



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

PARK GROVE, LEVENSHULME, MANCHESTER
RELIGIOUS CENTRE

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR AL-RAZA FOUNDATION
VERSION C: 29TH SEPTEMBER 2020
REFERENCE: 2015/0416/CIS/01

PARK GROVE, LEVENSHULME, MANCHESTER

2015/0416/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, we would recommend that the issues raised within section 3.3 are addressed, including but not limited to:

- Bicycle parking

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented we would be supportive of the planning application.



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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The development site is located on Park Grove, off Stockport Road, in the area of Longsight, Manchester.

The site is currently occupied by the existing centre; however, this will be demolished so that a new centre can be erected.

The existing building has retrospectively installed security features including box shutters and razor wire has been installed to the top of boundary treatments.

Boundary treatments to the sites perimeter include chain link fencing, concrete panel fencing and wooden panels.

A public footway runs to the rear of the development, from Park Grove.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The following information has been produced to give an insight into the types and volume of, crime experienced across Greater Manchester. Particular attention is paid to the area surrounding Park Grove and to crimes which research shows can be affected by the built environment. All data is based on crimes recorded between 2018 and 2019.

2.1 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.1.1 Doors (all kinds) were forced open with bodily pressure, or targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 security standard. PAS 24-rated doors are very difficult to force open. All ground floor or otherwise accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- 2.1.2 Glazing in windows was smashed using tools, and grilles removed.

Possible Solution - An appropriate glazing specification should be used to adequately secure the building. All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection. However, the layout of the building and position of windows should be designed to avoid vulnerabilities as much as possible. Any damage arising from vandalism should be repaired quickly in order to maintain a culture of care and respect, as a lack of maintenance can often attract further abuse.

- 2.1.3 Posing as a legitimate service user and exploiting insecure doors to gain access to restricted areas.




Possible Solution - Front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

- 2.1.4 Offenders gaining access to areas restricted to officials / staff to steal property

Possible Solution – Areas restricted to staff and officials should operate on an access control system to restrict entry. Codes / fobs should be regularly updated so that only those currently with legitimate purpose should be able to gain entry to these areas. Legitimate users should be encouraged not to allow strangers to tailgate them into restricted areas of the building. Facilities should be provided for staff and officials to store their belongings securely whilst at the premises.

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Places of Worship): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to burglary other offences within / against places of worship, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at places of worship across Greater Manchester peaks on a Tuesday, Friday and Saturday. Offenders may target places of worship at the beginning of the week and over the weekend as they perceive them to be a cash-rich target after hosting events over the weekend.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary spikes throughout the day, peaking in the late afternoon and into the evening (3pm – 8:30pm.). As well as the early hours of the morning (12am – 4am).
- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- Forcing open secure doors and windows (mostly located to the side and rear of the property) using bodily pressure and tools in order to gain entry to the building.
 - Exploitation of insecure windows and doors (mostly located to the side of the property).
 - Posing as a legitimate service user and exploiting insecure doors to gain access to restricted areas.
 - Breaking glazing in windows and doors.

2.3 Theft (Places of Worship): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within / against places of worship, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** Levels of theft peak on a Friday and Sunday when places of worship are often at their busiest, therefore opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency.

Time Range: The risk of theft peaks in the middle of the day (12pm – 2pm). During the day, when the majority of places of worship are open to the public, there are more opportunities for offenders to access buildings and private areas / rooms anonymously, before targeting both personal property and property belong to the place of worship.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is to demolish the existing building on site and erection of a new building for the use of the Al Raza Foundation.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The current building appeared to be vacant on the day of visiting the site. Unused buildings often attract antisocial and criminal behaviour. The redevelopment of the site will bring back activity and vitality to the local area.
- 3.2.2 A car parking area will be available to staff and visitors reducing reliance on street parking.
- 3.2.3 The existing building is fitted with retrospective security measures (i.e. external box shutters). When the centre is rebuilt there is an opportunity to install security features that are integral to the fabric of the building and do not create unsightly facades.

3.3 Changes and Amendments Needed

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Access to the rear of the development should be restricted to staff with a secure boundary treatment to a minimum height of 2400mm to prevent criminal and antisocial behaviour.
- 3.3.2 Any blank elevations should be treated with an anti-graffiti coating so that any graffiti can easily be removed.
- 3.3.3 The proposed bicycle stands are positioned towards the rear of the development where they cannot be easily seen once inside the building. It is recommended that the bicycle parking area is positioned within the car park where they can be viewed from inside the building.

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- 3.3.4 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobbies.
 - 3.3.5 Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
 - 3.3.6 The proposed development should be covered by a monitored alarm, with response.
 - 3.3.7 The development should be built in accordance with the principles of Secured by Design, to reduce the potential for criminal and anti-social behaviour affecting the development. The physical security of the building should be in accordance with the criteria set out in sections 4 and 5 of this report.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve the Secured by Design award.

4.1 Doors

- q External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- q Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- q External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- q Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- q Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- q Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- q Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- q Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- q There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- q Single storey roofs should be certificated to LPS 1175 SR1 or, alternatively, expanded metal or welded mesh could be incorporated between the skins of any new double-skinned roof coverings or within the roof space.

4.4 Alarms

- q A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Access Control

- q Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or proximity reader/fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
- Main entrance
 - Areas restricted to staff

4.6 Boundaries

- q Secure boundary treatments should generally be 2000mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used.
- q There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to any fence lines or pedestrian/vehicular gates (which would aid climbing) and they should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- q The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.

4.7 Lighting

- q External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes and parking areas in accordance with BS 5489.
- q Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- q Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- q Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Car Parks

- q Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- q Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- q Access in to the car parking area should be restricted when the building is closed to reduce the potential for anti-social behaviour.

4.9 CCTV

- q Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

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- q CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- q Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- q With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- q Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- q **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- q **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- q The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.

4.10 Other

- q Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11/01/2016	Najib Gedal	CIS application received
29/09/2020	Muneeb Lokasher	Revised drawings

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
01	Location Plan	-	-
RF 04	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	Dec 14	-
1144	Planning Issue 2		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status	Revisions Made
A		
B		General revisions
C		Slight layout change/updated crime statistics

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk

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