CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

POTATO WHARF, MANCHESTER

191 APARTMENTS

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR LEND LEASE RESIDENTIAL (NORTH WEST) LTD

VERSION A: 14TH MAY 2015

REFERENCE: 2005/1427/CIS/02

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

POTATO WHARF, MANCHESTER

2005/1427/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found generally acceptable; however, a series of recommendations have been made in section 3.3 of this report which should be included to reduce the potential risk of antisocial and criminal behaviour. Areas identified for further consideration include:

- Ground floor balconies on publically accessible boundaries.
- Bicycle parking.

If the recommendations included within this report are included we would be supportive of the development at planning application stage.



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1 Visual Audit


The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map edged in red. The site is located within the City of Manchester and close to the City of Salford boundary.

The development site is loosely bound by Potato Wharf to the North, the Bridgewater Canal to the East, a viaduct and Bridgewater Canal to the South, and Regents Road to the West.

The site is currently vacant with buildings from the previous use remaining on site. The site was last used as a concrete batching plant.

A cobbled access road lies to the North of the site, providing access to the site and pedestrian/cycle access to the A57.













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2014 and 30th April 2015.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site									
Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
30	54	86	167	50	<20	<20	100	<20	34

2.1.1 Overall crime in the area is moderately high. In the previous 12 months the most commonly occurring offences have been less serious wounding, theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage. Looking at the figures in more detail, in comparison to the averages for Greater Manchester and Manchester, the rates of violent crime, domestic burglary and criminal damage (per 1,000 dwellings) are all lower. However, the rate of vehicle crime (per 1,000 dwellings) is higher than that experienced across both Manchester and Greater Manchester (see section 2.4).

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Doors have been forced open using bodily pressure and tools

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (i.e. PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Lighting can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime.

2.2.2 Windows have been prised open

Possible Solution - Windows should be certified to recognised security standards (i.e. BS 7950), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Again, unauthorised access to the rear of the dwellings should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes to the rear of the properties.

2.2.3 Glazing has been smashed in windows and doors

Possible Solution - Ground floor and easily accessible glazing should incorporate a laminated pane which, unlike toughened glazing, does not shatter when smashed and provides a more robust barrier to entry.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Antisocial behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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
2.4 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

The rates below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.


Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The number of domestic burglaries per dwelling is **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester.

2.4.2 The number of woundings per dwelling is **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester.

2.4.3 Incidents of criminal damage per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester.


2.4.4 Incidents of vehicle crime per dwelling are **higher** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester.

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
2.5 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of residential burglary is greatest on Saturday.

2.5.2 Time Range: In the local area the risk of burglary peaks in the late evening. Offenders often target residential properties at night when it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.


2.5.3 Point of Entry: Burglaries have taken place through a number of different points of entry, including doors (particularly front doors) and through windows. Doors have frequently been forced open with tools and bodily pressure and in a number of cases glazing in doors has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Windows have frequently been prised open by offenders.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of vehicle crime is fairly consistent with a slightly greater risk on Wednesday.

2.6.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is greatest in the evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target vehicles in the evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low. Vehicles parked within open, communal areas or on streets, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure garages.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The development site is located within the City of Manchester and close to the City of Salford boundary. The development site is loosely bound by Potato Wharf to the North, the Bridgewater Canal to the East, a viaduct and Bridgewater Canal to the South, and Regents Road to the West.

3.1.2 The proposed development is the erection of two eight storey apartment buildings providing a total of 191 apartments. The proposed apartment buildings will form blocks 3 and 4 of the Potato Wharf development, Block 3 will provide 112 apartments and Block 4 will provide 79. Bicycle parking and 126 car parking spaces will be provided for residents.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The existing development is covered by a concierge service, this concierge service will be extended to cover the proposed apartment buildings which will allow CCTV to be monitored, illegitimate behaviour to be challenged, and for any criminal or anti-social behaviour to be reported to the police.

3.2.2 The proposed pedestrian links through the site to Regents Road and across the Bridgewater Canal to the West of the site will be restricted to daylight hours.

3.2.3 A secure parking area will be provided for residents vehicles. The car parking area will be illuminated and subject to CCTV coverage.

3.2.4 Postal workers will only be permitted access to one area of the building, through which they will post letters/parcels through the wall for residents to receive from the lobby area in a personal mailbox. This prevents postal workers being allow unfettered access throughout the development, which could potentially leave residents vulnerable.

3.2.5 The proposed development will bring this vacant site back in to use. The existing access road that runs to the East of the development site has been used for fly tipping and is not well overlooked, potentially

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leaving users of this footway vulnerable. The proposed development will open up the passageway, provide opportunities for surveillance and restricting access to daylight hours will restrict opportunities for antisocial and criminal behaviour.

3.2.6 The first phase of the development is covered by CCTV and this will be extended to cover the proposed apartment blocks.

3.2.7 The proposed boundary treatments will restrict access to communal areas to residents.

3.3 Changes and Amendments Needed

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.



3.3.1 The proposed first floor balconies are potentially problematic. The ground floor level is elevated above street level, raising the balconies above street level; however, they would still be at a height where they are potentially vulnerable (particularly where positioned near climbing aids such as bollards – see photograph opposite). We would highly recommend that ground floor balconies are avoided on the proposed development or limited to elevations within the secure boundary. If the ground floor boundaries are to remain the following measures should included:

- climbing aids, such as bollards should not be positioned close to balconies;
- glass balustrades should be fixed flush with the outer wall to prevent creating a foot/hand hold which could facilitate climbing;
- balcony areas should be illuminated to a high standard;
- external door and windows should be certified to BS PAS 24 and glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356; and,
- alarms should be provided where ground floor apartments are located on the publically accessible elevation (adjacent the access road).

3.3.2 The bicycle shelter in the underground car parking area of the blocks 1 & 2 has been targeted by offenders on multiple occasions. The parking area for the proposed blocks will be secured with full height gates, rather than just an arm barrier, which will restrict access to residents and this should provide a greater level of security to the proposed bicycle store. A more secure cycle parking solution would be to provide bicycle parking inside the apartment blocks, rather than in the car parking area, with a secure door subject to access control measures. If the cycle store remains in the car parking area it should be located where it should be well overlooked by the apartment blocks, it should be illuminated to a high standard, covered by CCTV (both externally and internally), be built of robust material and access should be restricted to residents. Cycle stands should be U-profile or Sheffield style stands.

3.3.3 The proposed access road should be illuminated to adoptable standards. Pedestrian routes through the site and car parking areas should be illuminated to BS 5489.

3.3.4 The proposed car parking area is located under the existing viaduct. Lighting within the car parking area should be display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. Lighting should be designed so that areas of shadowing and light pooling are avoided, particularly around supporting structures.

3.3.5 The vehicular gates to the car parking area and the managed delivery area be secured and restricted to residents. Automatic gates should be operated with a key fob/proximity rear with no automatic egress. It is acceptable for the gate in to the managed delivery area to be controlled by concierge/intercom. The gates and railings should have no features that could provide a climbing aid (i.e. horizontal bars, exposed hinges etc.) and the gap at the bottom should be minimised to prevent crawling under. Pedestrian gates should be provided and this should be self-closing and lock automatically so that it cannot be left insecure. The pedestrian gate to the footway/cycleway and bridge will only be closed at night time which is permitted, but should have these features if expected to be used by residents so that they remain secure.

3.3.6 Due to the number of apartments in the scheme as a whole it is recommended that the existing concierge service is extended do operated on a 24 hour basis. Through the night coverage would allow

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continuous monitoring of CCTV and assistance to residents in the event of anti-social or criminal behaviour.

3.3.7 The South facing elevation of block 3 (publically accessible elevation) and the adjacent vehicular/pedestrian route should be covered by CCTV.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors (Town House)

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access in to the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access in to the building.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor, and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

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4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
  - Communal entrance doors
  - Pedestrian/vehicular access gates
  - Bicycle store
  - Postal delivery areas
  - Concierge office

4.7 Boundaries

- ☐ Boundary treatments should be a minimum of 2400mm high and of welded mesh or railing construction. Where welded mesh fencing is used a close knit panel is recommended such as a 358 security mesh.
- ☐ Automatic gates should be operated with a key fob/proximity rear with no automatic egress. It is acceptable for the gate in to the managed delivery area to be controlled by concierge/intercom. The gates and railings should have no features that could provide a climbing aid (i.e. horizontal bars, exposed hinges etc.) and the gap at the bottom should be minimised to prevent crawling under. Pedestrian gates should be provided and this should be self-closing and lock automatically so that it cannot be left insecure.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

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4.9 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided all building elevations, external communal areas and all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.10 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Building elevations, car parking area, cycle stores and communal entrances.

4.11 Car Parks

- Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated.
- Car park exit gates should not be on an induction loop (open automatically). All gates to car parks should be fob-in and fob-out.
- The pedestrian gate in to car parks should also be fob in and fob out only.

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4.12 Other

- ❑ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ❑ Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf
- ❑ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20/04/2015	Pete Gleave	CIS instruction received
06/05/2015	Pete Gleave Steve Woodward Dave Vanderson	CIS meeting
28/05/2015	Pete Gleave Maria White	CIS issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
16042 A3010-A	Blocks 3 & 4 Ground Floor	Apr 15	-
16042 A3011-A	Blocks 3 & 4 First Floor	Apr 15	-
16042 A3012-A	Blocks 3 & 4 Second Floor	Apr 15	-
16042 A3013-A	Blocks 3 & 4 Third Floor	Apr 15	-
16042 A3014-A	Blocks 3 & 4 Fourth Floor	Apr 15	-
16042 A3015-A	Blocks 3 & 4 Fifth Floor	Apr 15	-
16042 A3016-A	Blocks 3 & 4 Sixth Floor	Apr 15	-
16042 A3017-A	Blocks 3 & 4 Seventh Floor	Apr 15	-
16042 A3018-A	Blocks 3 & 4 Roof	Apr 15	-
16042 SK01	DV Site Plan	Apr 15	-
16042 SK02	DV Red Line Boundary Plan	Apr 15	-
16042 SK02	DV Site Location Plan	Apr 14	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A				

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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