



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Event Arena at SportCity Way and

Alan Turing Way

Leisure (58,354sqm)

Client: OVG Manchester Limited

Version D: 27/02/20

Ref: 2019/0841/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Event Arena at SportCity Way and Alan Turing Way

2019/0841/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design elements to be considered

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more depth within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed when developing detailed proposals for future development, and these include:-

- Existing routes and connections
- Links to current key development sites
- Access & maintenance
- Landscaping design and features
- Lighting
- Event management
- Car parking

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the overall strategy for development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

This study area is bounded Alan Turing Way (East), Sports City Way (North), Joe Mercer Way (West) and the Ashton Canal (South).

The area contains a mix of uses ranging from private residential (semi-detached streets and apartment blocks) to the east, large retail & food outlets, sports facilities, public realm and associated car parking.


The site is located within the SportsCity campus and is a key destination on the periphery of the city centre. The Etihad stadium is the main dominant building within the area. The surrounding area of SportsCity contains additional sporting attractions such as; an athletics stadium, indoor tennis & the national squash centre.

The proposed site is afforded good public transport links with local bus routes and two tram stops in close vicinity. Vehicle transport routes to the site are provided along Alan Turing Way; with good links to, in and around the city. In addition to the public transport & vehicle routes there are two public walking routes from the city to SportsCity, approx. 1.5miles from Piccadilly train station.

There are notable level changes across the site, rising up from the north to the south along the canal.

The entire perimeter of the proposed site is currently fenced off with 2.4m high weld-mesh fencing. There are two gated vehicle access point from Sports City Way onto the site. The site is used occasionally for over-spill car parking.


There is a ramped pedestrian access from Alan Turing Way down to the canal tow path. To the north east of the site, across Alan Turing Way is Philips Park.



1 – View of site from Alan Turing Way.



2 – Etihad Stadium from Alan Turing Way




3 – Pedestrian route to canal tow path from Alan Turing Way.




4 - Existing site.



8 – Metrolink stop.



7 – Sport City Way towards Alan Turing Way.







6 – Existing car park.



5 – Canal tow path.

1.1 Visual Audit



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
7	11	15	58	17	<5	<5	9	7	5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is relatively low, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest recorded offences.
- 2.1.2 The majority of offences are taking place to the east of the proposed site, in which a local housing estate is situated. Less serious woundings mostly consist of assaults and public order offences, with offences taking place at the local sporting stadium and residential estate. Offences have involved road rage incidents, verbal and physical assaults at the sporting stadium during events, as well as verbal and psychical assaults occurring in dwellings and residential streets. Thefts have mostly involved unattended items being removed from tables and chairs in restaurants and stadiums, as well as parcels being removed from communal areas in the apartment buildings situated to the south of the proposed site. Industrial sites have also been targeted, with the removal of fuel from large machinery being the most common theft. Vehicle crime in the local area has mostly involved theft from motor vehicle, which has involved offenders targeting secure unattended vehicles and forcing their way into the vehicle by means of smashing glazing, or forcing doors using implements.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Retail:** Burglaries at retail premises are relatively common, with the forcing open of external shutters with instruments or vehicles being a particularly common MO for burglaries at retail premises, most likely because at the times when burglaries take place retail premises have their shutters closed.
- 2.2.2 **Offices:** Burglaries and other thefts are the most common offences at office premises across Manchester after malicious communications, most likely due to the number high value items in offices including computers, cash and other electrical equipment.
- Sports/Leisure:** As well as common burglary MOs such as forcing entry using instruments or exploitation insecure entry points, a particular MO has been used against sports and leisure facilities across Greater Manchester in which outdoor storage units have been forcibly opened using instruments such as bolt cutters or crowbars.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of personal property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private spaces
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period
- Criminal damage
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security

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- Controlled access (staff/user only)
 - Robbery
 - Theft of personal belongings in changing rooms




2.4 Public Realm Risk Factors

The typical security / disorder risks for a development of this nature are:

- Personal robbery
- Theft of personal belongings
- Criminal damage to property
- Arson
- Violence towards the public and staff at commercial/retail premises
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private spaces
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Antisocial behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Alcohol and drug misuse
- Alcohol related disorder

2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary Event Space: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against event space, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at event spaces in the Greater Manchester Area peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the evening (5pm – 10:30pm). Offenders target properties in the evening when they are closed or have fewer employees present, giving offenders the perception that there is less of a risk of being caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using implements and bodily pressure in order to gain entry.
- Exploitation of insecure doors and windows.
- Posing as a legitimate visitor and entering restricted areas.
- Broken glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements.

2.6 Theft Event Space: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against event space, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at event spaces in the Greater Manchester area peaks on a Wednesday and Saturday during the late evening (10pm – 11:59pm). Offenders have targeted customers and employees personal belongings, mostly mobile phones and purses/wallets. They have used means of distraction and pick pocketing in order to obtain the victims personal belongings.

2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Thursday during the late evening (9pm – 10:30pm). Offenders often target vehicles parked securely, where they are not over looked by vehicle owners. This gives offenders the perception that they are less likely to be apprehended. Offenders also target vehicles in the late evening when they are less likely to be seen due to the decrease in natural surveillance.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks to create a new purpose built arena to host multi-use events such as music, sports and corporate events within the Sport City campus in close proximity to the Etihad stadium and adjacent to Alan Turing Way.
- 3.1.2 The proposed arena will provide an opportunity to host events up to 23,500 capacity events. This capacity can only be reached when a centre stage configuration is used for specific events.
- 3.1.3 The development will incorporate food & beverage outlets and VIP amenities opportunities, retail and leisure opportunities and back-of-house support functions, cycle parking and associated works.
- 3.1.4 Extensive upgrading to the immediate public realm and neighbouring car park will also be incorporated into the development proposals. The new public realm will enhance and form part of the existing public realm network.
- 3.1.5 Works to the existing car park north of the development site will form a new vehicle entrance/exit junction onto Alan Turing Way opposite Briscoe Lane.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed building will see the development of long-standing partially used car park.
- 3.2.2 The proposal will enhance the existing leisure and event destination for the area bringing in a new diverse range of people to the area, thus helping to continue to repopulate this part of the city and generate activity throughout the day and night at specific times and dates. Additional activity associated with the site will help support informal policing and natural surveillance.
- 3.2.3 The redevelopment of the site will provide an interesting and diverse use; offering opportunity for employment, interesting and safer public realm and a chance to create an exciting destination.
- 3.2.4 Multiple public transport methods and local taxis are easily accessible at nearby tram stops and bus stops along Alan Turing Way and Ashton New Road.
- 3.2.5 A Travel plan management document will be submitted as part of the planning application.
- 3.2.6 The building has been designed to meet the requirements of crowd flow, security searches via walk through metal detectors and rummage search of bags A4 size or smaller. Visibility and wayfinding will be part of the building design and supported within the planning application pack.
- 3.2.7 Information points and event staff will be positioned at key locations to guide visitors to and from the building at key locations.
- 3.2.8 As part of the management plan 'soft checks will take place outside the building by event staff prior to event goers entering the building. Inspection checks for bags and tickets for events will take place at a number of locations within the building. Thus reducing potentially large numbers of people on the street and into a controlled environment.
- 3.2.9 The client; 'OVG Manchester Limited' are developing their security and screening strategy with a view to operating a No Bag policy. Event goers will be informed of this policy during ticket purchasing. Further information on this policy will be reiterated to event goers ahead of the event. This policy will form part of the overall management policy for the building.
- 3.2.10 A large number of emergency exits have been provided; exiting around the existing building. The high number of exits reflects the large capacity of the venue can cater for.
- 3.2.11 An Operating schedule and Event Management Plan will be submitted in support of the planning application and reviewed by the events team on a regular basis. An Operating Manual will be submitted as part of the Premises Licence application and will explain how the proposed development will operate on a day-to-day basis as well as during events. The plans will form part of the planning submission. An Events management plan will be prepared in advance of each event and will be a key event communication tool for relevant partners.

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- 3.2.12 Acoustic measures are being built into the building to minimise noise issue from the venue to local residents.
 - 3.2.13 The main circulation routes and entrances are obvious, leading people directly to where they need to go. The proposals are intended to integrate with surrounding circulation routes.
 - 3.2.14 The hard & soft landscaping will help to generate a sense of place, pride and safety in the community and create new links to existing neighbourhoods.
 - 3.2.15 The proposed development will result in an increase in footfall in the area, improving vitality across the wider area, providing additional natural surveillance, which can help promote a greater sense of safety on the street.
 - 3.2.16 The recognised approach to creating a safer public realm for pedestrian and cycle corridors supports an environment in which people want to work and visit.
 - 3.2.17 The public realm of the proposal is permeable, allowing pedestrian movement to be concentrated on the pavements. Commercial facilities are also well located helping to promote activity and surveillance across new vistas.
 - 3.2.18 The wider Etihad campus contains a number of secure bicycle storage locations which is sufficient to serves visitors and staff for now and in the future. No cycle store stores will be provided within the proposed building.
 - 3.2.19 The design of the building has incorporated ground floor amenity uses providing food & beverage outlets for event goers before an event. These uses provide activity to specific locations around the building and offer good opportunities for natural surveillance across the public realm areas. The design of the amenity frontages has incorporated a robust approach to the facing materials and function, ensuring a secure building envelop is maintained out of business hours.
 - 3.2.20 The building footprint is free of deep recesses that could provide shelter, impede surveillance or attract antisocial behaviour.
 - 3.2.21 A proposal for external light within and around the public realm will be submitted as part of the planning application. The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the space without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as CCTV.
 - 3.2.22 Engagement at the early RIBA stages has previously proven to afford those involved in the development the opportunity to 'build-in' protective measures, which often results in more aesthetically pleasing and cost-effective measures. The design team have discussed the design proposals with a GMP Design for Security consultant.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Any planting should avoid creating concealed areas or hiding places, and should not obscure sight lines close to circulation areas. The position of trees should be devised in conjunction with lighting and CCTV proposals in order to avoid blocking effective coverage. Account should be taken of the likely growth characteristics and maintenance regime.
- 3.3.2 No long-term (over the course of an event), event user car parking within 30m of the building, to provide adequate standoff when considering vehicle borne IEDs.
- 3.3.3 Any glazing to proposed elevations along or in close proximity to crowded pedestrian routes should incorporate laminated glass (see section 4.3 for further detail).
- 3.3.4 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design of the wider campus. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed. The location of cycle stores within area should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility. Cycle stands should be located 30m from the building to provide adequate stand-off when considering IED's.
- 3.3.5 Given the high levels of graffiti within and around the site, it is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed, protected and supports the removal of graffiti. Developments which contain graffiti can be an indication that the buildings management regime in respect of graffiti is a low priority. If graffiti is left on buildings/surfaces it can lead to further acts of graffiti and/or damage towards the

building and creates a lasting impression of a lack of care towards the building and public realm. Overtime neglected buildings / public realm can instil a sense of insecurity towards the area. It is understood from the design team that a measurement above the plinth level on exterior surfaces only, shall have anti-graffiti film applied.

- 3.3.6 Transport routes which dissect the area can form conduits for crime and anti-social behaviour. Movement along them (Canal tow paths and Tram lines), should be audited for the boundary security and suitability and a maintenance programme be implemented to ensure a lasting secure line against the canal towpath.
- 3.3.7 The development of the public realm space will encourage further significant pedestrian footfall in the area. The aspirations of the plans also seek to extend the use of this space beyond event times. It is therefore recommended that planners, developers, and architects concerned with this development consult with Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSA), throughout the planning and implementation of this development with a view to ensure protection from VAW attacks is as comprehensive as realistically possible. This engagement will also afford the opportunity to consider other attack methodologies and potential mitigations against them. The design team have on a number of occasions discussed the proposals with a GMP CTSA consultant and team leader and most if not all public dwell spaces are within protected HVM 'zones'.
- 3.3.8 Security measure carefully incorporated into the environment and building design can ensure that buildings and the environment is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SRB3 (issue 8).
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ All internal doors / frames to staff areas / stores / offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys / passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standard, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Any ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ If any shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and less visually intrusive.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within the vicinity of crowded places should incorporate laminated glazing. Any glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate 6mm outer pane and at least one pane

of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. It is recommended that glazing to elevations adjoining public areas or evacuation routes should also be laminated.

- ☐ All new glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) should incorporate at least one pane of a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ All glazing other than that with solid backing to the rear, such as glazing to spandrel panels and shadow boxes shall include laminate glass with a minimum 1.52mm thick PVB interlayer for the inner pane. For structural silicone glazing (SSG) systems, the bonding to façade frames shall be to the laminated panes of IGUs. Where the glazing retention is via pressure plates/caps, the bite of the pressure plate/cap shall be minimum 30mm.

4.4 Curtain Walling

Glazed curtain walling

- ☐ Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:
 - Large glazed units connected by 'spider clamp' system.
 - Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
 - Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.
 - Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.
- ☐ Glazed curtain walling must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:
 - Security glazing tape
 - Dedicated security sealant or gasket
 - A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)
- ☐ Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:
 - BS PAS 24:2016
 - STS 204 Issue 3: 2012
- ☐ LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ Fencing / boundary treatments separating the public realm from private space should not include any potential climbing aids. Avoid locating items of street furniture close by that could provide footholds.

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ Tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Street furniture should be designed to withstand casual acts of vandalism. When selecting or designing street furniture, consider how easily and quickly items can be repaired or replaced following damage. When commissioning bespoke street furniture and public artworks it is also important to be mindful of

the potential for attack and ease of repair. These features are best positioned where there is plenty of formal and informal surveillance, so any criminal acts are more likely to be witnessed.

- ☐ To avoid compromising the security of buildings street furniture must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments or onto terraces. Security can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close to fencing.
- ☐ Tree Establishment. Avoid the use of tree stakes by using an underground guying system. Irrigation systems / pipes should include tamper-proof coverings to avoid potential criminal damage / blockage.
- ☐ Use of loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Surfaces that could be vulnerable to graffiti should be formed of a resistant material or have a resistant coating applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal, e.g. 'easy-on' (see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).
- ☐ Cycle stands intended for short-stay use should enable cyclists to secure both wheels and the frame and obtained from an SBD-approved supplier.
- ☐ Security Bollards
 - Fixed and raising bollards are acceptable should they be successfully tested to PAS 68-1:2013 / IWA-14 and installed to PAS 69/IWA-14A.
 - Bollards providing passive protection should be successfully tested to BS 170-1

4.7 Communal Areas

- Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of the development should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

4.8 Gates

- ☐ Design of Gates. Gates will need to prevent people from clambering (or being tempted to climb) round them. Consideration should be given to inclusion of an emergency release button / device to allow anyone trapped inside to get out and reduce potential for entrapment (this should be beyond reach of people outside the gate and should also include an alert relay to the CCTV control room on activation of the gate at these times).
- ☐ Ease of repair. It is likely that gates will be subject to criminal damage to make them difficult to close or lock. The design should be sufficiently robust to withstand this kind of attack, but also should be capable of rapid repair. Use of bespoke components may create delays in obtaining replacements.
 - There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the gate, to reduce the potential for crawling into the secure area.

4.9 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting should be provided in accordance with BS 5489. The spread of lighting should be evenly distributed with no areas of shadowing or pooling. Levels should be sufficient to support the CCTV systems in operation in the area. The position of light sources must not create glare or be dazzling at eye level, nor shine directly into the CCTV cameras.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.10 Car parking and service areas

- ☐ No long-term (over the course of an event), event user car parking within 30m of the building, to provide adequate standoff when considering vehicle borne IEDs
- ☐ Lighting to surface car parking should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Lighting to the internal parking areas should display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ Electronic car park exit gates/shutters should be fob-in and fob-out; they should not operate on an induction loop (i.e. not open automatically).
- ☐ Pedestrian gates in to car parks should also be fob in and fob out only.

4.11 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main circulation routes / elevations and entrances to new pavilions / sheltered area between the two buildings / main gathering spaces.](#)

4.12 Other

- ☐ There must be no features of the building envelope which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.
- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

-
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
 - Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surrounding.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
08/08/19	Deloitte	Project Bradford initial meeting with CTSA & DfS
07/11/19	Client	Project Bradford GMP presentation with CTSA & DfS
13/11/19	Deloitte	Project Bradford GMP presentation
30/10/19	DfS & CTSA	Site visit
01/10/19	DfS	CIS application
04/10/19	DfS	CIS instruction confirmed
09/10/19	DfS	Invoice issued
21/11/19	DfS	CIS Draft issued to CTSA for comment
22/11/19	DfS	CIS completed & issued
07/01/20	DfS	CIS completed & issued
16/01/20	DfS	CIS completed & issued
05/02/20	Deloitte / DfS	Comments received CIS completed & issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
BRA-POP-XX-ZZ-DR-A-0300	GA Elevations North, East	19/07/19	P02
BRA-POP-XX-ZZ-DR-A-0301	GA Elevations West, South	19/07/19	P02
BRA-POP-ZZ-B0-DR-A-0100	Level B1 – All Zones	16/10/19	P01
BRA-POP-ZZ-GF-DR-A-0101	Level GF – All Zones	19/07/19	P01
BRA-POP-ZZ-01-DR-A-0103	Level 01 – All Zones	19/07/19	P01
BRA-POP-ZZ-02-DR-A-0104	Level 02 – All Zones	19/07/19	P01
BRA-POP-ZZ-03-DR-A-0105	Level 03 – All Zones	19/07/19	P01
BRA-POP-ZZ-04-DR-A-0107	Level 04 – All Zones	19/07/19	P01
BRA-POP-ZZ-05-DR-A-0109	Level 05 – All Zones	19/07/19	P01

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Version B issued	16/01/20
C	Version C issued	05/02/20
D	Version C issued	27/02/20

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk