

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Cornishway, Manchester

Erection of 8 no. Apartments & 12 no. Houses

For T & G Associates

Version A: 13/01/12

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Not Protectively Marked

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Cornishway, Manchester

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2012/0002/CIS/01

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Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. Particular consideration should be given to the following matters, which are discussed in more detail within this report:

- Gating of rear access road/parking area
- General boundary definitions

If these concerns/issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

I would encourage further dialogue with the applicant throughout the design and construction process to ensure the resulting development is secure. Please get in touch with Design for Security if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.



Bradley Hart *MTCP*

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.



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Photos 1, 2 & 3

The site is bounded by Cornishway to the north and Braintree Road to the east and south. It is currently occupied by scrub/low-level vegetation with some mature trees and is enclosed with low-level chain link fencing and railings, some of which is in a state of disrepair. The site also contains some loose building materials/rubble (probably left over from the building which previously occupied the site), as does the large roundabout to the immediate south of the site. Such loose material can be used to commit crime or nuisance/anti-social behaviour, but this should be a temporary issue as the site is developed.

Photos 4, 5 & 6

The surrounding area is primarily residential in nature and is overlooked from the south and east by semi-detached dwellings fronting onto Braintree Road. There is a part 3/4 storey apartment building along the western boundary of the site, which fronts onto Cornishway and has a rear car park accessed off Briantree Road. The car park is enclosed with high-level railings and a vehicular sliding gate, which was open at the time the site was visited – leaving the parked vehicles and side/rear elevations of the building fully accessible. Lighting levels also appear to be inadequate and the rear elevation of the apartment building is blank and does not include any habitable room windows overlooking the car park – all features which may provide opportunities to criminals.

Photo 7, 8 & 9

There is a large public house directly opposite the site (The Cornishman) and a large parade of shops just to the north-west (with flats above), including a post office, a pharmacy, s hair salon, newsagents, off-licences and hot food takeaways. Such premises can often be a focus for crime and anti-social behaviour incidents, particularly late at night and during the weekend. There is a CCTV column at the corner of Cornishway and Portway outside of the parade, indicating that there may have been such issues experienced. There is a bus shelter directly adjacent to the site on Cornishway – creating a feature which will attract legitimate loitering/gathering close to the proposed dwellings, potentially leading to nuisance and intimidation of residents.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2011 and 2012.

2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
21	<20	54	65	20	<20	<20	<20	<20	<20

2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is not exceptionally high and the rate of crime is generally lower than is experienced on average across Greater Manchester. Only the rate of wounding in the local area is greater than the rate experienced across Greater Manchester, but lower than the average rate for Manchester City Council.

Figure 2: Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 3: Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 4: Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 5: Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



2.1.2 The number of domestic burglaries per dwelling is **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.3 The number of woundings per dwelling is **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.4 Incidents of criminal damage per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.5 Incidents of vehicle crime per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

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2.2 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 6: Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Figure 7: Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Figure 8: Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.2.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary in the local area varies during the week. The risk of burglary is highest on Wednesday and Friday and lowest on Sunday. The risk of burglary, on average, is greater between Monday and Friday than at the weekend.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary peaks twice during the day, once at around midday and again at midnight. Offenders often target residential properties during the day when occupants are away from home/at work. Households are frequently targeted at night, when it is dark, streets are quiet and offenders perceive a lower the risk of being disturbed or detected.

2.2.3 Point of Entry: In the local area, the majority of burglaries have been committed through the rear of properties. Rear doors have frequently been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and tools to gain entry. Rear windows have been prised open by offenders and in some cases glazing has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.

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2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 10: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: In the area examined, the risk of vehicle crime is highest on Monday and Saturday and is significantly lower on other days of the week.

2.3.2 Time Range: In this area, the risk of vehicle crime is concentrated in the evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders often target vehicles when it is dark, streets are quiet as they perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to woundings committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 12: Wounding – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of violence in the local area is concentrated on Saturday and Sunday. Violence is typically more prevalent at the weekend when more people attend licensed premises – often drinking for longer and consuming more alcohol

2.4.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of violence is greatest in the evening and in the early hours of the morning. The risk of violence often increases in the evening and at night, when conflicts arise in license premises, on streets and in homes fuelled by intoxication.

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2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 13: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 14: Robbery Targets



2.5.1 Criminal Damage Targets: In the local area, the majority of criminal damage has been against properties rather than vehicles. The most common occurrence of criminal damage has been smashed glazing both to buildings and vehicles. Graffiti and damage to vehicle bodywork has also frequently occurred.

2.5.2 Robbery Targets: In the local area, the majority of robberies have been against individuals rather than businesses. Individuals have frequently been targeted when travelling alone through the area at night.

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Rear doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 6.1 and 6.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access (see Section 6.6). Lighting to the front and rear of the buildings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 7.2).

2.6.2 Rear windows have been prised open

Possible Solution - The windows themselves should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 6.3), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Again, unauthorised access to the rear of the dwellings should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open areas (such as pedestrian routes or parking areas) to the rear of the properties.

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3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1.1 The proposal is to erect 12 no. bungalows and a single 2 storey block of 8 no. apartments, with associated parking and landscaping. The dwellings will be located around the perimeter of the site, fronting onto Cornishway and Braintree Road. There will be a new rear access road taken off the existing roundabout to the south of the site – leading to a small communal car park (comprising of 8 no. spaces) and bin store serving the apartment block. The majority of the proposed bungalows will also have off-road parking spaces to their rear, accessed from the rear access road.

5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.2.1 The proposed houses/apartments front onto the surrounding roads, resulting in good levels of surveillance of and from the dwellings.

5.2.2 The proposed apartment block will have habitable room windows to the front elevation of the building, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street and any visitors.

5.2.3 The design of the buildings has been kept simple, with no front doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).

5.2.4 The development of this site will bring a currently vacant site back into use and provide some activity/surveillance to the area.

5.3 Points for Further Consideration

5.3.1 The rear access road/communal parking area should be fitted with automatic vehicular gates to prevent unauthorised access to parked vehicles and the rear of dwellings, where they could be attacked unseen from the street. The gates should be controlled by resident fob or proximity reader both on access into and egress from the access road/car park i.e. no induction loop (see Section 6.6).

5.3.2 It is essential that the sides/rears of the houses are enclosed and defined as private space to prevent unauthorised access to the rear of dwellings (see Section 6.6). The rear boundaries of the houses and apartments should be partially visually permeable to allow some surveillance over the rear access road/parking area and allow residents to see their own vehicles, whilst maintaining a secure boundary. The front elevations of all of the dwellings should be protected by some defensible space, defined by low-level walls/railings, creating areas in front of each property entirely separate from the street, in ownership/control of the residents themselves.

5.3.3 Those properties that are closest to the existing bus stop on Cornishway (Plots B2, B3 and B4) should have particularly robust front boundaries defined by 1200mm high railings along with defensive planting (which would deter comfortably sitting/leaning against the front boundaries), along with pedestrian gates to give some further protection and definition to their semi-private front gardens – deterring access to anyone without a purpose.

5.3.4 Ideally, at least some of the proposed bungalows should have habitable room windows to their front elevations, providing some surveillance over the street and any visitors.

5.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors (Houses)

6.1.1 Front and rear doors to the bungalows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. Any external french/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

6.1.2 Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. They should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.

6.1.3 Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential. Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

6.2 Doors & Access Controls (Apartments)

6.2.1 The main communal entrance doorsets must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. They should be self-closing and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.

6.2.2 The rear communal doors should also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2 and should be for the use of residents only, operated by key-fob only.

6.2.3 All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.

6.2.4 Postal delivery arrangements should ideally allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If not, there should be a ‘secure lobby’ arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries without providing access to all floors of the building.

6.3 Windows

6.3.1 Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.

6.3.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.4 Glazing

6.4.1 Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 0.8mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.8mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.5 Alarms

6.5.1 Each house and apartment should have an intruder alarm installed to comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems, or
- BS 6799 for wireless systems.

6.5.2 All external doors to should be fitted with alarm contacts and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

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6.6 Boundaries

6.6.1 The rear access road/parking area should be accessed through automatic gates to prevent unauthorised access. The gate/s should be 2100mm and operated using a key fob/proximity reader system with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out') so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights etc. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. If double gates are used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open. Any pedestrian gate should also be self-closing and fob-in/fob-out.

6.6.2 The sides (including gables up to/as close as possible the front building line) and rears of the houses and apartment block should generally be enclosed with 2100mm high walls or robust close-boarded timber fencing. Any side pedestrian gates to private space should be fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock. Sub-divisional rear boundaries should be 1500-1800mm high.

6.6.3 Rear boundaries that are adjacent to the secure rear access road/car park (see below) should be partially visually permeable (e.g. 900mm high wall with 1200mm railings above) to allow some surveillance through. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls/railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Rear pedestrian gates should be lockable from both side to allow residents access to/from their vehicles.

6.6.4 The fronts of all of the proposed houses should be demarcated by low railings to an approximate height of 1200mm. The properties closest to the existing bus stop (i.e. Plots B2, B3 and B4) should also incorporate 1200mm high pedestrian gates and defensive planting to provide some added protection.

6.6.5 Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

7 External Features

7.1 Landscaping

7.1.1 In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

7.1.2 Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

7.1.3 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

7.1.4 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

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7.2 Lighting

7.2.1 Lighting to all roads/footpaths and communal parking areas should be to adoptable standards (to comply with BS 5489).

7.2.2 External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.

7.2.3 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

7.2.4 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

7.3 Communal Areas

7.3.1 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7.4 Other

7.4.1 Ideally, meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of houses only and not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.

7.4.2 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

7.4.3 Any communal cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf

7.4.4 Any communal bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

8 Management & Maintenance

The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

9 Construction

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

For further information regarding site security, please contact your local Crime Reduction Advisor, **Gill Price**, on **0161 856 6174**.

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
30th December 2011	T&G Associates Ltd	Receipt of CIS instruction & plans
12th January 2012	T&G Associates Ltd	Email sent to Agent re: payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
8338/001	Existing Site Plan/Location Plan	June 2011	A
8338/101	Proposed Site Plan	November 2011	C
8338/110	Proposed Apartment Plans	November 2011	-
8338/111	Proposed Bungalow Plans & Elevations	November 2011	-
8338/120	Proposed Apartment Elevations	November 2011	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☒	☐	

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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