

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

John Dalton House, Manchester

Hotel

FOR: 5Plus Architects

VERSION B: 17th April 2018

REFERENCE: 2016/0198/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

John Dalton House, John Dalton Street, Manchester

URN:2016/0198/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes and recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, it should be considered essential that the recommendations that have been made within section 3.3 are implemented. If the recommendations are addressed we would be supportive at planning application stage.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Contents

1 Visual Audit 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 5

2.1 Crime Overview

2.2 Non-domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

2.3 Miscellaneous Theft: Risk Analysis

2.4 Risk Factors

2.5 Crime Summary

3 Layout Appraisal 8

3.1 Proposed development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

4 Physical Security 8

4.1 Doors

4.2 Windows & Building Fabric

4.3 Glazing

4.4 Access Control

4.5 Landscaping

4.6 Lighting

4.7 CCTV

4.8 Other

5 Management & Maintenance 10

6 Construction 11

7 Useful References 11

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Appendix

A Contact register 12

B Associated Documents 12

C CIS Version History 12

D Glossary 13

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The development site is located in the city centre area of Manchester on the junction of Deansgate and John Dalton Street, with Ridgefield Street and Mulberry Street to the rear. The proposed development will see the existing building, John Dalton House, refurbished as a hotel.















Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The following information has been produced to give an insight into the types and volume of, crime experienced across Greater Manchester, North Manchester and Manchester city centre. Particular attention is paid to the area surrounding John Dalton Street and to crimes which research shows can be affected by the built environment. All data is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2015 and 29th February 2016.

2.1 Crime Overview

2.1.1 Over the previous 12 months there have been 224,543 crimes reported across the Greater Manchester Police force area. Of these, 33,497 incidents (15%) have occurred on the North Manchester division with 30,182 (90%) of these victim based crimes (crimes with a specific identifiable victim).

2.1.2 When looking at the figures in more detail, the number of crimes recorded within a Km² centred on the development site over the previous 12 months is as follows:

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	164	233	688	753	68	41	169	<20	161

2.1.3 The most frequently occurring offences over the previous 12 months in the research area have been miscellaneous theft, less serious wounding and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced on Saturday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts).

2.1.4 As this Crime Impact statement has been prepared for a non-residential development the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and miscellaneous theft

2.2 Non-domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

2.2.1 Non-domestic burglary accounts for 4% (1,288 offences) of victim based crimes recorded within North Manchester; a figure which has decreased compared to previous years (March 2014 – February 2015).

2.2.2 When looking in detail at hotels in Manchester city centre, the graphs below show the level of risk to these premises in terms of day of the week and hour of the day.

Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



2.2.3 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at Manchester hotels is greatest on Monday and Wednesday.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.2.4 Time Range: The risk of burglary at hotels is greatest in the late afternoon, the evening and the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be away from their rooms or when the level of staffing at hotels is lower.

2.2.5 Further to the above it is also important to consider offenders entry points

Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.2.6 Point of Entry: In a number of hotel burglaries in the city centre area entry has been gained through doors which offenders have typically forced open using bodily pressure and tools. Insecure doors have also been targeted. The majority of burglaries have an unknown entry point, this is often when offenders have gained entry legitimately, posing as guests, before stealing property from various communal/staff areas such as bars, restaurants and gyms

2.3 Miscellaneous Theft: Risk Analysis

2.3.1 The graphs below show the risk of miscellaneous theft occurring at hotels within Manchester city centre. Miscellaneous theft covers offences such as theft of customer and/or staff property.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.3.2 Day Range: The risk of theft at hotels in Manchester is greatest between Friday and Sunday. This is potentially due to hotels typically having more guests at these times and thus the opportunity to carry out theft offences is greater.

2.3.3 Time Range: The risk of theft is greatest just after midday and late in the evening. Bedrooms are often targeted when left open by cleaners (while they are being cleaned), which usually takes place around midday. It is also likely that incidents of theft increase in the evening, as guests are unlikely to be in their rooms and the levels of staff presence (particularly on bedroom floors) is typically lower than during the day.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.4 Risk Factors

2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Violence towards staff

2.5 Crime Summary

Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, commonly used M.O's (modus operandi) and possible solutions/recommendations to help reduce the likelihood of them being used on/in future developments are as follows:

- Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

  Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

  Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place (see section 4.4) to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed entry into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is the refurbishment of the existing building, John Dalton House, and change of use to a 215 bedroom hotel.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 All bedrooms will be provided above street level, reducing the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).

3.2.2 Hotel corridors are typically linear offering good sightlines for guests, allowing them to survey any potential threats.

3.2.3 The proposed ground floor uses are self-contained with access between the ground floor units and the hotel only possible through the shared service yard.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The proposed service yard should be gated, with access restricted to staff, to prevent criminal behaviour and to deter antisocial behaviour and misuse such as loitering, drug taking, and vagrancy.

3.3.2 The proposed service yard boundary should be a minimum of 2400mm in height, with vehicular and pedestrian gates to the same height; the boundary treatment should be of paladin construction and a close knit/358 style panel is highly recommended.

3.3.3 The hotel reception desk should overlook the main entrance to the hotel allowing hotel staff to vet those entering the building.

3.3.4 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main sliding entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.

3.3.5 The stair/lift core should only be accessible/operable by guest key card, ensuring that access can only be gained by guests to their particular floor and no other. The circulation cores at either end of the building should be for emergency use only. All fire exit doors (on each level) should be fitted with electromagnetic locks (connected to the fire alarm), should be alarmed and have no ironmongery to the stairwell side of the door. Once an escape stairwell is accessed, the only means of egress should be onto the street at ground floor level, so that people at one level cannot use them to access other levels. Staff access/egress into or from the escape cores should be controlled via fob/swipe card.

3.3.6 Any blank facades should be treated with an anti-graffiti coating so that any graffiti can be easily cleaned.

3.3.7 External doors should be recessed no more than 600mm to reduce the potential for loitering, antisocial and criminal behaviour.

3.3.8 Access in to staff only areas should be restricted to staff. Signage should be provided so that it is clear which areas are restricted to staff, to prevent confusion being used a legitimate excuse for accessing staff only areas.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+).
- ☐ All individual hotel bedroom doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 (with door viewers and chain limiters), operable by VingCard or similar. Each bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows & Building Fabric

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Main entrances
  - External doors
  - Service yard gates
  - Stairs/lifts
  - Offices
  - Staff only areas

4.5 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

4.6 Lighting

- ❑ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ❑ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ❑ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ❑ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

- ❑ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ❑ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ❑ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ❑ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ❑ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ❑ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ❑ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ❑ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.

4.8 Other

- ❑ There must be no features of the building envelope which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.
- ❑ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

8.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made east for people to raise concerns or report observations.

8.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV)

5.1.1 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

5.1.2 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.3 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
02/03/2016	Peter Jackson	CIS application received
06/04/2018	Heather Mason	Revised plans received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
B2_02_2199	Proposed Floor Plan – Lower Ground Floor	05/04/2018	-
B2_02_2200	Proposed Floor Plan – Ground Floor	05/04/2018	-
B2_02_2201	Proposed Floor Plan – First Floor	05/04/2018	-
B2_02_2202	Proposed Floor Plan – Typical Upper Floor	05/04/2018	-
B2_02_2210	Proposed Floor Plan – Tenth Floor	05/04/2018	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Change of floor plans	17/04/2018

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable