

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Dalbeattie Street, Harpurhey, Manchester

10 No. Apartments

Bernard Taylor Partnerships

VERSION A:

URN:2017/0063/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

Dalbeattie Street, Harpurhey, Manchester, M9 4AP

2017/0063/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported with Further Points for Consideration

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, the recommendations made in section 3.3 should be addressed, including but not limited to:

- Access to front elevations of the building should be restricted
- Improving the security of the car parking area
- Access control

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented we would be supportive of the planning application.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Contents

1 Visual Audit 5
2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 6
2.1 Crime Summary
2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)
2.3 Risk Factors
2.4 Crime Rate Comparison
2.5 Burglary: Risk Analysis
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis
2.7 Care Home/Sheltered Scheme Burglary, Theft & Criminal Damage: Risk Analysis
3 Layout Appraisal 9
3.1 Proposed development
3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal
3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations
4 Physical Security 10
4.1 Doors & Access Controls
4.2 Windows
4.3 Glazing
4.4 Alarms
4.5 Boundaries
4.6 Lighting
4.7 Landscaping
5 Management & Maintenance 12
6 Construction 12
7 Useful References 12
7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Appendix

A Contact register 13
B Associated Documents 13
C CIS Version History 13
D Glossary 14

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1 Visual Audit

The propose development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Harpurhey area, within the city of Manchester.

The site is bound by Parkmount Road to the North, rear boundaries of properties on Leegrange Road (there is a gated passageway to the rear of some of these properties), open green space and a electricity substation to the South, and Delbeattie Street bounds the site to the West.

The local area is typically residential, with a large number of terraced houses occupying the surrounding streets. To the North of the site is Boggart Hole Clough, a large area of open green space and parkland. Close by to the North is Rochdale Road.













Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2016 and 31st May 2017.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
38	17	104	300	82	12	10	37	24	11

2.1.1 In the local area the volume of crime is not very high with the exception of violent crime. The rate of violent crime, per 1,000 dwellings, in the local area is more than 200% higher than the average experienced across North Manchester. The rate of burglary is lower than the average for North Manchester but higher than the average of Greater Manchester. The rates of criminal damage and vehicle crime are higher than both the North Manchester and Greater Manchester averages.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Insecure windows have frequently been targeted by offenders in this area, and in care homes across the Manchester area.

Possible Solution – Ground floor an otherwise easily accessible windows should be fitted with restrictors limiting the opening of the window to 100mm, to prevent the window being fully opened when left ajar, or allowing room for an offender to reach in and steal easily accessible property.

2.2.2 Front and rear doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard. Rear doors, or doors that are not well overlooked should be positioned behind a secure boundary treatment. All external doors should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.

2.2.3 Offenders have entered communal areas of care homes before targeting insecure areas

Possible Solution – Access into communal areas of building should be closely controlled to prevent unauthorised access in to the building.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site.

Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km), North Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), North Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), North Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), North Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **lower** than North Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **higher** than North Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester.

2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **higher** than North Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester.

2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **lower** /**higher** than North Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.5 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within 500m of the site.

Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary is greatest on Friday, with the lowest risk experienced on Sunday.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary in this area is concentrated in the evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders typically target residential properties when it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.

2.5.3 Point of Entry: In the local area the following point entries and MO's have been the most frequently occurring:

- Front and rear doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools
- Insecure windows have frequently been targeted by offenders in this area, and in care homes across the Manchester area.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of vehicle crime in this area is significantly higher at the weekend than between Monday & Friday.

2.6.2 Time Range: During the day the risk of vehicle crime is greatest in the evening an in the early hours of the morning. Offenders typically target vehicles in the evening and at night when it is dark and they perceive the risk of being seen as low.

2.7 Care Home/Sheltered Scheme Burglary, Theft & Criminal Damage: Risk Analysis

The information below relates to burglary other, miscellaneous theft and criminal damage offences within/against care homes/sheltered schemes, recorded across the Greater Manchester area.

2.7.1 In terms of care homes/sheltered schemes across Greater Manchester, the risk of burglary is concentrated in the late evening and the early hours of the morning. At these times, residents are likely to be asleep or in their rooms and staffing levels are likely to be lower, allowing criminals to operate without being detected.

2.7.2 The majority of burglaries at Greater Manchester care homes/sheltered schemes have occurred through doors to the front and the rear of premises and through rear windows. In a number of burglaries, force has not been required to gain entry - offenders have often exploited freely accessible areas and open bedroom windows/doors to steal property.

2.7.3 Most miscellaneous thefts occur during the afternoon and the evening, when residents are likely to be out of their rooms for longer periods of time - leaving insecure rooms, items of personal property and cash vulnerable to theft unseen/unnoticed. Care homes have also suffered from incidents of criminal damage – particularly the smashing of external glazing in the evening.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is of 10 apartments to accommodate those with learning disabilities.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will bring an unused site into use, increasing activity in the local area potentially reducing the likelihood of offenders targeting properties in the area.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3.2.2 The development will be overlooked by terraced houses opposite on Dalbeattie Street, allowing the apartments to be subject to natural surveillance. The main entrance gate is taken from a prominent location on Dalbeattie Street which is overlooked by residential properties.

3.2.3 Access in to the communal courtyard of the building is restricted with a secure gate. All apartment entrances are accessed from within the secure courtyard.

3.2.4 The building will be staffed at all times, deterring offenders from targeting the development.

3.2.5 The development will be covered with a CCTV system.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Access to the front elevations of the proposed building should be restricted to residents and staff, to prevent members of the public being able to access these areas to the detriment of residents – particularly with bedroom windows positioned on this elevation. The yellow demarcation below shows where infill panels or gates should be located to restrict access to the front elevation.



3.3.2 The proposed car parking area cannot be viewed from the apartment building but it is overlooked by properties opposite. It is recommended that the parking area is secured with automated vehicular gates to restrict access to genuine users and to deter offenders. The risk of vehicle crime is greatest in the evening and at night, if automated gates cannot be installed it is recommended that manual vehicle gates are installed which can be secured at night to protect vehicles.

3.3.3 The main entrance gate should be self-closing and operated by staff/resident key-fob and via a video access control system for visitors. The gate should be to a minimum height of 1800mm.

3.3.4 Pedestrian routes within the development and the courtyard area should be illuminated in accordance with BS 5489.

3.3.5 The car park should clearly be signed as being private, to deter unauthorised parking. Parking spaces should be well marked to avoid any confusion. Lighting to the car park should also be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ❑ The gate to the main entrance of the scheme should be a robust, steel gate with a steel frame to a minimum height of 2100mm. It should be self-closing and secured with an electrically operated multi-point lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system (ideally not a mag-lock, but if so, it should have a min. 4,500N resistance). The gate should be controlled by staff/resident key-fob and by means of a video entry phone system linked to the staff office, allowing staff to vet visitors to the scheme before allowing them access. Delivery of post should be made directly to the staff office and should then be either collected by residents or distributed by staff.

- ❑ The entrance doors to each individual apartment must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. The doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. They should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

- ☐ The entrance doors to the communal staff facilities building (adjacent to the main entrance gate) should be compliant with and certified to STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. They should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via staff key-fob. Internal doors/frames to storage rooms, staff rooms or offices should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) capable of being secured when unoccupied. Keys/passes should be carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ All ground floor/accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside), limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment should have an intruder alarm fitted to comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems, or
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

  Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ Pedestrian access gates should have no centrally located horizontal bars and exposed hinges and large apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.



- ☐ The proposed boundaries (drawing 110 rev 2) satisfy Secured by Design requirements.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to the car park should also be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. The communal landscaped courtyard should also be lit to an adequate and uniform level, with no areas of pooling or shadowing.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the main entrance gate, entrances to all individual apartments and entrances to the communal staff facilities, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

4.7 Landscaping

- ❑ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances to dwellings, parking areas and footpaths/communal areas, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

- ❑ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the scheme must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made east for people to raise concerns or report observations.

5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.3 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
30/01/2017	Simon Dennis	CIS application received
29/06/2017	Leanne Taylor	CIS confirmation received
21/07/2017	Leanne Taylor	Progress update

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
109	Proposed Elevation	23/03/17	
100	Location Plan	22/02/17	
110	Site as proposed	23/02/17	2
105	Communal areas	30/03/17	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable