

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Rosebank Farm, Rosebank Road, Manchester

12 Houses

For Muhammad Muazzam

Version A: 1st October 2012

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Not Protectively Marked

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Crime Impact Statement

Rosebank Farm, Rosebank Road, Manchester

12 Houses

2012/0730 /CIS/01

For Muhammad Muazzam
Version A: 1st October 2012

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

We are generally supportive of the outline proposals, which will inject some valid activity to a site which is currently very inward-facing and unable to provide passive surveillance and activity to support neighbouring residential properties. The proposed layout is acceptable in outline terms, however for us to support an application which seeks determination of layout; we would look for the contents of sections 5.2 and 6 to be incorporated within the detailed designs.



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1 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.



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2



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1 Rosebank Road is generally populated with semi-detached housing, which benefit from defensible space in the form of front gardens. Off road parking is generally not provided, although certain properties have adapted their boundaries to allow this. The boundary to the footpath mainly comprises vegetation, some of which is overgrown and impeding natural surveillance opportunities.

2 37 Rosebank Road lies adjacent the site. The proposed boundary solution to this corner of the site will need to be carefully considered to preserve security to this dwelling.

3 As above, many front boundaries which consist of hedgerow have either become overgrown, or are maintained to high to be conducive to security. The use of a visually permeable, hard boundary (such as picket fence or railing) will eliminate the issue of overgrowth and provide the opportunity for passive surveillance from dwellings over the street, and from the street to the dwelling.

4 The application site is occupied by a number of garage units, access to which is gated. The site is fronted by a high brick wall. These factors together mean the site contributes little in the way of supporting activity or surveillance to the street.

5 The surrounding houses are distinctive in style, and generally feature front doors to the side elevations. This is not advisable for several reasons. Firstly, residents, visitors or even intruders cannot be seen easily from the street. Secondly, side access requires secure boundaries to be set back from the front elevation, and doors in this position invite access towards the rear of the property. Front doors should generally be to the fronts of properties, where they can be seen from the street and surrounding properties.

6 Whilst most properties surrounding the site have boundary fences to secure rear garden areas, some do not. This allows free access to the rears of dwellings where most burglars prefer to operate. Public access should be restricted to the space to the front of the dwelling, which should benefit from natural surveillance of the street and surrounding dwellings.

7 A service road runs from Ascot Road (to the south) to the edge of the site. This road does not appear to be well maintained, and there are areas of disrepair to boundaries in this area. If this road is not part of the site, the boundary to the site at the end of this road must be designed to prevent through-access.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2011 and 2012.

2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
42	<20	77	74	23	<20	<20	23	<20	<20

Figure 2: Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 3: Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 4: Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 5: Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



2.1.1 In the local area the volume of crime is not exceptionally higher. The risk of burglary, violence and vehicle crime is lower than in than the average for Manchester but higher than the rate experienced across Greater Manchester. Criminal damage is the most prevalent crime in the local area and the rate is higher than the average for Manchester and Greater Manchester.

2.1.2 The number of domestic burglaries per dwelling is **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.3 The number of woundings per dwelling is **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.4 Incidents of criminal damage per dwelling are **higher** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.5 Incidents of vehicle crime per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

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2.2 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 6: Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Figure 7: Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Figure 8: Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.2.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary is highest on Monday, Thursday and Sunday. The risk of burglary is lower on Saturday.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary in the local area is greatest in the evening, peaking at 8pm. Offenders frequently target residential properties in the evening when it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.

2.2.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries in the local area have been committed through rear points of entry, particularly rear doors. Offenders frequently target rear points of entry as when they cannot be seen from the main road they often have more time to break in to dwellings. Rear doors have frequently been forced open with both bodily pressure or tools and rear windows have been prised open. Glazing in both doors and windows has frequently been smashed to gain entry.

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2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 10: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: Interpretation of Figure 9

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is greatest in the early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target vehicles in the early hours of the morning when it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.

2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to woundings committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 12: Wounding – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of violence is greatest on Saturday. The risk of violence often increases at the weekend when more people attend license premises, often for longer and consuming more alcohol leading to conflict.

2.4.2 Time Range: During the day the risk of violence is greatest in the late afternoon and in the evening. The risk of violence often increases at these times when alcohol has been consumed in homes and licensed premises leading to violence.

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2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 13: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 14: Robbery Targets



2.5.1 Criminal Damage Targets: In the local area properties have been targeted more frequently than vehicles. Windows have been smashed in the majority of cases, both on properties and vehicles.

2.5.2 Robbery Targets: In the local area individuals have been targeted rather than businesses. Individuals have been targeted they have often been walking through the area alone at night.

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Rear doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

In the first instance, dwellings should be provided with intelligently positioned and specified rear boundary treatments, which limit accessibility to the rear of the dwelling and address issues such as forced entry and climbing. Further to this, rear doors should be specified to PAS 24, a standard which ensures a high level of resistance against attack by not only bodily force, but also with a range of tools.

2.6.2 Rear windows have been prised open

Rear windows and doors are often preferred by burglars as they are often concealed from general view of the street, and high boundaries offer privacy whilst forced entry is attempted. Windows should be specified to BS 7950 or PAS 24 to provide resistance against forced entry.

2.6.3 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

Whilst good design can minimise the opportunity for criminals, ground floor glazing should incorporate laminated glass as a final line of defence. This type of glass will delay this form of entry, and the necessary repeated impact on the glass will likely draw attention to an attempted break in.

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3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Antisocial behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.1.1 All front doors face the street directly, meaning visitors and residents will not be led in to concealed areas.

5.1.2 Ample space is available for off-road, in-curtilage parking. This should form part of the detailed design.

5.1.3 Dwellings are distanced from the street by front gardens, forming defensible space.

5.1.4 Windows are positioned on the gable ends of the Type A plots, which will offer opportunities for natural surveillance by residents over driveways and the footpath. This design feature should be applied to the gables of Type B houses too (see section 5.2).

5.1.5 The proposed houses face one another and existing properties along Rosebank Road. This creates the potential for mutual surveillance between dwellings.

5.1.6 A cul de sac layout is proposed, which is shown by research to be one of the most secure layout options. This is because, due to the single point of entry and exit, a commitment is required by the offender to enter, and the absence of through-routes removes the legitimate excuse for an offender's presence.

5.1.7 The proposed properties are semi-detached. This is beneficial security-wise as it allows dedicated private access in to the rear gardens of houses, negating the need for communal gates and alleys, which can result in vulnerabilities when left insecure.

5.1.8 The site is currently occupied by garages, and doesn't appear to contribute much in the way of positive activity or natural surveillance. The provision of housing and greater legitimate activity on this site is therefore supported.

5.1.9 The design suggests little-to-no communal landscaping or areas of land. Whilst such spaces can enhance a place, lack of ownership and maintenance of communal areas can lead to the decline of an area.

5.2 Advice for Detailed Design



5.2.1 Whilst plenty of space is provided for off-road parking, the proximity of the junction between Rosebank Road and the new access road may prohibit a gable end driveway to the inner two Type A plots. The above sketch displays our preferred approach to parking for these plots. In the interests of providing as much rear garden space as possible, the driveways to these 2 no. plots needn't be gated. By setting the fence line back from the gable wall, the kitchen window will provide surveillance opportunities over parked vehicles (see inset).

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

5.2.2 It's recommended that driveways to the Type B plots are provided along the gable ends. The driveways should be of a sufficient length to allow inward swinging gates. The fence line (with gate) separating the driveway from the rear garden should be 2100mm high, including a 300mm trellis topping.

5.2.3 Gable end windows at ground and/or first floor should be introduced to the Type B plots to allow the opportunity for human surveillance over parked cars (as indicated with red arrows, above). This may only be possible from one property in the sketch above, due to overlooking distances.

5.2.4 As shown above, railings should be provided along the back of footpath to front gardens, with gates to allow access to front doors and driveways. Numerous houses in the area have front boundaries comprising vegetation, which has become overgrown, and resulted in security vulnerabilities. Therefore, a maintenance-free solution such as railings should be used.



5.2.5 There should be a secure boundary treatment between the head of the new access road, and the rear gardens of existing properties to the southeast. This should generally comprise a 2100mm timber fence including a 300mm trellis topping and concrete gravel board. A seemingly redundant service road abuts the site to the southeast, between numbers 32 and 34 Ascot Road. The site boundary in this area (shown to the right) should be more robust, and comprise a 2100mm brick wall, again with a 300mm trellis topping (to deter climbing).



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5.2.6 As with the Type B plots, the outermost Type A plots would also benefit from gable end parking. Again, the fence in to the rear garden should be 2100mm high (including trellis).

5.2.7 Low railings should separate the driveway of these plots from the existing plots, adjacent.

5.2.8 Sub-divisional low boundaries should be used to separate front gardens, as shown above.



5.2.9 Sub-divisional rear boundaries, between back gardens, should be to an approximate height of 1500mm. This will afford residents a degree of sight over their neighbours' properties, and increase the chances of an intruder being seen by neighbouring residents.



5.2.10 The threshold to the new access road should be treated with a different surface material. This will define the transition in to a semi-private cul de sac, and communicate resident 'ownership' over the space.

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6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 Front doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL, or LPS 1175 SR2.

6.1.2 Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

6.1.3 Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.

6.1.4 Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.

6.1.5 Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.

6.1.6 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

6.1.7 All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts (only if an alarm is to be provided)

6.2 Windows

6.2.1 Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.

6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 0.8mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.8mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Alarms

6.4.1 If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

6.4.2 If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors in to garages).

6.4.3 If an alarm is installed, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

6.4.4 If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

6.5 Boundaries

6.5.1 Rear boundaries enclosing back gardens should generally be 2100mm high and of close boarded timber construction. The top 300mm should consist of trellis structure. This includes boundaries which form the site boundary, and those which separate back gardens from driveways.

6.5.2 Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher (see example, right).



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6.5.3 Rear boundary treatments which partially enclose gable-end driveways (see sketch on previous page) would benefit from a 600mm trellis topping, to increase the visibility of vehicles to neighbouring properties.

6.5.4 Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.

6.5.5 The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low railings to an approximate height of 1000mm, with matching gates to both driveways and paths to front doors.

6.5.6 Gates in to the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
- A key operable deadlock

6.5.7 The section of site boundary at the end of the existing service route (off Ascot Road) should comprise masonry construction to a total height of 2100mm, including a 300 mm trellis topping.

7 External Features

7.1 Landscaping

7.1.1 In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

7.1.2 Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

7.1.3 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

7.1.4 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

7.2 Lighting

7.2.1 External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, as well as to any gable-end driveways. These should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.

7.2.2 Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

7.2.3 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

7.3 Communal Areas

7.3.1 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7.4 Other

7.4.1 Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.

7.4.2 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric.

7.4.3 Bin storage areas should be provided in rear gardens to reduce the likelihood of bins being left in the street, where they may act as climbing aids to opportunist criminals.

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8 Management & Maintenance

The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

9 Construction

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
19/19/12	Agent	Instruction to prepare CIS

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
01	Location Plan	10/09/12	-
03	Proposed Block Plan	12/09/12	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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