

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

The Atrium, 74 Princess Street

160 No. Bed Aparthotel & Ground Floor Retail Units

SACO Property Group

VERSION A: 22nd November 2017

URN: 2017/0906/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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The Atrium, 74 Princess Street, Manchester, M1 6JD

2017/0906/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, the recommendations made in section 3.3 should be addressed, including but not limited to:

- Access in to the hotel at night and around the building
- Illumination of recessed doorways

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented we would be supportive of the planning application.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre area of Manchester close to the Village area, Oxford Road, and the nearby University of Manchester campus (formerly UMIST).

The site is located on the junction of Princess Street and Whitworth Street West. The site is otherwise bound by Beaver Street and the Rochdale Canal and tow path.

The existing building is to be retained and refurbished to accommodate the proposed additional accommodation. The building is five-storeys, with a basement level. The main entrance to the building at present is slightly recessed with a wrought iron decorative archway.













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2016 & 30th September 2017

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
29	130	190	1424	586	195	34	164	44	124

2.1.1 The most frequently occurring offences over the previous 12 months in the research area have been less serious wounding, miscellaneous theft and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts).

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 **Hotel/Retail**: Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

2.2.2 **Hotel/Retail:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place (see section 4.4) to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed entry into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

2.2.3 **Retail:** Shutters were units forced upwards

Possible Solution – It is highly recommended that any roller shutters are certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 22). It is recommended that perforated shutters are used to prevent opportunities for defacement.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer/guest/staff property
- Criminal damage to property

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
2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis (Hotels)

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels recorded in the Manchester area.


Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary is greatest on Monday and Saturday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary is greatest in the early afternoon and late at night.

2.4.3 Point of Entry: In the Salford area the following point entries and MO's have been the most frequently occurring where hotels have been targeted:


- Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property
- Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

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
2.5 Theft Risk Analysis (Hotels)

The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels recorded in the Manchester area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range




2.5.1 Day Range: The risk of theft at hotels in Manchester is greatest at the weekend, potentially due to hotels typically having more guests and thus the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of theft is greatest just after midday and late in the evening. Bedrooms are often targeted when left open by cleaners (while they are being cleaned), which usually takes place around midday. It is also likely that incidents of theft increase in the evening, as guests are unlikely to be in their rooms and the levels of staff presence (particularly on bedroom floors) is typically lower than during the day.


2.6 Theft Risk Analysis (Retail)

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail premises recorded in the Manchester area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.6.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of theft does not vary greatly, with the exception of Sunday. The risk of theft often drops on Sunday when retail premises are open for shorter periods of time.


2.6.2 Time Range: The risk of theft is greatest in the afternoon, peaking between 13:00 & 17:00, it is likely that offenders target retail premises during this period when they are typically busiest and offenders perceive the risk of being caught as low due to operating in crowded areas where their activities are less likely to go noticed.

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
2.7 Burglary Risk Analysis (Retail)

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail premises recorded in the Manchester area.


Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.7.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary does not vary greatly. On average the risk is highest between Monday and Friday than at the weekend.

2.7.2 Time Range: During the day the risk of burglary is concentrated in the early hours of the morning. The risk of burglary at retail premises is typically greatest at night when it is dark and retail areas are not subject to high levels of footfall, leading offenders to believe the risk of being caught or identified as low, in addition to allowing them greater lengths of time to target properties.

2.7.3 Point of Entry: The most favoured entry point at retail premises in Manchester were as follows:

- Shutters were forced upwards using bodily pressure or tools.
- Offenders have posed as legitimate customers to access premises when they are open before targeting insecure doors or tailgating to restricted areas.
- Front and rear doors were forced open using bodily pressure/implements, particularly metal bars. In several cases, glazing was smashed in front door windows. The frequent use of tools/implements demonstrates offenders came well-equipped to offend.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is to increase the number of aparthotel rooms at the existing aparthotel to 160 rooms, the creation of 2 no. retail units at ground floor, a yoga studio and a hotel bar.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The hotel reception desk overlooks the main entrance to the hotel allowing hotel staff to vet those entering the building.

3.2.2 The corridors that the hotel rooms are located allow for good sightlines, allowing residents to view any threats.

3.2.3 Other than the canal side of the building at ground floor, all bedrooms will be provided above street level, reducing the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).

3.2.4 The mix of uses will bring visitors to the building at all times of the day.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Reception desk the hotel overlooks the main entrance, allowing staff to vet visitors as they enter the building.

3.3.2 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main sliding entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.

3.3.3 The retail units will be accessed through the main hotel lobby area. The units should be appropriately and robustly secured when not open to prevent those with access to the hotel lobby from gaining access to these units.

3.3.4 Non-guests should not be able to access areas of the hotel other than the ground lobby area and retail units.

3.3.5 Access from the hotel bar into hotel room corridors should be restricted to residents and staff. If the hotel bar is to be open to the public the opening hours should be in line with licensed premises in the local area.

3.3.6 The stair/lift core should only be accessible/operable by guest key card, ensuring that access can only be gained by guests to their particular floor and no other. The circulation cores at either end of the building should be for emergency use only. All fire exit doors (on each level) should be fitted with electromagnetic locks (connected to the fire alarm), should be alarmed and have no ironmongery to the stairwell side of the door. Once an escape stairwell is accessed, the only means of egress should be onto the street at ground floor level, so that people at one level cannot use them to access other levels. Staff access/egress into or from the escape cores should be controlled via fob/swipe card.

3.3.7 Internal doors on hotel room corridors should incorporate an element of glazing to allow staff/residents to view any potential threats.

3.3.8 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main sliding entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.

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3.3.9 Safes should be provided for all guests in the guest bedroom. Safes should be of robust construction and it is highly recommended that the locker be operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.

3.3.10 Access in to staff only areas in all aspects of the development should be restricted to staff. Signage should be provided so that it is clear which areas are restricted to staff, to prevent confusion being used a legitimate excuse for accessing staff only areas.

3.3.11 Any rooms housing safes should have solid blockwork walls, reinforced ceilings, and have a certified door set (i.e. PAS 24), with an outward opening leaf and a door viewer. There should be a landline installed in the safe room and a panic button for staff to use in the event of an emergency. A security certified safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover should be secured within the staff/safe room. The correct size and category of safe required should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. The safe should be time delayed to no less than 5 minutes; appropriate signage should be displayed as a deterrent in order to make potential offenders aware of the time delay.

3.3.12 Recessed ground floor external escape doors can potentially generate vagrancy and other sources of antisocial and unwanted behaviour.

3.3.13 Lockers should be provided for users of the gym/yoga studio, to allow them to securely store personal items.

3.3.14 Building elevations should be illuminated to deter loitering.

3.3.15 External doors should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting to deter offenders and to assist staff and guests

4 Physical Security

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main sliding entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.
- ☐ Doors into ground floor retail units, from the hotel lobby, should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+).
- ☐ Hotel bedroom doors/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. VingCard or similar).
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.1 Windows & Building Fabric

- ☐ Ground floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

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- ❑ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.2 Glazing

- ❑ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.3 Access Control

- ❑ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Main entrances
  - External doors
  - Doors from publically accessible areas into areas restricted to hotel guests
  - Stairs/lifts
  - Offices
  - Staff only areas
  - Changing rooms
  - Plant/service/storage areas
- ❑ All internal doors should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock, so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.

4.4 Landscaping

- ❑ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ❑ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.5 Lighting

- ❑ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ❑ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ❑ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

4.6 CCTV

- ❑ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ❑ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

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- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.

4.7 Other

- Each hotel bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.

4.8 Management & Maintenance

- A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All occupants should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations to the facilities management team.

- The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

  - Litter removal
  - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
  - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

- High value property should be should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

  - Litter removal

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- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
05/10/2017	Carl Murphy	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
L(20)01	Basement Floor General Arrangement Plan	18/07/17	A
L(20)02	Ground Floor General Arrangement Plan	14/06/17	A
L(20)03	First Floor General Arrangement Plan	18/07/17	A
L(20)04	Second Floor General Arrangement Plan	14/06/17	E
L(20)06	Fourth floor general arrangement plan	23/08/17	A
L(20)07	Fifth floor general arrangement Plan	18/08/17	A
L(20)08	Sixth floor general arrangement plan	18/08/17	A
L(20)09	Roof general arrangement plan	14/06/17	A
L(20)10	As proposed elevations sheet 1 of 3	18/07/17	A
L(20)11	As proposed elevations sheet 2 of 3	18/07/17	A
L(20)12	As proposed elevations sheet 3 of 3	18/07/17	A
L(20)13	As proposed sections sheet 1 of 2	18/07/17	A
L(20)14	As proposed sections sheet 2 of 2	29/06/17	A
L(90)01	Site Boundary Plan As Existing	06/09/17	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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