



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

CITY TOWER UNITS 39-41, PICCADILLY PLAZA, MANCHESTER
DEVELOPMENT OF 3 no. COMMERCIAL UNITS (TOTTALLING 456sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: City Tower Unit Trust

VERSION A: 07/07/20

REFERENCE: 2020/0378/CIS/01

City Tower Units 39-41, Piccadilly Plaza, Manchester

URN: 2020/0378/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes not required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

We are happy to support this development, subject to the appropriate security measures being incorporated into the proposed scope of works (see Section 3).

The overall security of the units will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the premises, rather than just the physical measures recommended in the report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is formed by Units 39-41 of Piccadilly Plaza, fronting onto Parker Street (Piccadilly bus terminus).



The units are currently vacant. Unit 39 was previously in use as a takeaway and Units 40-41 were previously an amusement arcade/casino.

The site is part of a long, partially covered parade of commercial units along Parker Street/the bus terminus, many of which have been recently refurbished. The unit to the immediate east is a 24 hour Spar and the unit to the west is a Ladbrokes betting shop. The wider parade is occupied by similar uses, as well as takeaways and food outlets.

The wide pavement along the parade is partially sheltered by the projecting upper floors of the building (which include the Mecure Hotel, City Tower offices and an NCP car park). Such sheltered spaces can often encourage loitering/gathering and can foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour – particularly late at night, when commercial units are shut and levels of footfall, activity and surveillance are lower. Such sheltered spaces can also provide comfort for rough sleepers.

The frontage of the existing former amusement arcade/casino includes some recessed alcoves – forming partially hidden, sheltered areas which can also often suffer from anti-social behaviour/mis-use within city centres (particularly late at night).

The units front towards a busy bus terminus, beyond which is Piccadilly Gardens Metrolink stop and Piccadilly Gardens itself. Piccadilly Gardens is a hotspot for violence, robbery and other types of anti-social behaviour – particularly late at night/at the weekend.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
53	262	361	2292	1355	544	71	303	48	196


- 2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is very high, particularly the levels of violence and theft, reflecting the site's location within the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of such crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area is concentrated around Canal Street, the Northern Quarter and Piccadilly Gardens and takes place largely in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises, often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts. Hot spots for theft are also located in the same areas, with offenders mostly using pick pocketing and distraction methods to steal personal belongings (mostly mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) or targeting personal items left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to proposed A1/A2/A3 commercial units, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late and night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.





2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

2.3 Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or off/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.1.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafés in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.1.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.
- 2.1.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester restaurants/cafés, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafés through external doors, which have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements
 - The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry
 - Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

2.2 Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.


2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest between Tuesday and Thursday and also on Sunday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

Office Burglary – Point of Entry




2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries against Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' or 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.


2.4 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.

Office Theft – Day Range



Office Theft – Time Range



2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday.

2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.5 General Risk Factors

2.5.1 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft off/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5.2 **Restaurants/Cafes:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5.3 **Offices:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft off/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Manchester retail/restaurant/office premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Retail:** A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 3.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- **Retail, Restaurants/Cafes & Offices:** Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 3.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by. Advice on glazed panels can be found below.

- **Retail, Restaurants/Cafes & Offices:** Windows have also been prised open and glazing within them (and doors) has been smashed by offenders

Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 3.2) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 3.2), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 3.2).

- **Retail & Restaurants/Cafes:** A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 3.3).

- **Retail:** Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

-
- **Restaurants/Cafes:** Theft of personal property, particularly from table tops, from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 4.2). The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

- **Offices:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to office buildings are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

3 Scheme Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to redevelop the existing vacant units to form 3 no. units at:
- 39 Piccadilly Plaza – 56sqm;
 - 40 Piccadilly Plaza – 300sqm; and
 - 41 Piccadilly Plaza – 105sqm.
- 3.1.2 The proposed planning application will be for a flexible change of use of these units to Use Class A1 (Shops); A2 (Financial and Professional Services) or A3 (Restaurants and Cafes), including internal subdivision and new shopfronts.

3.2 External Alterations

It is strongly recommended that any external alterations to be carried out as part of the proposed scope of works, or in the future, should incorporate the following physical security measures:

- ☐ New external doorsets (both single and double leaf) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ If the entrances to the units are to be formed by sliding doors, they should be tested and certified to BS EN 1627 (RC2+). They should also incorporate laminated glazing, have multi-point locking (preventing sliding and lifting) and ideally protected by an internal shutter (certified to LPS 1775 SR1/2) out-of-hours.
- ☐ New windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than just to perimeter columns.
- ☐ The inner pane within new double-glazed units must have no less than a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The outer pane should ideally be a minimum of 6mm toughened or have no less than a 0.8mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.8mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P2A under EN 356.
- ☐ Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), which should be installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Any external shutters should have shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building, where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage or being forced open.

3.3 Internal Security

- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas to any A1/A2/A3 units should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms or offices should be solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys. Key-code locks are not recommended as they can be easily observed/shared and are often rarely changed.
- ☐ Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings, a certified doorset to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

- ☐ It should not be possible for patrons of the units to gain unauthorised access to the communal BoH/servicing areas to the rear of the premises or through into other uses within the building or vice versa. Any doors between the units and such areas should be security-certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (with any escape ironmongery permitted under the security certification of the product, if they are required for means of escape purposes). They should also be alarmed and signed as such to deter casual use. Internal walls between adjacent units and BoH areas should also ideally be of either robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the walls of the units themselves are not vulnerable to attack/penetration.
- ☐ Any electric locking system to be used throughout the units should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

3.4 Alarms

- ☐ An alarm should be installed to cover each of the units, linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (e.g. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre or security control room, who will alert the key holder).
- ☐ It is also recommended that alarms systems incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in potentially vulnerable locations, such as behind bars or in cash offices (which should also contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal).

3.5 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors/shopfronts. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.

3.6 CCTV

3.6.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are [overview](#) and [recognition](#), which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.



The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the entrances to each unit, any bars/serveries and till positions, all customer circulation/seating areas and any cash offices.

4 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of the units should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

4.1 Retail

- 4.1.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.
- 4.1.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the unit.
- 4.1.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.
- 4.1.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 4.1.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 3.3) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

4.2 Restaurants/Cafes

- 4.2.1 Restaurants/cafe premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:
 - **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants/licensed premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
 - **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
 - **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants/licensed premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
 - **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
 - **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
 - **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 4.2.2 The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- 4.2.3 Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 4.2.4 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

- 4.2.5 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- 4.2.6 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 4.2.7 The area in front of counters should be clearly defined to provide an easy queuing system to help prevent against queue jumping, which can lead to conflict. Consideration should be given to Internal floor demarcations (such as different coloured floor tiles) to direct people and encourage efficient circulation within the premises (i.e. defining separate queuing/waiting and seating areas). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- 4.2.8 Any self-service fridges or counters should be in full view of the main counter and covered by CCTV cameras.
- 4.2.9 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 3.3) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 4.2.10 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 4.2.11 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of them. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises, including cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 5.1.2 The opening hours of the units should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses.
- 5.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the units, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only areas.
- 5.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11 th June 2020	CBRE	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
16 th June 2020	CBRE	Confirmation of instruction/fee
1 st to 2 nd July 2020	CBRE	Email correspondence re: timescales & payment
8 th July 2020	CBRE	Email sent re: report completion & payment
15 th July 2020	CBRE & MHBC Cumming	Email correspondence re: invoice/payment
17 th July 2020	CBRE & MHBC Cumming	Email correspondence re: invoice/payment
27 th to 28 th July 2020	CBRE & MHBC Cumming	Email correspondence re: invoice/payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
5298-ZR-00-100	Site Location Plan	16/03/20	-
5298-ZR-20-100	Existing Ground Floor Plan	16/03/20	-
5298-ZR-20-200	Proposed – Ground Floor GA Plan	16/03/20	-
5298-ZR-20-223	Existing and Proposed Elevations and Sections	16/03/20	-
-	Planning Document - Design and Access Statement	09/06/20	C

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24-1, 2016

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS 202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstdesign.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk