

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Ground Floor, 60 Spring Gardens, Manchester, M2 2BQ

Bar/Coffee Shop & External Seating Area

FOR: Roc & Rye Ltd

VERSION A: 8th November 20126

REFERENCE: 2016/0863/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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Ground Floor, 60 Spring Gardens, Manchester, M2 2BQ

URN:2016/0863/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found generally acceptable, with a series of recommendations made in section 3.3, if these recommendations are implemented we would be supportive of a planning application.



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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The development is the change of use, and refurbishment of part of the ground floor of 60 Spring Gardens, located in the city centre area of Manchester.

The main entrance to the licensed premises is located on the junction of Fountain Street and Spring Gardens. Property in the local area is generally offices but there are an increasing number of retail offerings, licensed premises/restaurants, and hotels. The location of the development is located to the North of the Town Hall area, to the South of Market Street/Piccadilly Gardens, and Deansgate/Spinningfields lies to the West.













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2015 and 31st October 2016.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within a Km of Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
25	332	410	1932	1525	260	83	252	42	433

2.1.1 Over the last 12 months, there have been 5371 crimes recorded within a Km of the development site; which is considered a very high volume of crime. The most prevalent crimes have been less serious wounding, criminal damage, miscellaneous theft and theft from motor vehicle, which are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.

2.1.2 Incidents of violence took place from Friday to Sunday, when the city centre is at its busiest, and most commonly occurred in the street, primarily around Piccadilly Gardens. Where there were incidents of theft, the majority of these also took place across the weekend and predominantly occurred in bars, nightclubs and on the street.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Doors (front, rear, side and fire) were forced open with bodily pressure or the glazing smashed in door windows to gain access.

Possible Solution – External doors should be rated to the security standards detailed in section 4.1.

2.2.2 Offenders posed as legitimate customers to gain access before targeting insecure doors- insecure internal and external doors was a common issue.

Possible Solution - Staff-only areas should be effectively separated, both visually and physically, so that customers cannot readily gain entry. This can be achieved by the use of access-controlled doors or barriers, but they should create a clear distinction so that any intruder can be more easily identified. There should be provision within the staff only areas for the secure storage of personal belongings while at work.

2.2.3 Theft of customer property from licensed premises and restaurants

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Theft of staff and customer property
- Loitering groups and anti-social behaviour
- Criminal damage to vehicles and commercial premises
- Cash robbery
- Uncontrolled access (staff/customer only)
- Commercial burglary


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- Cycle security
- Violence towards staff and other users


2.4 Burglary Other (Bar/Restaurant): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against bars and restaurants recorded in the North Manchester area.


Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at bars and restaurants in North Manchester is concentrated over the weekend, when they experience their highest levels of attendance.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk spikes throughout the day, peaking in the early hours of the morning between 3am to 5am. Offenders often target properties at this time when premises are likely to be closed, it is dark and the neighbouring streets/area are quieter.

2.4.3 Point of Entry: Over half of burglaries at restaurants and bars took place through doors, including fire, front, rear and side doors. Offenders frequently smashed through door windows or used bodily pressure to force doors open.

In a number of instances, offenders posed as legitimate customers to gain access to bars and restaurants before accessing restricted areas or targeting insecure doors; doors were also targeted


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when left insecure highlighting the need for stronger security measures in place to reduce the risk of this occurring.


2.5 Misc Theft (Bars/Restaurants): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against bars and restaurants, recorded in the North Manchester area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.5.1 Day and Time Range: There is a significant increase in the risk of theft at bars and restaurants over the weekend, rather than across weekdays. During the day, the risk peaks in the early hours of the morning from 1to 2am; this is when restaurants and licensed premises are often at their busiest and the opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency (particularly when victims have been drinking alcohol). Items are usually stolen from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is a change of use to a bar/restaurant.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The main entrance to the premises is taken from a recessed sheltered doorway. At present there is a metal gate which can be closed to restrict access to the sheltered area. It is recommended that this feature is retained so to reduce the potential for antisocial behaviour, or criminal behaviour, generated by the opportunity for concealment and shelter from the elements.

3.2.2 The surrounding area is not dominated by drinking establishments compared to other areas of the city centre and it is typically these areas where the volume of night time economy related crimes occur.

3.2.3 The main entrance to the development can be viewed from bar area, allowing staff to view those entering the premises.

3.2.4 Pedestrian flow in this area is not very high and therefore an external seating area should have little impact or potential to generate criminal activity.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work (i.e. lockers). Ideally, there should also be a secure cash office – which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a door set certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. Areas restricted to

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staff should be well signed so that would be offenders cannot use the excuse of becoming lost as an excused for accessing restricted areas.

3.3.2 Consideration should be given to high bars/service counters, which increases the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aids surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of the bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled).

3.3.3 The external seating area should be defined with a low barrier or similar, to prevent members of the public and would-be thieves from passing to closely to the tables which could leave personal property vulnerable.

3.3.4 Tables (both inside and outside) should be fitted with a hook such as a Chelsea clip or similar to allow customers to securely store handbags/rucksacks when sat at tables.

3.3.5 An alarm should be installed to cover the premises, linked to contacts on the entrance/fire doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (e.g. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder).

3.3.6 Toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Suspended ceilings, where drugs and paraphernalia can be hidden, should be avoided.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.

3.3.7 Licensed premises are often the scene of violence and therefore it is highly recommended that the premises covered by a comprehensive CCTV system.

3.3.8 The success of licensed premises is often down to good and proactive management practice. Section 5 of this report contains a number of recommendations which should form part of the management plan for the premises.

4 Physical Security

The proposed development comprises conversion of an existing building which involves little change to the structure, thus the potential to make alterations and upgrade the physical security of the building is limited. The following recommendations are made on this understanding but should apply to all new construction.

4.1 Door, Windows, Shutters

- ❑ External doors including French windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ❑ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ❑ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ❑ All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.
- ❑ Doors to storage, staff-only or office space should be solid core, with multi point locking.

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- Any new windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950, must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.2 Access Control

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Doors separating public and staff-only areas.

4.3 Intruder Alarm

- An intruder alarm should be installed linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover any rooms with windows.
- It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.4 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: all external doors, till points, bar area, entrances, and external seating areas.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:

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- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
- Inspection of toilets to reduce the potential for misuse;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

5.1.2 There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

5.1.3 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Service of drinks should end approximately 30 minutes before the premises closes, in order to aid effective dispersal of customers.

5.1.4 Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

5.1.5 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.6 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PD/ROC113_001	Site Location Plan	04-08-2016	
IEC-E0415.E01	Proposed Electrical Layout	08.09.2016	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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