



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Barbirolli Square, Manchester

External seating area (55m²)

FOR: EVI UK Investment 5 S.A.R.L

VERSION A: 11.03.20

2018/0956/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Barbirolli Square, Manchester

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We will be pleased to see the building back in use and happy to support the proposed external seating area.

Given the location of the premises, the balance of food and drink served at the premises and the absence of a public right of way in the vicinity of the unit, there are unlikely to be any significant issues affecting the premises from a crime prevention perspective. We do, however, make a number of recommendations (within section 3.3. of the report), the adoption of which will help to further reduce the risk of crime and disorder affecting the premises as well as protecting the amenity of nearby residents.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application.



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Consultant

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Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Modus Operandi used by offenders in committing burglary, theft & criminal damage in & around public squares in Manchester city centre & measures to reduce vulnerabilities	
	2.3 Risk Factors	
	2.4 Theft: Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Criminal Damage: Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Assault: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	7
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals	
	3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the proposals	

Appendix

A	Contact Register.....	9
B	Associated Documents.....	9
C	CIS Version History	9
D	Glossary	10

1 Visual Audit


The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site is located in the basement of the Barbirolli Square development. Two office buildings, 100 and 101 Barbirolli Square dominate the Square. Access into each building is gained from the Square via Lower Moseley Street to the east. The offices are currently being refurbished; number 100 is surrounded by contractor's hoardings. The Square itself is paved to a high quality and is monitored by CCTV. Bridgewater Hall lies to the south of the Square across a canal basin. The Hall has a striking glass façade which allows staff and customers a view across the basin and the Square beyond. A broad series of steps, with integrated ramp, provides access from street level down to the canal basin. There is no through route across the north side of the canal basin other than for residents of Chepstow House, a former mill converted to residential use that overlooks the south-eastern side of the basin. On the north-eastern side of the basin, in the basement of the Square, there is a large commercial unit, which is currently vacant; the most recent use was as a bar. The unit has a shopfront and entrance doors facing the basin. There are timber benches with tables at the water edge, in front of the commercial unit. A planning application to extend the commercial unit is currently lodged with the Local Planning Authority and awaiting a decision. The application seeks to extend the unit at the rear in order to improve servicing of the unit. If successful, the unit will open as a food and beverage outlet, with a bar and a number of food outlets operating from small kitchens around the periphery and customers seating within the centre of the unit.




100 and 101 Barbirolli Square, both office buildings, are currently undergoing refurbishment



Looking across the canal basin towards the basement premises of Barbirolli Square



Existing seating on the edge of the canal basin outside the premises



The existing seating with the shopfront of the premises behind



Looking north-west across the front of the premises towards the steps that provide access to the basin and canal-side commercial units



Bridgewater Hall overlooks the canal basin

There have been 4,339 reported crimes committed in the neighbourhood around the site in the period analysed. Violent crime is most common with around 47% of the total involving the use of or threat of violence. Theft is next most commonly recorded crime (26% of the total number of offences). Theft and violent crime are particularly associated with the night-time economy, which is especially vibrant within the Deansgate Locks, Oxford Street and Peter Street areas. There have been only 4 crimes recorded at Barbirolli Square. The principal risks associated with this development are likely to relate to be: a) violent crimes triggered by the consumption of alcohol; c) public order offences should the space be taken over by large groups; c) theft of property from the tables and chairs as thieves pass amongst the customers.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 and 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
45	164	267	1219	1008	281	56	548	40	136

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high; however the location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration. The proposed site is located within the city centre where there are a high number of retail premises, licenced premises and restaurants; this often leads to an increase of crime and disorder in an area. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded crimes in the local area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the area, particularly to the east of the proposed site, around Portland Street. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded in this area with an increase in offences over the weekend period during the late evening and early hours of the morning. There are a high number of licenced premises within this area, which can account for the higher number of violent offences. Offences have often involved known associates with alcohol being a common factor.
- 2.1.3 Thefts within the city centre are high, particularly to the north of the site, where bars, restaurants and nightclubs are common, and around the Deansgate Locks and Deansgate Metrolink stop, to the south-west. Offences have mostly involved offenders targeting personal items, mobile phones and bags/purses, using pick pocketing and distraction methods. Offenders have also targeted insecure items left on tables and under tables in bars and restaurants.

2.2 Modus Operandi used by offenders in committing burglary, theft & criminal damage in & around public squares in Manchester city centre & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.2.1 Doors, including escape doors, have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all entrance doors, service doors and escape doors should have enhanced security features, e.g. PAS 24 rated doors; and,
- entrance doors, service doors and escape doors should be visible from the 'street' not set within deep recesses or on secluded elevations unless actively monitored by CCTV. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;

2.2.2 Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via glazed areas:

- laminate glass should be used throughout a development. Laminate glass is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and open locks and, because of its structural properties; and,
- consideration should be given to installing ornate security grilles to the most vulnerable windows and doors

2.2.3 Offenders posing as legitimate customers gain entry to staff-only areas and then stealing property

To minimise the risk of offenders posing as customers to gain access:

- install access controls to doors connecting the public areas to back of house;
- locate the bar in a place that maximises surveillance over customer entry and back of house doors;
- install CCTV cameras to monitor movements in, out, and around the building;
- all staff should wear an identification badge;

- overt signage should be used to assist in deterring entry to private areas; and,
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g. lockers.

2.2.4 Criminal damage carried out against the premises and tables and chairs by means of graffiti and smashed glazing

To minimise the risk of criminal damage to property and furniture:

- use very robust materials for the tables and chairs;
- remove portable furniture at close of business;
- actively monitor CCTV images; and
- ensure repairs and maintenance are carried out regularly.

2.2.5 Thefts of personal belongings from customers

To minimise the risk of thieves operating at the premises:

- have staff actively monitoring the outdoor space to ensure a swift response to any emerging issues; and,
- erect discreet signage to warn customers to take care of personal belongings.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Theft of personal belongings
- Criminal damage to property
- Anti-social behaviour
- Alcohol and drug misuse
- Violence directed towards staff and among customers

2.4 Theft: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to theft carried out in public squares within Manchester City Centre.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft in Cathedral Gardens and St Peters Square is low with only 2% of theft offences occurring throughout these areas. Pick-pocketing is the principal method used to commit theft in these two squares, with mobile phones being the main target. Exchange Square has seen 3% of theft offences occurring and Albert Square 4%. Exchange square has seen offenders targeting insecure mobile phones and bags in restaurants and bars, as well as pick-pocketing. The number of incidents of theft increases over the weekend. Albert Square has seen an increase in pick-pocketing offences during well-attended events, particularly the Christmas markets.

2.4.2 Piccadilly Gardens has seen the largest number incidents of theft. Offenders have used distraction and pick-pocketing to steal, targeting mobile phones, bags and cash. Theft is a particular problem in the afternoon and evening.

2.5 Criminal Damage: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to incidents of criminal damage recorded in public squares within Manchester City Centre.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of criminal damage in St Peters Square, Cathedral Gardens and Exchange Square is very low. Offenders have targeted doors of buildings (smashing glass) and defacing public property, most commonly public seating. The vast majority of criminal damage offences have occurred in Piccadilly Gardens. Business premises and public property has been targeted including smashing glazing, graffiti and vandalism. Incidents of criminal damage rise sharply at the weekend.

2.6 Assault: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to assaults occurring within public squares within Manchester City Centre.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of assaults at Cathedral Gardens, St Peters Square, Exchange Square and Albert Square is low - only 6% of assaults occurred across these four squares whereas 96% of assaults took place in Piccadilly Gardens. Assaults are most common in the late evening, between 21.00 and 23.00. Incidents of assault increase sharply over the weekend. Incidents included physical assault, verbal assault and public order offences; in most cases the offender(s) was unknown to the victim.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The development involves the placing of tables and chairs on the forecourt of the premises, immediately adjacent to the shopfront. Five tables seating around thirty people are proposed.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Barbirolli Square currently has a very low number of crimes.
- 3.2.2 The Barbirolli Square development currently employs security staff to supervise and patrol the public spaces around the buildings and, additionally, these spaces are monitored by CCTV camera.
- 3.2.3 The setting of the proposed external seating area is of a very high environmental standard. Well managed, high quality spaces tend not to generate significant levels of crime and disorder.
- 3.2.4 The absence of a through-route along this side of the canal basin is likely to deter many thieves, who may otherwise have exploited a through route, having an excuse to pass alongside tables and then targeting property.

- 3.2.5 The premises are likely to be open until late in the evening, so the hours when the premises are closed and vulnerable to other forms of crime – burglary criminal damage are reduced.
- 3.2.6 Staff will oversee the seating area both from within the premises and whilst attending to tables and customers.
- 3.2.7 The canal basin will be animated and likely to attract additional custom because of the additional external seating, which can add to the ambience of the place and improves passive surveillance and informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.8 Enhancements to lighting, emanating from the unit through the recommencement use, will improve the sense of safety of the space during the hours of darkness.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the proposals

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The CCTV system should be upgraded when refurbishing the premises. Cameras should be capable of monitoring the external seating area and approaches to it as well as the entrance doors and the interior of the premises.
- 3.3.2 External lighting should be reviewed to ensure the pedestrian access to the unit is safe and that the lighting supports the CCTV system.
- 3.3.3 A pathway at least 1000mm wide must be available from the towpath/pavement to the entrances of the premises; this width must be maintained at all times.
- 3.3.4 A pathway at least 1500mm wide should be available to pedestrians passing the front of the premises to pass through unhindered to the Chepstow House development. The pathway should be kept clear of any obstructions.
- 3.3.5 The use of canvas screens/decorative barriers or planters should be used to define the external licensed area and to separate the passing pedestrians from those seated. Screens should be about 1000mm high and held between fixed posts. Fixings for the screens/barriers should not protrude above ground level when the barriers have been removed.
- 3.3.6 All customers should be seated.
- 3.3.7 Arrange the layout of furniture to reduce opportunities for crime and ensure staff are trained to be alert to all non-customers approaching tables at all times. The presence of staff in the tables and chairs area will act as a deterrent as well as ensuring tables and chairs are cleared promptly preventing littering of the street.
- 3.3.8 Given the proximity of Chepstow House, we recommend that the external seating area is closed at 23.00.
- 3.3.9 Tables, chairs, parasols and barriers should be stored in the premises overnight or fixed securely outside of the premises in such a manner that they are not able to be used.
- 3.3.10 Tables, chairs, parasols and barriers should be heavy enough to resist movement by wind.
- 3.3.11 Consider the introduction of hooks or Chelsea clips the tables to allow customers to hang their bags securely whilst seated, (see images right).
- 3.3.12 In some circumstances, we may recommend the use of plastic glasses.
- 3.3.13 If you are affected by an event such as a rally, procession, high profile football match, or open-air concert, for public safety and security reasons, we may request that you remove all your outdoor furniture and equipment while the event is taking place, even if it is within your licence times. If you usually store the furniture inside your premises you may have to make alternative arrangements for storing while you continue to trade.
- 3.3.14 Door staff should be employed at busier times.
- 3.3.15 Amplified music played within the premises should not be audible outside of the premises.



to

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
24.01.20	Tommy Chapman, Zerum	Request for Crime Impact Statement
07.02.20		Site visited
11.03.20	Tommy Chapman, Zerum	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawing:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
B1_02_2700	Proposed External Seating Plan	16/01/20	1

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk