

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Buckthorn Close, Chorlton-cum-Hardy

24 Apartments

for: Southway Housing

version A: 18th July 2017

ref: 2017/0461/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

Buckthorn Close, Chorlton-cum-Hardy

2017/0461/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes / security additions advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to expose any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime within the proposal.

The following issues have been identified as potential generators of insecurity, and must be addressed as described within the report (see Section 3.3 for more details):

- Effect of development on adjacent footpaths
- Inclusion of lobby entrance arrangements
- Bin store location
- Cycle storage
- Ground floor French windows

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issues being satisfactorily addressed, as described within the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Michael Craig *DipLD CMLI*

DfS Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies within the Chorlton-cum-Hardy district of south Manchester, about 1.5km south east of the local centre. The neighbourhood contains a mix of private and social housing provision. The site is located on the edge of the Arrowfield estate, which has recently benefited from significant investment to upgrade the dwellings and public realm in order to address some of the social and criminal issues that formerly affected the area. The network of routes through the housing has been rationalised to concentrate activity on fewer, better-overlooked routes.

There are large areas of undeveloped land and open space in the neighbourhood, including Southern Cemetery and playing fields.


The site is opposite Loretto High School which generates high levels of pedestrian and vehicular activity at peak times. The site is bounded on three sides by public roads. Buckthorn Close is a short cul-de-sac off Arrowfield Road, with various footpaths leading off it serving nearby terraced housing.

A vacant community building currently occupies the site. The operators of the building had installed security measures to discourage unlawful access.


Nell Lane showing boundary with adjacent site


The site is opposite Loretto High School, Arrowfield Road


Existing building on the site showing security measures




Nell Lane showing site on right of picture


Footpath adjacent to site along Nell Lane


Nearby housing showing narrow footway and dense vegetation


Substation on the site, Buckthorn Close

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2016 and 31st May 2017.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
14	<5	52	88	11	7	<5	20	<5	6

2.1.1 Within 500m of the development site, the majority of crimes (37%) have occurred in the most densely populated areas. The overall crime volumes are considered relatively low which can be largely attributed to several large areas of open space within the research area, such as Manchester Southern Cemetery and Hough End playing fields where crime and disorder is less likely to be detected.

2.1.2 The principal offences have been violence, vehicle crime and criminal damage- which has predominantly occurred against residential properties as opposed to vehicles and commercial premises. The area has also experienced several incidents of thefts from houses and gardens, including cycle thefts from gardens,

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Front and rear doors have been forced open using implements and bodily pressure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear doors and windows are only accessible to residents. Secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible, as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

2.2.2 Rear entry points were common targets- with windows prised open using implements.

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key-operated locks and opening restrictors. As above, the rear gardens should be enclosed within a secure boundary. Windows on accessible elevations should be set well back from pedestrian routes, behind low boundary fencing or planting.

2.2.3 Vehicles parked on the street were targeted for theft and criminal damage.

Possible Solution - The layout of the development should be designed at accommodate the likely demand for car parking space in order to cater for residents and their visitors. Parking spaces for residents should be located within the defined boundary of the site, with entry restricted to residents. Any other parking space should be located where it can be easily overlooked from windows of routinely-occupied rooms in adjacent premises.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary


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- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems


2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site.


Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **37%** **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **3%** **higher** than Greater Manchester.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **135%** **higher** than Manchester as a whole, and **231%** **higher** than Greater Manchester.

2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **63%** **higher** than Manchester as a whole, and **87%** **higher** than Greater Manchester.


2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **7%** **higher** than Manchester as a whole, and **46%** **higher** than Greater Manchester.

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
2.5 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day and Time Range: Over the past 12 months there has been a relatively low volume of residential burglary, with the majority of incidents occurring on Mondays in the early evening from 17:00-19:00.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following point entries and MO's have been the most frequently occurring:


- Front and rear doors have been forced open using a combination of implements and bodily pressure.
- Rear entry points (both doors and windows) were common targets as offenders can conceal themselves from view.
- Offenders used implements to prise open rear and ground floor windows. The use of implements for windows and doors suggests the offender has gone equipped to steal.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local neighbourhood fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Thursdays and Sundays.

Time Range: During the day, levels of vehicle crime peak in the evening from 19:00-22:00.

Vehicles were most commonly targeted for theft and criminal damage when parked on the street, particularly Nell Lane and Mauldeth Road West.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development comprises demolition of the existing buildings on the site and construction of an apartment block containing 24 dwellings over three floors.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 Definition to site. The site perimeter appears to be effectively defined and enclosed in order to make a clear distinction between the public realm and private / communal space around the flats. Proposed boundary treatments should not provide features that may create informal sitting / gathering areas or climbing aids.

3.2.2 The parking area is enclosed within a fence line which defines the area as belonging to the apartment block. The effect of the fence line on pedestrian routes should be considered further (see items 3.3.2 & 3.3.4). Where the vehicle manoeuvring / parking areas are close to boundary fencing, the fencing in these locations needs protection from potential vehicle damage.

3.2.3 The internal areas of the block appear to be generally free of obstacles, thus an intruder would find difficulty in hiding within the communal parts of the buildings. All communal doors within the corridors should include glazed elements to improve sight lines.

3.2.4 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime

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3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 French windows. Plans indicate that ground floor apartments will have French / patio windows, and this is only acceptable if they are within a secure private or communal garden boundary, as otherwise they are vulnerable to intruder access and also provide potential for further entry to secure corridors inside the blocks.

3.3.2 Footpath routes around site boundary. The impact on established footpath routes should be carefully considered. Pedestrian routes should be well defined allowing clear views along them and overlooked from adjacent dwellings. Any nearby vegetation should not obscure sightlines nor interfere with the spread of street lighting. The public footpath route from Arrowfield Road should be readily apparent on approaching the car park entrance, so that people do not enter the site unwittingly and find themselves contained within the fence line – such frustrations may generate disorder, most likely damage to the perimeter fencing or parked vehicles. The access to property no 8 Buckthorn Close should not create a concealed alley.

3.3.3 Substation. These features can be targets for criminal damage and provide nuisance for neighbouring residents. The boundary treatments should not provide climbing aids that could undermine the integrity of adjacent secure fence lines to adjacent gardens. An anti-graffiti coating should be applied to all exposed elevations / walls.

3.3.4 Rates of vehicle-related crime in the area are well above average for Greater Manchester. The security of the communal parking area and features within it would be greatly enhanced with the inclusion of access-controlled, automated, entry gates to the car park. Such gates should be located as close as possible to the back of pavement and be activated by a fob, only available to residents.

3.3.5 Cycle store / bin store. Cycle and bin stores located within publicly-accessible space are frequent targets for theft, criminal damage and provide cover for other criminal and antisocial behaviour. It is advised that they are located behind a secure fence line accessible to residents only. It is preferable for cycle storage for residents to be contained within the building. Cycle stands must be either located within a secure cage or room or within separate cycle lockers, only accessible to cyclists. Racks within the enclosure should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels, and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).

3.3.6 Lobby arrangement at entrances to blocks. A secure lobby arrangement should be introduced at the entrances to the block in order to reduce potential tailgating opportunities. This would require additional, access-controlled doors to prevent unauthorised entry to the stairs and residential corridors. Tailgating is the main way that intruders gain access to communal areas. Apartments should not be directly accessed off the lobby. Postal / identity theft is a significant problem within apartment blocks and if the mail boxes are to be located within the building itself they should be situated within the secure lobby area so that postal delivery staff do not have access to the whole of the building, or ideally a “through-the- wall” arrangement should be adopted, allowing external deliveries and internal collection of mail.

3.3.7 Lighting to access road and pedestrian routes around the site. Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for larger vehicles.

3.3.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

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4.5 Access Control

- ❑ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Main Entrance doors
  - Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies
  - Bin stores
  - Cycle stores
  - Staff-only areas
  - Communal roof garden
  - Car park access gates

4.6 Boundaries

- ❑ Secure boundaries should be formed of 2100mm high walls/railings (with no mid-rails that could aid climbing). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ❑ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the rear parking area must be certified to one of the following standards:
  - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
  - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
  - Sold Secure Gold
  - PAS 68: 2013
- ❑ Protection of rear garden fencing from vehicle overrun. Back garden fencing adjoining vehicle manoeuvring areas and parking spaces should be protected from accidental vehicle damage by installation of wheel stops around the edge of the parking court, or installation of kerbing / crash barriers.

4.7 Landscaping

- ❑ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ❑ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ❑ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ❑ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

- ❑ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

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- Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- Lighting to under croft parking areas should display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%.
- Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are ‘Overview’ and ‘Recognition’, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, foyer, stairs, lift lobbies, landings, cycle stores, bin store entrances.

4.10 Other

- Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.

5.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

5.1.3 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
- Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, alarms, CCTV)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting is not impaired.

5.1.4 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.

5.1.5 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
01/06/2017	JDA Architects	CIS instruction received
19/06/2017	JDA Architects	Fee agreed
28/06/2017	N/A	Site visit
12/07/2017	JDA Architects	Payment received
17/07/2017	JDA Architects	Progress Update
18/07/2017	JDA Architects	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
930_SK007	Proposed Site Plan	28/02/17	A
930	Sketch Ground Floor Plan	08/02/2017	E
930 003	Sketch First Floor Plan	08/02/2017	D
930 004	Proposed Elevations	13/02/2017	A
930 005	Sketch Second Floor Plan	13/02/2017	D
930 SK007	Proposed Site Plan Indicating Existing Utilities	17/03/2017	A
930 008	Roof Plan	05/05/2017	
930 011	Proposed Bin Store	25/05/2017	
930 SK012	Highways Plan	24/05/2017	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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