more rooms are likely to be occupied by guests.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary at hotels is low in the morning/afternoon and increases in the evening, peaking between 7pm and 9pm. The risk of burglary is likely to increase in the evening, when guests leave their rooms and staff numbers may be reduced, allowing offenders to more easily access restricted areas unnoticed.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: A large number of hotel burglaries in the city centre area have been through doors, but in the majority of cases, the point of entry was not known. Offenders targeting hotel rooms have typically forced them open using bodily pressure and tools. There have been a number of burglaries when offenders have gained entry legitimately, posing as guests, before stealing property from various communal/staff areas such as bars, restaurants and gyms.

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2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: The volume of vehicle crime in the local area is high, but the risk of vehicle crime does not vary greatly during the week, with no notable difference in levels of crime between the week and the weekend.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime increases in the afternoon and into the evening, where it peaks between 8pm and 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles in the evening, when it is dark, car parks and side streets are quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being detected/identified.

2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 10: Wounding – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people descend on the city centre area - attending licensed premises and often drinking for longer periods of time.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 4am. At these times, those attending licensed premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on the street, at taxi ranks/bus stops/train stations and at takeaways.

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2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 12: Robbery Targets



2.6.1 Criminal Damage Targets: In the local area, the risk of criminal damage to properties is greater than the risk of damage to vehicles. One of the most commonly occurring acts of criminal damage in the area is windows being smashed both to buildings and to vehicles. Other frequent occurrences of criminal damage include graffiti and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.6.2 Robbery Targets: Robbery in the local area has been predominately against the person, rather than businesses. Individuals have been targeted when using more secluded routes through the city centre, including along canal towpaths.

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Offenders forcing open doors to gain entry to rooms

Possible Solution – bedroom doors should be certified to the correct standards identified is section 6.1 to ensure an acceptable level of security.

2.7.2 Offenders, posing as guests, accessing staff restricted areas

Possible Solution - access controls and secure lobbies help to prevent unauthorised entry. Staff presence, such as reception, may also help to identify irregular behaviour and unauthorised entrants.

2.7.3 Theft of insecure personal property left unattended

Possible Solution – personal lockers should be provided for every guest. These should be of robust construction and of a reasonable size for guests to store all their valuable property. Lockers should be key lockable rather than padlock or combination.

Additionally, an electronic locking system should be used to gain access to the hostel and internal areas. A system such as Vingcard can be used to restrict access both to those who are not staying at the hostel and allow access only to permitted areas for guests. A system can also be programmed to be auditable in the event of a crime.

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

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- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Violence towards staff

4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.1.1 Entry to and egress from the hostel will take place from the main entrance located on the corner of Minshull Street and Bloom Street.

5.1.2 The route to the lift, bar area and guest amenity space will take anyone entering the building past the reception area where they can be vetted by staff.

5.1.3 Entry to the circulation of the building can be restricted to guests during periods when the reception area is not staffed.

5.1.4 Lockers are provided in the bedroom and reception areas for guests.

5.1.5 The proposed bedrooms are provided well above street level, reducing the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).

5.1.6 The bar, kitchen and reception areas will provide surveillance both internally and externally.

5.2 Changes and Amendments Needed

5.2.1 The desk adjacent to the main entrance of the hotel at ground floor level must be staffed at all times and have a full, unimpeded view of everyone entering/leaving the building. A high, wide reception desk increases the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive visitors and aids surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby. A personal attack alarm should be provided at the reception desk, which activates a loud alarm at the scene – clearly signalling that assistance has been requested.

5.2.2 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.

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5.2.3 The stair core and lifts at ground and first floor levels should be fitted with access controls (operated by guest key cards), to ensure only guests who have already booked in at reception and are staying at the hostel can access bedroom floors.

5.2.4 It is highly recommended than an electronic guest key card system, such as Vingcard, is used throughout the hostel to restrict access to guests and grant access for specified rooms only. These systems can also be auditable in the event of a crime occurring.

6 Physical Security

Due to the nature of the development as a change of use we realise that some existing fittings will remain in situ. The following physical security specification should be followed where fittings such as doors, windows and glazing are to be replaced to demonstrate an acceptable level of physical security. If the applicant wishes to achieve Secured by Design accreditation then it is more than likely that the majority of fittings would need to be replaced to meet the required standards.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

6.1.2 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

6.1.3 All bedroom doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 (with door viewers), operable by Vingcard or similar. Bedroom doors should be fitted with door closers to prevent guests from leaving the door unlocked.

6.1.4 An electric locking system should be used throughout the building. This system should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. The cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly disabled by staff to ensure that misuse is prevented.

6.1.5 All doors/frames to staff areas/stores should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

6.2 Windows

6.2.1 Any new or replacement windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.

6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Alarms

6.4.1 All external escape doors should be fitted with alarm contacts linked to a 24/7 intruder alarm.

6.4.2 Alarm activation should be relayed to the hotel reception/s, so staff can investigate or call the authorities as appropriate.

6.5 Access Control

6.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Bar store
- Office/luggage/store

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6.6 Fit-Out

Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:

- Internal access control
- Internal doors in to premises
- Alarm systems
- CCTV

These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6.7 Internal Facilities

6.7.1 Toilets can give rise to crime and anti-social behaviour and the following issues should be considered:-

- Avoid areas where items such as drug paraphernalia can be hidden (e.g. suspended ceilings). Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work, etc. should be used. Services where possible should be accessed from outside the facility.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening. This will aid gaining access to collapsed persons.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Provide hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6.7.2 Any safes should provide adequate capacity and overnight cover, with a deposit facility, certified to LPS 1183. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs.

6.7.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

6.7.4 The plans show lockers will be provided in each bedroom. It is important that each bedroom has the facility for all guests to secure their valuable possessions. These lockers should be of robust construction and be key-operated rather than combination/padlock. The capacity should allow guests to store all valuable possessions.

7 External Features

7.1 Landscaping

7.1.1 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

7.2 Lighting

7.2.1 Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

7.2.2 Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

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7.3 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

7.3.1 CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

7.3.2 Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

7.3.3 With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

7.3.4 Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, lifts, stairwells, sales counters and lobbies.

7.4 Other

7.4.1 Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf

7.4.2 Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

8 Management & Maintenance

The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)

9 Construction

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

For further information regarding site security, please contact your local Crime Reduction Advisor, **John Sargeson**, on **0161 856 3046**.

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
27/09/2011	Richard Lomas	CIS instruction received
31/10/2011	Richard Lomas	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
A(050)03	Existing Ground Floor Plan	03/06/2011	
A(050)04	Existing First Floor Plan	03/06/2011	
A(050)05	Existing Second Floor Plan	03/06/2011	
A(050)06	Existing Third Floor Plan	03/06/2011	
A(050)07	Existing Fourth Floor Plan	03/06/2011	
A(050)08	Existing Elevations 1 & 2	03/06/2011	
ANY12041616/6	Elevations	17/05/2010	
A(300)01	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	20/05/2011	E
A(300)02	Proposed First Floor Plan	20/05/2011	D
A(300)03	Proposed Second Floor Plan	20/05/2011	C
A(300)04	Proposed Third Floor Plan	20/05/2011	C
A(300)05	Proposed Fourth Floor Plan	20/05/2011	D
A(300)06	Section AA as Proposed	1/06/2011	A
A(300)07	Elevations 1 & 2 as Proposed	1/06/2011	B

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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