

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

23 New Mount Street, Manchester

Development of 57 apartments and 2 houses

for: CBRE Ltd

version B: 23rd November 2016

ref: 2016/0600/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

23 New Mount Street, Manchester, M4 4DE

URN: 2016/0600/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes / security additions advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED) in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

Overall the layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable in relation to security, but some changes are advised as discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report, and these include:-

- Entrance lobby arrangements
- Protection of street-level glazing
- Cycle storage arrangements

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we will be able to support this development at planning stage.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Michael Craig *DipLD CMLI*

Consultant

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Contents

1 Visual Audit 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 5

2.1 Crime Summary

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3 Risk Factors

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

2.5 Burglary: Risk Analysis

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

3 Layout Appraisal 8

3.1 Proposed development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

4 Physical Security 9

4.1 Doors

4.2 Windows

4.3 Glazing

4.4 Alarms

4.5 Access Control (residential)

4.6 Lighting

4.7 CCTV

4.8 Other

5 Management & Maintenance 12

6 Construction 12

7 Useful References 12

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Appendix

A Contact register 13

B Associated Documents 13

C CIS Version History 13

D Glossary 14

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1 Visual Audit

The site is located on the northern edge of central Manchester, in a former industrial area where many of the plots have been redeveloped to provide residential accommodation.


Due to its location on the edge of the city centre and proximity to major trunk roads and Victoria railway station, the area is popular for commuter parking, with many of the nearby vacant plots finding an interim use as car parks.

There are some major leisure facilities and attractions in the neighbourhood, including the Manchester Arena and Printworks, which generate significant demand for car parking in the evenings. New development in the area will displace some of the existing available parking space.

The typical local street pattern is a grid delineated by relatively small blocks fronting narrow streets. On-street car parking is very limited.

The site currently contains a mix of former warehouse buildings and office accommodation, and is partially vacant. The site forms a complete block and all elevations directly adjoin public roads.


Ludgate Street on western side of the site – note street level windows



Evidence of criminal damage Naples Street


Inconsiderate bin storage can obscure sight lines – Naples St.


Protection has been added to lower floor windows – School St.




The existing buildings vary in height and proportions – School St.


Street parking along New Mount Street


New Mount Street

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2015 and 30th June 2016.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site									
Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	64	147	404	243	45	20	193	29	82

2.1.1 The most frequently-occurring offences over the previous 12 months in the research area have been less serious wounding, miscellaneous theft, theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts).

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Offenders have targeted apartment entrance doors after gaining access to communal areas

Possible Solution - *A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment block before allowing them access to the building (see section 4.1). The main communal entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance door-set (see section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.*

2.2.2 Ground floor windows have been targeted when left insecure

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be fitted with opening restrictors (see section 4.2) to prevent offenders from reaching in to steal items or gaining unauthorised access. In most vulnerable locations, such as street level windows, additional protection may be appropriate, such as ornamental grilles / bars.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.4 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

The rates below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.


Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The number of domestic burglaries per dwelling is **lower** than the city of Manchester, and **lower** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.4.2 The number of woundings per dwelling is **higher** than the city of Manchester, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.4.3 Incidents of criminal damage per dwelling are **lower** than the city of Manchester, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.


2.4.4 Incidents of vehicle crime per dwelling are **higher** than the city of Manchester, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.5 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of residential burglary is greatest on Sunday.

2.5.2 Time Range: There is no recognisable pattern to the time or burglary incidents, with risk spread over the day.

2.5.3 Point of Entry: In the local area the following point entries and MO's have been the most frequently occurring:


- Offenders have targeted apartment entrance doors after gaining access to communal areas
- Ground floor windows have been targeted when left insecure

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day Range: The risk of vehicle crime is fairly constant throughout the week, but dips slightly at the weekend, when there are fewer commuters' cars parked in the neighbourhood.

Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is concentrated in the afternoon and the evening, Offenders often target vehicles during the day when residents are likely to be out at work or cars are left in communal car parks. In the evening offenders frequently target vehicles as it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low. Vehicles parked within open, communal areas or on streets, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure garages.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development comprises conversion of the buildings on the site to form a block of 54 apartments and 2 town houses and 3 maisonettes with their own entrances (total 59 dwellings).

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will bring some currently-unused parts of the buildings back into use, which will help to re-populate the area and increase the informal policing provided by people going about their normal business.

3.2.2 The building footprint at ground floor level is relatively free of recesses or projections that could provide cover for criminal or antisocial activity.

3.2.3 The main entrances to the building for residents are clearly located on the active elevations of the buildings.

3.2.4 The layout of upper floor corridors is relatively free of projections or recesses that could impede sight lines. Installation of mirrors should be considered to improve sight lines around blind corners in certain locations. Doors within communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve informal surveillance.

3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Lobby entrance layout. Where access to residential blocks is taken directly off the public realm, residents' entrances should be laid out with a double door entry system, creating a lobby area and inner access-controlled doors to allow further entry to the stair well or lifts.

3.3.2 Post. Arrangements for delivery of post should not need postal delivery staff to have access to residential blocks. Any mail boxes for residents should be located within a secure lobby area or use a "through-the-wall" arrangement allowing external delivery / internal collection.

3.3.3 The lower ground floor windows must include measures to protect them from accidental damage and deliberate attack. The integrity and effectiveness of any existing grilles should be assessed to ensure that they can prevent attack of the glazing. Additional reinforcement may be required to improve the burglary-resistance of the glass such as secondary glazing or replacement with laminated glazing (see sections 4.2 & 4.8). The design of any new window guards should not form a ladder or climbing aid that would create step up to the upper ground floor windows. It may be appropriate to include a strip of deterrent paving to discourage people from approaching these windows.

3.3.4 Cycle storage for residents is contained within the internal communal space of the building, accessible to all residents and visitors. Cycle stands must be either located within a secure cage or room, or within separate cycle lockers, only accessible to cyclists (see section 4.8). Racks within the enclosure should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels, and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).

3.3.5 Car Parking Provision. Levels of vehicle crime in the area around the site are well above the average for Greater Manchester, and any provision of vehicle parking for residents should not put their security at risk. Any arrangements made for off-site parking should utilise nearby car parks which are accredited with the "Park Mark" safer parking award (see www.parkmark.co.uk for details).

3.3.6 Where possible, the physical security measures listed below should be incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The proposed development includes alterations to a range of existing buildings, and thus the potential to make changes and upgrade the physical security is to some extent constrained by the present structures. The following recommendations are made on this understanding but should apply to all new-build and replacement features introduced as part of the proposed works. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants will be dependent on effective management and deployment of on-site security presence and / or monitored alarms / CCTV.

4.1 Doors

- ❑ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. The entrance should also be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that, in the absence of a concierge, residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.

- ❑ Revolving doors cannot be certified to the above standards. These doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+) or alternatively the doors should incorporate laminated glazing, have multi-point locking (preventing sliding and lifting) and be protected by a shutter (certified to LPS 1775 SR2).

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Internal doors/frames to the cycle and refuse stores should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electronic lock controlled by resident key-fob. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ New windows, including any secondary glazing, must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. This includes any secondary glazing installed at lower ground floor and ground floor levels.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors in to garages) and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control (residential)

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Main Entrance doors
  - Secondary entrance doors off internal lobby
  - Accessible entrance(s).
  - Bin stores

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

- Cycle store

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, lifts, stairwells, lobbies, cycle stores, car park entrance, service entrances.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Mail boxes should be obtained from a supplier approved by Secured by Design and installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions (see www.securedbydesign.com).
- ☐ Separate containers specifically designed for the secure storage of bicycles (and other property) must be certificated to LPS 1175 SR 1 or Sold Secure (Bronze, Silver or Gold depending on location).

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

- ❑ Any cycle stores must be fitted with a fob-activated electronic locking system with access restricted to genuine cyclists only. The doors/gates should include a self-closing hinge/door closer, which automatically locks the door/gate upon closure. Securely-anchored stands should be fitted within the cycle store (see www.securedbydeign.com for recommended suppliers).

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21/07/2016	CBRE Ltd	CIS instruction received
21/07/2016	CBRE Ltd	Fee agreed
17/08/2016	N/A	Site visit
26/09/2016	CBRE Ltd	Enquiry regarding drawing issue
07/11/2016	CBRE Ltd	Final Plans received
22/11/2016	CBRE Ltd	CIS version A issued
23/11/2016	CBRE Ltd	Revision requested / CIS version A issued

Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
N/A	Site Location Plan	-	-
27005(05)01	3D Massing	N/A	-
27005(02)01	Proposed Basement Drawing Detail	26/10/16	B
27005(02)02	Proposed Ground Floor Drawing Detail	13/10/16	A
27005(02)03	Proposed First Floor Drawing Detail	14/10/16	A
27005(02)04	Proposed Second Floor Drawing Detail	14/10/16	A
27005(02)05	Proposed Third Floor Drawing Detail	14/10/16	A
27005(02)06	Proposed Fourth Floor Drawing Detail	14/10/16	A
27005(04)01	Elevation 1 Proposed Elevations	14/07/16	-
27005(04)02	Elevation 2 Proposed Elevations	26/10/16	B
27005(04)03	Elevation 3 Proposed Elevations	14/10/16	A
27005(04)04	Elevation 4 Proposed Elevations	26/10/16	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

B CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Changes to number of dwellings on title page and site description (section 3.3.1)	23/11/16

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

C Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable