Crime Impact Statement

- Manchester House, 22 Bridge Street, Manchester
- New Through Mall, Retail Units & Office Entrance



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	23/06/10	Revised CIS sent/emailed to Client
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Summarative Evaluation

I do have some concerns about the scheme, particularly in relation to the internal retail street out-of-hours. As long as the recommendations of this report are incorporated into the scheme and the effective management arrangements remain in place, I would be happy to endorse this development.

Contact Register

Date of Contact	Summary of Contact
23rd April 2010	Receipt of CIS instruction.
4th May 2010	Receipt of draft layout plans/elevations.
10th & 12th May 2010	E-mail correspondence with Agent re: floorspace of proposals.
13th May 2010	CIS sent to Agent. Subsequent e-mail correspondence from Agent re: amendment to report.
14th May 2010	Version 2 of CIS e-mailed to Agent.
9th June 2010	Meeting with Client to discuss the scheme.
16th June 2010	E-mail correspondence with Client re: management of proposed mall.
21st June 2010	E-mail request sent to Client for most up-to-date plans, prior to revising report.
23rd June 2010	Receipt of current plans.

Document Register

The analysis of the proposals is based on the following documents submitted by the developer:

Document/Drawing Reference Number	Document/Drawing Title
-	File Note (Description of Proposals)

Superseded Plans	
4029-SK-036 Rev -	Site Location Plan
4029-SK-034 Rev -	Basement Level
4029-SK-035 Rev -	Ground Floor Level
4029-SK-037 Rev -	Elevations & Section
Current Plans	
4029-10-001 Rev E	Site Location Plan
4029-10-210 Rev E	Proposed Plan Basement Floor Level -1
4101-10-211 Rev F	Proposed Plan Ground Floor Level 0
4029-10-212 Rev E	Proposed Plan First Floor Level 1
4029-10-213 Rev F	Proposed Plan Podium Floor Level 2

Introduction

This Crime Impact Statement:

- Has been produced by the Greater Manchester Police Design for Security consultancy, a professional organisation independent of the design process.
- Highlights crime and disorder issues in the vicinity of the development.
- Assesses the development in terms of its likely effect on crime and disorder in the area.
- Identifies design solutions based on analysis of the crime issues in the area that will reduce the proposals vulnerability to crime.
- Helps an applicant to adapt a development to avoid/reduce the adverse affects of crime and disorder.
- Allows Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) to use the information to make better decisions and enable the planning process to run more smoothly.
- Helps to allay public fears about a development that are often brought about by a lack of information and create goodwill on behalf of the developer.

Part A – Analysis of the Site

1.0 The Proposal

The proposal is to create a new mall through the ground/first floors of the existing building, linking Bridge Street to the north and Wood Street (as well as Spinningfields) to the south, forming new shop units (including a large convenience retail unit) and new office entrance lobbies.

2.0 Site Analysis




- The site is bounded by Bridge Street to the north, Dolefield to the west and Wood Street to south. The existing Manchester House building is formed by a high-rise office block, sat above a two storey podium which previously housed offices, retail units and a restaurant (now unoccupied).
- Manchester Crown Court lies to the west of the site and to the north lies some Government Offices and Trinity Square (surrounded by retail/commercial units and office buildings). A Masonic Hall adjoins the site to the immediate east.

- To the south of the site lies the new Manchester City Magistrates Court and Coroners Court, as well as The Avenue (consisting of a number of units yet to be occupied, but intended for luxury brand retailers, restaurants and bars), beyond which is the rest of Spinningfields
- The area of Spinningfields lies on the west side of Manchester City Centre, bounded by Deansgate, the River Irwell, Quay Street and Bridge Street and includes high quality commercial, civic, residential, hotel, leisure and retail spaces set within a network public spaces and thoroughfares.


3.0 Crime Issues at this Location

The graph below illustrates the number of crimes recorded in the period 1st April 2009 and 1st April 2010 in a grid area centred on the site, measuring approximately 1km^2 (please see Appendix 1 for a description of each of the crime types).





As can be seen from the graph above, this is a high crime area. This is typical of such a city centre location. By far the most prevalent types of crime are miscellaneous thefts (702), vehicle crime (401 theft from and 34 theft of) and less serious wounding (366) - the majority of which can be attributed to the typical problems of a busy city centre and night-time economy. However, these very high levels distort the graph and conceal the

fact that there are also significantly high levels of burglary (14 dwelling and 223 other), criminal damage (177 – see breakdown opposite) and theft of pedal cycle (175).





As can be seen from the graphs below, an analysis of the existing crime trends in the general area over the last 12 months shows a relatively constant risk of burglary other throughout the week, with small peaks on Mondays, Fridays and Saturdays and a slightly lower risk on Wednesdays. In terms of the time of day of burglary other incidents, there appears to be an increased risk from mid-late evening and during the early hours of the morning.







The graph below shows that burglary other offences in the area have been carried out through a number of known entry points, particularly doors.








The graphs above again appear to indicate a relatively constant risk of vehicle crime throughout the week, with a slightly lower risk towards the end of the working week and on Saturdays and small peaks on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Sundays. In relation to the time of day of vehicle crime incidents, the levels of risk grow throughout the day, peaking late at night.





The graphs above show a clear pattern in relation to the risk of woundings within the area, indicating a higher risk at weekends and during the early hours of the morning, when patrons are likely to be intoxicated and bars, clubs and taxi ranks are at their busiest.

In terms of the more immediate area around the site itself, there is a clear concentration of crimes around/off Deansgate and Bridge Street/King Street West (aligned with the concentration of restaurants, bars, retail units, car parks etc.). These include, most notably:

- Miscellaneous thefts (mostly thefts of personal items such as mobile phones, handbags, jackets etc. from chairs/tables/floor or restaurants and bars, some from insecure offices);
- Theft from/of motor vehicle (mostly parked in nearby surface and multi-storey car parks);
- Burglary other (including using street cobble to smash window and steal from till, theft of vehicle keys/laptop from private offices, removing beading to rear door of portacabin, attempted theft of monies from till from within an area of a restaurant marked 'Private Staff Only', theft from first floor staff room, unauthorized access gained to office whilst posing as prospective customer, forcing open second floor rear skylight, smashing glazing to window/door, forcing doors);
- Less serious wounding (including a number of incidents at nearby bars and the adjacent courts); and
- Criminal damage (including damage to walls/fixed furniture within court building and of vehicle clamp, smashing windows, damage to parked vehicles).

There have also been a number of recorded incidents (not crimes) within the last 12 months, particularly rowdy/inconsiderate behaviour and begging. The concentration of these incidents mirror the crime trends outlined above.

4.0 Security Considerations

The typical security issues for a development of this nature are:

- Acts of theft and criminal damage during construction period.

During Normal Trading Hours

- Smash & grab raids.
- Cash robbery.

- Violence to staff.
- Shoplifting.
- Employee pilferage.
- Unauthorised access to storage/staff areas, offices etc.
- Theft of customer/staff belongings.
- Theft of/from parked vehicles.
- Loading & unloading of stock.

Outside of Normal Trading Hours

- Burglary of premises.
- Smash & grab raids.
- Ram-raids.
- Loitering/rough sleeping within sheltered/recessed areas

5.0 General Design Considerations

The seven attributes of safer places are contained within *'Safer Places – The Planning System and Crime Prevention'*, a planning guidance document issued by the Home Office and the ODPM (now the DCLG) for England and referenced by Planning Policy Statement 1. All seven general attributes, listed below, align with the general principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED) and 'Secured by Design' (SBD). They should be considered and applied to the detailed design of the development:

Access & Movement

Places with well defined and well used routes with spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- Pedestrian routes are poorly lit, indirect and away from traffic;
- Streets, footpaths and alleyways provide access to the rear of buildings;
- There are several ways into and out of an area – providing potential escape routes for criminal activity;
- It is easy for people to become lost or disorientated; streets and spaces are unwelcoming or underused by capable guardians.

A good movement framework has direct routes that lead people safely to the places they want to go by whatever means – on foot, by bike or on public transport. Layouts based on main routes and shared spaces reduce the need for underused alleyways, shortcuts and minor access points that can become vulnerable to or facilitate crime. The consequences of the number and type of connections in this setting need to be carefully considered.

Structure

Places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- Buildings and private/communal spaces have a large number of sides exposed to the public realm;
- The way that buildings streets and spaces are laid out allow criminals to move around and operate undetected;
- A places tends to bring together people who are likely to offend and suitable targets;
- Capable guardians are not present;

- Places become derelict or underused;
- Under and unused buildings and spaces that have become vulnerable to crime are not remodelled or removed.

A safe and legible urban structure has a well-defined and clearly understood movement framework and good quality, well-used public spaces that support surveillance. Pedestrians need well-lit and clearly defined routes linking areas of activity and key destinations. A legible layout lessens the need to depend on signs to find one's way around. It enables people to read their surroundings and the way ahead in order to detect dangers and warning signs.

Surveillance

Places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- Criminals can operate, including travelling to and from the location, without fear of being seen;
- Criminals or their activities do not attract attention – or they are confident that no one will take any action;
- All sides of buildings and all parts of spaces are not overlooked by surrounding users or passers-by;
- Buildings and spaces are not designated to allow surveillance 'outside' from 'inside' and vice versa.

Clear sightlines and good visibility allow people to see where they are going and make a reasonable choice of routes. This has a significant impact on feeling and being safe. In areas designed for use after dark, visibility depends on effective lighting. Well-designed lighting increases the opportunity for surveillance at night, sends positive messages about the management of an area, and enhances the aesthetics of the night-time environment.

Ownership

Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- It is unclear whether space is public or private, and what behaviour is expected in each;
- Private space is easily accessible to people who have no right to be there;
- An offender's presence in the area does not attract attention;
- A place feels like it is not under supervision of local residents, businesses, organisations or other users.

Encouraging residents and tenants to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for their surroundings can make an important contribution to crime prevention. Uncertainty of ownership can reduce responsibility and increase the likelihood of crime and antisocial behaviour going unchallenged. Alternatively, when responsibility and ownership are high, there is a feeling that crime is more likely to be detected and responded to.

Physical Protection

Places that include necessary, well-designed security features. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- The target hardening measures (for example the doors, windows and gates recommended for 'Secured By Design' (SBD) accreditation) are not selected to be appropriate to the building and to the crime risk faced, or are not integrated, installed or used properly;
- It is easy to enter and exit properties illegally;
- It is easy to remove property.

Physical protection involves measures that make it more difficult to commit offences and instil a feeling of safety in users. It includes active security measures (such as locks, doors, windows, and glazing) that aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture. It is important that this is done in a balanced way by employing methods that reasonably secure a place without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

Activity

Places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- An area is either very quiet or very busy, depending on the local context and the type of crime;
- Different groups of people feel that there is nothing to do;
- Criminals can go about their business unnoticed;
- Places become devoid of activity at certain times of the day or night, whilst remaining accessible to offenders;
- Potential offenders and/or victims are concentrated in the same place at the same time, such as bus stops, taxi ranks, or fast food outlets after pubs close or areas of the town centre throughout the evening.

Crime can be deterred through the 'eyes on the street' of people going about their everyday business. However, too much activity risks anonymity and can also lead to increases in the opportunity to commit particular types of crime, such as pick-pocketing, and anti-social behaviour. Decisions about which levels and types of activity are appropriate need to be made for the local context.

Management and Maintenance

Places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- Places are untidy or unattractive, giving the impression of not being cared for or that crime and disorder is tolerated;
- Signs of disorder and neglect, such as broken windows, abandoned vehicles or graffiti are not removed at the earliest opportunity;
- An organised human presence (such as police, security guards, street wardens or concierges) is absent.

The overall quality of the environment and its upkeep can influence both the perception and reality of safety and security. A good quality, attractive public space that is perceived as well maintained and cared for by its owners and its users improves its overall image, encourages greater use, promotes greater respect for the environment and reduces the likelihood of crime or vandalism.

6.0 Site/Development Specific Design Considerations

The above general measures/principles should be considered in the detailed design of the development. In terms of the layout of the development, the following site/development specific issues are highlighted at this stage and need to be addressed in the final design:

- Although the internal retail street will be open to the elements, it will be partially enclosed by the existing tower and sheltered to some extent by the 2 storey elements on either side. I am concerned that the route may foster loitering/gathering, criminal activity, anti-social behavior and nuisance at night/when the retail units and offices are not in use. The route will be secluded at night, leaving any pedestrians (and the retail/office units) vulnerable to attack. I would prefer to see the route

closed-off out-of-hours, so that pedestrians would be forced to use the adjacent street (where surveillance opportunities are maximised) and mis-use would be prevented.

- The mall must be robustly managed to encourage active use and enjoyment throughout the day, whilst leaving potential criminals feeling more vulnerable to detection and making crime less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- There should be a high/wide reception desk to the office lobbies, allowing staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering/exiting the building and maximizing surveillance over the street and mall. They should also be fitted with robust access controls to prevent unauthorised access to the offices in the absence of a concierge.
- The basement car park should be adequately secured to prevent unauthorized access to where the parked vehicles and basement entrances into the building could be attacked unseen.
- Building lines should be kept as simple as possible. Recesses and sheltered areas (including canopies) can create hiding places and congregation points which are a focal point for crime and anti-social behaviour, possibly leading to littering, graffiti, vandalism and arson.
- The internal layout of the retail units should be carefully considered so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Management/cash offices, staff areas and stock rooms should be appropriately secured to prevent unauthorised access.
- A robust and secure cash-in-transit (CIT) strategy must be developed for each of the retail units, preferably in areas away from the public.
- A successful lighting scheme deters and reveals potential intruders and reduces the fear of crime. Lighting levels should be good, but not oppressive, evenly distributed, allow clear colour rendition (supporting any CCTV system) and avoid light spillage.

- Any landscaping features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance of/from the buildings or reduce the effectiveness of any CCTV system. Future soft landscaping growth and maintenance must be taken into account at the design stage.

Given the existing crime levels in the area, it is highly recommended that the development is designed and constructed to 'Secured by Design' (SBD) standards (please see www.securedbydesign.com for more information and general design guides).

Part B – Assessment of the Development

1.0 Description of the Development

The proposal is to create a new through mall at ground/first floor of the existing building podium. The high-rise office block above will remain, with 2 no. new lobbies fronting onto the mall. There are a number of A1 to A5 use-class units proposed at ground floor level fronting onto the mall, Bridge Street and Dolefield, including a large convenience retail unit located at the north-west corner of the building. This unit will have a primary entrance fronting onto Bridge Street and an emergency exit providing egress onto the proposed mall. The basement of the building will house plants areas and a waste room, as well as stores for the convenience retail unit, the office stair/lift core, a cycle storage area and a reconfigured car park (accessed off Wood Street, at the rear of the building).

2.0 Assessment Criteria

2.1 Design & Layout

I would like to see the proposed partially sheltered mall secured at night to prevent unauthorized access. However, it is noted that this will be difficult to manage given the location of the office lobbies (which may require 24 hour access) and emergency exits. The Client has proposed the following management practices to control/monitor the route:

- The office lobby will be staffed 0700 to 1900 Monday to Friday. The on-site security officer will be responsible for the day-to-day management of the building and the outside areas.
- The existing extensive Spinningfields estate CCTV system will be extended to cover all external areas and extended public relam around Manchester House. The existing CCTV system is monitored 24/7 by a dedicated on-site control room.

- The proposed CCTV cameras will also be fitted with a public address facility linked to the control room and Redwall PIR sensors to detect activity along the route out-of-hours.
- The existing Spiningfields estate is continually patrolled by Security Officers, who are in direct contact with the CCTV control room and can react to any incidents observed. Manchester House will form part of the Security Officers' routine checks and two external readers will be added to log patrol times.

I am prepared to accept the above measures. However, if the route does become an issue in the future, it may be necessary to consider additional management practices, a gating strategy etc.

2.2 Physical Security

General

- All glazing at ground floor level/easily accessible from ground floor level should include a laminated inner (internal facing) pane to a minimum thickness of 7.5mm (with a minimum 'pvb interlayer' thickness of 1.5mm – the material that bonds the glazing together) and a toughened outer (external facing) pane.
- All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS 7950 (securely fixed in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications). All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of BS 7950, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- All elevations of the building (facing onto the surrounding streets) should be protected by anti-ram bollards (certified to LPS 1246 or BS PAS 68) or re-enforced stall risers.

- All external doorsets (including facing onto the mall and the basement car park) should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 (SR) 2 (with a BSI Kitemark tested and approved cylinder). Any fire doors/frames should be alarmed and designed without visible external ironmongery (with at least two-point locking to each leaf).

- A high-speed shutter operated by key fob/proximity reader, with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), should be provided at the entrance of the basement parking area so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape. If there is to be an emergency override push-button for the shutter, it should be alarmed and signed as such to deter casual use/use by criminals. There should also be access controls to the office entrance taken off the parking area (i.e. a self-closing door, secured with an electrically operated lock, such as the Winkhaus Cobra AV2E electronic automatic multi-point lock, operated by staff using a swipe card/proximity reader system), to ensure that if a criminal does access enter the area, further access is prevented.

- A suitable monitored alarm system should be installed to each of the units, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. The system should comply with the current version of the BS EN 50131-1 standard (minimum Grade 3). The alarm itself should have two secure signaling paths (one being GSM radio back-up). If either signaling path is tampered with by an intruder, or is faulty, the ARC will be alerted and the relevant emergency services, or authorized keyholder, will be called. If either is interfered with by an intruder, the other continues to monitor for any further alarms and transmits them as 'confirmed activations' – extra confirmation that an intruder is on the premises and that the alarm isn't false.

- In addition to the above measures, CCTV is a sound addition to provide the means to deter and monitor occurrences. The siting and design of CCTV cameras should be carefully considered to ensure that their presence is known, without being over-dominant within the development (covering all entrances, parking areas and circulation areas, both external and internal). Any CCTV system should be maintained and operated in accordance with the relevant British Standard (BS 7958). Recording

equipment should be stored in a secure area, with access restricted to authorised staff only.

- Lighting should be provided to the mall, the basement car park and all ground floor entrances, to an adequate and uniform level (as defined within BS 5489), so as not to allow any areas of pooling/shadowing.
- Cyclists should be encouraged to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar and, therefore, a design of cycle stand that enables this method of locking is recommended (i.e. 'Sheffield' stands). Wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable.
- The use of signage is important in preventing unauthorised access into and around the development. Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.
- Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight.

Office Lobbies

- The proposed revolving doors cannot be certified to the above standards. They should therefore incorporate 7.5mm thick laminated glazing and be certified to ENV 1627-30. The revolving doors should be secured outside of normal working hours (i.e. when the concierge is not present) and the adjacent single-leaf doors should be used for any out-of-hours access.
- The single-leaf doors themselves should be self-closing and secured with an electrically operated lock, such as the Winkhaus Cobra AV2E electronic automatic multi-point lock, operated by staff using a swipe card/proximity reader system or remotely by staff within the building via video access controls A/Cs (allowing staff to vet callers before allowing them access).
- The reception desks to the office lobbies should have full surveillance of everyone entering/leaving the building. All visitors should report to reception for vetting by staff before gaining access to the rest of the building.

- A high, wide reception desk increases the distance between reception staff and any potential aggressive visitors and aids surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby. A personal attack alarm should be provided at the reception desk, which activates a loud alarm at the scene. The activation of the alarm may well shock and disorientate visitors and clearly signals that assistance has been requested. All furniture should be fixed to prevent their being used as weapons. Fire hoses should also be properly housed and locked.

Convenience Retail Unit

- The proposed sliding doors also cannot be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 (SR) 2. They should therefore incorporate 7.5mm thick laminated glazing and be certified to ENV 1627-30.
- All internal doors to staff areas (including to offices, stores etc.) should have solid-core doors/frames with proximity-reader or swipe card auditable access controls to prevent unauthorised access. The cash management office should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings) and a certified doorset (see below) with a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover, with a deposit facility, certified to LPS 1183. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs.
- There should be direct access to the cash office for CIT personnel (ideally away from the sales area and the general public). A dedicated parking area should be provided for the cash-in-transit vehicle within the immediately vicinity of the access point.
- Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance/s of the store.

2.3 Management & Maintenance

- The comprehensive security regime for the management of the internal retail street described above must remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- The access control, alarm and CCTV systems recommended above must be regularly maintained and immediately repaired/replaced if faulty, in order to ensure the safety and security of the development and it's residents, staff and customers.
- Any vegetation existing or proposed around the buildings and parking areas should be kept to a maximum height of 1000mm and any foliage to trees should be at a height exceeding 2000mm, so as not to create potential hiding places for would-be criminals to exploit or impede natural surveillance of and from the buildings or parked vehicles.
- Cleaning, removal of graffiti and repair of damage arising from vandalism should be carried out quickly in order to maintain a culture of care and respect. A lack of maintenance often attracts further abuse.

2.4 Construction

Careful consideration should be given to securing the site during construction, to prevent unauthorized access and theft of equipment. For more information, please contact the local Crime Reduction Adviser (details below).

Name of local CRA(s):	Stuart Pizzey
Contact Telephone No(s):	0161 856 3046

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. We recommend the preferred contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme' (see Appendix 2), who maintain responsibility for a tidy area around their site.

3.0 Secured by Design (SBD)

SBD is a police initiative to encourage the building industry to adopt sensible security measures in the design and construction of developments to assist in reducing the opportunity for crime and the fear of crime, creating a safer and more secure environment. Developers who gain SBD accreditation also benefit from a significant marketing opportunity and are entitled to use the official SBD logo in their literature and advertising – the police award for incorporating design, layout and security measures that are conducive to community safety. More information about the application process and SBD licensed companies/products, as well as the application forms themselves, can be found at www.securedbydesign.com or www.designforsecurity.org.

4.0 Conclusions

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED) and 'Secured by Design (SBD), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. I have some concerns about the proposed development, particularly relating to out-of-hours access to the proposed mall. However, should the measures recommended above be incorporated into the scheme, I would be happy to support the proposed development.

As long as the other physical security measures above are incorporated, I see no reason why the proposed convenience retail store cannot achieve SBD accreditation. I would highly recommend that the internal fit-out of the other proposed commercial units are also SBD compliant.

designforsecurity Consultant	
	Bradley Hart MTCP

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

Appendices

A1 Glossary of Crime Types

SOURCE: Home Office

Arson

Deliberately destroying or damaging property by fire.

Burglary in a dwelling

Burglary in a dwelling

Where an offender enters a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Aggravated burglary in a dwelling

Where an offender, armed with a firearm, weapon or explosive, enters a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Burglary in a building other than a dwelling

Burglary in a building other than in a dwelling

Where an offender enters a building other than a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Aggravated burglary in a building other than a dwelling

Where an offender, armed with a firearm, weapon or explosive, enters a building other than a dwelling to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Criminal damage

Criminal damage to a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging somebody else's home.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging somebody else's home, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a building that belongs to someone else.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a building that belongs to someone else, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Criminal damage to a vehicle

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a vehicle that belongs to someone else.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a vehicle

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a vehicle that belongs to someone else, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Other criminal damage

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging items, excluding dwellings, buildings or vehicles that belong to someone else (not counted elsewhere).

Racially or religiously aggravated other criminal damage

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging items, excluding dwellings, buildings or vehicles that belong to someone else (not counted elsewhere), where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Threat or possession with intent to commit criminal damage

Threatening or causing someone to fear that his or her property might be damaged; or possessing anything, without lawful excuse, intended to cause damage.

Less serious wounding

Less serious wounding (including any minor injury)

Maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, with or without a weapon; also assaulting someone and causing him or her actual bodily harm.

Racially or religiously aggravated other wounding

Maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, with or without a weapon; also assaulting someone and causing him or her actual bodily harm, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Common assault (includes some minor injury)

Common assault (no injury)

Assaulting another person where the victim receives a minor injury or, as of 2002/03, no injury.

Racially or religiously aggravated common assault

Assaulting another person where the victim receives no injury and there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Miscellaneous theft

Theft from the person

Stealing property from another person, with intent to permanently deprive him or her of it.

Theft from shops

Stealing, with intent to permanently deprive, from retail premises (i.e. shoplifting).

Theft by an employee

Stealing from one's employer, with intent to permanently deprive the employer.

Theft or unlawful taking of mail

Unlawfully taking away or opening a mailbag.

Proceeds of crime

Concealing, disguising, converting, transferring or removing property obtained through criminal activity (i.e. money laundering).

Abstracting electricity

Dishonestly using, wasting or diverting electricity, without authority.

Other theft or unauthorised taking

Stealing not classified elsewhere.

Handling stolen goods

Dishonestly receiving or handling goods, knowing or believing them to be stolen.

Robbery

Robbery of personal property

The actual or threatened use of force during or immediately before the theft of personal property.

Robbery of business property

The actual or threatened use of force during or immediately before the theft of property belonging to a business.

Serious wounding

More serious wounding or other act endangering life

Viciously intending to cause grievous bodily harm to another person.

Theft from a motor vehicle

Theft from a vehicle

Where there is intent to steal from a vehicle rather than drive it away.

Vehicle interference and tampering

Interfering with a vehicle, its contents or anything carried in it.

Theft in dwelling

Theft from an automatic machine or meter

Stealing money from a meter in a dwelling.

Theft in a dwelling other than from an automatic machine or meter

Stealing property from a dwelling where the thief has not trespassed to gain entry

Theft of a motor vehicle

Theft or unauthorised taking of a motor vehicle

Stealing a motor vehicle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it.

Aggravated vehicle taking

Stealing a motor vehicle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it, and driving that vehicle dangerously, or consequently causing injury or damage to property, including to the vehicle.

Theft of a Pedal Cycle

Theft or unauthorised taking of a pedal cycle

Stealing a bicycle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it.

A2 Considerate Constructors Scheme

SOURCE:

www.consideratecon structorsscheme.org.uk

Code of Practice for the Scheme

1. ***Considerate***

All work is to be carried out with positive consideration to the needs of traders and businesses, site personnel and visitors, and the general public. Special attention is to be given to the needs of those with sight, hearing and mobility difficulties.

2. ***Environment***

Be aware of the environmental impact of your site and minimise as far as possible the effects of noise light and air pollution. Efforts should be made to select and use local resources wherever possible. Attention should be paid to waste management. Reuse and recycle materials where possible.

3. ***Cleanliness***

The working site is to be kept clean and in good order at all times. Site facilities, offices, toilets and drying rooms should always be maintained to a good standard. Surplus materials and rubbish should not be allowed to accumulate on the site or spill over into the surroundings. Dirt and dust from construction operations should be kept to a minimum.

4. ***Good Neighbour***

General information regarding the Scheme should be provided for all neighbours affected by the work. Full and regular communication with neighbours, including adjacent residents, traders and businesses, regarding programming and site activities should be maintained from pre-start to completion.

5. ***Respectful***

Respectable and safe standards of dress should be maintained at all times. Lewd or derogatory behaviour and language should not be tolerated under threat of severe disciplinary action. Pride in the management and appearance of the site and the surrounding environment is to be shown at all times. Operatives should be instructed in dealing with the general public.

6. ***Safe***

Construction operations and site vehicle movements are to be carried out with care and consideration for the safety of site personnel, visitors and the general public. No building activity should be a security risk to others.

7. ***Responsible***

Ensure that everyone associated with the site understands implements and complies with this code.

8. ***Accountable***

The Considerate Constructors Scheme poster is to be displayed where clearly visible to the general public. A site's contact details should be obvious to anyone affected by its activities.