

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Land Bound by New Union Street & St. Vincent Street, Ancoats

94 Flats & 6 Houses

For McCaul Developments (Northern) Limited

Version A: 25.04.13

www.designforsecurity.org
info@designforsecurity.org
0161 856 5912

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Not Protectively Marked

Crime Impact Statement

Land Bound by New Union Street & St. Vincent Street, Ancoats

94 Flats & 6 Houses

2008/1375/CIS/02

For McCaul Developments (Northern) Limited
Version A: 25.04.13

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

The security of the development is well considered with a very limited number of entrance doors, secure car/cycle parking and a mixture of uses that are compatible for this location. The outward facing nature of the layout encourages natural surveillance and activity onto the adjoining busy streets.
The communal entrances to the apartment blocks are well located on the New Union Street elevation (block B), and facing each other on the access road in the case of blocks C and D. The approaches to the communal entrances should be designed to a very high standard with suitable lighting and signage to make the entrances more prominent

I am happy to support the scheme subject to the adoption of the recommendations contained within sections 5.3, 6 and 7 of this report.



Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*
Consultant
e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Contents

1 Visual Audit 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 6

2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison

2.2 Burglary: Risk Analysis

2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis

2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

3 Risk Factors 9

4 Design Considerations 10

Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Secured by Design (SBD)

5 Design & Layout Appraisal 10

5.1 The Proposal

5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.3 Changes and Amendments Needed

6 Physical Security 11

6.1 Doors (Houses)

6.2 Doors (Apartments)

6.3 Windows

6.4 Garage Doors

6.5 Glazing

6.6 Intruder Alarm

6.7 Access Control

6.8 Boundaries

6.9 Landscaping

6.10 Lighting

6.11 Communal Areas

6.12 Other

7 Management & Maintenance 14

8 Construction 14

Appendix

A Contact register 15

B Associated Documents 15

C CIS Version History 15

D Glossary 16

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1 Visual Audit

1.1.1 The plan and photographs below highlight the site, plot N, (edged and shaded in red), the adjacent development site (plot M, edged in red), housing to the east, vacant development sites to the south (yellow on the plan), the Rochdale Canal and towpath immediately west of the site, an industrial unit on the western side of the canal, modern apartments to the south west of the site on the opposite side of the canal, and the local highway network.



1



2



3



4



5



6



7



8



9



Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1.1.2 This large irregular shaped site is located to the north east of Manchester City Centre and lies between the Rochdale Canal, New Union Street and St Vincent Street. Known as Plot N, the site forms part of the forms part of the New Islington Masterplan.

1.1.3 The site has been cleared and forms the northern part of a development site; the southern part is currently under construction, having benefitted from a recent planning consent for a 32 apartments and 8 canal-side houses. The proposed development continues the same theme of apartments and canal-side houses.

1.1.4 A brick wall separates the site from the towpath. Where the adjacent site is under development, this wall has been supplemented with a steel railing which raises the height of that boundary significantly, creating a secure edge to that part of the site.

1.1.5 A large, modern apartment building and an industrial building lie on the western side of the canal opposite the site. The apartment building is one of a number (new build and conversions) that have been developed in the Ancoats/New Islington area in the last 15 years, resulting in a large increase in the population of the area.

1.1.6 At the eastern edge of the site, facing New Union Street and Woodward Place, there are two terraces of modern houses, which provide more family style accommodation, which is typical of the form of development east of the site.

1.1.7 The land between St Vincent Street and Woodward Place has yet to be developed and lies vacant but secure.

1.1.8 The towpath along the Rochdale Canal provides a traffic free direct route between Ancoats, and the estate to the north, and the heart of the city centre. The quality of the environment along the towpath is generally very good, including a small seating and hard landscaped feature at the northern edge of the site where New Union Street and the towpath meet. There are, however, areas along the route, which suggest that anti-social behaviour is an issue; the New Union Street underpass is one such location nearby.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2012 -31st March 2013.

2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	34	67	54	60	<20	<20	86	<20	22

Figure 2: Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 3: Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 4: Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 5: Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



2.1.1 The volume of crime is not particularly high, with the exception of vehicle crime. A high number of residents or commuters park either on residential streets or in informal car parks within the study area (on the outskirts of the city centre), leaving their vehicles vulnerable for long periods of time – resulting in high levels of vehicle crime. The risk of domestic burglary in this area is very low when compared to the rate experienced across the Manchester City Council area.

2.1.2 The number of domestic burglaries per dwelling is **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester.

2.1.3 The number of woundings per dwelling is **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester.

2.1.4 Incidents of criminal damage per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester.

2.1.5 Incidents of vehicle crime per dwelling are **higher** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.2 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 6: Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Figure 7: Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Figure 8: Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.2.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary is concentrated on Monday.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary in the area examined is concentrated in the evening. Offenders frequently target residential properties in the evening, when it is dark and offenders perceive the risk of being caught as low.

2.2.3 Point of Entry: The majority of residential burglaries in the area have been committed through front doors and rear windows. The majority of burglaries have been committed at flats and offenders have often gained access to communal areas by deception through insecure communal entrances – allowing front doors of flats to be forced open with tools or bodily pressure. Ground floor rear windows of flats have repeatedly been prised open and this has been particularly common when rear windows are easily accessible or adjacent to public space.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 10: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of vehicle crime peaks on Wednesday and Friday.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is concentrated in the evening and early hours of the morning, peaking between 7pm and 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time when it is dark - leaving vehicles parked on remote/isolated side streets and car parks vulnerable.

2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to woundings committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 12: Wounding – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of violent crime is concentrated between Friday and Sunday. Greater numbers of people attend licensed premises at the weekend, increasing the potential for violent conflicts.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises themselves as well as on streets, at taxi ranks and in/around takeaways.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 13: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 14: Robbery Targets



2.5.1 Criminal Damage Targets: The makeup of the criminal damage in this area shows that properties are almost twice as likely to be targeted as vehicles. Common incidents of criminal damage include graffiti, windows being smashed and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.5.2 Robbery Targets: In the local area the majority of robberies have been against individuals rather than businesses. The risk of robbery increases when victims take quieter, more secluded routes through the area late at night.

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Rear windows of ground floor apartments have been prised open by offenders

Solution *Use BS7950 windows, which include key operated window locks and opening restrictors. Include laminate glazing to reduce the risk of an offender breaking the glass and unlocking windows.*

2.6.2 Front doors of apartments have been forced open with bodily pressure

Solution *Apartment front doors should be certified to a recognised security standard (PAS 24:2012). Communal entrance doors should also be security rated, with remote access controls and a strict no tailgating policy to prevent intruders gaining entry into apartment buildings.*

2.6.3 *An intruder alarm, with a visible alarm box fitted to the front elevation of the houses, also tends to deter opportunist criminals.*

2.6.4 *The combination of robust doors (accessed controlled where appropriate), windows, glazing, alarms and restricted access to the rear/communal gardens of the apartments and houses is proven to greatly reduce the risk of burglary.*

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Antisocial behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

4 Design Considerations

4.1.1 Design for Security recommends that designers and developers refer to:

Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

- Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design (SBD)

- Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 The Proposal

5.1.1 The scheme comprises the erection of 89 apartments (in three blocks (B, C &D) ranging from 4 to 7 storeys), 6 canal-side houses and associated landscaping, parking and highway treatments.

5.1.2 Block B will accommodate 23no. 1 and 2 bedroom apartments, Block C includes 17no. 1, 2 and 3 bed apartments units, whilst there will be 44no. 1, 2, and 3 bedroom apartments in Block D.

5.1.3 Six 3-bedroom, 3 storey houses are located in a terrace facing the canal, although separated from the towpath by the service road and a low wall, which forms the canal-side boundary to the site.

5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity and vitality to a previously derelict site with outward facing houses and apartments helping to provide natural surveillance over New Union Street and the canal towpath.

5.2.2 The principal entrances to the proposed apartment buildings are in appropriate locations.

5.2.3 Car parking is provided within secure garages or well within the site, adjacent to the canal boundary and reasonably secure.

5.2.4 The wall and railing separating site M from the towpath will be continued along the length of this site (N) to restrict casual intrusion into the site from this secluded pathway.

5.2.5 The open spaces within the site are well overlooked by houses and apartments and are set behind high boundaries.

5.2.6 Secure cycle parking is provided to both apartment blocks.

5.2.7 Varying the size of properties within the development allows for a more mixed population, which help promote stabilise the resident population and has the potential to make the development 'active' at most times of the day.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

5.3 Changes and Amendments Needed

5.3.1 Blank accessible gable ends should be avoided as these can attract graffiti or other forms of anti-social behaviour (block D).

5.3.2 The communal entrances to the apartment buildings must be security-certified to an appropriate standard. The main entrances should be single-leaf, secured with an electrically operated multi-point lock and operated via an audio-video access control system.

5.3.3 A change of hard surface treatment at the junction with St Vincent's Street is encouraged. Such enhancements emphasise territorial control, and provides a psychological barrier to those motorists and pedestrians who have no reason to enter the development. Signage should emphasise the point. The scheme is in a location where there is a high risk of anti-social behaviour – graffiti, youths causing annoyance, inconsiderate parking (including city centre worker parking).

5.3.4 Communal entrance or fire escape/secondary access doors should be clearly visible from 'the street', illuminated, and offer minimal weather protection; not hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines, where they could be vulnerable to crime.

5.3.5 All external doors, communal entrance doors, and apartment entrance doors should be certified to BS PAS 24. The use of split spindles or fixed handles on front doors to houses and apartments is encouraged; it will mean access is only possible with a key and reduces the possibility of 'walk-in' burglaries.

5.3.6 Secure cycle stores should be provided to the apartment blocks.

5.3.7 Ground floor/accessible windows of all houses and apartments should be certified to BS7950 with lockable handles and opening restrictors.

5.3.8 A through-the-wall post box system should be provided; meaning access to the building is not required for general mail deliveries.

5.3.9 It is likely that large expanses of paving will attract anti-social parking. Measures should be put in place to avoid this issue developing, e.g. the inclusion of appropriate street furniture or the privatisation of such space.

5.3.10 Gates to the communal gardens must be designed without features that might make them easy to climb – horizontal elements, locking and hinge points should be carefully considered. The gates should be self closing and self locking, operated by a fob or swipe card to enter and leave. Solenoid bolts at the gate mid-point are preferred to magnetic locks.

6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors (Houses)

6.1.1 Front and rear doors to the houses must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

6.1.2 Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

6.1.3 Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.

6.1.4 Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.

6.1.5 Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.

6.1.6 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

6.2 Doors (Apartments)

6.2.1 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. These must be accessible by fob, and keypads should not be used.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

6.2.2 An intercom with both audio and video should be provided at both the main front entrances, linked to a video handset in each apartment.

6.2.3 Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Balcony doors must be similarly certified if they are accessible from ground lower ground level

6.2.4 Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.

6.2.5 Letterboxes should be provided as a through-the-wall system, adjacent to the main communal entrance door.

6.3 Windows

6.3.1 Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.

6.3.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.4 Garage Doors

6.4.1 All garage doors (those integral to the houses as well as the two garages adjacent to St Vincent's Street) should be certified to LPS 1175 SR1.

6.5 Glazing

6.5.1 Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 0.8mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.8mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.6 Intruder Alarm

6.6.1 If an alarm is installed to each house or each individual apartment, then it should comply with either BS EN 50131 or PD 6662 for wired systems, or BS 6799 for wireless systems. The alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors into garages); PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

6.6.2 If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

6.7 Access Control

6.7.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Communal doors to the apartment blocks (intercom/remote lock release for guests and fob access for residents)
- Other apartment block entry doors i.e. doors into the communal gardens or secondary access at the northern end of block D (resident access only with fob).

6.8 Boundaries

6.8.1 The boundary to the canal should be 2100mm high and comprise of the existing wall topped with railings. The top of the railings should be designed in such a way as to deter climbing.

6.8.2 Rear garden boundaries to the houses should be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure. Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.

6.8.3 The fronts of the houses should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.

6.8.4 Boundaries to the communal gardens should be 1800-2100mm, 1800mm on road facing boundaries and 2100mm on more secluded boundaries. On public streets railing should be used supported by appropriate planting, which creates private areas but also retains some areas where the gardens and the street are inter-visible.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

6.8.5 Gates into the rear curtilage of the houses and to the communal gardens should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

Houses

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
- A key operable deadlock

Communal Gardens

- Fob activated solenoid lock, on a self-locking and self-closing gate

6.8.6 Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

6.9 Landscaping

6.9.1 Planting around apartment block entrances, communal parking areas, and alongside footpaths should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

6.9.2 Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

6.9.3 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

6.9.4 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

6.9.5 Trees and street furniture – street lamps, junction boxes etc should not be positioned in such a way that makes it easy to scale boundaries.

6.10 Lighting

6.10.1 External lighting must be provided to the front and rear doors of the houses and to all external doors to the apartment block. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.

6.10.2 Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

6.10.3 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

6.11 Communal Areas

6.11.1 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6.12 Other

6.12.1 Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas, or to the sides which may result in gates being positioned mid-gable.

6.12.2 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

6.12.3 Cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf

6.12.4 Bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

7 Management & Maintenance

7.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

8 Construction

8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

8.1.3 For further information regarding site security, please contact your local Crime Reduction Advisor, **John Sargeson**, on **0161 856 5912**.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
27.03.13	Tony McCaul	Request for Crime Impact Statement
15.04.13		Site visit
25.04.13	Tony McCaul	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
Via dropbox link	Design and access statement	March 2013	
1231 101 01… onwards	All floor plans and layouts	March 2013	
	Site sections and building elevations	March 2013	
	Site survey and location plan	March 2013	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at *www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted*)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable