

Crime Impact Statement

Units 11 & 12, Printworks, Manchester

Change of Use to Licensed Premises (bar)

For Planning Perspectives

Version B: 11.01.13

www.designforsecurity.org
info@designforsecurity.org
0161 856 5912

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Crime Impact Statement

Units 11 & 12, Printworks, Manchester

Change of Use to Licensed Premises (bar)

2012/0853/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

For Planning Perspectives
Version B: 11.01.13

Executive Summary

Significant material changes are advised

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

The site lies within The Printworks where there are several licensed premises, both bars and licensed restaurants. Increasing the density of licensed premises in an area can increase the potential for crime and disorder, and put further strain on the City Centre Police Team. However, well managed premises pose few problems to the Police. Consequently, I am happy to support the proposal providing the developer:

- duly considers all measures highlighted in sections 6 and 7 of this report;
- makes reasonable efforts to incorporate these measures into the works necessary to complete the development;
- produce an operation plan, see section 6.3.3 which should be submitted to the Police and the Local Authority for approval, the plan should be carried out in full and the then adhered to for the life of the development.

Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*
Consultant
e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

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2 Visual Audit

2.1.1 The plan and photographs below highlight: the site edged in red within the Printworks development; the Arndale Centre to the south; Urbis building to the west; a small group of commercial buildings to the east; tramlines to the north; and, the local highway network.



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

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

6


7


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2.1.2 The site comprises a former nightclub unit, which occupies a central space within The Printworks. Accessed from within The Printworks itself, the unit sits in beside Norwegian Blue and opposite the entrance to the Odeon Cinema.

3 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2011 and 2012.

3.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
20	170	198	540	941	105	35	247	20	327

3.1.2 In the last 12 months the volume of crime in the local area has been very high and this reflects the site's location close to the city centre. In particular there have been a high number of robberies, thefts of bicycles and theft from motor vehicles.

3.2 Misc Theft (Licensed Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against licensed premises, recorded in the Manchester City Centre area.

3.2.1

Figure 2: Misc Theft – Day Range



Figure 3: Misc Theft – Time Range



3.2.2

3.2.3 Day Range: During the week the risk of misc theft peaks on the days of the weekend, between Friday and Saturday. On these days, nightclubs, bars and public houses in the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Licensed premises are usually open for longer at the weekend and the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is much greater.

3.2.4 Time Range: The risk of theft increases late in the night into the early morning. This is when bars and nightclubs area busiest and the opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency. The most frequently stolen items are customer belongings, such as handbags, purses, wallets and mobile phones.

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3.3 Burglary Other (Licensed Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against licensed premises, recorded in the Manchester City Centre area.

3.3.1

Figure 4: Burglary Other – Day Range



Figure 5: Burglary Other – Time Range



3.3.2

Figure 6: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



3.3.3 Day Range: In the Manchester area the risk of burglary at licensed premises is greatest on Sunday and Tuesday. The risk of burglary is not significantly higher than the risk of burglary on other days. The risk of burglary is likely to be highest on Sunday when opening hours are often curtailed.

3.3.4 Time Range: The risk of burglary is highest early in the afternoon and in the early hours of the morning. Licensed premises are likely to be targeted at these times, as they are unlikely to be open or are open with reduced numbers of staff.

3.3.5 Point of Entry: In many cases of burglary the point of entry is undetermined and this could be due to the open access of most bars and nightclubs where people can walk in freely, without raising any suspicion. In many cases of burglary offenders have accessed staff only areas, or areas that are not open to the public and stealing property. When offenders have broken in they have typically targeted doors, including fire doors. Doors have routinely been forced open using bodily pressure or tools.

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3.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

3.4.1 The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



3.4.2 Day Range: During the week the risk of vehicle crime is greater at the weekend than during the week.

3.4.3 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is greatest in the evening, peaking between 7pm and 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time when it is dark, leaving vehicles parked on remote/isolated side streets and car parks vulnerable. On-street parking is more popular in the evenings when there are no charges which could explain the spike in figures.

3.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

3.5.1 The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 10: Wounding – Time Range



3.5.2 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people descend on the city centre area to attend licensed premises, often drinking for longer periods, consuming more alcohol.

3.5.3 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 2am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, taxi ranks and takeaways.

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3.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

3.6.1 The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 12: Robbery Targets



3.6.2 Criminal Damage Targets: The makeup of the criminal damage split in this area shows that property is almost twice as likely to be targeted as vehicles. Common incidents of criminal damage include graffiti, windows being smashed (both on properties and buildings) and damage to vehicle bodywork.

3.6.3 Robbery Targets: Robbery against the person is much more prevalent than against businesses in this area. The risk of robbery increases when victims take quieter, more secluded routes through the area in the evening/at night.

3.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

3.7.1 Theft of customer property from/under tables and chairs.

Solution *Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see opposite) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.*



3.7.2 Burglary where rear doors and windows have been forced open to gain entry.

Solution *All external doors and ground floor windows should be certified to recognised security standards PAS 24 or LPS 1175 for doors and BS7950 and LPS 1175 for windows.. Where feasible, access should be restricted to any hidden elevations of the building, where any doors could be attacked unseen from the street or avoid locating door or windows in particularly secluded elevations of the building.*

3.7.3 Burglary where glazing in doors and rear windows have been smashed to gain entry.

Solution *Secure rear windows when the premises are closed with discreet security shutters which meet the LPS 1175 standard, use laminate glass in all ground floor doors and windows.*

3.7.4 Violent disorder/conflict between intoxicated customers

Solution *Although I appreciate that the proprietor cannot currently be held responsible for the behaviour of patrons once they leave the establishment, they can adopt good practice management measures to discourage violence and disorder. The effective*

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management of entry (including any queuing) and egress of patrons by staff, particularly at busy periods, is essential to control numbers and avoid conflicts.

4 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Theft of customers belongings
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises

5 Design Considerations

Design for Security recommends that designers and developers refer to:

- ***Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London***

5.1.1 Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

- ***Secured by Design (SBD)***

5.1.2 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

6 Design & Layout Appraisal

6.1 The Proposal

6.1.1 This application relates to the change of use of units 11 and 12 premises, most recently operating a nightclub, to licensed premises. There is an existing entrance onto The Printworks. There are no external works proposed, the application simply seeks to change the use to a licensed premises.

6.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

6.2.1 Licensed premises, particularly those that offer food and entertainment, tend to attract a wider range of customers than nightclubs, and if well managed and do include a food offer, they are less prone to disorder or criminal activity.

6.2.2 The Printworks has proactive security personnel on site throughout the day and at night-time.

6.3 Design Considerations

6.3.1 If poorly managed, licensed premises can generate crime for the following reasons:

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- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons of licensed premises are stationary for long periods of time making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction, and other factors mean patrons are easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – particularly during busy periods and in larger, city centre premises, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality', i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of, and care for, the environment around them. This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur in venue where there is a 'regular' clientele.
- **Customer turnover** – High customer turnover premises, with high levels of customer movement within the establishment are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, etc. Often these are on show, and theft of such items can be an issue particularly on external seating areas, although that is not an issue with this proposal.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

6.3.2 In order to minimise criminal opportunities, I recommend the following elements be included:

- Only one entrance should be used by customers and it must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Tables should be spaced so that it is easy for staff and customers to negotiate their way through the premises.
- Back-of-house/staff areas should be inaccessible to the public and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work (the office). Doors to the plant rooms, cellar, store rooms and the office should be self closing and self locking – the only way into these rooms should be with a key.
- High/wide bars are recommended as they increase the distance between staff and aggressive patrons, and the slight elevation of staff behind higher level bars improves surveillance of the premises.
- Toilets should be clearly signed so that there is no excuses for customers finding their way to the back of house
- Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till/bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. Cash should be stored securely in a safe within a secure office.

6.3.3 With the above in mind, an 'operating policy' should be drawn up which includes:

- security (door policy; door staff; staff training; CCTV cameras - monitoring and recording facilities, and their locations; and cash storage/management);
- fire safety;
- dispersal procedure;
- waste management;
- 'Chelsea clips', or similar, should be included on each of the tables, and their presence advertised to customers;

7 Physical Security

7.1.1 The development comprises changing the use of a part of an existing building. The potential to make alterations and upgrade the physical security of the building is both limited and, perhaps, given the way the Printworks is managed, unnecessary. The security of units 11 and 12, The Printworks building as a whole, its tenants and customers will be dependent on continued effective management and retention of the on-site security presence, monitored alarms, and effective CCTV. All of these measures will allow any issues that do evolve to be dealt with before they become a crime or disorder problem.

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7.1.2 Should the proposal ultimately involve works to the fabric of the units then the following specification should be adopted:

7.2 Doors

7.2.1 External doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

7.2.2 Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

7.2.3 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

7.2.4 Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

7.3 Alarms

7.3.1 An alarm should be installed to cover the entire unit, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. The alarm should be monitored, with a response facility, by Printworks security/management.

7.3.2 The alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors.

7.4 CCTV

7.4.1 CCTV systems used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the bar. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- Procedures for recovery of recordings should be established (e.g. trained staff/the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
    - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
    - **Identification** –To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). Lesser views, i.e. 'Overview' and 'Recognition', whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

7.4.2 The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: all external doors (entrance and fire doors), till/bar areas, and doors to secure staff areas.

7.5 Access Control

7.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. Doors into the staff only areas should be controlled.

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7.6 Other

7.6.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An 'operating policy' should be drawn up which includes:

- Location and management of any smoking area;
- Details of waste management provision (bins should be securely stored within the service yard);
- A procedure for making the premises secure after customers have left so that counting and securing the takings can be carried out in a secure environment, as well as a procedure for staff leaving and securing the premises, so that staff safety is not compromised;
- Cash storage/management, to take place in a secure room with a certified safe;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries;
- Details of a CCTV system - including camera positions and monitoring and recording facilities; and,
- Management of stock deliveries.

7.6.2 It is recommended that the proposed opening hours do not vary from existing similar uses in the Printworks.

7.6.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers, music equipment, etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
24.10.12	Elizabeth Milimuka	Request for Crime Impact Statement
07.11.12		Site visit
04.12.12	Elizabeth Milimuka	Report issued
13.01.13	Polly Canning/Holly Needham	Report re-issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
P2949 - 950	Land Registry Plan - Ground floor	04.08.2011	
P2949 - 951	Land Registry Plan - Mezzanine floor	04.08.2011	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	
B	☐	☐	☒	Licensed bar

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing Interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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