



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

56 Oxford Street

Change of Use to Offices

FOR: Helical (Churchgate) Limited

VERSION B: 9th March 2020

REFERENCE: 2012/0711/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

56 Oxford Street

2012/0711/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found generally acceptable, with a series of recommendations made in section 3.3 which should be implemented where feasible.



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

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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The extent that the report focuses on is the change of use of an area of the basement of Churchgate House from car parking to a offices.

Churchgate House is located in the city centre area of Manchester and it is bound by Great Bridgewater Street to the North, Oxford Street to the East, the River Medlock to the South and adjacent buildings to the West.

The area the site is positioned is largely commercial, being in close proximity to the Central Library/Town Hall area and Oxford Road train station. Opposite the site is St James Buildings which features a number of ground floor retail and F&B units and opposite on Great Bridgewater Street is NCP Oxford Street which has a number of ground floor uses similar to St James Building.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 2018 and 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
68	152	265	1391	991	316	51	537	36	148

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high; however the location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration. The proposed site is located within the city centre where there is a high concentration of retail outlets, bars and restaurants which increases the amount of crime and disorder in the area. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest reported crimes in the area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are taking place throughout the area, with a particularly high concentration taking place to the east of the proposed site, around Princess Street, Sackville Street and Faulkner Street. This area holds a particularly high concentration of bars and restaurants. Assaults and public order offences are the highest recorded less serious woundings, with offences mostly taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period, when licenced premises see a high number of attendances. Thefts, again are taking place throughout the local area with a majority of offences taking place to the east of the proposed site. Offenders are using distraction methods and pick pocketing techniques in order to obtain mobile phones, wallets and bags from victims. Offenders have targeted insecure bags and mobile phones, left on tables or on the back of chairs. Vehicle crime in the area has mostly consisted of theft from a motor vehicle, with offenders targeting securely parked vehicles in private car parks or using on street parking facilities. Smashed glazing and over riding the central locking system has been the most common entry point, with personal items removed from within the vehicle. Offenders have also targeted vehicle registration plates.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Opening secure doors (all door types) using bodily pressure and implements to access the premises.
Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.2) which are designed to withstand a prolonged attempt to gain entry.
- 2.2.2 Breaking glazing in doors and windows, mainly to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.
Possible Solution – Any ground floor or easily accessible glazing should contain a pane of laminate glazing, which cannot be easily smashed or shattered to gain entry.
- 2.2.3 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.
Possible Solution – Personnel gates or turnstiles should restrict access from the office foyer into the circulation core of the building. Any external doors should operate on an access control system.
- 2.2.4 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.
Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals.

2.3 Risk Factors




The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff

- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

Non-Domestic Burglary Offices: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.





- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night/into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries against Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors. Windows behind them.

2.4 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours/staffing levels.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises are likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out. Purses/wallets, cash, mobile phones and other items of technology (such as laptops) were the most frequently stolen items.

2.5 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** Vehicle crime in the local area has been high throughout the week, peaking on a Saturday during the afternoon and into the evening (4pm – 11:59pm). Offenders target vehicles in the city centre, particularly over the weekend period, as they are left unattended for longer periods of time.

There is less natural surveillance in private car parks, giving offenders the perception that there is less of a risk involved.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is a change of use from a basement car park to offices.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed use is in keeping with the building. The proposed offices will benefit from the management of the wider building.
- 3.2.2 The units will have a dedicated access points taken from the front elevation where they can be overlooked from the public highway, allowing natural surveillance opportunities.

3.3 Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration.

- 3.3.1 There should be a reception to the office(s) and it should be staffed during standard office hours (i.e. 9am-5pm) to allow visitors to be vetted before being permitted access in to the building,
- 3.3.2 There should be a video/audio intercom on the main entrance to allow staff to vet visitors to the building when the main reception is not staffed.
- 3.3.3 The main entrance into the office suites from the reception area should operate on an access control system so that only members of staff and genuine visitors can gain access to the main office floor.
- 3.3.4 Access from the lift lobby into the offices should be restricted with an access control operated door to prevent illicit access.
- 3.3.5 The proposed sliding entrance door should be certified to a burglary resistant standard such as BS PAS 24 or STS202, or ENV 1627-30 (RC2/3). The entrance doors should be well-lit either by existing light sources (i.e. street lighting) or the provision of dedicated lighting.
- 3.3.6 Glazing within the sliding door and proposed windows on the front elevation should include at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- 3.3.7 The proposed offices should be covered with a monitored alarm system with a response facility (i.e. by a security team or at an alarm receiving centre).
- 3.3.8 Any CCTV coverage of the building should be extended to the proposed offices.

4 Physical Security

The proposed development comprises conversion of an existing building which involves little change to the structure, thus the potential to make alterations and upgrade the physical security of the building is limited. The following recommendations are made on this understanding but should apply to all new construction for the proposals to achieve a Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Door, Windows, Shutters

- ☐ External sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS202, or ENV 1627-30 (RC2/3).
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

-
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
 - ☐ All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.
 - ☐ Any new windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
 - ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass (retained windows on the canal-side elevation or those protected by existing metal railings/bars do not require laminated glazing).

4.2 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card, fob, or be keylockable. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Entrances into office suites

4.3 Intruder Alarm

- ☐ An intruder alarm should be installed linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover any rooms with windows.
- ☐ It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.4 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ [Acceptable Standard](#) - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ [Identification](#) – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '[Overview](#)' and '[Recognition](#)', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 An operating/maintenance plan should also be prepared, focussing on issues such as:
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. any boundary treatments, lighting, access controls, CCTV cameras, alarm system etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- 5.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, music equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
17/10/2019	Nick Pleasant	CIS application received
21/02/2020	Nick Pleasant	Revised scheme

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
P(102)	Proposed Basement Plan	Dec 2019	G

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Change of use to offices	09/09/2020