



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

54 Oldham Street

Offices (370sqm)

For: CM Properties (NW) Ltd

Version A: 22/09/20

Ref: 2020/0504/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

54 Oldham Street

2020/0504/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, which includes:

- Staff & back-of-house areas.
- Single main entrance.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a 'Secured by Design' planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



David Maher *Dip Arch*

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

Oldham Street is located in the Northern Quarter of Manchester City Centre. Oldham Street is a busy traffic route into Piccadilly Gardens from Great Ancoats St.






Stevenson Square is located to the south-east of the proposed development site. Stevenson Square forms part of the east to west route through the Northern Quarter and hosts a mixture of retail, café and bars and retail premises. Residential accommodation is a popular location in this area of the city centre. There is a particular concentration of licensed premises in the north-west of the Northern Quarter.

There is evidence of existing retrospective security products to adjacent business premises of the proposed development.

The surface car park located to the rear of the premises between Spear Street and Bradley Street is now under construction for redevelopment.

The proposed development is entered off Oldham Street. The rear of the proposal will include a small new extension.

This section of Oldham St has a number restaurant/bar, retail and commercial office uses; resulting in higher visitor numbers across the daytime and evenings.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
44	224	318	1807	1003	429	72	405	47	169

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high; however this is reflected in the area in which the proposed site is positioned. The site is located within the city centre which has a greater volume of retail, bar and restaurants which often leads to an increase in crime and disorder within the area. Violence, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences types recorded, which are common within town and city centres.
- 2.1.2 The majority of violence has occurred around the proposed site and to the south, where Piccadilly gardens is located and to the west where Shudehill is located. These areas have a high volume of bars, restaurants and retail premises which leads to a higher volume of foot fall. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded violent offences, with the risk increasing during the evening and early hours of the morning, over the weekend period. Offences often increase over this time as the city experiences a greater number of visitors of the weekend period, with alcohol being a contributing factor to the crime and disorder occurring.
- 2.1.3 Thefts have also taken place around the vicinity of the proposed site, as well as to the west, around Piccadilly Gardens and Market Street. Offenders have used pick pocketing and distraction methods in order to obtain personal belongings. Offenders have targeted victims in restaurants/ bars as well as those on public transport and shopping, removing insecure items, mostly mobile phones from tables and bags stored under tables and on the back of a chair.
- 2.1.4 Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime in the area, with offences taking place throughout. Offenders are targeting vehicles parked securely in car parks, as well as those using on street parking facilities. Offenders have smashed glazing in order to remove goods from within the vehicle as well as the removal of vehicle parts and vehicle registration plates.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Exploitation of insecure doors to gain entry to the premises.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.2 Smashing glass windows or panels in doors to gain entry to the premises.

Possible Solution - All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 5.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- 2.2.3 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff-only areas to steal property.

Possible Solution - There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

- 2.2.4 Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular community access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

- 2.2.5 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily pressure in order to access the doors and windows located beneath.

Possible Solution – It is highly recommended that any roller shutters are certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 2). It is recommended that perforated shutters are used to prevent opportunities for defacement.

- 2.2.6 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors (mostly to the side and rear of the property).

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.


2.3 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings / private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Offices: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night / into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries committed in Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors and windows behind them.

2.5 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours / staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday and Sunday during the morning and through into the evening, peaking over the afternoon period. Offences peak over the weekend period due to the increased number of visitors into the city. Vehicles are left unattended for long periods of time, creating low risk opportunities for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks to redevelop the ground floor retail unit by reconfiguring and simplifying the layout at the rear of the ground floor unit to form a new office arrangement.
- 3.1.2 The upper floors of the commercial office space will be rationalised and developed to provide high quality office and amenity spaces.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The large expanse of glazing allows office staff to monitor staff and public behaviour on Oldham Street providing good levels of natural surveillance towards the main entrance.
- 3.2.2 There are a number of retail & business premises on Oldham Street, which will face the proposed office entrance providing mutual overlooking.
- 3.2.3 The proposals will help to bring additional vitality to the street across the day and should attract more legitimate activity to this part of Oldham Street at times when it is currently quiet. Informal policing provided by members of the public and staff will help to marginalise criminal and antisocial activity.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Currently the main entrance is located on Lever St. It is essential to use only one entrance to a premises in order to ensure adequate control and monitoring to patrons entering the building.
- 3.3.2 The access-control strategy adopted for the development should be capable of confining movement into and through the building, thus allowing staff and visitors to only enter parts of the site to which they have legitimate reason to be present. Access permissions should be fully auditable and regularly reviewed.
- 3.3.3 Access controls and flexibility of use within the building. When accommodating customer requirements for increased flexibility of space within the building, the security of these areas must not be compromised nor impact on other parts of the building. Space shared by a variety of users at varying times means that an intruder is less likely to be identified – it is therefore essential that accommodation is provided for the secure storage of personal items, for instance while staff are away from their work space.
- 3.3.4 The refuse store arrangement should allow bins to be collected without the need to leave bins out on the street for long periods of time; and operated so that the building can be secured while collections are taking place.
- 3.3.5 External PIR lighting should be provided for the cycle entrance/exit location (section 4.8).
- 3.3.6 The application does not involve fundamental physical changes to the building. As such the success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately (see section 5).
- 3.3.7 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The doors into the emergency escape cores at each level should be fitted with electromagnetic locks, connected to the fire alarm, so that people at one level cannot access other levels. Once an emergency escape core is accessed, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.

4.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Security ratings higher than those listed above may be required dependant on:
 - type of risk,
 - level of crime risk,
 - location of building *or*
 - security level of the door or window to be protected.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. It is recommended that glazing to elevations adjoining public areas or evacuation routes should also be laminated.

4.5 Wall Construction

Glazed curtain walling and window walls

- ☐ Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:
 - Large glazed units connected by 'spider clamp' system.
 - Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
 - Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.
 - Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.
- ☐ Glazed curtain walling must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:
 - Security glazing tape

- Dedicated security sealant or gasket
- A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)

☐ Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:

- BS PAS 24:2016
- STS 204 Issue 3: 2012
- LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1
- LPS 2081 Issue 1:2014 Security Rating A

4.6 Alarms

☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.7 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Main Entrance Doors
- Doors to each individual level / suite
- Refuse / service areas
- Doors into cycle store

☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated / disabled to ensure that misuse is prevented.

4.8 Lighting

External lighting

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

Internal Lighting

☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

4.9 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

-
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
 - ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
 - ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
 - ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
 - ☐ Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
 - ☐ Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
 - ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

4.10 Fit out

- ☐ Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:
 - Internal access control
 - Internal doors in to premises
 - Alarm systems
- ☐ These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

4.11 Other

- ☐ Reception desk and staff. Reception staff should have a clear view of the approaches to all entrances. Reception desks require restricted access from the public side the desk should be deep enough to afford protection for the receptionist. Access beyond a public reception area should be controlled by the receptionist or fob.
- ☐ Effective signage is important to help customers / visitors navigate around the area, so they can easily find the various facilities and locate exit points.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.

-
- Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
- 5.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.3 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.
- All communal or amenity areas not under the ownership of individual tenants should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space is not detrimental to its surroundings
- 5.1.4 In order to minimise these and other security issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:
- Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff.
 - All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
 - Large amounts of cash should not be stored in the premises overnight and signage should be installed to indicate this. Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
 - There should be no places for concealment in public areas to allow staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation. Installation of mirrors in strategic locations can assist staff in monitoring areas outside their direct line of sight.
- 5.1.5 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. A maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras, lighting, doors and locks etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti;
 - Opening and closing of premises including staff arrival and departure, with particular attention to lone members of staff.
- 5.1.6 Toilets should be clearly signed so that there is no excuse for customers finding their way to the back of house.
- 5.1.7 A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development, and should not require bins to be left on the street for extended periods. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- 5.1.8 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers, music equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors

Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
07/08/2020	Create It Studio Arch	CIS instruction received
11/08/2020	Create It Studio Arch	CIS instruction confirmed
10/08/2020	DfS	Site visit
21/08/2020	DfS	Invoice issued
23/09/2020	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A1255(01)AP001	Existing Site and Location Plan	12/02/20	
A1255(01)AP002	Existing Basement and Ground Floor Plans	12/02/20	
A1255(01)AP003	Existing First and Second Floor Plans	12/02/20	
A1255(01)AP004	Existing West and North Elevations	12/02/20	
A1255(01)AP005	Existing East and South Elevations	12/02/20	
A1255(01)AP006	Existing Street Elevation	12/02/20	
A1255(02)AP001	Proposed Site Plan	24/03/20	C
A1255(02)AP002	Proposed Basement and Ground Floor Plans	20/05/20	D
A1255(02)AP003	Proposed First and Second Floor Plans	24/03/20	C
A1255(02)AP004	Proposed West and North Elevations	24/03/20	C
A1255(02)AP005	Proposed East and South Elevations	24/03/20	C
A1255(02)AP006	Proposed Street Elevation	24/03/20	C

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk