

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

40-46 PRINCESS STREET, MANCHESTER

REFURBISHMENT & EXTENSION OF EXISTING BUILDING TO FORM 732sqm. BASEMENT GYM, 259sqm. GROUND FLOOR RETAIL/CAFÉ UNIT & 4,666sqm. GROUND FLOOR/UPPER FLOOR OFFICES

FOR: Withington Investments (Properties) Ltd.

VERSION B: 18/10/17

REFERENCE: 2012/0371/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

40-46 Princess Street, Manchester

URN: 2012/0371/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Protection to the reinstated basement windows, which will be fully exposed to the public realm and potentially vulnerable to nuisance/anti-social behaviour, damage and unauthorised access.
- Control of access into/around the office portion of the building.
- Ground floor entrance lobby to basement gym capable of being secured and controlled remotely by reception staff or via membership card if/when required, in order to prevent nuisance/antisocial behaviour.
- Secure enclosure of external escape stairs within courtyard to the north of the building, in order to prevent loitering/gathering, nuisance, anti-social behaviour and unauthorised access to the upper floor escape doors.
- Prevention of unauthorised internal access between the office, retail/café and gym premises.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The site lies at the junction of Princess Street and Harter Street, within Manchester city centre. It is occupied by a part 5, part 6 storey Grade II listed red brick building in multiple use. It is currently leased by Citibase, who have various tenants occupying small offices at all levels. There are also 2 no. restaurants at ground floor level and a nightclub within the basement of the building. Charlies Bar also occupies part of the ground floor of the building to the rear (accessed off Harter Street) and is to remain unchanged under the proposed renovation works.

The existing offices within the building are served by a stepped entrance off Princess Street and a level entrance off Harter Street. The basement nightclub and ground floor restaurant premises are also served by separate and dedicated external entrances off Princess Street/Harter Street. Communal entrances serving multiple uses within a building can provide opportunities for criminals to exploit, as they can allow offenders to gain unauthorised access between uses anonymously and unnoticed.

The building features blocked-up basement window openings fronting directly onto the street (particularly Harter Street) right down to ground level. Such windows can be vulnerable to attack, criminal damage (e.g. kicking etc.), nuisance and anti-social behaviour. Many other buildings in the area have similar glazed window openings fronting directly onto the street, some of which have been fitted with ornate railings/bars to protect them. The ground floor windows of the building are slightly elevated above street level, offering them some protection, but could still be reached by a determined offender.

There is a service courtyard to the north of the building, between the (north) side elevation and the rear elevations of the buildings fronting onto Portland Street. The courtyard is accessed via an undercroft route off Princess Street, which is fitted with full-height gates (insecure at the time the site visit was carried out). The building is served by an external escape stair within the courtyard, which could provide unauthorised access to the external doors at each upper floor level if the courtyard is left accessible.

Princess Street is an extremely busy pedestrian and vehicular, close to its junction with Portland Street, meaning the site benefits from good levels of overlooking and passive surveillance. Harter Street is a narrower route and is likely to benefit to more limited levels of activity and pedestrian footfall.





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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2016 and 30th June 2017.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
36	204	269	1855	822	267	51	248	42	239

2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is very high, particularly the levels of violence and theft, reflecting the site's location on the edge of the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of such crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises, often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts. The area also suffers from particularly high levels of vehicle crime (including theft of/from and criminal damage), particularly vehicles parked within public car parks (48% of incidents) and on-street (40% of incidents).

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed mixed-use development (including office, retail/café and gym uses), the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.

2.2 Burglary Other (Gyms): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against gyms, recorded in the Manchester area.


2.2.1 Day & Time Range: There have been relatively few incidents of burglary at gym premises in Manchester, which may be because there are not generally considered to be cash-rich targets and the majority of gym equipment cannot be easily removed. There is a slightly greater risk of burglary experienced on Monday, with most offences taking place late at night when most gyms are closed and are unsupervised.

2.2.2 Point of Entry: Offenders have primarily gained entry to Manchester gyms by smashing the glazing within doors or windows.


2.3 Miscellaneous Theft (Gyms): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against gyms, recorded in the Manchester area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester gyms remains high throughout the week, peaking slightly on Tuesday and Thursday.


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2.3.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the middle of the day and during the early evening. This is when gyms are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities for offenders to exploit are greater. Offenders have most frequently targeted the personal property of gym users, such as mobile phones, wallets/purses and handbags, when left insecure in changing rooms or by forcing open lockers.


2.4 Burglary Other (Restaurants/Cafes): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against restaurants/cafes, recorded in Manchester.


Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary peaks during the early evening (when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest) and during the early hours of the morning (when premises are usually closed).


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2.4.3 Point of Entry: In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafes through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools. In a number of cases, glazing in doors has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry is unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.


2.5 Miscellaneous Theft (Restaurants/Cafes): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against restaurants/cafes, recorded in Manchester.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range




2.5.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of miscellaneous theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many such premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft are greater.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurant/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.


2.6 Burglary Other (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against retail premises recorded in the Manchester area.

Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range




2.6.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester remains consistently high throughout the week, peaking slightly on Tuesday.

2.6.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of burglary peaks in the early hours of the morning/late at night. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.

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Burglary Other – Point of Entry




2.6.3 Point of Entry: In many incidents of burglary at retail premises within Manchester, offenders have gained entry by forcing shutters open, using tools and bodily pressure. Front and rear doors have also been frequently targeted and offenders have also gained unauthorised access through windows, walls and roofs, but to a lesser extent. Where points of entry were unknown, these are likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises, before exploiting insecure doors or tailgating to access unauthorised areas.


2.7 Miscellaneous Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts and shoplifting offences within/against retail premises recorded in the Manchester area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.7.1 Day Range: The risk of theft remains consistently high throughout the week and drops slightly on a Sunday – when some units are closed or operate on reduced opening hours.


2.7.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the mid-afternoon. Other than incidents of shoplifting (90% of incidents), thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers. The risk of shoplifting and the theft of customer belongings are likely to be greater during this period, as retail premises are often at their busiest - creating more opportunities for offenders. Thefts of staff property are more likely to be noticed when lunch breaks are taken or when staff are leaving for the day.

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
2.8 Burglary Other (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against office premises, recorded in the Manchester area.


Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.8.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest between Wednesday and Friday and also on Sunday.

2.8.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises late at night/into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.


2.8.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

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
2.9 Miscellaneous Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against office premises, recorded in the Manchester area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.9.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of miscellaneous theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Wednesday.

2.9.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated between 11am and 5pm. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts often peak at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing for the day and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.10 General Risk Factors

2.10.1 Gyms: The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Cash robbery
- Theft of user/staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Controlled access (staff/members only)
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Cycle security
- Arson
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.10.2 Cafes: The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict if licensed
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues

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- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.10.3 Retail: The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.10.4 Offices: The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.11 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.11.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting gym/café/retail/office premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Gyms, Restaurants/Cafes & Offices: Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain access

  Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Sections 4.3 & 5.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

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- Restaurants/Cafes, Retail & Offices: Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure to gain entry

  Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1 & 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- Restaurants/Cafes & Retail: Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas

  Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

- Restaurants/Cafes: Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

  Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

- Retail: Roller shutters have been forced upward by offenders

  Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- Offices: Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

  Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to office buildings are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Section 4.1). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposal is to refurbish the existing building (including a fourth floor extension) to form a 732sqm. basement gym, a 259sqm. ground floor retail/café unit and 4,666sqm. ground floor/upper floor offices.

3.1.2 The basement gym will be served by a dedicated ground floor entrance off Princess Road and will include a reception area, changing rooms, gym and studio. The retail/café unit will also be served by its own dedicated entrance at the junction of Princess Street/Harter Street, with opening windows along the Harter Street elevation. The offices will be served by stairs/a platform lift off Princess Street, leading to sliding main entrance doors. There will be a central hub area, with a lift/stair access core serving a variety of office suites at ground floor to fifth floor level. There will also be a basement cycle store, showers and toilets for the use of office tenants.

3.1.3 Planning permission will be sought for external changes to the existing building, including the fourth floor extension, the re-opening of basement windows, the addition of lifts and stairs into the existing lightwell, a new internal lightwell running down the centre of the offices, associated roof re-configuration for the covered lightwell and lift over runs and the reconfigured entrance to the building.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The building is in a prominent position within Manchester city centre. The main entrance/s to the building benefit from good levels of natural surveillance from the public realm, particularly during the day.

3.2.2 The approaches to the front of the building for pedestrians are along routes that have good sightlines.

3.2.3 There are clearly-defined, entirely separate entrances off the street into each of the different uses proposed, which reduces the opportunities for confusion and conflict and reduces the opportunities to criminals.

3.2.4 The office portion of the building has a single access/egress point in a prominent location off the public realm, capable of being robustly managed to control access. The ground floor hub adjacent to the entrance could accommodate a staffed reception desk, providing surveillance over everyone entering/leaving the building and vetting any visitors before directing them to individual office suites. Each of the suites themselves are capable of being individually secured.


3.2.5 The high-level cills to the ground floor windows provide some protection to them and reduces the potential impacts of noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/ construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the scheme can ensure it is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The basement windows to be reinstated should be security-certified (see Section 4.2), non-opening and should incorporate laminated glazing (see Section 4.3). Given their vulnerable location at street level, they should also be protected by robustly fixed decorative wrought-iron bars/railings - to provide a visual deterrent and protect them from kicking/criminal damage and unauthorised access (see opposite for an example at a nearby building). The bars themselves should be set within the rebate of the window openings and they should be designed with limited horizontal elements to prevent them from being used to climb up to upper floor windows. It is also highly recommended that the existing ground floor windows of the building are replaced with security-certified windows and laminated glazing or certified/laminated



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secondary glazing units are installed behind the existing windows (see Section 4.2 & 4.3).

3.3.2 The control of access into and around the office portion building is paramount to the security of the scheme. There should be a reception desk within the ground floor hub area (staffed at all times when the building is operational), which should have full surveillance of everyone entering/leaving the building (see Section 4.1). All visitors should report to reception for vetting by staff before gaining access to the rest of the building. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby. If the building is to be open at any time without a concierge staffing the hub area, the entrance doors should be secured and controlled by means of a video access control system linked to each individual office suite (allowing staff to vet callers before allowing them access).

3.3.3 If the offices are to be occupied by multiple tenants, it should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office floor/suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and any rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Any fire escape cores/stairs should be secured to prevent unauthorised access between floors/suites (see Section 4.1). Access to all plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only), as should any staff locker/changing areas, cycle or refuse stores.

3.3.4 The reception area to the basement gym should be similarly staffed at all times when the premises are open, in order to control and overlook all access to and egress from the gym. Given the ground floor entrance will not be directly overlooked by the reception staff (located within the basement), the main entrance doors should be capable of being secured and controlled remotely by reception staff or via membership card if/when required (e.g. into the evening/at night), in order to prevent nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby. The lobby should also be covered by CCTV, monitored by reception staff to ensure there can be an immediate response to any incidents recorded (see Section 5.6). Sports facilities often suffer high levels of theft – particularly of unattended property within changing rooms. Typically, thefts occur when service users leave items in unsecured lockers/changing rooms whilst taking part in activities, returning to find their property missing. To mitigate the risk of theft, secure lockers should be provided for the use of customers. Staff should undertake regular inspections of all areas of the premises and any changing facilities. Ideally, all high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools, portable gym equipment etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

3.3.5 The external escape stairs within the courtyard to the north of the building is potentially vulnerable to fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal damage, as well as leaving the upper floor escape doors accessible and vulnerable to attack – particularly when the courtyard is left insecure (which can often happen when access is shared by multiple users). It is highly recommended that the emergency escape stair is enclosed at ground level with secure fencing, to prevent/deter unauthorised access, with a gate for emergency egress purposes only (see Section 4.5).

3.3.6 It should be possible for any staff/patrons of the one use to gain unauthorised access to another use within the building, or vice versa. Any shared escape stairs/cores should be fitted with security-certified fire doors that are alarmed and signed as such to prevent mis-use (see Sections 4.1 & 5.1). Internal walls between premises should also be robust to prevent penetration (see Sections 4.3 & 5.3).

3.3.7 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

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4 Physical Security (Offices)

The following checklist (Sections 4 & 5) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ❑ All new external doorsets, including single-leaf, double-leaf and sliding doors, should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.

- ❑ The external stair/platform lift lobby to the main entrance of the offices should be secured with ornate, robust gates when the building is closed, in order to prevent the sheltered space from fostering nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal activity out-of-hours. Ideally, the gates should full-height. If not, they should at least be 2400mm high, with no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.

- ❑ There should be a reception desk within the hub that is staffed at all times when the building is open. All visitors should report to the reception for vetting by staff before gaining access to the rest of the building. A high, wide reception desk increases the distance between reception staff and any potential aggressive visitors and aids surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby/waiting area. Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors of should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required (e.g. into the evening/at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby. If the lobby is not to be staffed at any point, the sliding doors should be secured and operated via staff key-fob and a video access control system for visitors (linked to each individual office suite).

- ❑ If the office building is to be occupied by multiple tenants, all individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled solid-core doors (minimum 44mm thick), operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and any individual rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. The doors into any emergency escape cores at each level should also be solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with electromagnetic locks connected to the fire alarm, so that people at one level cannot access other levels. Once an emergency escape core is accessed, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level onto the street. Doors into escape cores shared with the basement/ground floor commercial premises should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, with any escape ironmongery permitted under the security certification of the product. Emergency egress doors should be alarmed and signed as such to prevent mis-use.

- ❑ All internal doors/frames to staff-only plant/service/storage areas, as well as to the staff locker/changing areas and any cycle/refuse stores, should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls.

- ❑ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

4.2 Windows

- ❑ All new windows, where possible, should be certificated BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

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- Any opening lights at ground and first floor levels (escape requirements permitting) should ideally be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

- If any existing ground floor windows are to be retained, consideration should be given to the installation of secondary glazing units installed certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR1 (e.g. http://www.selectaglaze.co.uk/benefits/security-secondary-glazing), which should incorporate laminated glazing (see below).

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- All new glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. All upper floor glazing should be to EN 356 P1A.

- Internal walls between the office portion of the building and the basement/ground floor commercial premises, as well as to any shared escape cores, should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

- Any louvres to servicing/plant areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows. Security-certified louvered doorsets are available if required to plant/servicing areas (e.g. http://www.securedbydesign.com/members/premier-ss-ltd/).

4.4 Alarms

- Monitored alarms should be installed to cover the whole building (including each individual office floor/suite), linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room/patrol team.

4.5 Boundaries

- The external escape stairs to the building should be enclosed with 2400mm high rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and a gate/s at ground level, in order to prevent/deter unauthorised access. Any panic mechanism on the internal face of the gate (for emergency egress purposes) should be fitted so that they cannot be reached/operated from the external face of the gate.

- The existing gates to the courtyard access at the north side of the building should be retained and should not be left insecure and unattended.

4.6 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to the exterior of the building, particularly to all external doors.

- Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

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- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

  Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

  Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: all external doors (including escape doors at all levels), the main office reception lobby/hub area and all lifts/stairwells.

4.8 Other

- The cycle store should include stands/racks that allow both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to them, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://designforsecurity.org/downloads.

- Any bin/recycling stores should be a secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosure. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

- There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows.

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5 Physical Security (Retail/Café Unit & Gym)

5.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ❑ All new external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ❑ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ❑ Given the ground floor gym entrance will not be directly overlooked by reception staff, the entrance doors should be capable of being secured and controlled remotely by reception staff or via membership card if/when required (e.g. into the evening/at night), in order to prevent nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.
- ❑ All back-of-house/staff areas within the retail/café and gym should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms and offices should be solid-core and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times). Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a certified doorset to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ❑ Internal doors into escape cores shared with the offices should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, with any escape ironmongery permitted under the security certification of the product. Emergency egress doors should be alarmed and signed as such to prevent mis-use. Once an emergency escape core is accessed, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level onto the street.

5.2 Windows & Shutters

- ❑ All new windows, where possible, should be certificated BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ❑ All basement windows should be fixed (i.e. non-opening). Basement window openings should also be protected by robustly fixed decorative bars/railings as described within Section 3.3, in order to deter nuisance/anti-social behaviour, damage and unauthorised access.
- ❑ If any existing ground floor windows are to be retained, consideration should be given to the installation of secondary glazing units installed certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR1 (e.g. http://www.selectaglaze.co.uk/benefits/security-secondary-glazing), which should incorporate laminated glazing (see below).
- ❑ If any shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

5.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ❑ All new glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

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- Internal walls between the basement/ground floor commercial premises and the office portion of the building, as well as to any shared escape cores, should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

- Any louvres to servicing/plant areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows. Security-certified louvered doorsets are available if required to plant/servicing areas (e.g. http://www.securedbydesign.com/members/premier-ss-ltd/).

5.4 Alarms

- A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover each of the premises, linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

5.5 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to the main entrances of the units, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.

- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

5.6 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

  Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

  Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrances to each unit, internal circulation areas and all sales counters/till positions.

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5.7 Other

- Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.
- Public toilets can give rise to crime and anti-social behaviour issues and the following issues should be considered:
  - Avoid areas where items such as drug paraphernalia can be hidden (e.g. suspended ceilings). Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work, etc. should be used. Services where possible should be accessed from outside the facility.
  - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
  - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening. This will aid gaining access to collapsed persons. Opaque panels can be used to great effect to ensure no persons are collapsed inside, whilst preserving privacy. This measure discourages drug taking and facilitates staff checks. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 20 centimetres from the floor and to reduce the top height.
  - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
  - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
  - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

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6 Internal Layout Guidance for Café or Retail Premises

The internal layout of any retail or café premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6.1 Café

6.1.1 Cafes/restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in cafes/restaurants generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

6.1.2 In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

6.2 Retail

6.2.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.

6.2.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the unit.

6.2.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.

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6.2.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

6.2.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 5.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

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7 Management & Maintenance

7.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of each of the premises must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of them. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of the premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Any cash storage/management within the premises;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices;
- Management of stock deliveries and waste collection;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access controls, lighting, alarm system, CCTV cameras etc; and
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.

7.1.2 The opening hours of the any café should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

7.1.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools, portable gym equipment etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

7.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

8 Construction

8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
24th July 2017	Engine Room	Receipt of CIS instruction form
26th July 2017	Engine Room	Confirmation of instruction & receipt of additional plans & information re: proposals
8th August 2017	Engine Room	Receipt of D&A Statement
14th August 2017	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
24th August 2017	Engine Room	Version A of CIS issued to Architect
18th October 2017	Engine Room	Telephone correspondence re: existing ground floor windows and cycle store

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
100	Existing Location and Site Plan	09.11.16	-
101	Existing Sub-basement	10.04.17	A
102	Existing Basement Plan	10.04.17	B
103	Existing Ground Plan	10.04.17	B
104	Existing First Floor Plan	10.04.17	B
105	Existing Second Floor Plan	10.04.17	B
106	Existing Third Floor Plan	10.04.17	B
107	Existing Fourth Floor Plan	10.04.17	B
108	Existing Fifth Floor Plan	10.04.17	B
109	Existing Roof Plan	10.04.17	B
-	Citibase Existing Basement	Dec 2016	-
-	Citibase Existing First Floor	Dec 2016	-
-	Citibase Existing Second Floor	Dec 2016	-
-	Citibase Existing Third Floor	Dec 2016	-
-	Citibase Existing Fourth Floor	Dec 2016	-
-	Citibase Existing Fifth Floor	Dec 2016	-
300	Proposed Location and Site Plan	18.04.17	-
302	Proposed Plan Basement (SUPERSEDED)	10.04.17	E
303	Proposed Plan Ground Floor (SUPERSEDED)	02.06.17	G
304	Proposed Plan First Floor (SUPERSEDED)	10.04.17	D
305	Proposed Plan Second Floor (SUPERSEDED)	22.02.17	D
306	Proposed Plan Third Floor (SUPERSEDED)	19.04.17	F
307	Proposed Plan Fourth Floor (SUPERSEDED)	10.04.17	E
308	Proposed Plan Fifth Floor (SUPERSEDED)	10.04.17	D
302	Proposed Plan Basement (Annotated)	26.07.17	F
303	Proposed Plan Ground Floor (Annotated)	26.07.17	H
304	Proposed Plan First Floor (Annotated)	26.07.17	D
305	Proposed Plan Second Floor (Annotated)	26.07.17	D
306	Proposed Plan Third Floor (Annotated)	26.07.17	F
307	Proposed Plan Fourth Floor (Annotated)	26.07.17	E
308	Proposed Plan Fifth Floor (Annotated)	26.07.17	D
309	Proposed Plan Roof	26.07.17	A

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321	Proposed Elevation at Courtyard	19.04.17	A
322	Proposed Elevation Princess Street	10.04.17	B
323	Proposed Elevation Harter Street	20.04.17	A
324	Proposed Rear Elevation 4a & 4b	10.04.17	A
325	Proposed Elevations at Light Well	20.04.17	A
350	Proposed Section A-A	10.04.17	-
351A	Proposed Section B-B	10.04.17	-
351B	Proposed Section B-B	10.04.17	-
352	Proposed Section C-C	10.04.17	-
354	Proposed Section F-F	10.04.17	-
-	Design & Access Statement and Heritage Statement	02.06.17	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor amendments to wording relating to existing ground floor windows & cycle store	18/10/2017

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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