

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 18 apartments

at land at Monsall Road, Newton Heath

FOR: **Mangrove Estates Ltd/Jigsaw Homes Ltd**

VERSION A: **13.08.18**

2018/0576/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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Monsall Road, Newton Heath, Manchester

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

The development occupies a prominent corner site and is located in an area where there are significant levels of crime and disorder. However, from a crime prevention perspective, the scheme has been very well designed with a few only minor design interventions recommended. The design team appear cognisant of the need to ensure that the development animates the 'street' and facilitates natural surveillance of the public realm without compromising the security and privacy of future residents. The development is likely to make a positive addition to the neighbourhood.

Positive aspects of the scheme include:

- The proposed building is appropriately separated from the street appropriate width of 'defensible' space has been included separating the building from the street Windows on all elevations will facilitate natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm and car park;
- Secure car parking is provided within the site;
- Secure cycle parking is provided on site; and,
- Street activity, natural surveillance and lighting levels on the Emmett Street East and Monsall Road will be enhanced by the presence of the development.

To improve the security of the development:

- Install an automated vehicle entrance gate;
- Install 1800mm high fencing and pedestrian gates fitted with electronic locks to secure the car park, cycle and refuse stores and the amenity space;
- A through the wall postal system should be included at the entrance; and,
- The development should be built to Secured by Design standards.

I am happy to support the development, subject to the adoption of the standards and recommendations set out in sections 3.3 and 4 of this report.



Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*
Consultant
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
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1 Visual Audit


The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located at the junction of Monsall Road and Emmett Street East in Newton Heath. Formerly used as a car park for employees of Wilson House opposite, the site now lies vacant and overgrown. The tall, steel railings of the Monsall Road and Emmett Street East boundaries remain intact and prevent access onto the site. However, the remaining 'exposed' boundary on Mangrove Close is only semi-secured, with temporary mesh fencing, and there is some evidence of fly-tipping at the site. The land to the north and west of the site has recently been developed for family housing; several of the houses have common boundaries with the site, including two houses either side of the proposed site access on Mangrove Close. Despite each house within this development having a driveway, there are numerous cars parked on the pavement, particularly with the head of the cul-de-sac on Mangrove Close. Wilson House, a five-storey, office building, sits on the street corner directly opposite the site on the south side of Emmett Street East. The windows on the ground floor of Wilsons House are all protected with security grilles. The large site on the opposite side of Monsall Road is currently used for storage and distribution purposes.




Looking south along Monsall Road with the site on the right



Wilson House overlooks the site from its position on the south side of Emmett Street East




Modern, two-storey housing facing Monsall Road, adjacent to the northern boundary of the site





The site is largely overgrown with succession vegetation and attracts fly-tipping



Mangrove Close, a residential cul-de-sac, provides access to the rear of the site where



The narrow, western edge of the site on Mangrove Close

There have been 449 reported crimes in the neighbourhood around the site in the past 12 months. By Manchester standards, this is well the average although the neighbourhood does include two Metrolink stations, a police station and numerous industrial buildings. In this area, crimes predominantly carried out at against residential property, i.e., burglary, theft from gardens, criminal damage, and vehicle crime committed on driveways, account for only 7% of the total crime committed. Vehicle crime - theft of, theft from and criminal damage to vehicles – similarly amounts to about 17% of crimes. Crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence are most common with around 46% of crimes involving violence. When considering the types of offences committed in this neighbourhood, the modus operandi used by offenders in committing those crimes, and the environment of the site and its immediate surroundings, the principal concerns with this development will be: ensuring the proposed building is appropriately located on the site, so that passers-by do not affect the amenity of residents; that car and bicycle parking is provided in a secure location, and in sufficient numbers, to serve the development; and that the design and location of the communal entrance to the development is appropriately located on one of the principal elevations.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2017 and 30th June 2018.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
15	25	90	224	38	11	6	15	14	5

2.1.1 The volume of crime recorded in this neighbourhood is higher than average for a neighbourhood within the City of Manchester. The principal crimes involve the use of, or threat of, violence, burglary, criminal damage and vehicle related crime.

2.1.2 The highest rates are criminal damage and vehicle crimes, as these offence categories overlap and criminal damage to a vehicle accounting for most vehicle crimes in the area. These offences are more heavily concentrated in the area south of Monsall tram stop and around the roundabout on Northampton road.

2.1 Modus Operandi used by offenders in committing burglary and vehicle crime in this neighbourhood & measures to reduce vulnerability

2.1.1 Front doors of flats have been forced open after offenders have gained access to unsecured communal areas

- communal entry doors and individual apartment entry doors should be certified to PAS 24 or LPS 1175 sr2 security standards.
- access control systems should also be in place to prevent casual entry to the building or car park, and to allow residents to vet visitors before allowing them access to the building.
- entrances should be kept to a minimum, be located in highly visible positions, and brightly illuminated to deter offenders from attempting entry.

2.1.2 Doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- communal entrance door should be very visible rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- secluded passageways to the side or rear of the building should be secured or avoided altogether wherever possible, such routes can facilitate access to vulnerable doors or windows as well as attract anti-social behaviour; and,
- external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property is occupied, and the light will also highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed.

2.1.3 Doors and windows have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in/climb-in' burglaries:

- communal entrance doors and inner lobby doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key/residents' fob;
- defensible space should be provided between building and the 'street';

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- windows should be certified to the PAS 24 standard, and fitted with locks and tamper proof, opening restrictors; and,
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors.

2.1.4 **Vehicles were targeted when parked in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'**

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting cars parked in car parks or on the street:

- car parking should be located within the boundaries of the development, within an area that is both very secure and well overlooked by residents or, ideally, both.

2.2 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary
- Tail-gating and poorly maintained access control systems
- Theft from communal gardens or terraces/balconies
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bicycle theft
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period

2.3 Crime Rate Comparison


Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site.

Domestic Burglary



Wounding




2.3.1 The rate of burglary per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **16% lower** than the Manchester rate but **23% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate.


2.3.2 The rate of wounding crimes per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **107% higher** than the Manchester rate and **242% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate.

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Criminal Damage



Vehicle Crime




2.3.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **195% higher** than the Manchester rate and **325% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate.

2.3.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **199% higher** than the Manchester rate and **382% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate.


2.4 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

Burglary Dwelling – Day Range




Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



2.4.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of burglary is highest on a Friday and in the early hours of the morning. Offenders tend to target properties when residents may be out at work, socialising or when they are likely to be asleep. At night, streets are generally deserted and the cover of darkness helps an offender to avoid being witnessed or apprehended.

Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.4.2 Point of Entry: Flats and houses were targeted by offenders, with doors the most common points of entry. Rear doors and windows are generally favoured by offenders as they are less likely to be


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witnessed in secluded rear gardens of properties. In several cases, residents left doors unlocked allowing offenders to enter without using force.


2.5 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.5.1 Day and Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is greatest on Thursday and in the late afternoon and evening. Around 83% of the vehicles targeted by criminals were parked on the street.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development involves the clearance of the site followed by the erection of a three-storey building containing 18 apartments.

3.1.2 There will be 6no. one-bedroom apartments and 12no. two-bedroom. There will be three apartments on each of the floors.

3.1.3 The proposed building will be positioned at the corner of Monsall road and Emmett Street East, separated from the street by a band of landscaping and a 1200mm high railing, which will define the street facing site boundaries and provide separation between the street and the living and bedrooms on the ground floor.

3.1.4 A single residents' and visitor entrance is proposed, which will be centrally located on the Monsall Road elevation.

3.1.5 A 15 space car park will provided at the rear of the building, with access gained from Mangrove Close. An automated, sliding gate will be installed to secure the car park.

3.1.6 The plans also indicate the provision of a secure cycle store and refuse store both accessed via a gate on the Emmett Street East site of the development.

3.1.7 Residents using the car park or cycle store will have to walk around the edge of the building to the sole communal entrance on the Monsall Road elevation in order to enter the building. His pathway will to the rear of the building will be secured with gates.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 Bringing forward this scheme will result in the redevelopment of a vacant site that, over time, is likely to attract crime and further anti-social behaviour, all of which is very likely to negatively affect the quality of life of existing residents and lower the quality of the environment.

3.2.2 Given the neighbouring houses, the use of the site for residential purposes seems entirely suitable.

3.2.3 The development is modest in size and number of apartments so residents should quickly become familiar with each other and recognise residents and non-residents.

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3.2.4 The inclusion of a 1200mm railing around the development and a band of planting between the railing and the proposed apartment building creates a suitable band of 'defensible space' that will help to preserve privacy of ground floor residents as well as reducing the risk of crime and anti-social behaviour affecting the development.

3.2.5 A single communal entrance door faces Monsall Road, a principal elevation, and will be readily visible to visitors.

3.2.6 The proposed development will provide additional activity, overlooking and natural surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.

3.2.7 The majority of the proposed apartments will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of any noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.8 'Living' room windows on all floors of the building and all elevations will facilitate natural surveillance of the surrounding buildings and streets, and the car park.

3.2.9 If appropriately secured with an automated gate and high perimeter fencing, the proposed car park will reduce the risk of vehicles being targeted by offenders.

3.2.10 A cycle store is provided within the private space of the scheme. If appropriately robust and secure, the cycle store will encourage residents to cycle and reduce the risk of offenders targeting the development.

3.2.11 A refuse store is provided within the secure part of the development, although it will not be easily be accessed easily by contractors. This must be addressed.

3.2.12 A small amenity space is included within the development. As well as the obvious health and well-being benefits afforded by outdoor space, the inclusion of communal amenity space can help residents to build connections with each other, which helps to build 'social capital'. Residents who know each other tend to look out for each other's interests, which can result help to deter crime. The development and the landscaping of the grounds will help to raise the quality of the local environment. Well maintained environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Car park capacity and controlled entry to it

3.3.1 The development includes apartments that are modest in size and are located in a very sustainable location close to two Metrolink stations and a bus corridor, so despite the congestion in the immediate surrounding streets, I am happy that there is adequate parking provision for residents of the development. Visitor parking is not included. An under provision of parking can lead to cars parked on surrounding streets and footpaths, where they may obstruct traffic and pedestrians, and lead to an increase in vehicle related crime. However, this development is sufficiently modest in scale that the current issue relating to congestion is unlikely to be appreciably different.

3.3.2 The car park access gate must be automated. It should, match the height of adjacent fencing, about 1800mm high, and must be of a very robust construction. The speed of vehicle gates opening and closing is particularly important – slow moving gates allow offenders to gain entry to the development.

3.3.3 The gate operation should be controlled by a residents' fob,

3.3.4 Pedestrian entrance gates

3.3.5 The pedestrian gates that will secure the pathways around the building, and pathway from Emmett Street East should be fabricated in steel with a steel frame. They should be 1800mm high and each be fitted with an electronic lock (with a holding force of around 4500N) that is released with a residents' fob. All three gates should be fitted with a self-closing mechanism that engages the locking mechanism upon closure.

3.3.6 Self-closing gates that match the adjacent 1200mm railing should be fitted to the pathway leading from Monsall Road to the communal entrance door and from Emmett Street East to the side entrance gate to the cycle store/refuse store.

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Southern boundary fencing

3.3.7 To match the vehicle gates and pedestrian gates and to secure the site, the eastern boundary to Emmett Street should be secured with 1800mm high fencing, ideally railings.

Control entry into the building

3.3.8 The communal entrance must be particularly well lit and include security-certified self-closing and lock upon closure door. The door should be secured with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ❑ The communal entrance door should be:
  - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2;
  - include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
  - self-closing and lock automatically on closure.
- ❑ Entry through the communal entrance door should be controlled by resident key-fob.
- ❑ An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the entrance door to a handset in each apartment to allow communication between residents and visitors. Residents should be able to operate the locking mechanism of this entrance door remotely from within their apartments to allow bona fide visitors entry.
- ❑ Individual apartment entrance doors must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. A door viewer and an opening limiter should be fitted so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- ❑ Apartment entrance doors should have fixed external handles or handles fitted with a split spindle, meaning access is only possible with a key when the door is closed.

4.2 Windows

- ❑ Ground floor windows on all elevations of the building must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ❑ Glazing within and surrounding the external doors, inner lobby doors and all ground floor windows must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Intruder Alarm

- ❑ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each apartment. If fitted, alarms should comply with BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems or BS 6799 for wireless systems, and be linked to contacts on the entrance door of each apartment together with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows.

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4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Ideally, locks on the communal entrance door and the apartment entrance doors should be activated by a residents' fob.
- ☐ The car park vehicle gate should be automated, and activated by a residents' fob (entry and exit).
- ☐ The locks on the pedestrian gates securing the rear of the development should all be operated with a residents' fob.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ A 1200mm high railing should define the Monsall Road and Emmett Street East boundaries of the site.
- ☐ The amenity space, cycle store, refuse store, and car park should be enclosed with railings 1800mm high.
- ☐ The pedestrian and vehicle gates securing the access to the car park/amenity space/cycle and refuse stores should be a powder-coated railing or welded-wire mesh style and be 1800mm high.
- ☐ Care should be taken when installing boundary fencing and gates to avoid:
    - horizontal elements that would aid climbing;
    - locating lighting columns/bollards, outdoor furniture, junction boxes or trees too close to perimeter fencing where they might assist climbing; and
    - ensuring the gap between the ground and the bottom of boundary railings is small enough to prevent crawling through.

4.7 Car Park

- ☐ Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and should display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Bays should be clearly demarcated.

4.8 Cycle Store

- ☐ The door to the cycle store should be self-closing and self-locking steel-railing gate, fitted with a fob activated electronic lock.
- ☐ Cycle stands/racks within the store should allow the cyclist to secure the wheels and frame to the stand/rack.

4.9 Landscaping

- ☐ The hedge around the street facing elevations should be maintained at 1200mm high.

4.10 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting must be provided to: the entrance door; pedestrian gates; the car park entrance gate; the car park; pathways around the building; the cycle store; and the refuse store. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor. PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.11 Other

- ☐ A sign with the name of the development should be erected at the front entrance.

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- ❑ A through-the-wall system for postal delivery with mail dropping into secure boxes should be included in the design of the communal entrance.
- ❑ If smart meters are not fitted, the meter cupboard should be located to the front of building.
- ❑ Rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ❑ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ❑ A plan should be drawn up that includes details of contracts or other arrangements to maintain, *inter alia*: landscaping; lighting; car park and pedestrian gates; access controls; interior cleaning and signage.

6 Construction

- ❑ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular movements in and out.
- ❑ The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ❑ If employed, site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved (see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ❑ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
16.07.18	Andrew Gent , Grays Architecture	Request for Crime Impact Statement
06.08.18		Site visit
13.08.18	Andrew Gent , Grays Architecture	Report Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
4209/001	Existing Site Plans / Location Plan	Jan 17	
4209/110	Proposed Plans	June 18	
4209/101	Proposed Site Plan	Nov 16	
	Proposed Elevation	Nov 16	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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