Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement: Lite

LOCO Superstore Unit G18, Smithfield Building

Retail and Leisure

For Creative Planning

Version A: 17th June 2013

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Not Protectively Marked

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2013/0421/CIS/01

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The 'Crime Impact Statement: Lite' Explained

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Lite' has been created to accompany planning applications for small developments, changes of use, and other minor applications at the discretion of the local planning authority in accordance with the local validation checklist. These developments, although small, can have a tendency to invite a disproportionately high volume of crime and incidents, making designing-out criminal opportunities at the outset an invaluable opportunity. The CIS: Lite will advise on a range of measures possible given the scope of works, which aim to minimise these opportunities for crime.

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

Levels of crime in the district, particularly violent and alcohol-related disorder, are above average for Greater Manchester. It is therefore essential that the scheme does not incorporate features that would increase the risk of crime or the fear of crime in and around the premises.

The development does not seek to make major physical alterations to the building, and thus the success of the proposal will be largely dependent on effective management measures being implemented, in order to provide adequate levels of supervision within the premises. Our support for this development is subject adoption of recommendations contained within section 4 of this report.



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1 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.



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- The site is in Manchester's 'Northern Quarter', part of the city centre characterised by small-scale creative industries, independent retailers, restaurants, bars and housing.
- Buildings in this area generally front directly on to the street, and are low and medium rise structures containing minimal external / servicing space.
- The existing pattern of development has created relatively small "blocks", and many streets in the area are narrow.
- There are a number of licensed / restaurant premises in the Northern Quarter, although they are not heavily concentrated in one place.
- The site has frontage on three streets – Thomas Street, Tib Street and Carpenters Lane – the latter being effectively a back street, providing service access to the rear of premises on Thomas Street.
- The site is opposite a large multi-storey car park for the use of general public and local residents. There are some small parcels of "amenity space" around the car park, some of which do not relate particularly well to the adjacent buildings or street pattern, and have been subject to abuse. A local community group is making some improvements to the appearance of these neglected areas by introducing planting and other landscape features.

Pictures

1 Tib Street looking north with the application premises on the right of the picture. The street contains a mix of uses including residential properties.

2 The application premises front Tib Street and contain large windows that help to provide good levels of natural surveillance of and from the street. The building frontage itself does not included any deeply recessed areas that could be exploited for criminal or antisocial purposes.

3 The vehicular entrance to the multi-storey car park is directly opposite the site. The design of the car park has created a number of

4 The utility structure on the corner of Tib Street and Thomas Street is an incongruous feature in the street scene and has been a regular target for criminal damage.

5 Opposite the site there are some odd parcels of left-over land around the car park, some of which have been neglected and / or subject to abuse. Accumulations of litter over extended periods create a negative impression of the area, can constitute a hazard and generate a lack of respect for the public realm that can lead to further abuses.

6 Refuse bins for commercial waste lined up on Tib Street close to the application premises. These can be subject to abuse if left out for extended periods.

7 View of the junction of Tib Street / Thomas Street opposite the application premises. Poorly maintained trees / street furniture and ancillary structures in the public realm can obscure sight lines and provide cover for criminal or antisocial activity, and can contribute to an impression of neglect known as the "broken window effect" – often leading to further abuse.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2012 and 2013.

2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
23	201	326	914	955	201	27	325	63	348

2.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is very high, due to its location within the city centre. The volumes of violent crime, theft, robbery and vehicle crime are exceptionally high and the rate of burglary at commercial premises is much greater than normally experienced in Manchester as a whole.

2.2 Misc Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to misc theft offences within/against retail premises, recorded in the Manchester city council area.

2.2.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of theft is greatest on Saturday. It is likely that the risk of theft increases on Saturday when shops are busiest, providing offenders with more opportunities.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of misc. theft increases in the afternoon, peaking between 4pm and 5pm. The number of shoppers is greatest in the afternoon and therefore the opportunity to commit theft is greater. It is likely that thieves will target the busiest shops, as crowds can provide anonymity and can reduce the risk of being detected.

2.3 Burglary Other (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against retail premises, recorded in the Manchester city council area.

2.3.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary is greatest on Monday and Friday, with the risk lowest on Saturday and Sunday.

2.3.2 Time Range: During the day the risk of burglary increases in the afternoon and in the early evening. A high number of burglaries have taken place when shops are open and offenders have entered as customers before targeting areas restricted to staff.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries at retail premises have been committed through front and rear doors, and a high number committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which have typically been when offenders, posing as customers, have targeted staff only areas. When doors have been targeted they have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure and in a number of cases glazing within doors have been smashed by offenders to gain entry.

2.4 Misc Theft (Café/Restaurants): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against café/restaurant premises, recorded in the Manchester area.

2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of misc. theft peaks on the days of the weekend, between Friday and Saturday. Restaurants are usually open for longer periods at the weekend, and are busier, leading to more opportunities for offenders to commit theft.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of theft increases later in the evening, when café/restaurants are busiest and the opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency.

2.4.3 Handbags, phones and cameras belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Items are usually stolen from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

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2.5 Burglary Other (Café/Restaurants): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against café/restaurant premises, recorded in the Manchester area.

2.5.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary at café/restaurants is highest between Monday and Friday, when restaurants and licensed premises are open less frequently and for shorter periods of time. At the weekend, such premises are often open for longer and the opportunity to commit burglary is reduced.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary is highest early in the afternoon and in the early hours of the morning. Restaurants are likely to be targeted at these times, as they are unlikely to be open or have a reduced staff presence.

2.5.3 Point of Entry: In many cases of burglary, the point of entry is undetermined and this could be due to the open access of most café/restaurants, where people can walk in freely without raising any suspicion. In many cases, offenders have accessed staff only areas or areas that are not open to the public (by tailgating or through insecure doors) and have stolen property. When offenders have broken in, they have typically targeted doors, including fire doors. Doors have routinely been forced open using bodily pressure or tools.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The information below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

2.6.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday.

2.6.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is greatest in the evening, peaking between 7pm and 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time when it is dark, leaving vehicles parked on remote/isolated side streets and car parks vulnerable to attack undetected.

2.7 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The information below relates to woundings committed within a Km² centred on the site.

2.7.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people descend on the city centre area to attend licensed premises, often drinking for longer periods and consuming more alcohol.

2.7.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 2am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on streets, in taxi ranks and at takeaways.

2.8 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The information below relates to criminal damage and robbery committed within a Km² centred on the site.

2.8.1 Criminal Damage Targets: The makeup of the criminal damage in this area shows that properties are almost twice as likely to be targeted as vehicles. Common incidents of criminal damage include graffiti, windows being smashed (both of properties and vehicles) and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.8.2 Robbery Targets: Robbery against the person is much more prevalent than against businesses in this area. The risk of robbery increases when victims take quieter, more secluded routes through the area alone in the evening/at night.

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2.9 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.9.1 Theft of customer property from/under tables and chairs

Possible Solution - Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see opposite) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.



2.9.2 Burglary where rear doors have been forced open to gain entry

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (PAS 24 or LPS 1175). Access should be restricted to any hidden elevations of the building, where any doors could be attacked unseen from the street.

2.9.3 Burglary where rear windows have been smashed to gain entry

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (PAS 24 or LPS 1175). Access should be restricted to any hidden elevations of the building, where any doors could be attacked unseen from the street.

2.9.4 Violent disorder/conflict between intoxicated customers

Possible Solution - Whilst it is appreciated that the operator of the premises cannot be held responsible for the behaviour of patrons once they leave the establishment, they can adopt good management practices to discourage violence and disorder. The effective management of entry (including any queuing) and egress of patrons by staff, particularly at busy periods, is essential to control numbers and avoid conflicts. Restrictions on swearing, rowdiness etc. can also reduce aggression. Whilst it is accepted that restaurant premises create fewer problems than establishments that dispense alcohol, operators of the premises should nevertheless liaise with other local businesses and cooperation with police initiatives in order to reduce potential disorder in the vicinity.

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Theft
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises

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4 Design Considerations

4.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

4.1.1 The main entrance for customers of the restaurant and deli is in an obvious and highly visible location off Tib Street.

4.1.2 The large ground floor windows will effectively connect the internal activities with the public realm, thus helping to enliven the street scene and improve natural surveillance.

4.1.3 The internal layout appears relatively uncluttered and free of recesses and pinch points that would create opportunities for criminal or antisocial behaviour.

4.1.4 Most back-of-house functions appear to be adequately separated from public areas. All staff only rooms should be fitted with access controls and key lockable. Signage should also be used to direct customers and restrict access to staff only rooms and stores.

4.2 Further Consideration Required

4.2.1 Mix of deli and restaurant functions could provide opportunities for people to leave the premises without making payment – the entrance and steps areas will need careful supervision by staff in order to discourage this.

4.2.2 Access to toilets for customers in the basement requires passage through the shop area which cannot easily be separated and this provides opportunities for theft. This area will require a staff presence at all times that the basement is in use.

4.2.3 Opening hours should be similar to other restaurant premises in the area.

4.2.4 The basement diner should be designed with efficient ventilation / extraction systems capable of reducing temperatures and providing sufficient ventilation in the kitchen and dining areas without the need for staff or customers to open service doors / windows that could undermine the integrity of other security arrangements.

4.3 Advisory Comments

4.3.1 Restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons of restaurants are stationary for long periods of time making them easier to target.

Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction, and other factors mean patrons are easily distracted.

Cohesion – particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent premises means that such a venue would lack ‘community territoriality’, i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them. This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur in venue where there is a ‘regular’ clientele.

Customer turnover – High customer turnover restaurants, with high levels of customer movement within the establishment are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.

Valuable goods – often available and possibly on show, a particular problem on external seating areas, although that is not currently an issue with this proposal. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, etc.

Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.

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- Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff.
- All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- Large amounts of cash should not be stored in the premises over night and signage should be installed to indicate this. Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till/bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- Consideration should be given to high/wide bar areas, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of the service counter should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled).
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points. A clear pathway to and from the toilets to the seating areas is desirable.
- There should be few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation.

4.3.2 With the above in mind, an 'operating policy' should be drawn up which includes:

- security (door policy; door staff; staff training; CCTV cameras - monitoring and recording facilities, and their locations; and cash storage/management);
- fire safety
- dispersal procedure
- waste management.

4.3.3 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. A maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:

- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti;
- Opening and closing of premises including staff arrival and departure
- Cash management within the premises
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices
- Management of stock deliveries.

4.3.4 For further guidance on security management, and information regarding security initiatives in the area, please contact the local Crime Reduction Advisor – Colette Harris-Jones, on 0161 856 2418

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5 Useful References

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

5.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

5.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
28/05/13	Creative Planning	CIS Instruction Received
13/06/13	N/A	Site Visit

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
N/A	Site Location Plan	N/A	
N/A	Existing Ground Floor	N/A	
N/A	Existing Basement Floor	N/A	
N/A	Proposed Ground Floor	N/A	
N/A	Proposed Basement Floor	N/A	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

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