



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Princess Street

8 Bedroom Hotel (276sqm)

FOR: GLH 2 Ltd

VERSION A: 13/03/20

REFERENCE: 2019/0850/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Princess Street

2019/0850/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/design changes required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, which includes:

- Control of access into/around the hotel – including access controls to main entrance out-of-hours, to prevent non-guest access and staff-only access to ground floor/basement back-of-house areas.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



David Maher *Dip Arch*

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site contains the disused commercial office building which neighbours the Waterhouse pub on Princess St.

The main entrance and elevation faces onto Princess St. There is no access to the rear of the building as it is bounded by properties on Kennedy St to the rear.

The proposed building faces onto the north elevation of Manchester Town Hall.

St Peter's Square is located to the south of the site and now forms a popular and well-presented piece of public realm within the city centre. The square also contain a metro-link inter-change.


Princess St contains a number of popular leisure destination at street level and a strong commercial presence within the city.

The building forms part of the neighbouring terrace housing the Waterhouse pub which has a pavement drinking area for patrons.

Alongside the neighbouring pub there are a number of restaurants, retail uses and a Tesco Metro supermarket all within a 100m radius of the site.

To the north west of the site; on Princess St, there is a bus stop which supports a number of bus routes.

Princess St is a busy pedestrian route connecting many parts of the city centre.



7 – Public Houses on Kennedy St to rear of the proposed site.




6 – Bow Lane and retail premises



5 – View along Princess St



1 - View towards the existing Robin Hill Youth centre



2 - View of nearby Cenotaph



3 – View at Fountain St junction



4 – Proposed site

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
20	307	368	2320	1638	554	76	481	41	248

- 2.1.1 The overall crime in the local area is high for Manchester; however the location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration. The proposed site is located within Manchester City Centre where there is a high concentration of bars, restaurants and retail outlets. High volumes of licenced premises and retail outlets often lead to an increase in crime and disorder within the area, which explains the crime volume around the proposed site. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences in the area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area with a hotspot occurring to the east of the proposed site, around Portland Street and Canal Street. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the area. Offences have mostly taken place over the weekend period, during the late evening and early hours of the morning, with alcohol being a common factor. Licenced premises often close around the time when the disorder increases in the area.
- 2.1.3 Thefts have again taken place throughout the local area with a couple of hotspots being identified to the north, where the Northern Quarter is located and to the east, around Canal Street and Portland Street. Offenders are using pick pocketing and distraction methods to obtain personal items, with mobile phones being the most common target. Offenders are also entering bars and restaurants, posing as legitimate customers and removing insecure items from tables and chairs, with mobile phones and bags commonly targeted.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area is high, with theft from motor vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle being the highest recorded vehicle crimes. Offenders have targeted vehicles using private car parking and on street parking facilities. Offenders are smashing glazing, causing damage and gaining entry to vehicles, as well as removing number plates and vehicle parts. Offenders are also targeting paint work and body work of vehicles, causing damage. Offenders target vehicles using car parking facilities within the city centre as vehicles as usually left for long periods of time.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property
Possible Solution - The main reception should be located to have full view of everyone entering and leaving the premises and all routes to bedrooms and staff areas. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Access controls should be used to restrict access to vulnerable areas and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.
- Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic key-cards/fobs or by exploiting insecure doors.
Possible Solution - Auditable electric locking systems (such as Vingcard or similar) should be used, which can be easily activated/disabled electronically by reception staff.
- Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tool/implements to gain entry
Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

-
- Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables
Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at Manchester hotels fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offender's time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain entry before targeting insecure doors/ restricted areas.
- Opening secured doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure doors to gain entry to hotel room.
- In cases of unknown point of entry offenders have often gained possession of the hotel room key card and accessed the room, removing personal and business property.

2.5 Theft (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend. It is possible that the risk increases at these times when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday and Friday, when they are typically less busy and they perceive a lower risk of being caught/challenged.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft is greatest around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Thefts of personal property (such as mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) are the most routinely stolen items.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday and Sunday, during the afternoon and into the late evening. Offenders have targeted securely parked vehicles using car parks and on street parking facilities. Offenders have targeted vehicles during the day as they are often left unsupervised, in secluded areas for long period of time, whilst owners attend the city centre, therefore reducing the risk of the offender being caught.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks to redevelop an existing building (65 Princess St), to form a new hotel. The proposed hotel will provide 8 bedrooms and associated lobby area at ground floor.
- 3.1.2 The hotel entrance is accessed via the upgraded existing entrance on Princess Street. Upon entering the hotel you are within the reception and waiting area. From this space you can move through to the hotel lobby circulation to all floors (hotel bedrooms and basement BOH).

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area, at varying times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The building will present an active frontage onto Princess St. enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 The development will re-use an existing building which has been vacant for some time and which has provided the opportunity for criminal and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.4 The new glazed elements of the building offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the street/public realm.
- 3.2.5 The hotel reception/lobby area will be located directly adjacent to the entrance lobby at ground floor level.
- 3.2.6 The hotel bedrooms will be provided well-above street level, reducing the potential impacts of noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The control of access into and around the hotel is paramount to the security of the development. The ground floor entrance lobby must be covered by CCTV and recorded. At night, the main entrance doors should be secured and controlled by guest key card or controlled remotely by hotel staff, via a video access control system (see Sections 4.1 & 4.5 for more information).
- 3.3.2 The entrance lobby into the building should be fitted with a security-certified door-set fitted with access controls (operated by guest key-cards), to ensure that only guests who have already booked in and are staying at the hotel can access the bedroom floors (see Section 4.1/4.5).
- 3.3.3 The basement back-of-house areas should only be accessible to staff.
- 3.3.4 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Staff should be able to remotely secure and control access through the main entrance door if/when required (e.g. into the evening/at night). Ideally, the main entrance should be formed by a single-leaf door-set (which is easier to secure with an electrically operated multi-point lock, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system). It should be self-closing and controlled by guest key-card (for guests that have already checked-in) or by means of a video entry phone system linked to the staffed reception.
- ☐ All individual hotel bedroom door-sets/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing and secured with 3 hinges and an electronically operated lock, controlled by Vingcard or similar. They should also be fitted with door viewers and chain limiters.
- ☐ Any doors off the access stairwell to the staff-only basement floor area should also be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, operated by staff key-card.
- ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/rooms, offices, plant areas, luggage stores and general stores should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Any ground floor windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other new window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of BS PAS 24, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ All new first floor level windows should also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24. If the existing first floor windows are to be retained, there should be internal secondary glazing units installed certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR1 (e.g. <http://www.selectaglaze.co.uk/benefits/security-secondary-glazing>), which should incorporate laminated glazing (see below).
- ☐ Any ground or first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground and first floor glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ All internal/external escape doors should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to a 24/7 intruder alarm system.
- ☐ Alarm activations should be relayed to the hotel reception, so staff can investigate or call the authorities as appropriate.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff swipe card/fob or by guest key-card, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The main entrance door out-of-hours.
 - The bedroom doors.

- The entrance lobby doors at ground and basement level and all other back-of-house areas/any cash office - for staff-only.

☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff and guest key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

4.6 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to the exterior of the building and the surrounding public realm, in accordance with BS 5489. Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '[Overview](#)' and '[Recognition](#)', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [all external doors, the entrance lobby at ground floor level, the first floor reception and all lift/stair lobbies on each floor.](#)

4.8 Other

☐ Each guest bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.

☐ There should also be no external plant/air conditioning units or any other features of the buildings (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) that could form climbing aids.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
17/02/20	Paul Bulter Assoc.	CIS application received
13/03/20	DfS	Site visit
21/02/20	Paul Bulter Assoc.	Client confirmation
27/02/20	DfS	Invoice issued
23/03/20	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
19-0017-20-001	Location Plan	12/11/19	P1
19-0017-20-010	Existing Basement Plan	08/05/19	P1
19-0017-20-011	Existing Ground Floor Plan	08/05/19	P1
19-0017-20-012	Existing First Floor Plan	08/05/19	P1
19-0017-20-013	Existing Second Floor Plan	08/05/19	P1
19-0017-21-000	Proposed Basement Plan	08/05/19	P1
19-0017-21-001	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	08/05/19	P1
19-0017-21-002	Proposed First Floor Plan	08/05/19	P1
19-0017-21-003	Proposed Second Floor Plan	08/05/19	P1
19-0017-21-004	Proposed Roof Plan	08/05/19	P1
19-0017-30-001	Existing Elevations	08/05/19	P1
19-0017-30-002	Existing Elevations	08/05/19	P1
19-0017-31-001	Proposed Elevations	08/05/19	P1
19-0017-31-002	Proposed Elevations	08/05/19	P1

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk