

PLANNING AND
BUILDING CONTROL
22 JUL 2013

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Mayfield Depot, Fairfield Street

Leisure

For The Addy Consultancy

Version A: 22.07.13

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Not Protectively Marked

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Crime Impact Statement

Mayfield Depot, Fairfield Street

Leisure

2013/0426/CIS/01

For The Addy Consultancy
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Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

This proposal has been assessed against the principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design, CPTED, and reviewed in terms of its likely impact upon its surroundings from crime and disorder and public safety perspectives.

The site lies in a high crime area, which is to be expected for a location on the periphery of the city centre. At this stage there is no suggestion that there will be any material alterations to the external elevations of the building, but would suggest any refurbishment should incorporate components to the standards set out within this report.

Given the nature of the proposed use, their proximity to taxi ranks and other forms of public transport, I am happy to support the proposal providing the developer:

- duly considers all measures highlighted in this report;
- makes reasonable efforts to incorporate these measures into the proposed works necessary to complete the development;
- produces an operations plan, which is submitted to the Police and the Local Authority, its contents agreed, and the plan adhered to for the life of the development; and
- limits any license application opening hours to be consistent with the availability of public transport.

I am happy to support the proposal.

Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*
Consultant
e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

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
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1 Visual Audit

1.1.1 The plan and photographs below shows site edged in red, Piccadilly Station and associated rail lines and viaducts to the north and north-west, the Baring Street industrial area to the south; the River Medlock also to the south of the site; student accommodation to the south west, and the surrounding highway network.



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
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
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1.1.2 This former railway station, Manchester Mayfield, is located on the south side of Fairfield Street, opposite Piccadilly Station. It is bound by Baring Street Fairfield Street, Temperance Street and the River Medlock.

1.1.3 Like Piccadilly Station, the lines and platforms are elevated above street level, within a two storey station building, the ground floor of which was most recently used for storage and industrial uses. It is currently, temporarily, being used to stage performances associated with the Manchester international Festival.

1.1.4 The site comprises a red brick built building with a very large footprint, and has entrances on Fairfield Street, Temperance Street and Baring Street.

1.1.5 The area immediately to the south of the site is made up of storage and industrial buildings, which make up the Baring Street industrial area. Piccadilly Station and lines associated with the station lie to the north. There are a number of residential buildings and a hotel on the western side of Baring Street, close to the site. The River Medlock lies to the south of the site. The Star and Garter public house lies adjacent to the 'drop-off' area in front of the site on Fairfield Street

1.1.6 Because of the network of operational and non-operational lines in the vicinity of the site, there are a number of viaducts on approach roads to the site, these, together with the lack of street activity (other than traffic), create a rather hostile pedestrian environment.

1.1.7 During the day Baring Street and adjacent side streets are used by queuing Hackney Carriages waiting to enter the rank at Piccadilly Station. Their presence is likely to have a positive effect on the levels of crime experienced in the area in the daytime.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2012 and 31st May 2013.

2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
21	47	59	86	76	67	<20	118	<20	41

2.1.1 In the study area, the volume of crime is high but not as high as other areas in the city centre. The lower level of crime is perhaps attributable to the site's peripheral location in relation to the city centre core, the lower density of development and the low numbers of retailers and licensed premises in the area examined.

2.2 Miscellaneous Theft (leisure related premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against music venues/restaurant and bars, recorded in the Manchester City Centre area.

Figure 2: Misc Theft – Day Range





Figure 3: Misc Theft – Time Range



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2.2.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of theft is concentrated between Thursday and Sunday, peaking on Saturday. The risk of theft often increases at the weekend when these types of premises are busiest, creating more opportunities for theft.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of theft increases later in the evening, when premises are busiest and the opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency (particularly when victims have been drinking alcohol.)

2.2.3 Handbags, phones and cameras belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Items are usually stolen from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

2.3 Burglary Other (leisure related premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against music venues/restaurant and bars, recorded in the Manchester City Centre area.

Figure 4: Burglary Other – Day Range




Figure 5: Burglary Other – Time Range





Figure 6: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary is highest between Monday and Friday, when premises are open less frequently and for shorter periods of time. At the weekend, such premises are often open for longer and the opportunity to commit burglary is reduced.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary is highest early in the afternoon and in the early hours of the morning. Venues are likely to be targeted at these times, as they are unlikely to be open or have a reduced staff presence.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: In many cases of burglary, the point of entry is undetermined and this could be due to the open access of most restaurants, where people can walk in freely without raising any suspicion. In many cases, offenders have accessed staff only areas or areas that are not open to the public (by tailgating or through insecure doors) and have stolen property. When offenders have broken in, they

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have typically targeted doors, including fire doors. Doors have routinely been forced open using bodily pressure or tools.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range





Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: In the local area the risk of vehicle crime is greatest on Wednesday. On average the risk of vehicle crime is slightly higher between Monday and Friday than at the weekend.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is greatest in the evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target vehicles in the evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.

2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Wounding – Day Range





Figure 10: Wounding – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people descend on the city centre area to attend licensed premises, often drinking for longer periods and consuming more alcohol.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 2am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on streets, in taxi ranks and at takeaways.

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2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets





Figure 12: Robbery Targets



2.6.1 Criminal Damage Targets: The majority of criminal damage in the local area has targeted property rather than vehicles. In a high number of cases of criminal damage windows on both buildings and vehicles have been smashed.

2.6.2 Robbery Targets: In the local area all robberies have been against individuals rather than businesses. Typically, individuals have been targeted when walking through the area alone, at night.

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Theft of customer property – mobile phones, wallets, purses/bags.

Solution *Consideration should be given to providing small secure lockers for customers to deposit their belongings whilst in the venue.*

2.7.2 Offenders stealing property from areas of premises that are restricted to staff

Solution *A combination of signage, staff presence and access control will help to restrict access to such areas by unauthorised persons. CCTV can be a useful tool to both deter and identify criminals, but should not be relied upon as a sole security measure.*

2.7.3 Doors/shutters being forced open with bodily pressure or tools to gain entry

Solution *British and 'Loss Prevention' standards are used to construct doors and shutters designed to be resistant to such attacks. Use of doors to these standards will therefore increase the security of a unit in this location.*

2.7.4 Fire doors being forced open using tools

Solution *The standards above can also be applied to escape doors. Escape-only doors should be alarmed at all times to increase the chances of a burglar, or those attempting to gain entry without tickets/payment, being noticed.*

2.7.5 Late night disorder in and around premises

Solution *The level of disorder is dictated by the nature and volume of licensed premises in the area. Such incidents typically require operational policing. However, disorder is less likely in areas where premises are isolated and when customers are not forced out of premises in large numbers all at the same time but are allowed to disperse over a reasonable time period.*

2.7.6 Robbery *of individuals leaving the premises*

Solution *Clear signage should direct customers to the nearest taxi ranks and public transport, with staff available at exits to assist customers to orientate themselves and offer advice.*

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2.7.7 Vehicle crime

Solution *Customers should be encouraged to use legitimate, safe and secure car parks. Advertising on ticketing, website and at the premises can help direct new and repeat customers to the most appropriate car parks.*

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft of customers belongings
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises

4 Design Considerations

4.1.1 Design for Security recommends that designers and developers refer to:

- Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

- Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 The Proposal

5.1.1 A leisure use is proposed within the premises with entrances via the existing doors onto Fairfield Street, and service entrances on Temperance Street and Baring Street.

5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.2.1 The proposed use is unlikely to unduly disturb local residents providing that Baring Street is not used as the principal entrance and exit,

5.2.2 Public transport, including taxis, is easily accessible at Piccadilly Station.

5.2.3 The use of the building will introduce a legitimate night-time use into an area that is generally deserted outside of normal business hours. The presence of such a facility may generate further businesses into the area and increase the levels of activity and surveillance into the area.

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5.3 Recommended Design Features to Improve Security

5.3.1 Minimise the number of entrances (one is preferable, although not always possible). Entrances should be clearly defined and well illuminated with crowd control barriers to maintain order queuing.

5.3.2 Door staff should be present to monitor queues, entrances and the customers as they enter the premises.

5.3.3 Provision should be made for electronic searching of customers to prevent weapons being taken into the premises. Similarly, provision should be made for preventing customers entering the premises with controlled substances.

5.3.4 Secure coat/bag storage should be provided. The cloakroom should be constantly supervised. There should be a defined queuing area to the cloakroom to avoid crowding in the entrance lobby.

5.3.5 Consideration should be given to providing small lockers in which customers can store small personal items securely. Coded lockers in a well supervised area would be appropriate.

5.3.6 A secure room (solid walls and a security rated door to PAS 24 or LPS 1175) should be created to act as a manager's office. The office should include a time delay safe securely fixed to the floor with a floor anchor.

5.3.7 Bar stores should only be accessible from the bar area.

5.3.8 Staging/equipment stores should be key access only, or otherwise access controlled to prevent people accessing the space to steal, or misusing the space.

5.3.9 The relationship between the bar and the public area should allow for good surveillance, with no concealed areas.

5.3.10 Access to the staff areas, including bin stores, should be restricted with the use of a key fob or swipe card. This should also be communicated by signage.

5.3.11 Use of the service doors must be considered and controlled appropriately. I realise these will be needed to receive deliveries, but strict monitoring procedures should be in place to protect assets within the building. The doors should not be left open and unattended. An additional alarm should be used to alert staff that service doors, or any fire doors, are open.

5.3.12 Lighting should be easily controlled from appropriate, secure positions within the building.

5.3.13 Overcrowding should be avoided through stringent capacity limits.

5.3.14 A smoking area should be defined and be clearly demarcated by a secure, physical boundary.

5.3.15 The proposed works present an opportunity to upgrade security on existing doors, windows and the building itself.

6 Physical Security

Should any of the existing windows, shutters and doors be replaced as part of this change of use, the standards set out below should be used. In addition, a range of security measures should be employed to reduce the risks of burglary, robbery, petty theft and disorder, and these too are set out below.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 Where replaced, external doors should be compliant with and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.

6.1.2 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

6.1.3 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

6.1.4 All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.

6.1.5 Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

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6.2 Glazing

6.2.1 External glazing in any doors or replacement glazing to low level windows should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.3 Cash storage

6.3.1 A cash storage/management office should be created with solid walls and a security rated door (LPS 1175 SR2), including provision of visibility from the office to the area beyond so that staff can vet callers before allowing entry. The office should be incorporated into the intruder alarm security system and include CCTV coverage.

6.3.2 A safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover should be installed with a deposit facility, certified to LPS 1183. A time-delay lock is advised. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and meet insurance requirements.

6.3.3 Chute deposit safes (also to LPS 1183) should be provided behind the bar(s) and entry points to reduce cash amounts held in tills during busy periods. A protocol should be set up to ensure that large amounts of cash are not kept in the tills at any one time.

6.3.4 The installation of a 'drug' safe may be appropriate. This should have two keys; one held by Police and one by the premises supervisor. Both keys are needed to empty the safe and deposits can be made without a key. A formal protocol between operators and Greater Manchester Police will need to be put in place to manage this facility.

6.4 Alarms

6.4.1 An intruder alarm should be installed linked to contacts on all external doors and shutters; PIR detectors should cover any rooms with windows. The alarm signal should terminate at a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre. The system should comply with the current version of the EN 50131-1 standard and be eligible for a Police response as defined by the ACPO Policy on Police Response to Security Systems, Level 1 status.

6.4.2 The alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind the bar, at the payment/ticket desk on entry, and in the cash office. The cash office should contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal.

6.5 Access Control

6.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. Doors to sensitive areas such as to the back of house – e.g. access to staff office, staff room and to the cellar/ stock rooms should all be controlled.

6.6 Lighting

External Lighting

6.6.1 External lighting must be provided to all pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

6.6.2 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

6.6.3 Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

6.6.4 Additional lighting around entrances and exits may be necessary.

Internal Lighting

6.6.5 Use internal lighting to create the right atmosphere. Strike a balance - lighting which is too dim prevents the staff from seeing all that is going on allowing criminal behaviour to go unheeded, but bright glaring light is cold, and unwelcoming.

6.6.6 Lighting should be controlled from behind the bar or in a security/management room, away from public access.

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6.6.7 Zoned dimmers should be used to increase control of areas from the bar/management office.

6.6.8 An override is required, within easy reach of security staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised. High-level house lighting is an important element of control. This will also help at the end of trading so that staff can see to clear up, and patrons have no doubt that its closing time.

6.6.9 The lighting override can also be linked to music controls so that, in the event of an incident, music can be turned off immediately as well as lighting increased.

6.7 CCTV

6.7.1 A CCTV system should be used to monitor spaces internally and the entrances and exits externally. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
    - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
    - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

6.7.2 The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: all external doors, queuing area, till points, the bar(s), the entrance lobby, and locations around the premises so that all internal areas are monitored.

6.8 Other

6.8.1 Bins should be securely stored within the building and not stored on the street.

7 Management & Maintenance

7.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further. An operations plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- security (door policy; door staff; staff training; CCTV cameras - monitoring and recording facilities, and their locations; and cash storage/management);
- fire safety;
- smoking area use:
- clear signage displaying a zero tolerance on weapons and drugs policy. The policy should including procedures for liaising with Greater Manchester Police;
- dispersal procedure;

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- repairs to CCTV, lighting, and signage:
- collection of waste around the periphery of the building entrances; and.
- repair to CCTV, lighting, signage, access controls.

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
31.05.13	Bill Addy	Request for Crime Impact Statement
27.06.13	Bill Addy	Further information on proposed use provided
07.07.13		Site visit
22.07.13	Bill Addy	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
	Location map	17.06.13	
	Existing General Arrangement	17.06.13	
	Proposed General Arrangement	17.06.13	
	Column and Beam Layout	04.06.13	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at *www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted*)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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