Application for
Planning Permission
& Listed Building Consent
at:

45 Dale Street, Manchester, M1 2HF

November 2013

Appendix C

Crime Impact Statement

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Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

45 Dale Street

Change of Use to A3/A4

For Architecture:m

Version A: 12.06.13

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Not Protectively Marked

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Crime Impact Statement

45 Dale Street

Change of Use to A3/A4

2013/0262/CIS/01

For Architecture:m
Version A: 12.06.13

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

The site lies in an area where crime and disorder are very significant issues, and whilst, to a degree, that is to be expected in a very busy city centre the presence of large numbers of licensed premises is a major factor affecting the crime levels. Increasing the density of licensed premises is likely to increase the potential for crime and disorder, and put further strain on the City Centre Police Team.

However, given the nature of the premises proposed, their proximity to taxi ranks and other forms of public transport, I am happy to support the proposal providing:

- the developer duly considers all measures highlighted in this report;
- makes reasonable efforts to incorporate these measures into the proposed works necessary to complete the development;
- produces an operation plan which is submitted to the Police and the Local Authority and its contents agreed and the plan adhered to for the life of the development; and
- limits any license application opening hours to be consistent with the availability of public transport.

This development has been assessed against and is consistent with the principles of ‘Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design’ (CPTED). The development will not achieve ‘Secured by Design’ (SBD) accreditation without the replacement of all existing external building elements (such as glazing, windows and doors) to SBD standards. ,



Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

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1 Visual Audit

1.1.1 The plan below shows the premises (in red), the surrounding buildings, areas of surface car parking, development sites (yellow), the canal network to the east, and the local highway layout.





















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1.1.2 The site is located on the corner of Dale Street and Tariff Street in the Northern Quarter, lwithin the boundary of the Stevenson Square Conservation Area. The main entrance into the building is located on Dale Street. The basement entrance, on Tariff Street, is secured with padlocked steel gates and a secured door behind the gates.

1.1.3 Dale Street is a fairly busy road with both pedestrian and vehicular traffic, providing some level of natural surveillance over the site. There are a number of side roads located off Dale Street making the road network around the site very permeable. The majority of roads located off Dale Street are back streets with services entrances leading out onto these roads.

1.1.4 There are several bars and restaurants in the vicinity of this development along with hotels, retail, offices and wholesale businesses. Residential uses in this locality are concentrated further to the east around the canal basin.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2012 and 31st March 2013.

2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	198	301	968	1247	189	40	271	37	421

2.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is high due to its location within the city centre. The volumes of violent crimes, theft, robbery and vehicle crime are exceptionally high and the rate of burglary at commercial premises is much greater than normally experienced in Manchester as a whole.

2.2 Miscellaneous Theft (bar/restaurants): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against licensed premises, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.

Figure 2: Misc Theft – Day Range



Figure 3: Misc Theft – Time Range



2.2.1 Day Range: The risk of theft peaks on the days of the weekend, between Friday and Saturday. On these days, nightclubs, bars and public houses in the city centre area experience higher levels of patronage than during the week. Licensed premises are usually open for longer at the weekend and the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is much greater.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of theft increases late in the night into the early morning. This is when bars and nightclubs area busiest and the opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency. The most frequently stolen items are customer belongings, such as handbags, purses, wallets and mobile phones.

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2.3 Burglary Other (Bar/restaurants): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against licensed premises, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.

Figure 4: Burglary Other – Day Range



Figure 5: Burglary Other – Time Range



Figure 6: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day Range: In the Manchester area the risk of burglary at licensed premises is greatest on Sunday and Friday. The risk of burglary is not significantly higher than the risk of burglary on other days. The risk of burglary is likely to be highest on Sunday when opening hours are often curtailed.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary is highest early in the afternoon and in the early hours of the morning. Licensed premises are likely to be targeted at these times, as they are unlikely to be open or are open with reduced numbers of staff.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: In many cases of burglary the point of entry is undetermined and this could be due to the open access of most bars and nightclubs where people can walk in freely, without raising any suspicion. In many cases of burglary offenders have accessed staff only areas, or areas that are not open to the public and stealing property. When offenders have broken in they have typically targeted doors, including fire doors. Doors have routinely been forced open using bodily pressure or tools.

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2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is greatest in the evening, peaking between 7pm and 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time when it is dark and vehicles parked on remote/isolated side streets and car parks are vulnerable to attack undetected.

2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 10: Wounding – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people attend city centre licensed premises, often drinking for longer periods and consuming more alcohol – leading to conflicts.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 2am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on streets, at taxi ranks/bus stops/train stations and at takeaways.

2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 12: Robbery Targets



2.6.1 Criminal Damage Targets: The makeup of the criminal damage in this area shows that properties are almost twice as likely to be targeted as vehicles. Common incidents of criminal damage include graffiti, windows being smashed (both of properties and vehicles) and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.6.2 Robbery Targets: Robbery against the person is much more prevalent than against businesses in this area. The risk of personal robbery increases when lone victims take quieter, more secluded routes through the area in the evening/at night.

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Burglary where rear doors have been forced open to gain entry.

Solution *All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (PAS 24 or LPS 1175). Access should be restricted to any hidden elevations of the building, where any doors could be attacked unseen from the street.*

2.7.2 Theft of customer property from/under tables and chairs.

Solution *Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see left) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter theft by promoting surveillance and creating an uncluttered, environment, avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.*



2.7.3 Burglary where rear doors have been forced open to gain entry.

Solution *All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (PAS 24 or LPS 1175). Access should be restricted to any hidden elevations of the building, where any doors could be attacked unseen from the street. External doors not well illuminated by street, or other lighting, should include low intensity dusk til dawn lighting.*

2.7.4 Burglary where rear windows have been smashed to gain entry.

Solution *Secure rear windows, when the premises are closed, with discreet security shutters, which meet the LPS 1175 standard.*

2.7.5 Violent disorder/conflict between intoxicated customers

Solution *Whilst I appreciate that the operator of the premises cannot be held responsible for the behaviour of patrons once they leave the establishment, they can adopt good management practices to discourage violence and disorder. The effective management of entry (including any queuing) and egress of patrons by staff, particularly at busy periods, is essential to control numbers and avoid conflicts. Restrictions on swearing, rowdiness etc. can also reduce aggression. The licensee should be encouraged to become a member of the 'Best Bar None' initiative, an award scheme for licensed premises developed by Manchester City Safe project to address alcohol related crime and improve the night-time environment (see www.bestbarnone.com for more information).*

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict aimed at staff or customers
- Theft of staff and customer belongings
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring uses e.g. residential property

4 Design Considerations

4.1.1 Design for Security recommends that designers and developers refer to:

- Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

- Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 The Proposal

5.1.1 A bar restaurant is proposed on the ground and basement floor of the premises with entrance via the existing entrance on Dale Street.

5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.2.1 The absence of details of the interior make it difficult to highlight particular design features although licensed premises that offer food tend to have less disorder problems.

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5.2.2 In terms of the exterior environment, I have no concerns regarding the movement of customers into, and out of, the front of premises. External seating is not recommended nor does it form part of the proposals at this stage.

5.3 Recommended Design Features to Improve Security

5.3.1 Bar/restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons of restaurants are stationary for long periods of time making them easier to target.

Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction, and other factors mean patrons are easily distracted.

Cohesion – particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality', i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them. This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur in venue where there is a 'regular' clientele.

Customer turnover – High customer turnover restaurants, with high levels of customer movement within the establishment are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.

Valuable goods – often available and possibly on show, a particular problem on external seating areas, although that is not an issue with this proposal. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, etc.

Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of the W/Cs lobby via a CCTV system to monitor movements to and from the basement.
- All back-of-house/staff areas should inaccessible to the public and there should be secure lockers for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till/bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. A time delay safe located in the manager's office is recommended
- Consideration should be given to high/wide bar areas, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises.



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- Tills fronting customers are preferable as they enable staff to maintain vision of the serving area and beyond. (Ideally fit tills below the bar or protect with screening to prevent snatches). If tills are placed rear facing, mirrors should be installed to facilitate staff monitoring.
- Casual access to the rear of service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch).
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points. A clear pathway to and from the entrance/exit and the toilets to the seating areas is desirable.



- The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation.
- Service areas should be secured at all times.

5.3.2 With the above in mind, an 'operating policy' should be drawn up which includes:

- security (door policy; door staff; staff training; CCTV cameras - monitoring and recording facilities, and their locations; and cash storage/management);
- fire safety;
- dispersal procedure; and
- waste management (avoiding the disposal of glass late at night which might disturb nearby residents.

5.3.3 The proposed development will bring additional vitality to the area during all times of the day and will help to increase levels of surveillance over Dale Street and neighbouring properties. Lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal belongings

5.3.4 The proposed works present an opportunity to upgrade security on existing doors, windows and the building itself.

6 Physical Security

Should any of the existing windows and doors be replaced as part of this change of use the following standards should be followed:

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 External doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

6.1.2 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

6.1.3 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

6.1.4 All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.

6.2 Windows and Shutters

6.2.1 Any new windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950, must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

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6.2.2 Any replacement shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

6.3 Glazing

6.3.1 Any new external glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Intruder Alarm

6.4.1 An intruder alarm should be installed linked to contacts on all external doors and shutters; PIR detectors should cover any rooms with windows. The alarm signal should terminate at a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre. The system should comply with the current version of the EN 50131-1 standard and be eligible for a Police response as defined by the ACPO Policy on Police Response to Security Systems, Level 1 status.

6.4.2 The alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind the bar and in the cash office. The office should contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal.

6.5 Access Control

6.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. Doors to sensitive areas such as to the back of house – e.g. access to staff office, staff room and to the cellar/ stock rooms should all be controlled.

6.6 CCTV

6.6.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
    - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
    - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

6.6.2 The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: all external doors, queuing area, till points, the bar, the entrance lobby, and locations around the premises so that all internal areas are monitored.

6.7 Lighting

6.7.1 All lighting sources should be compatible with requirements of any CCTV system installed.

6.7.2 Internal lighting should be used to create the right atmosphere. Striking a balance, which avoids being so dim as to prevent staff from seeing all that is going on, but not so bright that the light is glaring, 'cold', and unwelcoming.

6.7.3 An override is required, within easy reach of bar staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised. High-level house lighting is an important element of control. This will also help at the end of trading so that staff can see to clear up, and patrons have no doubt that its closing time.

6.7.4 Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

6.7.5 External fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

6.8 Staffing

6.8.1 There should be a lone worker policy drawn-up, ensuring that there is more than one staff member on the premises at any one time, and that locking down the premises at the end of business is not carried out by a single member of staff.

6.9 Cash storage

6.9.1 Cash kept on the premises should be stored securely. A safe certified to LPS 1183 will provide a good level of security. A time-delay lock is advised.

6.9.2 Consider a chute deposit safe (to LPS 1183) behind the bar to reduce cash amounts held in tills during busy periods. A protocol should be set up to ensure that large amounts of cash are not kept in the tills at any one time.

6.10 Other

6.10.1 Bins should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant.

Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
02.04.13		Request for Crime Impact Statement
19.04.13		Site visit
20.06.13		Report Issued

A Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
	Location plan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

B CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

C Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at *www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted*)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

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