CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

BUSINESS SCHOOL,
BOOTH STREET WEST

UNIVERSITY ACCOMMODATION (4198SQM) &
RETAIL (1142SQM)

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR BRUNTWOOD
VERSION A: [08.08.14]
REFERENCE: 2013/0031/CIS/02

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Manchester Business School, Booth Street West

2013/0031/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes not required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposed development suggests the designers are cognisant of the need to promote surveillance and activity at suitable locations within the scheme, and to control access into the Business School.

The proposed scheme has been found acceptable and if submitted to Manchester City Council in its current form we will support the application, providing the developer demonstrates/clarifies that there will be an access control strategy, which addresses movement around the whole of the development, is prepared and executed in full.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



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1 Visual Audit



Manchester Business School, MBS, is principally located on the south side of Booth Street West between Oxford Road and Higher Chatham Street. The current entrance to MBS is rather anonymously located on the western, Higher Chatham Street, elevation.



Windows on the southern elevation look out onto the landscape public realm of the university campus. Planning consent for a complementary executive education centre and hotel, on the site of the car park immediately west of the site, was granted in April 2013.





MBS west is a multi-levelled building occupying a large, broadly rectangular, footprint. The building rises to 10 storeys on the Booth Street West elevation and 4/5 storeys on the southern elevation.



The eastern end of the building is largely given over to retail space, known as the Precinct Centre. Whilst a bridge spanning Oxford Road connects MBS West with complimentary services on the opposite side of the road.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2013 and 30th June 2014.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site									
Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	124	176	294	332	26	<20	158	<20	328

2.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is high, largely due to its location close to the city centre, high pedestrian and vehicle traffic, mixture of uses in the vicinity and the presence of large numbers of cars and bicycles parked within the area analysed. The volumes of violent crimes, theft (particularly cycle theft), robbery and vehicle crime are high and the rate of burglary of commercial premises is much greater than is experienced across Manchester as a whole.

2.2 Common Local/Use Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Education: Offenders have gained access in to buildings open to members of the public before targeting staff only areas.

Solution *University buildings frequently allow free uncontrolled access, which allows criminals to gain entry without suspicion, and then target the more sensitive areas of the building. Access control systems help to ensure only authorised people can gain access to designated spaces. Doors may be controlled by fob/swipe systems, and turnstiles or speed gates can be used at building entrances. All security strategies should be complimented by signage to clearly identify restricted areas and procedures to ensure staff/students/guests carry and display authentic identification and eliminate/minimise tail-gating into secure areas. This, in conjunction with human supervision (and CCTV), will greatly reduce the scope for offenders to operate.*

2.2.2 Education: Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure

Solution *The positioning of external doors should be carefully considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), but it is inevitable that some will be located at the rear of the buildings where they will not benefit from natural surveillance. Consequently, all external doors should be certified to recognised security standards, alarmed and CCTV cameras should be installed to monitor movements through and around external doors.*

2.2.3 Retail: Rear doors and windows have been forced open by offenders

Solution *Security-certified doorsets should be used to all external doors within retail premises. Concealed doors at the rear of buildings should be particularly robust as this is where intruders are likely to approach the premises. Additional protection may be required in such cases. Windows on rear elevations should be certified to either PAS 24 or LPS 1175. In high crime areas, windows on concealed elevations should be avoided or their numbers and size of openings kept to a minimum. Again, additional protection such as bars or shutters may be considered.*

2.2.4 Retail: Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

Solution *Use SBD approved door sets, i.e. PAS 24 or LPS 1175 security rating 2 doors, with 7.5mm laminate glazing within the door and shopfront generally. Provide additional protection to particularly vulnerable doors with SBD approved shutters. Avoid locating doors where they are concealed from view and ensure they are adequately illuminated or monitored with CCTV.*

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2.3 Burglary Other (Education): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against college/university premises, recorded in the Manchester city council area.

Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary at universities/colleges is concentrated between Thursday and Sunday.

2.3.2 Time Range: The majority of burglaries have taken place in the evening and in the early hours of the morning. Properties are generally targeted at these times when they are closed, it is dark and offenders perceive the risk of being caught as low.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: In the majority of burglaries entry has been gained through doors. Offenders have typically forced doors open with bodily pressure and tool. In a number of burglaries, offenders simply walked into openly accessible buildings before targeting areas restricted to staff.

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2.4 Burglary Other (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against retail premises, recorded in the Manchester city council area.

Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary is greatest on Monday and Friday, with the risk lowest over the weekend.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary increases in the afternoon and in the early evening. A high number of burglaries have taken place when shops are open and offenders have entered posing as customers, before targeting areas restricted to staff.

2.4.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries at retail premises across Manchester have been committed through front and rear doors. A high number have also been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which have typically been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers) have targeted staff only areas. When doors have been targeted, they have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure and, in a number of cases, glazing within doors have been smashed by offenders to gain entry.

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2.5 Miscellaneous Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against retail premises, recorded in the Manchester city council area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: The risk of theft at Manchester retail premises is greatest on Saturday. It is likely that the risk of theft increases on Saturday when shops are busiest, providing offenders with more opportunities.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk increases in the afternoon, peaking between 4pm and 5pm. The number of shoppers is greatest in the afternoon and therefore the opportunity to commit theft is greater. It is likely that thieves will target the busiest shops, as crowds can provide anonymity and can reduce the risk of being detected.

2.6 Miscellaneous Theft (Education): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts college/university premises, recorded in the Manchester city council area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.6.1 Day Range: The risk of theft is concentrated between Monday and Friday, peaking on Tuesday and Wednesday. The majority of thefts have been against students and members of staff and opportunities for thefts often arise when buildings are busiest, which is generally between Monday and Friday.

2.6.2 Time Range: The risk is concentrated between 10am and 5pm.

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2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.7.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday.

2.7.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is greatest in the evening, peaking between 7pm and 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time when it is dark and vehicles parked on remote/isolated side streets and car parks are vulnerable to attack undetected.

2.8 Violent: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to violent crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Violent Crime – Day Range



Violent Crime – Time Range



2.8.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people attend city centre licensed premises, often drinking for longer periods and consuming more alcohol – leading to conflicts.

2.8.2 Time Range: The risk increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 2am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on streets, at taxi ranks/bus stops/train stations and at takeaways.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The development involves the refurbishment and reconfiguration of the Business School West to allow better use of the existing floorspace. The principal elements of the work include:

- A glazed extension and creation of a new entrance on the western elevation.
- Reorganising existing space to provide new teaching and administrative facilities and a Learning Resource Centre.
- Public realm improvements including the removal of the link bridge across Oxford Road, elevated walkways and pavement widening.
- Remodelling of the Precinct Centre to create a modern retail offer served from street level with shop fronts facing Oxford Road and the landscaped public realm of the southern elevation.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The new entrance to the Business School will be much more visible, and relates well to the proposed hotel/executive education centre opposite.

3.2.2 Entry beyond the reception area will be controlled with entry turnstiles. Additional entrance/exit doors will be access controlled or used in an emergency only.

3.2.3 The reception desk orientated in such a way that staff are clearly visible to those entering the building and visitors are easily visible to reception staff.

3.2.4 The building presents a much more active frontage to the Oxford Road elevation, which will help to enliven the street scene.

3.2.5 The dominance of glazing at either end of the building means that surveillance and lighting of the surrounding streets will be enhanced.

3.2.6 The removal of escalators elevated walkways and recesses of the Precinct Centre will make the retail offer much more logically laid out and will address the current imbalance of public/private space within the development.

3.2.7 Retail uses are concentrated at the most logical end of the building benefitting from high levels of footfall and adjacent to the public realm on the southern elevation

3.2.8 The toilet facilities are all set within the access control zone.

3.2.9 The design of circulation spaces means that the fire escape stairs need only be used in an emergency.

3.2.10 A prestigious development such as this is likely to positively influence the quality of management of the public realm surrounding the development as the University will be keen to portray a very positive image of the area.

3.2.11 The redevelopment of the adjacent car park site will greatly improve the level of activity through the day and long into the evening.

3.3 Changes and Amendments Needed

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Use of the fire escape stairs for general circulation should be avoided as it could compromise the security of the building, weakening the secure of turnstile entry control system.

3.3.2 The development should take into account the security of students and staff approaching and leaving the building, particularly at quiet times and late at night. The areas outside the premises should be well illuminated and a monitored CCTV system covering the approaches to the development is recommended.

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3.3.3 Given that many students/guests will be first time or irregular visitors to the development, signposting is vital to ensure that guests have an understanding of how to find facilities within the development as well as facilities elsewhere on campus or directions to safe routes to the city centre or Oxford Road, for example.

3.3.4 The reception desks should have a staff/security presence at all times that the building is open

3.3.5 Entry to staff-only areas should be access controlled and individual rooms lockable by key to prevent unauthorised entry. Signage should indicate which areas are only for members of staff.

3.3.6 The default position for service yard shutters should be closed.

3.3.7 Any external seating areas associated with café/restaurant uses should be: a) supervised; b) the space with barriers with a single entry/exit point; and, c) tables and chairs should be either securely fixed or removed into premises at night. To facilitate secure storage of belongings (particularly handbags and laptop bags), whilst customers eat and drink, table and chairs should be designed in such a way or fitted with to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.

3.3.8 Cycle parking hoops should be removed from the Booth Street West elevation and a more secure cycle park provided in a very visible location, close to areas of day-round activity, or in area monitored by University security staff.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Doors

4.1.1 External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.

4.1.2 Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+).

4.1.3 Revolving doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+).

4.1.4 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.1.5 All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- ❑ Any newly installed windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.
- ❑ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ❑ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ❑ Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2, and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Curtain Walling/Glazing

- ❑ Glazing to a height of 2400mm must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

4.4.1 An intruder alarm should be fitted to the Business School and each retail unit, with contacts on all external doors. PIR detectors should cover all rooms with windows, and in the case of the Business School, the alarm should be monitored by the University security staff.

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4.5 Access Control

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Entrance turnstiles
  - Staff only areas of the Business School.
  - Back of house of retail units.
  - Access to and from, the inner service yard from the outside of the building or from within.

4.6 Retail Fit-Out

- Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:
  - Internal access control
  - Internal doors in to premises
  - Alarm systems
- These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5 External Features

5.1 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations, such as at building entrances and alongside footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people and CCTV cameras to monitor the immediate environment and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

5.2 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

5.3 CCTV

- CCTV cameras used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
  - With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

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- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
    - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
    - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances to the MBS and retail units, emergency escape doors inner and outer sides, sales counters and lobbies.

6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to lighting, signage, access controls
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications

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and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
04.08.14		CIS application
26.07.14		Site visit
08.08.14		Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
01(0-)A009	Existing plans – Basement floor	06/14	C
MP(0-)A010	Masterplan – Existing context elevations Higher Cambridge Street	06/14	E
01(0-)A005	MBS refurbishment – Proposed context elevations North & South	06/14	G
01(0-)A029	Proposed plans – Basement floor	06/14	F
01(0-)A006	MBS refurbishment – Proposed context elevations East & West	06/14	G
01(0-)A004	MBS refurbishment proposed context elevations – Higher Cambridge Street	06/14	F
01(0-)A003	Manchester Business School – Proposed elevations – North	06/14	F
01(0-)A001	Manchester Business School – Proposed elevations 01 & 03 East & West	06/14	F

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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