

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

One Central Park, Northampton Road, Manchester

Extension to provide additional office space

Manchester City Council

VERSION B: **15.09.17**

2014/0455/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

One Central Park, Northampton Road, Manchester, 2014/0455/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

The proposed remodelling of the building to create a new digital and creative hub is welcomed. The proposals are likely to result in an increased footfall to the area and, consequently, passive surveillance of the surrounding public realm will be enhanced. The proposed extension is well designed from a crime prevention perspective and there are no significant issues to address but, to improve the overall security of the building, a number of recommendations are included, the main ones are summarised as follows:

- A receptionist/concierge is present whenever the building is open.
- Security rated external doors, and laminate glazing, are installed.
- Access controls are installed in order to regulate movement into and through the building, and into individual office suites.
- CCTV and intruder alarm systems are modified to take account of the new arrangements.
- The refuse store should be fully secured and timbers treated to reduce fire risk.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application.



Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Contents

1 Visual Audit 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 5

2.1 Crime Summary

2.2 Modus Operandi used by offenders in committing burglary and theft at offices in Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3 Risk Factors

2.4 Burglary at Offices: Risk Analysis

2.5 Theft at Office Premises: Risk Analysis

3 Layout Appraisal 7

3.1 Proposed development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

4 Physical Security 8

4.1 Doors

4.2 Windows and Shutters

4.3 Glazing

4.4 Intruder Alarms

4.5 Access Control

4.6 Lighting

4.7 CCTV

4.8 Refuse Store

5 Construction 9

6 Secured by Design (SBD) 9

Appendix

A Contact register 10

B Associated Documents 10

C CIS Version History 10

D Glossary 11

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site, One Central Park, edged in red on the plan, is situated on the north side of Northampton Road, Newton Heath. The building itself is positioned on the western half of the plot and is triangular-shaped, and of three storeys with a central courtyard. It consists of 7730m^2 of lettable office space. There is a 272 space car park on the eastern side of the site access to which can be gained from Northampton Road. There are no perimeter fences around the site but there well maintained landscaped grounds and clear footpaths which guide staff and visitors around the site. The main entrance is prominent on the southern elevation facing Northampton Road. Located within the spacious lobby, members of staff at the reception desk are easily able to intercept visitors before they are able to access the wider building. The site is well illuminated and monitored by CCTV, which has an audio facility to warn intruders that their actions are being recorded, whilst the hard and soft landscaping is very well maintained; together they contribute to a sense that the development is very well managed and supervised. The business park is generally of a high quality of environment with well-considered security features including CCTV, a manned security presence, well- designed lighting and well- managed landscaping. The presence of Greater Manchester Police Divisional and Force Headquarters on the business park, opposite the site, is likely to be a factor in the low level of crime experienced within Central Park.



One Central Park is set in open, landscaped grounds on the western edge of the business park



The main entrance to the building is prominently located on the south-east facing elevation



The landscaped, internal courtyard is open to the elements





The eastern elevation and access into the car park



The rear elevation of the building and controlled entry to the car park at the western edge of the site



Greater Manchester Polices Manchester Divisional Headquarters is situated directly opposite

There have been 160 crimes committed in the neighbourhood around the site in the past 12 months, which is about 30% less than the average number for a neighbourhood within the City of Manchester. Of the total number of crimes recorded, crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence account for 29% of the total. Vehicle crime, including criminal damage of vehicles, account for about 18% of the recorded crimes. Unusually, theft of cars is the most common vehicle related crime. In terms of concentrations of crime, the Divisional headquarters is a focus for reporting crime and as a result is, somewhat unexpectedly, a place where there is a high concentration. Numerous other offences are committed, often by those arrested and held in custody. Church Lane north of the site is another area where there is a concentration of crime. Finally, there is a cluster of crimes around the nearby Central park Metrolink Station. Crime at transport hubs is common. Offices on the Park and One Central park are relatively crime free, although the buildings on Madison Place at the eastern end of the Park. When considering the local environment, the security measures employed at the various premises on the Park and the principal crime groups that affect office developments, there are few areas risk with the proposed development providing the existing security measures and management standards are maintained.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2016 and 31st May 2017.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
10	7	31	67	10	8	<5	6	11	5

2.1.1 Over the past 12 months, the number of recorded crimes in this neighbourhood has been quite modest. The principal crimes have been violence, criminal damage and vehicle crime, with the concentrations of crime occurring in the most highly populated areas.

2.2 Modus Operandi used by offenders in committing burglary and theft at offices in Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.2.1 **Doors of offices, including escape doors, have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools**

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all communal entry doors, office suite entry doors, service doors and escape doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- communal entry doors, service doors and escape doors should be visible from the 'street' not set within deep recesses or on secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- defensible space should be provided in the form of a secure lobby to the offices.

2.2.2 **Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed**

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows:

- laminate glass should be used throughout the development. Laminate glass is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and open locks and, because of its structural properties; and,
- consideration should be given to installing security grilles to particularly vulnerable windows and doors

2.2.3 **Offenders posing as legitimate customers or staff to gain entry to offices or access staff only areas and then stealing property**

To minimise the risk of offenders posing as customers or staff to gain access:

- install access controls to doors connecting the more public areas to private/sensitive areas;
- install access controls at each office floor;
- locate reception desks in such a location that maximises surveillance over entry doors in the ground floor lobby and office suite lobbies;
- install CCTV cameras to monitor movements in, around, and out of the building.
- access control systems should be employed to prevent unauthorised personnel from entering the building, and places where staff belongings may be stored;
- staff should wear an identification badge;
- overt signage can also assist in deterring casual entry; and,
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g. lockers.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft of business/staff property
- Bicycle theft
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Unauthorised access to private space
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Burglary at Offices: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglaries recorded at offices in Manchester.

Burglary– Day Range



Burglary – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary is greatest on Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Sunday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk is greatest in the evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders typically target premises when they are closed for business and there are unlikely to be staff present, whilst darkness provides a degree of cover for the offender and there is less street activity resulting in a reduced risk of being witnessed..

Burglary – Point of Entry



Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.4.3 Point of Entry: As a means to enter office premises, offenders have forced doors open, smashed the glass in glazed door panels and entered via fire doors that were left unsecured. Where entry points were unknown, offenders are thought to have posed as employees tailgating legitimate staff and targeting insecure areas such as staffrooms.

2.5 Theft at Office Premises: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to theft at offices recorded in Manchester.

Theft – Day Range



Theft – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: The risk is greatest on Mondays and Wednesdays..

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk is greatest from 9:00-17:00; which is consistent with standard office working hours.

2.5.3 Cash, mobile phones and electrical items, such as laptops, were most frequently stolen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The refurbishment work will include reconfiguring the current offices and meeting rooms to create more flexible and innovative workspace. Additional accommodation will be provided by extending each of the three blocks that make up the building sides into the central courtyard creating an additional 824m^2 office space. The open-air courtyard will be enclosed with a transparent roof.

3.1.2 There are no alterations to the public facing elevations of the building.

3.1.3 A new timber refuse store is will be sited within the car park adjacent to the northern elevation of the building, resulting in a slight reduction in parking provision.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The building is very well managed and includes several security features, which have resulted in a near absence of crime on the site.

3.2.2 The proposed extensions are confined to the inner courtyard so are not accessible from public space.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Employ round-the-clock security presence on the site.

3.3.2 Include security certified doors to the secure the extension.

3.3.3 Install a monitored alarm to each office space.

3.3.4 Install access controls to each office suite.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3.3.5 The refuse store is in an easily accessible location where it could be targeted by arsonists or offenders planning identity theft. In addition, the store's proposed position in close proximity to the office building and parked vehicles raises some concerns relating to fire risk. Consequently, the timber should be treated to minimise fire risk, the store should be should be fully enclosed - including a roof, and a robust locking mechanism should secure the door/gate.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ❑ External and escape doors must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ❑ The entrance doors must be capable of being operated via an electronic, access control system which forms part of the security rating of the door. An audio visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) to each office suite to allow vetting of visitors prior to allowing entry. Staff should be able to operate the locking mechanism of the entrance doors remotely from within their office. These doors should be self-closing and lock on closure.
- ❑ All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.
- ❑ Entrance doors into office suites should be either PAS 24 rated or be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), have multipoint locking and a minimum of 3 hinges, in either case a door viewer should be fitted.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- ❑ Any ground opening windows must be certified to PAS 24, be lockable with a key, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ❑ Glazing to all windows must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Intruder Alarms

- ❑ The intruder alarm should be modified to allow all circulation areas to be monitored PIR detectors on office suite doors and all rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

- ❑ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob; numeric key pads are considered less secure. The following doors should operate on access control:
  - The main entrance doors (out-of-hours, and if reception is not staffed)
  - Doors to each of the office suites

4.6 Lighting

- ❑ Dusk-to-dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

- ❑ It is recommended that most internal office lighting is operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on and off due to movement activity or the lack of it in each room. The controlling mechanisms for the system should be contained securely.

4.7 CCTV

- ❑ The existing CCTV system should be modified to allow all circulation areas to be monitored.

4.8 Refuse Store

- ❑ To minimise fire risk, the refuse store timbers should be appropriately.
- ❑ The store should be should be fully enclosed - including a roof - and a robust locking mechanism should secure the door/gate.

5 Construction

- ❑ The developer should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site. The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ❑ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority approved, (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

6 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ❑ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
25.06.17	James Hackett, PRP	Request for crime impact statement
03.07.17		Site visited
16.08.17	James Hackett, PRP	Report issued
15.09.17	Sarah Campbell, James Hackett, PRP	Report re-issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
AA6525 4000	Existing Plan – GA Ground Floor Plan	17/05/2017	
AA6526 4001	Existing Plan – GA First Floor Plan	17/05/2017	
AA6525 4002	Existing Plan – GA Second Floor Plan	17/05/2017	
AA6525 4003	Existing Plan – GA Third Floor Plan	17/05/2017	
AA6525 4004	Existing Plan – GA Fourth Floor Plan	17/05/2017	
AA6525 4005	Existing Plan – GA Roof Plan	17/05/2017	
AA6525 4020	Proposed Plan – GA Ground Floor Plan	17/05/17	A
AA6525 4021	Proposed Plan – GA First Floor Plan	17/05/17	A
AA6525 4022	Proposed Plan – GA Second Floor Plan	17/05/17	A
AA6525 4023	Proposed Plan – GA Third Floor Plan	24/05/2017	A
AA6525 4024	Proposed Plan – GA Fourth Floor Plan	24/05/2017	A
AA6525 4025	Proposed Plan – GA Roof Plan	24/05/2017	
AA6525 4070	Existing Elevations – East and South	17/05/2017	
AA6525 4071	Existing Elevations – West and North-West	17/05/2017	
AA6525 4075	Existing Elevation – South West Courtyard	11/05/2017	
AA6525 2010	Proposed Plan GA Site Plan	August 2017	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Refuse store added	15.09.17

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable