

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

London Road Fire Station, London Road, Manchester

Development of commercial space comprising Hotel, Offices / Workspace, Gym / Sauna, Private Hire / Cinema room, Bar / Restaurant

for: Allied London

version B: 13th December 2019

URN: 2010/0567/CIS/03

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

London Road Fire Station, London Road, Manchester, URN:2010/0567/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major Design Changes Not Required

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. In general the proposed scheme has been found acceptable, but further consideration of some aspects is advised, as highlighted in section 3.3 of this report.

As the proposal does not include major changes to the building layout, and the long-term success of the operation will be dependent on effective site management.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to Manchester City Council that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Michael Craig *DipLD CMLI*

Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The application premises is a listed building within the Whitworth Street Conservation Area of central Manchester, directly opposite Piccadilly railway station and tram stop.

The area contains many potential areas of concealment where an offender can hide. Poor sight lines and low lighting levels under ramps and bridge structures discourage legitimate use of some routes around the site.

The neighbourhood has well-above average rates of crime due to its central location and the large numbers of people passing through the area.

The area around the site contains a number of licensed premises. Late-night revellers leaving licensed premises and gathering on the nearby streets and spaces can cause nuisance and generate significant disorder

The application premises has been vacant for many years and shows some signs of neglect. The consequent lack of natural surveillance over adjoining streets has provided opportunities for unobserved disorder, and minor incidents of criminal damage to the buildings and nearby features such as phone boxes, has resulted. The internal courtyard contains features that could aid concealment of a potential offender




Whitworth Street elevation


Whitworth Street elevation


Whitworth Street / Minshull Street South junction


London Road elevation


Entrance off London Road


Fairfield Street elevation


London Road elevation

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 and 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
68	106	196	920	581	232	27	439	54	76

2.1.1 Over the previous 12 months, the volume of the crime in the local area is very high, reflecting the site's location within the city centre. The most prevalent crimes have been less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime, which is consistent with previous crime analyses conducted in this area and typical of those experienced within close proximity of city centres where there is often a cluster of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The rate that violence, theft and vehicle crime occurs in this area is higher than the average rate experienced across Greater Manchester and England & Wales.

2.1.2 Incidents of violence most commonly occurred over the weekend period, during the late evening and early hours of the morning, when the city centre's at its busiest, with the majority of instances taking place in public, rather than private locations, primarily licensed premises or on the street. Offences of theft have largely taken place towards the village area of the city, where this is a concentration of bars and restaurants. Offenders have targeted insecure bags and mobile phones from victims in restaurants and licenced premises. Vehicle crime has taken place throughout the local area with offenders targeting vehicles parked securely in car parks and using on street parking facilities. Theft from motor vehicle has been the highest reported vehicle crime in the area, with smashed glazing in windows being the most common entry point.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 **Hotel:** Offenders posed as legitimate customers to access hotels before targeting insecure doors, unmanned areas or tailgating to restricted areas.

Possible Solution - *Access controls and secure lobbies help to prevent unauthorised entry. Staff presence, such as at reception, will also help to identify irregular behaviour and unauthorised entrants. Locating reception areas to overlook the public entrance will help to discourage / detect unauthorised entry to the premises. Entry to staff only areas should be managed using access controls. Secure lockers should be provided for staff to store personal belongings while at work.*

2.2.2 **Restaurant / Bars:** Locks on doors (all kinds) were broken by using tools or applying bodily pressure. The glazing in door windows was also frequently smashed.

Possible Solution – *Staff-only areas should be effectively separated, both visually and physically, so that customers cannot readily gain entry either accidently or deliberately. This can be achieved by the use of access-controlled doors or barriers, but they should create a clear distinction so that any intruder can be more easily identified. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.*

2.2.3 **Restaurants / Bars:** Offenders posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises before targeting unmanned tills and bars, or tailgating to restricted areas.

Possible Solution – *There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that public access is not possible to staff-only areas. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.*

2.2.4 **Offices:** Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

*Possible Solution - **Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded***

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metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

2.2.5 **Offices:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff-only areas to steal property.

Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place to ensure that visitors to the buildings are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed further access into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

2.2.6 **Event spaces:** Doors (all kinds) were forced open using tools or bodily pressure; rear points of entry (doors and windows) were commonly targeted as offenders can conceal themselves from view.

Possible Solution *- All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.*

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2.3 Risk Factors (Hotel)

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Tailgating / Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Robbery
- Burglary
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Theft of / from parked cars
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Employee theft

2.4 Risk Factors (Restaurant / Bar)

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Cash robbery
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Theft of business/customer property
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Tailgating / Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Risk Factors (Event space)

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Robbery
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings / private spaces
- Theft of / from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings / private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

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
2.7 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2018.


Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km), North Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), North Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), North Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), North Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.7.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **56% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **23% lower** than Greater Manchester and **20% higher** than England & Wales.

2.7.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **146% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **285% higher** than Greater Manchester and **359% higher** than England & Wales.

2.7.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **8% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **34% higher** than Greater Manchester and **81% higher** than England & Wales.


2.7.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **171% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **392% higher** than Greater Manchester and **632% higher** than England & Wales.

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
2.8 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary dwelling – Day Range



Burglary dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.8.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at residential buildings in the local area peaks on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening (1:30pm – 8pm). Offenders often target dwellings in the afternoon when residents are likely to be away, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught.

2.8.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- Forcing open secure windows and doors using implements and bodily pressure in order to gain entry.
- Exploitation of insecure doors and windows.
- Posing as a legitimate visitor / resident by means of insecure doors and tailgating in order to access communal areas.
- Broken glazing in windows and doors using implements.

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
2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range




2.9.1 Day / Time Range: During the week, the greatest risk of vehicle crime is over the weekend. This is when the city centre's often at its busiest, therefore there are more cars parked in the centre and more opportunities for theft. Levels of vehicle crime peak during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders often target vehicles at this time when neighbouring streets/area is quieter – all of which contribute to a lower perceived risk of being caught or identified. Vehicles were most vulnerable to theft when parked in car parks or on the street, as opposed to individual driveways or secure garages are they are more accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners.


2.10 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.

Office Theft – Day Range



Office Theft – Time Range




2.10.1 Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours/staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

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
2.11 Non-Domestic Burglary Offices: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.


Office Burglary – Day Range



Office Burglary – Time Range



Office Burglary – Point of Entry



2.11.1 Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night / into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.11.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:


- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries against Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors. Windows behind them.

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
2.12 Burglary Risk Analysis: Hotels

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.


Burglary Hotel– Day Range



Burglary Hotel – Time Range



Burglary Hotel – Point of Entry



2.12.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at hotels in the local area is consistently high throughout the week peaking on a Tuesday and a Wednesday during the early morning hours (1am – 8am).

2.12.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- Offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain entry before targeting insecure doors / restricted areas.
- Opening secured doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure doors to gain entry to hotel room.
- In cases of unknown point of entry offenders have often gained possession of the hotel room key card and accessed the room, removing personal and business property.

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
2.13 Theft Risk Analysis: Hotels

The data below relates to thefts within / against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.

Hotel Theft – Day Range



Hotel Theft – Time Range




2.13.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of theft in local hotels is consistently high throughout the week peaking on a Saturday and Sunday throughout the day, peaking during the morning (4am – 9:59am), the afternoon (11am – 3pm) and the evening (7pm – 11pm). The theft occurring is mostly of personal property, mobile phones, bags and wallets.


2.14 Non-Domestic Burglary Restaurant / Café: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against restaurant/café, recorded in the Manchester area.


Burglary Restaurant/Cafe – Day Range



Burglary Restaurant/Cafe – Time Range



Burglary Restaurant/Cafe – Point of Entry



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2.14.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at restaurants and cafes in the Manchester area peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the early hours of the morning. Offenders target properties when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that there is less of a risk of being caught or identified.


2.14.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the premises.
- Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the windows and doors located underneath.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors, accessing restricted areas and removing goods belonging to staff and the company.


2.15 Theft Restaurant / Café: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against restaurant/café, recorded in the Manchester area.

Restaurant / Cafe Theft – Day Range



Restaurant / Cafe Theft – Time Range




2.15.1 Day / Time Range: the risk of theft at restaurants and cafes in the Manchester area peaks on a Wednesday and Saturday during the afternoon and into the evening (2pm – 7pm). Offenders have targeted items belonging to customers by means of distraction and pickpocketing, with insecure mobile phones and bags being the most targeted items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within the restaurant, tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

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
2.16 Non-Domestic Burglary Event Space: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against event space, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.

Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.16.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at event spaces in the Greater Manchester Area peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the evening (5pm – 10:30pm). Offenders target properties in the evening when they are closed or have fewer employees present, giving offenders the perception that there is less of a risk of being caught or identified.

2.16.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- Forcing open secure windows and doors using implements and bodily pressure in order to gain entry.
- Exploitation of insecure doors and windows.
- Posing as a legitimate visitor and entering restricted areas.
- Broken glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements.

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
2.17 Theft Event Space: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against event space, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.17.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of theft at event spaces in the Greater Manchester area peaks on a Wednesday and Saturday during the late evening (10pm – 11:59pm). Offenders have targeted customers and employees personal belongings, mostly mobile phones and purses / wallets. They have used means of distraction and pick pocketing in order to obtain the victims personal belongings.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development involves refurbishment and enhancement of the grade 2* listed London Road Fire Station buildings. The building will included a hotel, accessed off Whitworth Street, with guest rooms at upper levels, with bar / restaurant / gym / sauna uses at ground level. Office / commercial space is at first – fourth floor levels. Entry to the internal courtyard will be available through the gated archway off London Road.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

General

3.2.1 The proposed development makes a positive use of a largely vacant building that has previously been subject to minor acts of criminal damage and other abuse. Repopulation and regular use of the proposed facility will bring additional vitality and should help to improve informal policing of the area.

3.2.2 The buildings will present an active frontage to most of the public elevations around the site, which will help to enliven the street scene and help to provide useful natural surveillance of the public realm. The uses of ground floor premises have been designed to accommodate activities that require routine occupation, such as offices, reception areas, café and retail uses, whilst also having potential to provide additional incidental lighting into public areas.

3.2.3 The existing building occupies the entire block with the façade abutting the back of pavement, which generally creates an effective secure boundary to the site. The building contains few recesses in its public elevations, thus reducing opportunities for offenders to conceal themselves or carry out criminal acts without being witnessed.

3.2.4 The various uses of the building are generally well-separated, thus service users, staff and visitors are restricted only to parts of the site to which they have legitimate access (see also section 3.3 3).

3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings and avoids the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.2.6 Hotel

3.2.7 Hotel reception. The control of access into and around the hotel is paramount to the security of the development. The reception desk within the entrance lobby will have a good view of everyone entering / leaving the building and must be staffed at all times. All guests should initially report to the reception for vetting by staff before being allowed access to the rest of the building. The position of the hotel reception desk should allow staff to monitor people using stairs and lifts leading up to the higher level facilities. The layout should be designed to maximise surveillance from the reception of both the internal lobby area and the external space around the main entrance.

3.2.8 The back of house areas appear to be well defined and access to these areas can be easily controlled.

3.2.9 Hotel corridors are typically linear offering good sightlines for guests, allowing them to survey any potential threats.

Retail / Restaurant / Café / Bar

3.2.10 The retail / leisure premises will help to generate legitimate activity in the public spaces within and around the site which should increase informal policing of the area.

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3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to fully support the proposed scheme.

General

3.3.1 Evaluation of the security capability of the existing construction should be undertaken, to ensure that any potential weakness in the building fabric is identified and appropriately addressed. The proposal will make use of some facilities that have been out of action for approximately 30 years, and these may not now form a reliably-secure perimeter to the site, for example the large doors along Whitworth Street, where it may be necessary to provide some additional reinforcement to ensure that they are effective at preventing unauthorised entry to the building.

3.3.2 The peripheral layout of the courtyard area contains some features that create potential concealment which could be exploited by an offender. More remote areas must not be publicly-accessible, with robust barriers to prevent unauthorised access. The division between public and staff-only areas should be readily obvious so that people know where they should and shouldn't have access to. Movements in and out of the buildings should be confined to specific areas and access controls used to ensure only authorised staff / personnel can enter controlled areas.

3.3.3 There should be no shared facilities that could compromise security, and emergency egress routes that involve access to shared stairwells or corridors should be alarmed and covered by monitored CCTV. Regular access from for example the hotel corridors in the eastern corner of the building on to the office / workspace walkway should be prevented. Control of access to basement corridors and facilities accessed off them need further consideration, e.g. bike store – features such as this need to be accessible to legitimate cyclists only with fob-activated doors.

3.3.4 Cash Handling. Consideration for movements of cash in and around the site should be devised, to allow delivery / collections to be made without exposing staff to potential attack. Parking for security vehicles should be specifically allocated and located where the distance between the vehicle and collection point is minimised.

3.3.5 Arrangements for storage and disposal of refuse should not compromise the security of the development. Entry to refuse stores should be strictly controlled. Collection of waste should not require or allow external operatives to enter restricted areas within the site. Waste bins must not be stored on the streets.

3.3.6 The development should take into account the security of guests, visitors, and staff approaching and leaving the building, particularly at quiet times and late at night. The areas outside the premises should be well-illuminated without creating areas of shadow or pooling. A monitored CCTV system covering all elevations of the premises should be included.

3.3.7 The design of any window guards should not form a ladder or climbing aid that would create step up to the upper ground floor windows. It may be appropriate to include a strip of deterrent paving to discourage people from approaching these windows.

3.3.8 Car Parking Provision. Levels of vehicle crime in the area around the site are above the average for Greater Manchester, and any provision of vehicle parking for guests and staff should not put their security at risk. Any arrangements made for off-site parking should utilise nearby car parks which are accredited with the "Park Mark" safer parking award (see www.parkmark.co.uk for details).

3.3.9 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

Office / Workspace

3.3.10 Communal corridors and stairwells in the building should be free of obstacles that could block sight lines. Use of glazed doors, creative lighting and reflective surfaces on acute corners can help with improving visibility and reduce potential for concealment.

3.3.11 Street Entrance. In order to discourage tailgating, where possible the entrances should be laid out with a double door entry system, creating a secure lobby area and inner access-controlled doors to allow further entry to the stair well or lifts. This arrangement helps to reduce potential for tailgating, which is the most common means of entry for intruders. The buildings opposite the proposed entrance include

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some recesses that could provide cover for a potential offender, in close proximity to the communal doors, which increases opportunities for tailgating.

3.3.12 Office staff should have the ability to control access into the building, especially outside of standard working hours. The street entrance doors should be self-closing and self-locking, and include an electronic lock, activated by a fob. An audio link between this entrance and the ground floor the reception desk, and audio visual link to each reception desk on the upper floors, should be installed to allow visitors to communicate with each tenant's reception desk or building management staff. A remote lock release facility should also be installed at each reception to allow staff to release the door remotely to allow visitors into the reception area prior to being accompanied through the building.

3.3.13 Cycle storage for staff should be located within a secure enclosure. Access should be restricted to genuine cyclists only using access controls. Cycle stands should allow bikes to be secured by both wheels and the frame. There should be sufficient secure storage lockers provided for cyclists to store day wear.

Hotel

3.3.14 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors to the hotel should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if / when required (e.g. into the evening / at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance / antisocial behaviour in / around the entrance lobby, and an audio link between door and reception desk to allow guests to communicate with staff at these times.

3.3.15 Room Safe. Secure storage facilities should be provided for guests to store valuable items either within bedrooms or at reception. Ideally, bedroom safes should operate by the guests' key cards or by using a resettable pin which can be chosen by the guest.

3.3.16 A dedicated secure room should be provided for storage of residents' luggage in the back of house area behind the main hotel reception.

3.3.17 The stair / lift core should only be accessible / operable by guest key card, ensuring that access can only be gained by guests to their particular floor and no other. Any fire exit doors (on each level) should be fitted with electromagnetic locks (connected to the fire alarm), should be alarmed and have no ironmongery to the stairwell side of the door. Once an escape stairwell is accessed, the only means of egress should be onto the street at ground floor level, so that people at one level cannot use them to access other levels. Staff access / egress into or from the escape cores should be controlled via fob / swipe card.

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4 Physical Security

The proposed development comprises adaptation of an existing listed building, and in order to preserve its character, the potential to make alterations and upgrade the physical security of the building is constrained. It is appreciated that any changes need to be sensitive to the architecture, and the following recommendations are made on this understanding. However, any new-build elements should be constructed to the following standards. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence.

4.1 Doors and Windows

- External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.
- The doors/frames to any staff-only plant / service / storage areas should be robust / solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Any cash offices / stock rooms should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false / suspended ceilings and door sets certified to BS PAS 24, STS02 or LPS 1175 SR2 with at least one key operated lock certified to BS 3621 or 8621, and with two locking points. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- Any new windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950, must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.2 Glazing

- External glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- Any secondary glazing installed should utilise a product approved by Secured by Design (see www.securedbydesign.com for details of suppliers / installers).
- Glazing Film. The film acts rather like the PVB interlayer in laminated glass and holds the glass together when it's broken. The film should be accredited to BS EN 12600, Class 2B and needs to be applied *behind* the glazing beads or bars to be fully effective which is likely to require removal of the glazing panel in order to do this (if there is a gap between the film and edge of the glass / frame, this significantly reduces the security performance of the film) - professional installation is therefore recommended. In this location any film should have a thickness of 300microns.

4.3 Alarms

- An intruder alarm should be installed linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover any rooms with windows.
- It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

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4.4 Access Control

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Doors at the interface between staff-only and public areas of the premises.
  - Doors providing access to stairs.

4.5 Lighting

- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.6 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: all external doors, till points, bar areas, entrance areas, doors to stair cores / lifts.

4.7 Other

- Graffiti on surfaces. Expanses of blank wall exposed to public areas should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface or have a resistant coating applied to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings.

4.8 Fit Out of Retail / Commercial Units

- Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-user's requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:

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- Internal access control
- Internal doors in to premises
- Alarm systems
- ATMs
- Cash offices
- External Seating

- The above features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5 Further Guidance on Internal Layout of Café / Bars

- Licensed premises and restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:
  - Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating bars / restaurants generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
  - Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
  - Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent bars / restaurants means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
  - Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
  - Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, MP3 players etc.
  - Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.
- In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:
- The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access / egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Customers entering / leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any WCs to monitor their use.
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility. Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public highway, i.e. large promotional signs and menus should not obstruct views.
- Consideration should be given to high/wide bars / service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled).
- All back-of-house / staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- Locate toilet facilities away from public entrances to discourage bilking and use / abuse from non-customers.

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6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.

6.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews / exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

6.1.3 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
- Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.

6.1.4 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.

6.1.5 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6.1.6 The hotel management should consider membership of the Manchester Hoteliers Association (MHA), who share best practice in security management and recruitment.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
08/11/2016	Deloitte / Levitt Bernstein	Meeting with Planning Consultant and Architect
23/11/2016	Deloitte	CIS instruction received
24/11/2016	N/A	Site visit
14/12/2016	Deloitte	Progress update
22/11/2019	Zerum	Request to update report
18/11/2019	Zerum	Additional information received
06/12/2019	Zerum	Progress Update
13/12/2019	Zerum	CIS version B issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
3336 - D110	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	11/08/16	P11
3336 - D111	Proposed First Floor Plan	11/08/16	P11
3336 - D112	Proposed Second Floor Plan	11/08/16	P12
3336 - D113	Proposed Third Floor Plan	11/08/16	P11
3336 - D114	Proposed Third Mezzanine Plan	11/08/16	P8
3336 - D115	Proposed Roof Plan	11/08/16	P5
3336 - D109	Proposed Basement Plan	11/08/16	P12
LR-GA-00-P7	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	23/10/19	P7
LR-GA-01	Proposed Level 1 Plan	09/07/19	P3
LR-GA-02	Proposed Level 2 Plan	09/07/19	P3
LR-GA-03	Proposed Level 3 Plan	09/07/19	P3
LR-GA-04	Proposed Level 4 Plan	09/07/19	P3
LR-GA-LG	Lower Basement Plan	28/09/19	P6

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Report revised following receipt of amended proposals	13/12/2019

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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