



WILLIAM MORRIS

Legal & Corporate Communications

Security Design Scheme & Measures Report

Applicant:

ML Design on behalf of Al-Raza Foundation
8-16 Park Grove
Manchester,
M19 3AQ

Agent:

William Morris Project No. 137483-00
William Morris Legal & Corporate Communications
Russell Street
Leeds
LS1 5RN

Application Site

8-16 Park Grove
Manchester,
M19 3AQ

Application Details:

Application for the erection of building to form place of worship with ancillary education facilities (Class D1) to include access, appearance, layout and scale following demolition of existing building.

This report takes into account the particular
Instructions and requirements of our client.
It is not intended for and should not be relied
Upon by any third party and no responsibility
Is undertaken to any third party.

Job number 137483-00

William Morris
Sheaf Street • Suite 43 • Leeds
Phone 0113 245 9487

Crime Impact Statement

Al Raza Foundation, 8-16 Park Grove, M19 3AQ

Application for the erection of building to form place of worship with ancillary education facilities (Class D1) to include access, appearance, layout and scale following demolition of existing building.

137483-00

ML Design on behalf of Al-Raza Foundation

Executive Summary

- ☐ Significant material changes are advised
- ☐ Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are
- ☒ Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. Particular consideration should be given to the following matters, which are discussed in more detail within this report:

- Enclosure/treatment to the landscaped area at the west of the site, protecting the rear boundaries of the proposed dwellings.
- General boundary definitions.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, the local authority should support the development.

I would encourage further dialogue with the applicant throughout the design and construction process to ensure the resulting development is secure. Please get in touch with William Morris if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.

Table of Contents

1.0 Visual Audit	3
2.0 Crime Statistics & Analysis	4
3.0 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	6
4.0 Wounding: Risk Analysis	7
5.0 Criminal Damage & Robbery: Breakdown	7
6.0 Common Local M.O's (modus Operandi)	8
7.0 General Risk Factors.	8
8.0 Design Considerations	9
9.0 Crime Summary	9
10.0 Layout Appraisal	10
11.0 Physical Security	12
12.0 Construction.	15
13.0 Management & Maintenance	15
14.0 Useful References	16

1.0 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.



1



2



3



4



5



6



Photos
1, 3, 3, 4, 5 & 6

The site is located on Park Grove which is primarily a residential area but has some commercial overspill from Stockport Road. The existing property which we wish to demolish and rebuild is currently vulnerable to unauthorised access, as such areas can provide easy access/escape routes that usually benefit from little/no natural surveillance.

The derelict side of the existing building is in a poor state of disrepair and the surrounding alleyway is overgrown. There are a number of signs of disorder, including damage, graffiti and fly-tipping. Such unattractive and accessible sites can often attract abuse. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if an offenders presence does not attract attention and a place feels like it is not under supervision. If graffiti and damage are not removed/rectified, they can give the impression that an area is not cared for and that crime and disorder is tolerated.

The site is overlooked from the east by Stockport Road. The surrounding area as already mentioned is primarily residential in nature, however Stockport Road is largely commercial.

2.0 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The following has been produced to give an insight into the types and volume of crime experienced across Greater Manchester & Levenshulme. Particular attention is paid to the area surrounding the site on Park Grove and to crimes which research shows can be affected by the built environment. All data is based on crimes recorded between October 2018 & October 2019.

2.1 Crime Overview

	ASB	Burglary	Robbery	Vehicle	Violent	Shoplifting	CD&A	Other Theft	Drugs	Bike Theft	Theft From the Person	Weapons	Public Order	Other	Total
Mar 2020	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Nov 2019	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Jun 2019	32	8	9	16	54	4	6	9	5	2	4	2	17	3	171
May 2019	24	10	8	24	45	1	12	7	3	6	2	1	11	3	157
Apr 2019	30	8	9	9	36	4	20	13	1	0	3	1	17	3	154
Mar 2019	23	17	5	13	40	1	9	7	2	1	0	1	19	1	139


– Over the previous 12 months there have been 355, 565 crimes reported across the Greater Manchester police force area. When looking at the figures in more detail, the number of crimes recorded within a Km2 centred on the development site over the previous 12 months is as follows:

– The most frequently occurring offences within the area of 10Km2 of the site over the previous 12 months have been violent order offences nine cases of theft. As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed community centre, the more detailed analysis below will look at burglary and vehicle crime.


2.2 Residential burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km2 centred on the site.


Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Burglary Dwelling - Day Range (Tameside)



Burglary Dwelling - Time Range (Tameside)




The rate (i.e. incidents per 1000 dwellings) of domestic burglary within a 7Km2 of the site is lower than the average rate for Levenshulme and lower than the average rate for Greater Manchester as a whole.

Although there have been relatively medium incidents of dwelling burglary within the study area, the high density of residential properties in the area usually results in a higher domestic burglary rate.

2.3 Day Range: In the local area, the risk of burglary is highest on Tuesday and Thursday and lowest between Friday and Sunday.

2.4 Time Range: In the local area, the risk of burglary is concentrated in the evening, peaking at 10pm. Offenders typically target residential properties at night when it is dark, streets are quiet and they perceive a lower risk of being detected. It is also easier for offenders to observe which properties are unoccupied at these times.

2.5 Point of entry: Where offenders have targeted residential properties within Tameside, that have used the following points of entry:





The majority of residential burglaries in Levenshulme have been committed through rear points of entry including doors, patio doors and windows. Rear points of entry are often targeted, as offenders can conceal themselves from view. Rear doors have been forced open with tools and/or bodily pressure and rear windows have been prised open by offenders. In a number of incidents, the glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Front doors have also been targeted when leg insecure.

3.0 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a 7Km2 centred on the site.

3.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime within a 7Km2 is greatest on Wednesday.



3.3 Time Range: During the day, the risk of vehicle crime peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. Vehicles parked within open, communal areas or on streets, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often



more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure garages/parking facilities.

4.0 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to woundings committed within 7Km2 centred on the site.




4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of violence is concentrated on Saturday and Sunday. The risk of violence often increases at the weekend when more people attend license premises, often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts.

4.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of violence is greatest late in the afternoon and in the evening. The risk of violence often increases at these times when alcohol has been consumed in homes, on streets and in licensed premises.

5.0 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to woundings committed within 7Km2 centred on the site.

5.1 Criminal Damage: Two thirds of criminal damage in the local area has been against properties, with the remaining third against vehicles. In the majority of cases windows, the windows of both buildings and vehicles have been smashed.



5.2 Robbery Targets: In the local area, all robberies have been against individuals rather than businesses. Typically, individuals have been targeted when walking through the area alone, at night.

6.0 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

6.1 Rear doors have been forced open with tools

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Lighting to the front and rear of the buildings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime.

6.2 Rear windows have been prised open

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The windows themselves should also be certified to recognised security standards, with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Again, unauthorised access to the rear of the dwellings should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes to the rear of the properties.

6.3 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed by offenders

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

7.0 General Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary

- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Antisocial behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction project

8.0 Design Considerations

The design and layout of the development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. William Morris does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

9.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

9.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

9.0 Crime Summary

Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Rear doors have been forced open using bodily pressure and/or tools.

Possible solution - all external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of Forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All private spaces to the sides/rears of the building should be robustly enclosed (See section 4.6), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Lighting to the front and rear of the building can also deter and reveal return potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (See section 4.7).

- Rear windows have been prised open by offenders

Possible solution - all ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognise security standards(See section 4.2) with key operated locks of opening restrictors. Again, an authorised access to the rear of property should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes/publicly accessible areas to the rear.

- Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain access

Possible solution - all ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pain, which forms a much more robust about you again shattering and penetration(See section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set away from locking points.

- Front doors targeted when left insecure

Possible solution - A robust access control system should be in place to allow members to vet visitors to the proposed building before allowing them access to the building. The main communal entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well lit to deter offenders from trying to gain authorised access. All individual rooms within the proposal should also be secured with a security certified entrance door set (see section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as illegitimate visitor etc.) Cannot gain further access without drawing attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridor should not be located in the recesses, where the vendor could operate without fear of detection.

10.0 Layout Appraisal

10.1 Proposed Development

The proposal is to demolish a single-storey underused tin covered property, comprising of a car park. The car park will be accessed off Park Grove (Through fob based electronic access gates) And will include enough vehicles bases for all to use, along with cycle & bin storage areas.

The proposal, once built will be able to provide a comfortable enclosed space for a small amount of local worshippers, with associated parking and landscaping.

10.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

The following proposal features will make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime:

- the proposed development will bring a not well maintained site back into use and will provide additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area, at all times of the day and night.
- The principle entrance to the building will be located in a prominent position It will be capable of being clearly seen from the public realm. For pedestrian visitors to the proposal, there is only one entrance point, which allows security to be focused on this location.

- The footprint of the building has been kept simple, with no accessible doors/ windows hidden within deep recesses behind building line (Where they would be vulnerable to attack unseen).
- All parking spaces will be enclosed within the secure car park with a single fob controlled entrance off Park Grove to prevent illegitimate access.
- The rooms within and main congregation hall are well away from street level, meaning that attendees possessions cannot be easily observed and authorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and antisocial behaviour (Particularly at night).
- The proposed development providing the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retributive security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design to ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.
- The proposal has large windows to their front elevations (at ground floor level), maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between buildings.

10.2 Points for further consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for design security to support the proposed scheme.

- The boundary treatments to the proposal are vitally important to secure it and to preventing unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides (including gables up to the front building line) and rear of the building should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access. Care should be taken to ensure ground level changes do not inadvertently facilitate scaling boundaries or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. Defensive planting (incorporating densely branched, thorny shrubs) can be used to great effect on the public side of publicly accessible boundaries to deter scaling and damage.
- The communal entrance to the building fronting onto the car park should be formed by a security certified, Single leave doorset (Which is easier to secure and operate remotely) secured with an electrical operated multipoint lock, capable of being operated by a robust electronic access control system. Consideration should also be given to a secure system for postal deliveries.
- Access to the proposed vehicle and cycle parking areas must be robustly secured, controlled maintained, in order to prevent unauthorised access. The entrance to the car park should be fitted with a high-speed automatic fob operated gate (to reduce the potential to tailgating), operated by member key fob/proximity reader with no automatic egress (i.e access control both 'in' and 'out') so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape. The location of the gates should not create a deep sheltered recess within the building line that may foster loitering/ gathering, nuisance and antisocial behaviour. All entrances off the car park should be security certified and access controlled to ensure that if unauthorised access is gained to this area (e.g. via tailgating, forcing open shutters etc), further access to the upper floors of the building is prevented. The cycle parking area should also be enclosed and fitted with fob controlled doors/gates to prevent unauthorised access/theft. Where it is absolutely unachievable to provide a secure communal

enclosure, individual cycle lockers should be provided. More information relating to secure cycle storage can be found at: <http://designforsecurity.org/downloads>.

- It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed in this document are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal - making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety members and visitors.

11.0 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve secured by design accreditation

11.1 Doors & Access Controls

- All external doorsets and internal doorsets of the ground floor car park into the access course of the compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product.
- The main communal entrance to the building should be single leaf, self closing and secured with a multi-point electric lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The entrance should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with picture viable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that members can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access. The entrance doors off the basement ground floor car park or any providing accessible to the ground floor amenity space should also be self closing and operated by member key fob only.
- Postal delivery arrangements should ideally allow for external deposits and internal withdrawal by members. If not, there should be a secure lobby arrangement, with a secondary communal door to this insecurity specification of the article, to allow for delivery without providing access to all floors of the building. The post box itself should be of robust construction, with letterbox apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to the members via the access control system.
- All individual room entrances door sets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- Internal doors/frames to the refuse cycle stores should be solid core (Min 44 mm thick), with three hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by member/staff key fob. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development

11.2 Windows

- All ground floor/easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- All ground floor/easily accessible opening light (Escape requirements permitting) must be key lockable, and have a fixed/Lockable opening restrictors (Not releasable from the outside) Limited to 100 mm.

11.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- All glazing at ground floor level must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.
- Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key- lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 0.8mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.8mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

11.4 Alarms

- Each floor should have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover all accessible rooms with windows.

11.5 Car Park

- The vehicular entrance to the car park should be fitted with a high speed shutter operated by member key fob/proximity reader, with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape. If there is to be an emergency override mechanism for the shutter, it should be alarmed and signed as such to deter casual use by criminals.
- The pedestrian entrance doors of the car park should be security certified and fob control on access and egress, preventing any visitors accessing the proposals parking area through the building and ensuring that if a criminal does gain access to the car park, further access is prevented into the building.
- Any cycle or refuse stores should be fitted with fob controlled doors/gates to prevent unauthorised access/theft.
- Lighting to the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%. Light -coloured walls and ceilings can help achieve this.
- Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion/ conflict and aid surveillance.

11.6 Boundaries

- The sides (including gables to the front building line) and rear of the proposal should be enclosed with 2100mm high railings and lockable gates. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath railing panels. Pedestrian gates should be self closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e an

automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.

- It is highly recommended that prevented planting (I.e. low level densely branched, thorny shrubs) is provided on the publicly accessible side of the boundaries to private space (accessible from the existing routes/open space surrounding site), in order to deter unauthorised access/damage. The location of boundaries should be amended to allow for this requirement.
- Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/ sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

11.7 Lighting

- Lighting to all roads/footpaths should be adoptable standards (To comply with BS 5489)
- External lighting must be provided to all external doors/shutters, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- Fittings should produce white light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a compatible output) should be used, as these offers superior colour rendition all alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids of the boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layout low planting should not exceed should be developed together to avoid this.

11.8 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, footpaths etc, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromise if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

11.9 Communal areas

- public open space or amenity areas should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

11.10 Other

- Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows/balconies.
- The secure cycle store should include stands that allow members to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable).
- A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- Ideally, meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of the proposal only and not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.
- Any communal bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

12.0 Construction

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'considerate constructors scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to. For further information regarding site security, please contact your local Crime Reduction Advisor, Judith Hackney, on 0161 856 9353.

13.0 Management & Maintenance

The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage etc.)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

14.0 Useful References

A-Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant:

Drawing no.	Drawing title	Date	Rev
RF 04	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	June 2020	
RF 05	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	June 2020	
RF 06	Proposed First Floor Plan	June 2020	
RF 07	Proposed Elevations	June 2020	
RF 08	Elevation Elevations	June 2020	
RF 09	Proposed Street Elevations	June 2020	

B - CIS Version History

Version	Status	Revisions Made
A	☐ ☐ ☒	

C - Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular Dorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for secured by design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and clarifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines)

CPTED

Crime prevention through environmental design

CRS

Crime reduction specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime prevention officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, Police, Designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security	Secured by design	DAC (Design Against Crime)
www.designforsecurity.org	www.securedbydesign.com	www.designagainstcrime.org
Secured by design	RIBA Product Selector	Building for life
www.securedbydesign.com	www.ribaproductselector.com	www.buildingforlife.org
Crime Reduction (Home Office)	LPCB - Red book live	CLG
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk	www.redbooklive.com	www.communities.gov.uk



WILLIAM MORRIS

Legal & Corporate Communications

William Morris
Sheaf Street • Suite 43 • Leeds
Phone 0113 245 9487