



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

47 Peter Street, Manchester

Hotel

FOR: Peter Street Exclusive Development

VERSION A: 13th December 2018

REFERENCE: 2010/0218/CIS/03

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Peter Street (47)

2010/0218/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, it should be considered essential that the recommendations that have been made within section 3.3 are implemented. If the recommendations are addressed we would be supportive at planning application stage.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre of Manchester and is positioned on the junction of Peter Street and Southmill Street; to the rear of the building is Bootle Street.

The site is located on Peter Street, approximately half way between St Peters Square to the East and Deansgate to the West. The site is located in close proximity to the Central Library, Town Hall and Albert's Square area, as well as the Midland Hotel (diagonally opposite on Peter Street), the Great Northern Warehouse is nearby on the junction of Peter Street and Deansgate.

The existing building has windows at basement/lower ground floor and these are protected with ornate iron railings.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2017 to 30th September 2018

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
15	278	282	2207	1021	281	47	381	36	228

- 2.1.1 The level of crime recorded in the local area over the last 12 months is extremely high. This is almost certainly due to the proximity of the site to the city centre. Offences are particularly concentrated in the area where the proposed site is located, most likely due to the density of licenced premises and restaurants in this area.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Many or most of the burglaries with unknown entry points are highly likely to be the exploitation of hotel room doors left insecure by occupants, malfunctioning electronic locks on hotel rooms doors or surreptitious entry to hotel rooms.

Possible Solution – Hotel bedroom doors/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. VingCard or similar). Doors should have a door closer to ensure that doors cannot be left ajar accidentally by residents when they leave their room.

- 2.2.2 Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.3 Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place (see section 4.4) to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed entry into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.




2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary from hotel rooms
- Criminal damage to buildings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Customer disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Hotels: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning and in the evenings, in particular during the week.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Many or most of the burglaries with unknown entry points are highly likely to be the exploitation of hotel room doors left insecure by occupants, malfunctioning electronic locks on hotel rooms doors or surreptitious entry to hotel rooms.
- Opening of secured doors and windows using bodily force or instruments to gain access to the premises or hotel rooms.
- Exploitation of insecure doors and windows to gain access to the premises or hotel rooms.

2.5 Theft Hotels: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft is highest during the day and in the early hours of the morning at the weekend, and in the late morning during the week.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is a change of use of the existing building to hotel bedrooms on first floor and above, with a reception at ground floor level shared with the existing restaurant.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The location of the reception desk will allow staff to view those entering the building and those entering the circulation core of the hotel, allowing them to vet those entering the hotel and those going to the hotel floors.
- 3.2.2 Hotel bedrooms are located on first floor and above, reducing the potential for noise disturbance from passers-by – particularly late at night and in the early hours of the morning.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 All ground floor external doors should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting. Recessed entrances should be particularly illuminated to a high standard to deter antisocial behaviour (such as loitering, vagrancy, and congregation).
- 3.3.2 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.
- 3.3.3 Doors into hotel room corridors should only be accessible/operable by guest key card, ensuring that access can only be gained by guests of that specific area of the hotel.
- 3.3.4 Lockers should be provided for all guests, located in close proximity to their bed. Lockers should be of robust construction and it is highly recommended that the locker be operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- 3.3.5 Access in to staff only areas should be restricted to staff. Signage should be provided so that it is clear which areas are restricted to staff, to prevent confusion being used a legitimate excuse for accessing staff only areas.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Hotel bedroom doors/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. VingCard or similar).
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows & Building Fabric

- ☐ Ground floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Main entrances
 - External doors
 - Doors from publically accessible areas into areas restricted to hotel guests
 - Stairs/lifts
 - Staff only areas
 - Plant/service/storage areas
- ☐ All internal doors should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock, so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

4.6 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.

4.7 Other

- ☐ Each hotel bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- 4.7.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5 Useful References

5.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 5.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1	00-PETER-STREET-APART-HOTEL-CONCEPT-PROPOSAL-02.08.18-low-res-002.pdf		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk