

# CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

**40 Laystall Street, Manchester**

**Retrospective Chase of Use to Aparthotel**

**Indigo Planning**

**VERSION A: 27th February 2018**

**URN: 2018/0103/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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# 40 Laystall Street, Manchester, M1 2JP

# 2018/0103/CIS/01

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The building has been operating as an aparthotel from 2010 and there have been few crimes associated with the development. Following construction of the building as an apartment building the scheme was viewed as being largely compliant with Secured by Design standards for a residential development; operating as an aparthotel the development is staffed at all times increasing the security of the building. For the reasons outlined above, in addition to those detailed in section 3.2, the development is supported.



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# 1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre area of Manchester, in close proximity to Ancoats and the Northern Quarter.

The site is bound by Laystall Street to the North, a small parking area to the East, Lomax Street to the South, and Brock Street to the West. Opposite the site on Laystall Street is the rear service yard area of the Urban Exchange development (Aldi, GO Outdoors, M&S Outlet and Pure Gym). To the North of the site is Central Retail Park. To the South of the site are a number of commercial/industrial units/works.

The site is presently occupied and the application is for retrospective planning permission. The building was originally developed as an apartment scheme and is presently operating as an aparthotel. Ground floor units of the building are currently unoccupied.















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# 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2017 to 31st January 2018

## 2.1 Crime Summary

| Recorded Crime within 500m of Site | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
| 32 | 108 | 153 | 641 | 244 | 64 | 15 | 239 | 80 | 92 |

2.1.1 Over the previous 12 months, levels of crime and disorder in the local area have been relatively high. This can be attributed to the site's location in the city centre neighbouring a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises often leading to a greater risk of criminal activity.

2.1.2 The area suffers from high volumes of violence, miscellaneous theft and vehicle crime (including criminal damage to and theft of/from). Incidents of violence have most commonly occurred on the street or in licensed premises, and taken place over the weekend when alcohol-related violence is at its greatest. Where vehicles have been targeted for theft and criminal damage, these have primarily taken place in surface car parks or on the street.

## 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

  *Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.*

- Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

  *Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place (see section 4.4) to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed entry into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongigs while at work.*

## 2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Violence towards staff


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
## 2.4 Burglary Other (Hotels/Aparthotels): Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.*


Burglary Other – Day Range




Burglary Other – Time Range




Burglary Other – Point of Entry




2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at Manchester hotels is greatest on Monday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary at hotels is greatest in the evening and early hour of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at this time when guests are likely to be out in the evening or when the level of staffing at hotels is lower.

2.4.3 Point of Entry: In the Salford area the following point entries and MO's have been the most frequently occurring where hotels have been targeted:


- Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property
- Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure


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
## 2.5 Theft (Hotels/Aparthotels): Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.*

Theft – Day Range




Theft – Time Range




2.5.1 Day Range: The risk of theft at hotels in Manchester is greatest at the weekend, potentially due to hotels typically having more guests and thus the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of theft is greatest just after midday and late in the evening. Bedrooms are often targeted when left open by cleaners (while they are being cleaned), which usually takes place around midday. It is also likely that incidents of theft increase in the evening, as guests are unlikely to be in their rooms and the levels of staff presence (particularly on bedroom floors) is typically lower than during the day.

# 3 Layout Appraisal

## 3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is a retrospective change of use from apartments to an aparthotel.

## 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

3.2.1 The main entrance doors into the building are certified to BS PAS 24. External doors include a pane of laminated glass. There is an intercom on the main entrance, allowing staff to vet visitors before allowing them access in to the building.

3.2.2 Apartment entrance doors are certified to BS PAS 24 and operate on an electronic access control system.

3.2.3 All ground floor an easily accessible windows are certified to BS 7590 (a legacy security standard that has now been replaced with BS PAS 24).

3.2.4 Ground floor glazing is laminated to Secured by Design standards. Glazing on internal walk ways is laminated to a height of 1500mm.

3.2.5 The main entrance to the aparthotel is illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.

3.2.6 The recess in the building line on Laystall Street elevation is illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.

## 3.3 Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

3.3.1 Access in to staff only areas should be restricted to staff. Signage should be provided so that it is clear which areas are restricted to staff, to prevent confusion being used a legitimate excuse for accessing staff only areas.


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3.3.2 Safes should be provided for all guests in the apartments to allow guests to securely store valuable possessions. Safes should be of robust construction and it is highly recommended that the locker be operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.

3.3.3 All ground floor windows should be fitted with opening restrictors to prevent them being opened if left insecure by guests/staff.

# 4 Physical Security

***The existing building largely complies with Secured by Design standards following the discharge of the planning condition attached to the original planning permission (078448/MO/2006/C3). It is recommended that if any alterations to the building are made that the following security standards are adhered to.***

## 4.1 Doors

- ❑ External doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ❑ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+).
- ❑ All individual apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 (with door viewer), operable by VingCard or similar.
- ❑ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ❑ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

## 4.2 Windows & Building Fabric

- ❑ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ❑ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ❑ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

## 4.3 Glazing

- ❑ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

## 4.4 Lighting

- ❑ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ❑ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.


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## 4.5 Safes

- ❑ Safes should be provided for all guests in the apartments to allow guests to securely store valuable possessions. Safes should be of robust construction and it is highly recommended that the locker be operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.

# 5 Construction

5.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

5.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

# 6 Useful References

## 6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/


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# A Contact register

| Date | Contact With | Summary of Contact |
|---|---|---|
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# B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No. | Drawing Title | Date | Rev |
|---|---|---|---|
| L(20)15 | Site location plan | 31/01/18 | |
| L(20)13 | Existing twelfth floor | 31/01/18 | |
| L(20)12 | Existing eleventh floor | 31/01/18 | |
| L(20)11 | Existing tenth floor | 31/01/18 | |
| L(20)10 | Existing ninth floor | 31/01/18 | |
| L(20)09 | Existing eighth floor | 31/01/18 | |
| L(20)09 | Existing seventh floor | 31/01/18 | |
| L(20)07 | Existing sixth floor | 31/01/18 | |
| L(20)06 | Existing fifth floor | 31/01/18 | |
| L(20)05 | Existing fourth floor | 31/01/18 | |
| L(20)04 | Existing third floor | 31/01/18 | |
| L(20)03 | Existing second floor | 31/01/18 | |
| L(20)02 | Existing first floor | 31/01/18 | |
| L(20)01 | Existing ground floor | 31/01/18 | |
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**PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.**

# C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made | Date |
|---|---|---|
| A | | |
| | | |


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# D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS 7950, 1997

***Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.***

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

#### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

***General performance requirements for door assemblies.***

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

#### BS PAS 24-1, 2012

***General security performance requirements for door assemblies.***

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

#### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

***Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification***

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

***Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components***

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

#### STS01 Issue 4: 2012

***Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24***

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

#### STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

#### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

***Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.***

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

#### CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

#### CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

#### INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

### Useful Websites

***Design for Security***
***www.designforsecurity.org***
***Secured by Design***
***www.securedbydesign.com***
***RIBA Product Selector***
***www.ribaproductselector.com***
***LPCB – Red Book Live***
***www.redbooklive.com***
***Crime Reduction (Home Office)***
***www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk***
***DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre***
***www.designagainstcrime.org***
***Building for Life***
***www.buildingforlife.org***
***CLG (Communities and Local Government)***
***www.communities.gov.uk***


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