

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 14 houses

on land between the Cringlewood Club & Beech House Nursing Home, Yewtree Lane, Northenden

FOR: **Yew Tree Development Ltd**

VERSION A: **09.08.17**

2017/0624/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

Land between the Cringlewood Club and Beech House Nursing Home, Yewtree Lane, Northenden

2017/0624/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

Residential development of the site seems entirely appropriate. The development is well laid out from a crime prevention perspective and we are happy to support the proposals. There are several recommendations set out in section 3.3 of the report, they are summarised as follows:

- Include a high quality streetscape to promote ownership of the public space within the development by residents.
- Use 'Green Screen' fencing rather than timber fencing on the rear boundaries that adjoin Yewtree Lane.
- For added security, add defensive planting and a taller boundary fence along the western boundary of the site with the Cringlewood Club car park.
- Front gardens of the houses facing Yewtree Lane and those close to the entrance to the cul-de-sac should be defined with 1000mm high hedges in keeping with the Wythenshawe vernacular.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security may make representations to Manchester City Council to require the inclusion of conditions that would address these matters, as well as a condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation (see section 4 specification).



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1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site, edged in red on the plan, is situated on the north side of Yewtree Lane, Northern Moor, in a predominantly residential area of low-rise, family houses, principally under the management of Wythenshawe Community Housing Group. Typical of the Wythenshawe area, the streets are characterised by generous grass verges, street trees and front gardens enclosed with hedges. Barry Road lies immediately to the north of the site; the rear garden boundaries to the houses that face Barry Road form the northern boundary of the site. Crude security measures have been added to rear garden walls to several of these houses designed to prevent intruders gaining access from the site into their properties. The Cringlewood Social Club and car park lie west of the site; Beech House Nursing Home is situated immediately to the east. A timber hoarding, which has been breached in several places, encloses the Yewtree Lane boundary. The site has been cleared of all buildings that once stood on the site, although some of the walls have been retained on the northern edge of the site where they help to define the boundary (see above re: crude security measures). A short cul-de-sac provides access to the site though the locked timber gates, which form part of the southern boundary, currently prevent access. The fringes of the site have been colonised by succession vegetation. Mature trees line the eastern and western boundaries. In April 2014, planning permission was granted to erect nine bungalows on the site together with the creation of a new access road from Yewtree Lane.



Looking west along Yewtree Lane with the site on the right and housing on the opposite side of the road.



Looking south along the site access road to the timber gates & hoarding on the Yewtree Lane boundary.



A high brick wall defines much of the northern boundary of the site. Beech House is on the right.





The Cringlewood Club and associated car park lies immediately west of the site.



Family housing on the south side of Yewtree Lane face the site



Razor wire & other crude measures - used to secure rear boundaries to the houses that face Barry Road.

There have been 184 reported crimes committed in the neighbourhood in which the site is located in the past 12 months; this is just below the average number of offences when compared with similar largely residential neighbourhoods across Greater Manchester. Of the total number of crimes recorded, those involving the use, or threat, of violence account for about 38% of the total. Around 33% of crime directly relates to housing - be they burglary, theft from gardens/garden sheds, theft of, or from, cars parked on driveways, or criminal damage - to houses, cars parked on driveways, or damage to boundary fencing. Vehicle crime, including criminal damage of vehicles, account for about 17% of the recorded crimes. When considering the local environment and the principal crime groups that affect residential development, the areas of risk with this proposed development are likely relate to; the availability of secure car parking; the security of the rear gardens of the proposed properties, particularly those adjacent to pathways; and, the quality of doors, windows and glazing used in constructing the dwellings. It is important to orientate the proposed houses to maximise natural surveillance across the development so that cars and neighbouring houses are easily supervised by residents. Offenders are unlikely to target houses or cars where their actions are likely to be witnessed by neighbouring residents. Avoiding layouts that allow easy access to rear gardens helps to reduce the risk of burglary as well as the risk of theft of items such as bicycles or tools from gardens and garden sheds.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2016 and 31st July 2017.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	. Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
22	7	53	73	8	<5	<5	10	<5	5

2.1.1 Overall, the volume of recorded crime in this neighbourhood is just below average. The most prevalent offences have been violence, criminal damage, and residential burglary; all of which exceed the average rates experienced across Manchester and Greater Manchester. Where there have been incidents of criminal damage, these have primarily occurred against vehicles and residential properties as opposed to commercial premises. The majority of crimes took place on Sale Road (27%) and Yewtree Lane (17%).

2.2 Modus operandi used in committing burglary in this neighbourhood & measures to reduce future risk

2.2.1 Doors and windows have been targeted when left unlocked

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors to should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- windows should be fitted with opening restrictors;
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e. a small front garden perhaps enclosed with a 1000mm high fence. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property; and
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors. Light suggests a dwelling is occupied; it also aids residents in locating keys and locks and highlights the actions of intruders.

2.2.2 Glazing was smashed in windows and patio doors to gain entry.

To minimise the risk of offenders smashing glass:

- all windows, and glazed panels within doors, should be fitted with laminate glass;
- windows should be fitted with key operated locks; and,
- in particularly high crime areas, glazing to secluded side and rear doors should be avoided.

2.2.3 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and

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- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

2.3 Risk Factors


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period


2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site.

Comparing burglary dwelling rates in the neighbourhood around the site with those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




Comparing wounding rates in the neighbourhood around the site with those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




2.4.1 The rate of burglary per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **17% higher** than the Manchester rate and **91% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate.

2.4.2 The rate of wounding crimes per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **132% higher** than the North Manchester rate and **227% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate.

Comparing criminal damage rates in the neighbourhood around the site with those in Manchester and Greater Manchester



Comparing vehicle crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site with those in Manchester and Greater Manchester



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
2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **96% higher** than the Manchester rate and **126% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate.

2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **39% lower** than the Manchester rate and **16% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate.


2.5 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within 500m of the site.

Burglary Dwelling – Day Range




Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



2.5.1 Day and Time Range: The risk of burglary in this neighbourhood remains consistent through the week with a greater risk on Saturdays. In terms of the time of the day, the hours of the mid-afternoon and late evening carry the greatest risk.

Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry




2.5.2 Point of Entry: The most common entry points were rear windows. Glazing in front and rear door was smashed to gain entry and doors forced open with bodily pressure. Windows were targeted when left insecure by residents or offenders smashed the glass to gain entry.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day & Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime remains consistently low throughout the week, with the greatest risk on a Tuesday. In terms of the time of day, the risk rises through the late afternoon and in the middle of the night. Offenders often target vehicles during the late evening and at night using the cover of darkness. Offenders most frequently targeted vehicles for theft and criminal damage when parked on the street, particularly on Yewtree Lane.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development involves the construction 14no. four bedroom detached houses. Each house will have 2 driveway parking spaces located at the front or side of the property. Each house will have a modest front garden and a more generous rear garden.

3.1.2 Two of the houses will face Yewtree Lane, with the remaining facing what appears to be the existing tarmacked cul-de-sac.

3.1.3 Three of the plots (plots 601, 602, 610 and 612) will have tall side or rear garden fencing adjoining Yewtree Lane.

3.1.4 There is no public amenity space within the development but several of the mature trees along the periphery of the site will be retained.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.2.1 A residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land use.

3.2.2 The proposals result in the redevelopment of a site that is prone to anti-social behaviour, such as fly-tipping.

3.2.3 The proposals will result in greater security to the rear boundaries of those houses on Barry Road whose rear boundaries adjoin the site and which have been reinforced with crude security measures to reduce the risk of intruders entering their gardens.

3.2.4 The development provides a range of housing, including family housing, which tends to be occupied for much of the day, particularly residents with young families, and there is sufficient 'critical mass', in terms of the numbers of, and size of, dwellings an help retain a level of activity and passive surveillance throughout the day. The actual presence of residents or even visible signs of people present - cars on driveways, lights on in houses, external lighting on at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.

3.2.5 Short cul-de-sac developments tend to attract less crime than those located on 'through' roads, which have a greater volume of traffic, including pedestrian traffic, where offenders tend to be less conspicuous.

3.2.6 Front doors and principal room windows face the street, which helps to promote street activity and promotes natural surveillance.

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3.2.7 Defensible space is provided to the front and rear of the houses.

3.2.8 Landscaping of the modest front gardens helps to raise the quality of the local environment. Care should be taken not to have a street scene dominated by tarmac. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.9 The proposed parking arrangements facilitate the security of vehicles.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

3.3.1 In order to emphasise ownership and encourage play in the street, the application of a high specification treatment to the surfacing of the cul-de-sac is recommended. The creation of 'Homezone' style surfacing, rather than a standard engineering solution will emphasise 'territoriality', promote 'ownership' of the street amongst residents, and encourage play in the street – all of which adds to the overall supervision of the public space and deters crime. Whilst appreciating costs may prevent the entire access road having a high specification treatment, the design team should concentrate efforts on the street in front of the houses within the head of the cul-de-sac but also include a speed threshold, with a change in the hard surface treatment, at the 'entrance' to the development.

3.3.2 Front gardens of the houses facing Yewtree Lane and those close to the entrance to the cul-de-sac plots 601, 611 and 612, should be defined with 1000mm high fencing, ideally hedges in keeping with the Wythenshawe vernacular.

3.3.3 Rear garden fencing should be 1800mm high, rising to 2100mm high along the western boundary with the Cringlewood Club car park.

3.3.4 'Green Screen' style, pre-cultivated hedges (see below), or similar, managed at 1800mm, should be used to define the rear garden fences to plots 601, 602, 610 and 612 that adjoin Yewtree Lane. To improve the outlook for residents of plots 608 and 609, 'Green Screen' should also be considered for the rear, northern, boundaries to plot 613 and 614.



3.3.5 The same green screen style fencing, at 2100mm high, could be used to secure the western boundaries. Alternatively, the boundary should include dense, 'defensive' (prickly) shrub planting to provide additional security to the fencing to the gardens of plots 609 and 614 where they adjoin the Cringlewood Club car park. 'Green screen' or defensive planting should be utilised on the car park side of this boundary to deter intruders climbing over the fence and to protect the fence from accidental or malicious damage.

3.3.6 Rear garden entry gates should match the styling and height of adjacent fences and, ideally, be self-closing and self-locking. Locks should be operable from either the public or the private side of the gate.

3.3.7 Hedges of around 1000mm in height should be used to define ownership of the greenspace between plots 602 and 603

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ❑ All external front and rear doors, including French, doors and multi-folding rear doors, must be tested, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ❑ Front doors to all houses should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ❑ Front doors should have fixed sidelights or a door viewer as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.

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- Letterboxes within doors must be fitted with deflector plates and be located a minimum of 400mm away from the internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows

- Ground floor windows to all properties must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- Glazing within external doors and all ground floor windows on all properties must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Intruder Alarm

- It is good practice to fit an alarm to each dwelling (but not essential for Secured by Design accreditation). If fitted, alarms should comply with BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems or BS 6799 for wireless systems, and be linked to contacts on all external doors of each property with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows.

4.5 Boundaries

- Rear gardens to houses should generally be enclosed with 1800mm high, close -boarded, timber fencing.
- The rear boundaries of the properties along the western edge of the development, adjacent to the open club car park, are particularly vulnerable as they are accessible to the public and are hidden from view from the street. These boundaries should be defined with 2100mm high 'green screen', or 2100mm high timber, with dense defensive planting on the car park side to deter damage and climbing. Care should be taken that the existing trees along the edge of the car park do not form climbing aids over the proposed rear boundaries.
- For visual and for security reasons, 'Green Screen' fencing should be installed to plots 601, 602, 610 and 612 where the boundaries adjoin Yewtree Lane,
- Sub-divisional rear plot boundaries should include a privacy screen of 1800mm perpendicular to the house, reducing to 1500mm for the remainder of the boundary.
- Front boundaries to plots 613 and 614, facing Yewtree Lane, as well as plots 601, 611 and 612 within the cul-de-sac, should be defined with a 1000mm hedges/fences. Houses located within the head cul-de-sac do not require front boundary fences, a change of surface is sufficient to mark plot boundaries here.

4.6 Landscaping

- In order to facilitate natural surveillance across the development, shrub planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

4.7 Lighting

- External, dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided to the front and rear doors of all properties and to the 'side of the house' parking bays (unless there are windows directly overlooking these bays). Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not appropriate.

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- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 Other

- If smart meters are not fitted, meter cupboards should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each property.
- Rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- If garden sheds are provided, they should be fitted with sold secure locks and have a ground anchor fitted, to allow residents to secure valuable equipment and/or bicycles.

5 Construction

- The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved, see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details.

6 Secured by Design (SBD)

- Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of housing and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
26.07.17	Colin Leith, Bowker Saddler	Request for Crime Impact Statement
07.08.17		Site visit
06.03.18	Colin Leith, Bowker Saddler	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
018	4b6p wide		A
110	Location Plan	18/07/17	
111	Proposed Site Plan	23/06/17	
152	3D Site Axonometric	24/07/17	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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