CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

FORMER POMONA HOTEL, 24 REDDISH LANE, GORTON

RESIDENTIAL (15 no. APARTMENTS)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: One Manchester

VERSION B: 31/07/19

REFERENCE: 2006/1407/CIS/01

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Former Pomona Hotel, 24 Reddish Lane, Gorton

URN:2006/1407/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.


The layout of the proposed scheme is only considered acceptable if the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure enclosure/gating of rear car park, which if left open/publicly accessible could leave resident's vehicles and the rear of the building vulnerable to attack/unauthorised access unseen.

In addition, protection of the exposed rear boundary to the site accessible from the adjacent open space and enclosure of the ground floor communal areas within the building itself are highly recommended, in order to prevent unauthorised access.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the west side of Reddish Lane in Gorton. It was formerly occupied by a public house, which has been demolished and cleared – leaving areas of hard standing, scrub vegetation and some mature trees to the rear of the site, enclosed with herras fencing.

To the north of the site is a takeaway unit, which has a gated compound along the northern boundary of the site.


To the south of the site is a terrace of residential properties (with a gated rear access alleyway) and residential properties fronting onto Glenacre Gardens.

There is a narrow pedestrian route running between the southern portion of the site and the rear of the dwellings to the south, which links to an open area of grassland to the immediate west of the site. The land includes a number of footpaths running to the north, south and west. Gorton Cemetery lies beyond it to the west.

Footpath links and open space to the side/rear of sites, buildings and dwellings can often lead to nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal damage issues and such secluded routes can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark. Adjacent properties can also often be vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance or direct overlooking.

Reddish Lane is a busy vehicular and pedestrian route, meaning the site benefits from good levels of passive surveillance. There are terraced residential properties, vacant commercial units and some takeaways on the opposite side of Reddish Lane from the site. While such premises can provide legitimate activity and surveillance opportunities to an area, they can also often be a focal point for nuisance/anti-social behaviour issues, particularly late at night.

The wider surrounding area is largely formed by terraced residential streets to the north-west, east and south. Terraced residential properties often front directly onto the street, meaning their front elevations are not protected by any defensible space – leaving windows/doors exposed to nuisance, anti-social behaviour, unauthorised access (if left insecure) and attack. Residents vehicles must be parked on street as they cannot be parked within the curtilage of the dwellings – leaving them exposed to damage/attack. Rear communal alleyways can also leave terraced dwellings vulnerable to unseen rear access and many of them in the locale have been fitted with communal alleygates as a result.













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2018 to 31st May 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
32	7	82	183	27	13	<5	41	11	9


2.1.1 Over the last 12 months, the general volume of crime in the local area has been high, with the most prevalent types of crime being less serious wounding, criminal damage and vehicle crime. Incidents of recorded crime are concentrated along the main arterial routes and terraced residential streets to the north-west (around/off Hyde Road and Woodland Road/Dean Road), east (around/off Hyde Road and Debdale Lane/Turnbull Road) and south (around/off Reddish Lane and Athol Street/Belfield Road) of the site.

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will look at residential burglary and vehicle crime.


2.2 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January to December 2018.


Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester



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2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **52% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **17% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **29% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **9% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **71% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **104% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **13% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **26% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **70% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **13% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **58% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **135% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Domestic Burglary – Time Range



Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Monday and Saturday.

2.3.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of domestic burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target residential properties at night when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

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
2.3.3 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements (particularly to the rear of properties) and doors have been exploited when left insecure by residents (particularly to the front of properties.
- Offenders have gained unauthorised access to apartment buildings without drawing attention (e.g. by tailgating, posing as legitimate visitors etc.).
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been targeted (to a lesser extent) and have also been prised open or targeted when left insecure.
- Offenders have used bodily force/implements to gain access to sheds and steal items.


2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Wednesday and Saturday.

2.4.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of vehicle crime also peaks during the early hours of the morning. Vehicles are often targeted at night when it is dark, streets are quiet and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or identified. A number of incidents of criminal damage in the area have also targeted vehicles, including smashing windows and damage to bodywork.

2.4.3 Vehicles parked on-street (as is often the case on terraced residential streets) and within open, communal areas/car parks, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are usually more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure garages/parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages

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- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Secure doors have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements (particularly to the rear of properties) and doors have been exploited when left insecure by residents (particularly to the front of properties

  Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

  All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

  All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.5), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- Offenders have gained unauthorised access to apartment buildings without drawing attention (e.g. by tailgating, posing as legitimate visitors etc.)

  Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment block before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access

  Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.

- Windows have also been targeted (to a lesser extent) and have also been prised open or targeted when left insecure

  Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties (see Section 4.5). Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

  Again, unauthorised access to the rear of buildings should be deterred by robust boundaries (see Section 4.5) and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes/publicly accessible space to the rear of the properties.

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- Offenders have used bodily force/implements to gain access to sheds and steal items

  Possible Solution – All private spaces to the sides/rears of the building should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.5), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Lighting to the front and rear of the properties can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

  Any sheds should be of robust construction (i.e. minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and door), with coach-bolted hinges, two hasp and stables to meet 'Sold Secure' Silver and two padlocks to meet 'Solid Secure' Silver or LPS 1654 SR1.

- Vehicles have been targeted for theft of, theft from and damage when parked on-street or within open car parks

  Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that residents vehicles are secured and overlooked where possible. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen (see Section 4.5).

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 2/3 storey building, comprising of 15 no. residential apartments with associated parking and landscaping.

3.1.2 The building will front towards Reddish Lane and will feature 5 no. bed apartments at ground and first floor levels and 5 no. 1 bed apartments at second floor level, with communal areas open to the elements. The site will also feature landscaped gardens to the rear, including timber scooter store, garden room and bin store, and a 15 no. space rear car park accessed off Reddish Lane.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.

3.2.2 For visitors to the block, there will only be one communal entrance in a prominent position on the street, which allows security to be focussed on this location.

3.2.3 The building will have habitable room windows to its elevation fronting directly onto the street, providing surveillance opportunities over the street and any visitors to the block.


3.2.4 The majority of the apartments will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively deterred. This also reduces the potential impacts of any excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).

3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 As proposed, the rear car park is to be left open/accessible to all, with a 1800mm high boundary between it and the rear landscaped gardens. The rear car park is partially hidden from the street and cannot be easily overlooked from within the building itself – leaving the fully accessible parked vehicles exposed and very vulnerable to damage and theft (both of and from vehicles). Any offenders attempting to gain access to the rear of the building from the accessible car park would also be hidden from view from the street. It is therefore considered essential that the rear car park (and the adjacent amenity areas) are fully enclosed as a private, resident-only space and secured with an automatic vehicular gate/s off Reddish Lane, operated by resident key-fob both on access and egress (see Section 4.6 for more information). The installed gate/s must be regularly maintained and immediately repaired/replaced if it fails, in order to continue preventing unauthorised access to all but residents.



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3.3.2 The southern (side) boundary of the site will directly abut an existing narrow pedestrian footpath and the western (rear) boundary of the site will border onto an existing area of open space. As such, these boundaries will be publicly accessible but will benefit from limited surveillance – leaving them vulnerable to damage, penetration and scaling unseen. As well as robust boundary treatments (see Section 4.5), it is highly recommended that the rear boundary of the site is protected by a belt of mature defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs or hedging) if at all possible, in order to discourage access, damage and scaling (see illustration above).

3.3.3 Given that the rear of the site could be vulnerable to unauthorised access from the adjacent footpath/open space, it is also highly recommended that at least the ground floor communal areas of the building are secured with full-height glazed panels or railings (see illustration above and Section 4.3 for more information). This will ensure that all elevations of the building are not vulnerable to unauthorised access if an offender does manage to gain access to the private car park/landscaped gardens at the rear of the site.

3.3.4 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents, visitors and staff.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main communal entrance doorset must also be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ Ideally, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If this is not possible, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries without providing access to all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ Any rear entrance door off the communal garden/car park should also be security-certified to one of the above standards and should be operated by resident key-fob only.
- ☐ All individual apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. These doors should have either a door viewer or a fixed sidelight, containing laminated glazing. If individual apartment doorsets are accessed from open communal areas and not enclosed corridors, if fire regs allow, they should have fixed external handles or split spindles - meaning access is only possible with a key and they cannot be left insecure. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door.
- ☐ All ground and first floor double-leaf or sliding patio doorsets should also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Any ground floor/easily accessible curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ The ground floor communal areas of the building should ideally be secured with full-height glazed panels or full-height railings (see illustration within Section 3.3) to prevent unauthorised access to all levels of the building.

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☐ There should be no other features of the building (such as projecting canopies, window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows, balconies or communal areas.

4.4 Alarms

☐ If alarms are to be installed to each apartment, they should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems, or
- BS 6799 for wireless systems.

All doors should be fitted with alarm contacts and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows. If alarms are not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm if required.

4.5 Boundaries & Car Park

☐ The sides and rear of the site (including the landscaped gardens and residents car park) should be enclosed and defined as private, resident-only space by 2100mm high walls, railings or close-boarded timber fencing (with masonry or other hardwearing base) and vehicular/pedestrian gates (see Section 3.3 for illustration). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railing/close-boarded timber fencing should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.

☐ The western (rear) boundary of the site should also be protected by some low-level defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs) on the public side where possible, in order to deter damage to and scaling over the boundary itself.

☐ Vehicular access and egress to the site should be secured with a 2100mm high automatic vehicular gate/s to prevent unauthorised access. The gate/s should be operated using a key fob/proximity reader system with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles or the rear of the building and escape. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns etc. If double gates are used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open.

☐ Any pedestrian gates to private space should be 2100mm high, self-closing and self-locking, operated by resident key or fob on access and egress. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. They should also be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street furniture, lighting columns etc. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.



☐ The street frontage of the building should be protected by some defensible space, defined by low-level railings (to a minimum height of 1200mm) and low-level defensive planting beds.

☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.6 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to all vehicular/pedestrian routes and parking areas within the site, in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting to all surface parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

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- ☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances and parking areas, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Other

- ☐ The proposed timber garden room and timber scooter store should be of robust construction (i.e. with concrete foundation, minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and door). The doors should have coach-bolted hinges and either two hasp and stables to meet ‘Sold Secure’ Silver with padlocks to meet ‘Solid Secure’ Silver or the doors/frames should be thick enough to be secured with a mortise deadlock or mortise sash lock certificated to BS 3621.

- ☐ The external refuse store should be enclosed with 1800-2100mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and a self-closing and ‘slam to lock’ gate, which cannot be left unlocked when shut. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

- ☐ Any communal cycle store serving the apartment block should be similarly enclosed and should include ‘Sheffield’ style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, fencelines, access controls etc.)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or hidden corners/recesses).

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
19th June 2019	John McCall Architects	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
19th June 2019	John McCall Architects	Confirmation of instruction/fee & receipt of additional information
26th June 2019	John McCall Architects	Email correspondence re: timescales/payment
16th July 2019	GMP Finance Dept.	Confirmation of payment
22nd July 2019	John McCall Architects	Version A of CIS report issued
24th to 25th July 2019	John McCall Architects	Email correspondence re: concerns outlined in Version A of report
25th July 2019	MCC Planning Dept	Email sent to Case Officer outlining concerns relating to rear car park if not gated
30th July 2019	John McCall Architects	Receipt of amended plans to be submitted to MCC

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PL.007	Location Plan	June 19	-
PL.001	Existing Plan	-	-
PL.002A	Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)	June 19	-
PL.002B	Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)	June 19	B
PL.003A	Plans (SUPERSEDED)	June 19	-
PL.004A	Plans (SUPERSEDED)	June 19	-
PL.005A	Elevations (SUPERSEDED)	June 19	-
PL.006A	Views (SUPERSEDED)	June 19	-
PL.003 P03	Site Plan	June 19	-
PL.004 P03	Plans	June 19	-
PL.005 P03	Plans	June 19	-
PL.006 P03	Elevations	June 19	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Patio doors removed from street frontage and addition of boundary treatments	31/07/19

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24-1, 2016
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS 202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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