

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

8-16 Newton Street, Manchester

Refurbishment of Building to create 4,250m^2 commercial space

For: Eastern Green Ltd

VERSION A: 26th February 2018

URN: 2018/0068/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

8-16 Newton Street, Manchester, M1 2AE

2018/0068/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major Design Changes Not Required

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. In general the proposed scheme has been found acceptable, but further consideration of some aspects is advised, as stated in section 3.3 of this report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Michael Craig *DipLD CMLI*

DfS Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The site consists of a range of listed buildings within the Stevenson Square Conservation Area in central Manchester. It is close to both Piccadilly railway station and Piccadilly Gardens.

The site fronts Newton Street and Dale Street, both relatively busy streets with vehicles and pedestrians. Mangle Street and Back Piccadilly are effectively service roads providing access to the side and rear of premises fronting other streets, and are consequently very quiet.


The neighbourhood contains a varied mix of premises, with old warehouse buildings having been converted or replaced with residential, retail, commercial and hotel uses. Some of the older buildings are currently vacant, thus reducing legitimately activity in and around them. There are also a number of licensed premises in the area.

Concealed and recessed areas in the back streets have been subject to abuse. They are not well overlooked from adjacent premises, and openings at accessible levels have been blocked off or reinforced with grilles and other security enhancements to prevent unauthorised access.


Mangle Street is a service road off Dale Street


External stairs installed to provide emergency escape


Protection has been added to lower floor windows along Back Piccadilly



Newton Street frontage with relatively narrow footway & bus stop




Newton Street / Back Piccadilly with proposed development site on left


Mangle Street showing bins and evidence of criminal damage

Newton Street frontage


Back Piccadilly looking towards Newton Street

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2017 to 31st December 2017

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
35	233	341	2838	1009	435	49	274	105	238

2.1.1 Over the previous 12 months, the volume of crime reported in the vicinity of the development site has been very high. The principal crimes are violence, theft, criminal damage, robbery and vehicle crime. These crimes are typical of those experienced within a city centre – especially where there is a concentration of retail and licensed premises, and large car parks. Several local streets have very high volumes of crime – Piccadilly and Market Street are the main locations. Both have very high pedestrian flows and attract criminals for this and other reasons. Like many transport hubs, Piccadilly Interchange is also a volume crime generator.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 **Doors of offices, including escape doors, have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools**

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all communal entry doors, office suite entry doors, service doors and escape doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- communal entry doors, service doors and escape doors should be visible from the 'street' not set within deep recesses or on secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- defensible space in the form of a secure lobby to the offices should be provided.

2.2.2 **Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed**

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via glazed areas:

- laminate glass should be used throughout the development. Laminate glass is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and open locks and, because of its structural properties; and,
- consideration should be given to installing security grilles to the most vulnerable windows and doors

2.2.3 **Offenders posing as legitimate customers or staff to gain entry to offices or access staff only areas and then stealing property**

To minimise the risk of offenders posing as customers or staff to gain access:

- install access controls to doors connecting the more public areas to private/sensitive areas;
- install access controls at each office suite;
- locate a reception desk in a location that maximises surveillance over entry doors in the ground floor lobby and office suite lobbies;
- install CCTV cameras to monitor movements in, out, and around the building, including the basement car park.
- access control systems should be employed to prevent intruders from entering the building and 'back of house' areas places where staff belongings may be stored;
- reception staff should wear an identification badge;
- overt signage should be used to assist in deterring casual entry; and,
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g. lockers.

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2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary
- Theft of employees personal belongings from offices or staff rest rooms
- Theft of stock and equipment by employees
- Theft of customer property
- Robbery
- Theft of bicycles
- Criminal damage, including graffiti, to the building
- Tailgating and uncontrolled access into offices
- Violence directed towards staff of food and drink premises
- Theft of materials and of plant and machinery during construction

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
2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis Offices

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against office premises recorded in the Manchester area.


Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in North Manchester is greatest on Friday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary against office premises in North Manchester is greatest in the late evening and during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target office buildings when they are closed for the day, it is dark, the areas they are typically located in are quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.


2.4.3 Point of Entry: The majority of office burglaries in North Manchester have been committed through doors. Many of the burglaries against office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. A number of burglaries have also been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff-only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

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
2.5 Theft Offices - Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against office premises recorded in the Manchester area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of miscellaneous theft at offices is greatest on Wednesday and is much lower during the weekend – when many are likely to be closed.

2.5.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of miscellaneous theft is concentrated between mid-morning and 6pm in the evening – aligning with standard working hours. During these times, many office workers will take their breaks (particularly at lunch), leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts often peak at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing and premises are likely to be less secure, possibly while cleaning operations are carried out.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development comprises refurbishment of the existing building, with works to all the upper floors (levels 1-4) and also includes part of the basement and ground floor to provide office space and ancillary accommodation.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development makes a positive use of a partly-vacant building. Repopulation and regular use of the building will bring additional vitality and should help to improve informal policing of the area.

3.2.2 The main pedestrian entrances to the building are located in prominent locations and are readily apparent on approaching from the surrounding public realm.

3.2.3 The proposed development will formalise the storage of refuse containers for existing and future occupants of the building (see also section 3.3.10)

3.2.4 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

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3.3 Changes Advised and Further Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Control of access beyond entrance lobby. The proposed plans do not indicate any reception facilities. Measures must be included to prevent visitors / intruders from progressing beyond the entrance lobby without authorisation. Access to stairs / lifts should be controlled using turnstiles or other access controls.

3.3.2 Communal corridors and stairwells in the building should be free of obstacles that could block sight lines. Use of glazed doors, creative lighting and reflective surfaces on acute corners can help with improving visibility and reduce potential for concealment.

3.3.3 A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed to monitor / record activity in and around the building. CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying pedestrian / cycle movements into and out of the site as well as the building entrances and lobbies. To facilitate the CCTV system, dusk until dawn lighting should be provided, particularly around the access doors / gates and any loading bays. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be monitored and recorded.

3.3.4 All individual office suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards / fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions, and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Access to plant / service / storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only). Main entrance doors should be controlled by means of a video access control system linked to each individual office suite (allowing staff to vet callers before allowing them entry).

3.3.5 Office staff should have the ability to control access into the building, especially outside of standard working hours. The Newton Street entrance door should be self-closing and self-locking, and include an electronic lock, activated by a fob. An audio link between this entrance and the ground floor the reception desk, and audio visual link to each reception desk on the upper floors, should be installed to allow visitors to communicate with each tenant's reception desk or building management staff. A remote lock release facility should also be installed at each reception to allow staff to release the door remotely to allow visitors into the reception area prior to being accompanied through the building.

3.3.6 Subdivision of Floor Space. Each suite of offices should be capable of separation with their own individual access controls.

3.3.7 Cycle storage for staff is located in a separate room off the basement parking area. Access should be restricted to genuine cyclists only using access controls. Cycle stands should allow bikes to be secured by both wheels and the frame. There should be sufficient secure storage lockers provided for cyclists to store day wear.

3.3.8 Signage and orientation. Routes leading to and from various facilities in and around the building should be obvious to site users and visitors. Disorientation can provide legitimacy for an offender to be present in a restricted area. Clear signage should be provided throughout the site which will help to direct people to where they need to go, and discourage entry to restricted areas.

3.3.9 Protection of street-level glazing is advised to prevent criminal damage to windows. Use of external rails or grilles should be considered and filming of the glass. The design of any external window guards should not form a ladder or climbing aid that would create step up to upper floor windows. It may be appropriate to include a strip of deterrent paving to discourage people from approaching these windows.

3.3.10 Waste disposal strategy. Arrangements for storage and disposal of refuse should not compromise the security of the development. Entry to refuse stores should be strictly controlled. Collection of waste should not require or allow external operatives to enter restricted areas within the site. Waste bins must not be stored on the streets for prolonged periods or overnight.

3.3.11 Control of access to the basement rooms, corridors and facilities accessed off them need further consideration. Emergency egress routes should not involve passing through secure areas of neighbouring premises.

3.3.12 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and visitors.

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4 Physical Security

The proposed development includes conversion of a listed building, and thus the potential to make alterations and upgrade its physical security is to some extent constrained by its structure. The following recommendations are made on this understanding and should apply to all new and replacement features introduced as part of the proposed development. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants / users will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence and / or monitored alarms / CCTV.

All new-build elements should be constructed in accordance with the following standards to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
  - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
  - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any secondary glazing installed should utilise a product approved by Secured by Design (see www.securedbydesign.com for details of suppliers / installers).
- ☐ Glazing Film. The film acts rather like the PVB interlayer in laminated glass and holds the glass together when it's broken. The film should be accredited to BS EN 12600, Class 2B and needs to be applied *behind* the glazing beads or bars to be fully effective which is likely to require removal of the glazing panel in order to do this (if there is a gap between the film and edge of the glass / frame, this significantly reduces the security performance of the film) - professional installation is therefore recommended. In this location any film should have a thickness of 300microns.

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4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
  - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
  - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
  - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
  - Cycle store

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

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- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrance lobbies, loading bays, emergency egress doors, external areas around the building, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

4.8 Other

- All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

- Consideration should be given to a protective coating applied to any areas that may be vulnerable to graffiti (such as large expanses of blank walls and inside toilets) - applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal (e.g. 'easy on' – see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).

- Cycle stands should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).

- Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and concealment / securing of cabling.

4.9 Fit Out of Retail / Commercial Units

- Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-user's requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:

  - Internal access control
  - Internal doors in to premises
  - Alarm systems
  - ATMs
  - Cash offices
  - External Seating

- The above features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell

5 Further Guidance on Internal Layout of Café / Bars

5.1.1 Licensed premises and restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating bars / restaurants generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent bars / restaurants means that such a venue would lack 'community

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territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.

- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, MP3 players etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

5.1.2 The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access / egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.

5.1.3 Customers entering / leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any WCs to monitor their use.

5.1.4 The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility. Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public highway, i.e. large promotional signs and menus should not obstruct views.

5.1.5 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars / service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled).

5.1.6 All back-of-house / staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

5.1.7 Locate toilet facilities away from public entrances to discourage bilking and use / abuse from non-customers.

6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.

6.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

6.1.3 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
- Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)

6.1.4 Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.

6.1.5 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any

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future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
18/01/2018	Atelier MB	CIS instruction received
19/01/2018	Atelier MB	Instruction confirmed / fee agreed
05/02/2018	Eastern Green Limited	Receipt of payment confirmed (cheque)
16/02/2018	N/A	Site visit
26/02/2018	Atelier MB	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
E(110)	Basement Floor Plan	08/16	B
E(120)	Ground Floor Plan	10/17	B
E(130)	First Floor Plan	01/18	B
E(140)	Second Floor Plan	01/18	B
E(150)	Third Floor Plan	01/18	B
E(160)	Fourth Floor Plan	04/16	B
E(170)	Roof Plan	06/16	-
E(202)	Existing Elevation	04/16	A
E(203)	Existing Elevation	06/17	-
E(204)	Back Piccadilly Elevation	06/17	
E(212)	Part 1 Newton Street	09/17	-
E(213)	Part 2 Newton Street	09/17	-
E(214)	Back Piccadilly Street	09/17	-
E(215)	Part 1 China Lane	09/17	-
E(216)	Part 2 China Lane	09/17	-
E(217)	Dale Street	09/17	-
E(301)	Section AA	10/17	-
E(303)	Existing Section CC	10/17	-
E(304)	Section DD	10/17	-
E(310)	Loading Bay Section	10/17	-
E(310)	Existing Section DD	10/17	-
E(315)	Existing Section DD	10/17	-
E(900)	Site Location Plan	05/17	-
P(110)	Basement Floor Plan	01/18	B
P(111)	Basement Floor Plan	10/17	-
P(113)	Basement Floor Plan	06/17	-
P(115)	Sugar Rays Unit	06/17	A
P(116)	Basement Floor Plan	09/17	D
P(120)	Ground Floor Plan	01/18	K
P(121)	Ground Floor Plan	10/17	B
P(123)	Ground Floor Plan	09/17	-

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P(125)	Loading Bay Plan	09/17	E
P(130)	First Floor Plan	01/18	P
P(131)	First Floor Plan	10/17	B
P(133)	First Floor Plan	11/17/	-
P(140)	Second Floor Plan	01/18	P
P(141)	Second Floor Plan	10/17	B
P(143)	Second Floor Plan	11/17	-
P(150)	Third Floor Plan	01/18	O
P(151)	Third Floor Plan	10/17	B
P(153)	Third Floor Plan	08/17	A
(P160)	Fourth Floor Plan	01/18	L
P(160)	Fourth Floor Plan	10/17	B
P(163)	Fourth Floor Plan	02/17	A
P(170)	Roof Plan	09/17	E
P(171)	Roof Plan	10/17	B
P(212)	Part 1 Newton Street	09/17	-
P(213)	Part 2 Newton Street	09/17	-
P(214)	Back Piccadilly Street	09/17	-
P(215)	Part 1 Mangle Street	09/17	-
P(217)	Dale Street	09/17	-
P(225)	Loading Bay Mangle St	10/17	-
P(301)	Section AA	07/17	-
P(302)	Proposed Section BB	07/17	-
P(303)	Proposed Section CC	07/17	-
P(304)	Section DD	07/17	-
P(306)	Section FF	07/17	-
P(310)	Loading Bay Section	09/17	D
P(314)	Section DD Part 1	07/17	-
P(315)	Section DD Part 2	07/17	-
P(321)	Section AA	07/17	-
P(324)	Section DD Part 1	07/17	-
P(325)	Section DD Part 2	11/17	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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