



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

103-105 Cheetham Hill Road
Budget hotel (31 bedrooms) &
Commercial space (676sqm)

For: Mr Faisal Khan

Version A: 07/10/19

Ref: 2009/0102/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

103-105 Cheetham Hill Road

2009/0102/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security additions & Design changes required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, which includes:

- Control of access into/around the hotel – including access controls to main entrance out-of-hours, upper floor bedroom corridor/access core to prevent non-guest access and staff-only access to ground floor/basement back-of-house areas.
- Reception desk location and staffing levels.
- Waste storage facilities
- External lighting
- Protection to hotel reception entrance from vehicles

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



David Maher *Dip Arch*

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies on the northern edge of Manchester city centre. The area is principally commercial, having developed with small-scale textile factories, warehousing and wholesale businesses. In recent years the functions of premises have diversified with the introduction of more retail, food preparation and restaurant uses.


The site appears to contain a number of uses at ground floor and the floors above. To the rear on Knowsley St, the site contains a fashion retail unit ending on Bent St.

Due to the proximity to city centre and Manchester Arena, there is considerable demand for car parking space in the vicinity. The pavement depth adjacent to this block and numerous locations along Cheetham Hill Rd has developed into informal car parking for the local area and city centre users.

There are a number of vacant plots in the area; predominately used for car parking, these are frequently neglected and can become a dumping ground for rubbish. In turn this creates the impression that the environment is not cared for and that abuse is tolerated.

A variety of measures have been used to protect nearby premises from unauthorised access via the introduction of metal bars and security shutters to ground floor windows and doors.


Cheetham Hill Rd is a busy arterial route in & out of the city centre with a number of bus stops for a variety of bus companies.



1 – Proposed site on Cheetham Hill Rd.



2 – Proposed site on Cheetham Hill Rd.



3 – Neighbouring banqueting hall



7 – Cheetham Hill Road.



6 – Neighbouring Derby Arms.



5 – Pavement parking along Cheetham Hill Road.



4 – Retail outlet on Knowsley St.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
4	81	100	273	64	21	13	360	31	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high; however it is worth taking into consideration the context of the area and its close proximity to the City Centre. The highest reported offences have been less serious wounding, vehicle crime and non-domestic burglary.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are largely taking place to the south west of the proposed site, around Southall Street and Carnarvon Street. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest reported less serious woundings in the local area. The majority of assaults are taking place within the Prison located to the south west, as well as in sheltered accommodation in the area. Theft from motor vehicles has been the highest reported vehicle crime with smashed glazing being the most common entry point. Offenders have targeted this area as there are car parks which commuters use when working in the city centre. These car parks are unsupervised and the offender(s) are unlikely to be witnessed. Offenders have also targeted vehicles using on street parking, again the vehicle are being left for long periods of the day, thus creating opportunities for the offender(s). Non domestic burglaries in the area are high, with a lot of industrial and retail units surrounding the proposed site. Offenders are mostly forcing open shutters in order to gain access to the windows and doors located below. Offences are likely to take place in the evening and early hours of the morning when there is less foot fall in the area, reducing the possibility of the offender being apprehended.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Hotels: Exploitation of insecure doors and windows to access hotel rooms and staff only areas (mostly kitchens in the hotel to steal meat and bar areas to steal alcohol.)

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.2 Hotels: Offenders forcing open doors to hotel rooms to commit theft

Possible Solution – All individual bedroom doors should ideally be security-certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Access controls should also be incorporated to limit and regulate access to bedroom floors.

- 2.2.3 Hotels: Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic keycards or fobs.

Possible Solution – Auditable electric locking systems (such as Vingcard or similar) should be used, which can be easily activated/disabled electronically by reception staff.

- 2.2.4 Hotels: Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property.

Possible Solution – The main reception should be located to have full view of everyone entering and leaving the premises and all routes to bedrooms and staff areas. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Access controls should be used to restrict access to vulnerable areas and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

- 2.2.5 Hotel & Bar: Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

2.2.6 Hotel: Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.

2.2.7 *Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.*




2.3 Risk Factors – Retail Premises

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer/staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating/exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.5 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Thursday and over the weekend period. The risk of vehicle crime increases in the late morning and into the afternoon (11:30am – 4pm). Offenders have targeted vehicles parked in car parks where they are not overlooked and they are likely to be parked for a long period of the day, giving offenders the perception of a reduced risk of being identified.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises of retail/commercial units at ground floor and basement level, with hotel bedrooms at first floor and above (with ground floor lobby area).
- 3.1.2 The ground floor of the building; (103 Cheetham Hill Road), forms the hotel reception accessed from Cheetham Hill Road. A hotel restaurant will be accessed from the main reception. The upper floors of existing buildings (103/105), will form the hotel bedroom layout.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area, at varying times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The building will present an active frontage onto Cheetham Hill Road, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 The development will re-use an existing building which has been partially vacant for some time and could provide the opportunity for criminal and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.4 The new glazed elements of the buildings offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the street/public realm.
- 3.2.5 The hotel reception area will be located directly adjacent to the entrance lobby at ground floor level.
- 3.2.6 The hotel bedrooms will be provided well-above street level, reducing the potential impacts of noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 There are no indications on the proposed drawings of how the developer intends to create a secure refuse bin storage area. It is been evident that the area suffers from bins and euro bins which have not been collected and left unsecured on pavements or roads.
- 3.3.2 A purpose built storage space should be identified within the enclosed boundary to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bin stored at the rear of the hotel building where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.
- 3.3.3 Arrangements for collection of refuse should not allow further access within the building, nor require bins to be left outside for prolonged periods.
- 3.3.4 There are no proposals to control off-road parking in front of the hotel reception. The existing condition Ground floor glazed elevations to the hotel premises should be protected from ram-raider type attacks by creative use of hard landscape features in the adjacent public realm, or installation of anti-ram bollards.
- 3.3.5 The control of access into and around the hotel is paramount to the security of the development. The reception desk and waiting area at ground floor level must be staffed at all times to meet and direct guests. All visitors should report to the reception for vetting by staff before gaining access to the rest of the building. Consideration needs to be given to the reception desk design and layout to provide opportunities for interaction between staff & residents, but also distance between reception staff and any potential aggressive visitors but also providing surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby/waiting area. The ground floor entrance lobby must be covered by CCTV, monitored by staff at reception. At night, the main entrance doors should be secured and controlled by guest key card or controlled

remotely by reception staff, via a video access control system (see Sections 4.1 & 4.5 for more information).

- 3.3.6 Zoning. The building should be capable of zoning which would restrict access within the site and thus if an intruder does manage to enter, their movements are restricted. All rooms containing facilities for residents should have access controls managed by the building operators. The scale of the proposed development requires subdivision so that residents only have access to the floor where they are staying and do not have unrestricted entry to all floors.
- 3.3.7 Vehicle crime is significant in the area around the site and the provision of vehicle parking for staff and guests should not put their security at risk. I would recommend that guests be directed along safe routes to local car parks currently accredited with the Park Mark safer parking award (see www.parkmark.co.uk for details).
- 3.3.8 All corridors leading to the guest bedrooms and the staircore / lift serving the other floors of the building should be fitted with a security-certified door-set fitted with access controls (operated by guest key-cards), to ensure that only guests who have already booked in at reception and are staying at the hotel can access the bedroom floors (see Section 4.1/4.5).
- 3.3.9 Any cycle storage for guests and staff should be located in secure enclosures within the building, with access restricted to genuine cyclists only. If any cycle stands for short-stay use are proposed, they should be located where they can be observed from routinely occupied rooms and covered by CCTV. The choice of stand should enable cyclists to secure their bikes in at least two places.
- 3.3.10 All ground floor external doors should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting. Any recessed entrances should be particularly illuminated to a high standard to deter antisocial behaviour.
- 3.3.11 Hotel staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.
- 3.3.12 The stair/lift core should only be accessible/operable by guest key card, ensuring that access can only be gained by guests to their particular floor and no other.
- 3.3.13 Safes should be provided for all guests, located in close proximity to their bed. Safes should be of robust construction and it is highly recommended that the locker be operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- 3.3.14 Access in to staff only areas should be restricted to staff. Signage should be provided so that it is clear which areas are restricted to staff, to prevent confusion being used a legitimate excuse for accessing staff only areas. The ground floor back-of-house areas should only be accessible to staff.
- 3.3.15 There is a significantly amount of graffiti in the local area, particularly on rear and blank elevations of buildings. For this reason, any blank facades should be treated with an anti-graffiti coating up to a height of 2400mm so that any graffiti can be easily cleaned.
- 3.3.16 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ All individual hotel bedroom doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 (with door viewers and chain limiters), operable by VingCard or similar. Each bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.

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- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
 - ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows & Building Fabric

- ☐ Ground floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Main entrances
 - External doors
 - Stairs/lifts
 - Staff only areas

4.5 Safes

- ☐ Safes should be provided for all guests in the guest bedroom. Safes should be of robust construction and it is highly recommended that the locker be operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ The rear elevation of the building should be illuminated.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

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- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
 - ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
 - ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
 - ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
 - ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the hotel must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the development. There should be regular reviews / exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 An operating / maintenance plan for the premises should also be prepared, which focuses on issues such as:
 - Details of staff security training
 - Location and management of any smoking areas
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, and CCTV cameras
 - Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods
 - Cash-in-transit collections / deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs)
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods)
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter
 - Refuse collection arrangements
- 5.1.3 Ensure that the site management for which the site was designed remains in place, (i.e. 24 hour staffed reception).
- 5.1.4 All high value equipment should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. Records should be maintained which log all such items.
- 5.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods / overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- 5.1.6 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

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- 5.1.7 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
 - 5.1.8 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
12/09/19	TMD Design	Application received
13/09/19	TMD Design	Client confirmation
18/09/19	GMP	Invoice issued
07/09/19	DfS	Site visit
08/09/19	DfS	CIS completed
09/09/19	DfS	CIS issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Design and Access Statement		
PL01	Proposed & Existing Plans	Jan 19	
PL02	Proposed Plans & Existing Elevations	Jan 19	
PL03	Proposed Plans & Existing Elevations	Jan 19	
PL04	Proposed Elevations	Jan 19	
PL05	Proposed Elevations	Jan 19	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk