



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Manchester Cathedral / Victoria Street

Public Realm

for: Galliford Try

version B: 10th September 2020

URN: 2013/0127/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Land adjacent to Manchester Cathedral / Victoria Street, M3 1SX

2013/0127/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major Design Changes Not Required

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. In general the proposed scheme has been found acceptable, but the developer must take into account the recommendations contained within sections 3 & 4 of this report when finalising the detailed design.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification and management practises described within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



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
1 Visual Audit

The site, shown within the red line on the plan, is located in the Cathedral Conservation Area of central Manchester. Major features of the area include Chetham's School of Music, Manchester Cathedral, Victoria Railway Station and Manchester Arena which generates heavy pedestrian and vehicular flows at peak / event times.

The site is also close to other leisure and retail centres, including the Printworks, Arndale Centre and football museum.

The site includes the pedestrianised sections of Victoria Street and Fennel Street. The western side of the site adjoins the River Irwell, although the deep culvert means it is not readily apparent. The site adjoins the historic Chetham's school and cathedral buildings.


Disorder issues affecting the neighbourhood include large antisocial gatherings, abuse of street furniture by skateboarders, rough sleeping and vagrancy / begging. Some of the public realm lacks much in the way of natural surveillance provided by overlooking premises, and there are a number of sheltered / concealed spaces nearby that provide cover for unlawful activity, such as railway arches and recessed doorways. Licensed premises in the vicinity can generate alcohol-related disorder incidents.




Junction of Victoria Bridge and Deansgate



Site of former Palatine House, now demolished




Area to west of Cathedral



Riverside wall and balustrade viewed from Chapel Street



Historic retaining wall bounding Chetham's School



Looking west from Cathedral Yard



Existing balustrade along riverside

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2017 to 30th June 2018

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
18	154	212	1353	460	182	20	227	26	121

- 2.1.1 The level of crime recorded in the local area over the last 12 months has been extremely high; however this is to be expected for a site in the city centre. There is a concentration of offences in the Deansgate area where there are a large number of licenced premises and a high footfall. There are issues with vagrancy & rough sleeping in the area, with recessed doorways and other concealed & sheltered spaces being subject to abuse / criminal damage.



2.2 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Personal robbery
- Theft of personal belongings
- Criminal damage to property
- Arson
- Violence towards the public and staff at commercial/retail premises
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private spaces
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Antisocial behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Alcohol and drug misuse
- Alcohol related disorder

2.3 Violence against the person: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to violent crimes committed within 500m of the proposed site.



- 2.3.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of violence against the person is highest in the early hours of Saturday and Sunday, most likely linked to the night time economy. The risk is also high throughout the week and on Saturdays during the afternoon.
- 2.3.2 The majority of violence against the person is public fear, alarm or distress or assault without injury, which make up 35% and 32% of violence against the person offenses respectively. Of these the majority of incidents are either verbal abuse or threats causing public fear, alarm or distress or physical assaults without using weapons such as pushing or grabbing. Assault with injury is the next most common offence, and is largely more serious physical assaults without using weapons such as punching or kicking causing injury. These offences are generally concentrated where there are large numbers of licenced premises.

2.4 Personal Robbery: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to personal robberies committed within 500m of the proposed site.



- 2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of personal robbery is highest in the afternoons and evenings and the early hours of Saturday morning. It is likely that the high rate of personal robberies in the early hours of Saturdays are linked to the night time economy, and that the risk is higher in the evenings as the area is busier and it is dark, increasing the opportunity for offenders to commit robbery while causing offenders to perceive it to be less likely that they will be caught.
- 2.4.2 There is a particular concentration of personal robberies close to the site on Withy Grove, with 10% of personal robberies taking place on this street despite it being a relatively small street. It is likely that victims in this area are being targeted moving between licenced premises and transport links, with this road being the most direct link between areas such as Printworks or the Corn Exchange and Shudehill bus station.

2.5 Criminal Damage: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to criminal damage committed within 500m of the proposed site.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of criminal damage is generally higher in the early hours of the morning in particular on Saturdays and Sundays, and during the afternoon throughout the week.
- 2.5.2 The most common form of criminal damage is criminal damage to a vehicle, which makes up 48% of criminal damage offences. The majority of vehicles targeted are parked on the street, despite the area having few places in which vehicles can park on the street. Offenders are most often smashing vehicle windows to search inside, most likely in an attempt to commit theft from motor vehicle but not finding valuable items within the vehicle.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development will upgrade the existing public realm around Manchester Cathedral and the surrounding pedestrian areas, with new paving, street furniture, tree planting and lighting. The site of Palatine House, formerly part of Chetham's School and now demolished, will also be landscaped and included in the area of public realm.
- 3.1.2 A permanent memorial garden is included in the proposal, commemorating the atrocity at Manchester Arena in May 2017.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The layout appears generally free of obstacles to vision allowing people to see and be seen within the area and maintains sight lines across the site. Planting and street furniture has been designed to avoid creating potential hiding places and avoids blocking sight lines. The choice of trees and other plant species should allow some visible permeability through the canopies and foliage so that people cannot be concealed within the public spaces.
- 3.2.2 The proposed layout will include a high-quality landscape treatment which is designed to create an attractive space that would draw in more legitimate activity. This would increase the pedestrian flow as well as increasing the natural surveillance and should assist with informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.3 Some of the existing vegetation will be thinned out or removed. The choice of new trees and other plant species should allow some visible permeability through the canopies and foliage.
- 3.2.4 Area on site of former Palatine House includes features to discourage loitering in close proximity to the school boundary. Sections of new and historic red sandstone walls will be protected using planting along the base and should help to discourage criminal damage.
- 3.2.5 Vehicular access to the space. Street furniture is located within the layout to remove opportunities for vehicles to gain access to the pedestrian areas. Any street furniture specifically intended for this purpose should be certified to BS PAS 68. Arrangements for service vehicles and for VIP / disabled access to the cathedral, will should limit access to these areas only, and prevent further entry to the pedestrian areas.
- 3.2.6 Arena memorial. The proposed location is relatively well-overlooked from passing pedestrians, particularly at peak times. The design is carefully considered to provide a fitting memorial and avoids inclusion of features that would be vulnerable to criminal damage or theft. The memorial should be specifically covered by monitored CCTV, with lighting to support this. Due to the sensitive nature of the proposals, it is strongly recommended that a security presence and / or regular security patrols are implemented to monitor the site.

3.3 Recommendations / Changes Advised

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Seating next to school gates. The single bench shown in the recessed section of wall beside the school on Fennell Street is not easily overlooked and is likely to generate antisocial / criminal activity in close proximity to the school and memorial garden. It is recommended that this feature be removed and replaced with low planting.
- 3.3.2 Planting. Dense planting should not exceed 1m in height, in order to avoid obscuring sight lines or hindering the coverage of lighting and CCTV. Choice of plant species should be made with regard to the likely level of maintenance the planting will receive.
- 3.3.3 Street furniture should be designed to withstand casual acts of vandalism. When selecting or designing street furniture, consider how easily and quickly items can be repaired or replaced following damage. When commissioning bespoke street furniture and public artworks, it is also important to be mindful of

the potential for attack and ease of repair. These features are best positioned where there is plenty of formal and informal surveillance, so any criminal acts are more likely to be witnessed.

- 3.3.4 The design of benches and other landscape features should not include voids / spaces where illicit substances can be stashed.
- 3.3.5 Review of CCTV coverage. Any existing city-council CCTV systems should be reviewed and adapted as necessary to reflect the changes to the layout, and to ensure that all accessible areas remain within its coverage, with sufficient lighting to support reliable images. Any areas not already covered should be included into the monitored system (see section 4.4).
- 3.3.6 The position of temporary structures, portable buildings, outdoor seating, parasols, and other ancillary equipment within the open areas can create blind spots and hiding places that may be difficult to survey. They also have potential to obscure sight lines and interrupt the coverage of lighting and cameras. Consideration should be given to provision of subtle markings within the surfacing materials, to designate where the location of such features is and is not permitted.
- 3.3.7 All cycle parking should be located where it does not obstruct circulation yet is well overlooked from surrounding buildings and by passing pedestrians, and covered by any CCTV system.

4 Physical Security


All new-build elements of the proposed development should be constructed in accordance with the following standards to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

4.1 Boundaries

- q Fencing / boundary treatments separating the public realm from private space should not include any potential climbing aids. Avoid locating items of street furniture close by that could provide footholds.

4.2 Landscaping

- q In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- q Skateboarding. The design of street furniture, steps and walls should take account of possible damage from skateboarders, and it should be planned to withstand or discourage this potential mistreatment. The shape and position of the furnishings relative to other features can reduce its attractiveness in this respect. In the detailed design, deterrent features to interrupt runs of ramps or grinding surfaces should be included at the outset in order to avoid the need to retrofit with unsightly additions (see example below).



- q Tree Establishment. Avoid the use of tree stakes by using an underground guying system. Irrigation systems / pipes should include tamper-proof coverings to avoid potential criminal damage / blockage.

-
- q Use of loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
 - q Surfaces that could be vulnerable to graffiti should be formed of a resistant material or have a resistant coating applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal, e.g. 'easy-on' (see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).
 - q Cycle stands intended for short-stay use should enable cyclists to secure both wheels and the frame and obtained from an SBD-approved supplier.
 - q Security Bollards
 - Fixed and raising bollards should be successfully tested to PAS 68-1:2013
 - Bollards providing passive protection should be successfully tested to BS 170-1
 - q Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential unauthorised access to cabling.

4.3 Lighting

- q External lighting should be provided in accordance with BS 5489. The spread of lighting should be evenly distributed with no areas of shadowing or pooling. Levels should be sufficient to support the CCTV systems in operation in the area.
- q Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- q Bollard or other low-level lighting should not create glare which could dazzle pedestrians or shine directly into CCTV cameras. Light fittings should be sufficiently-robust to withstand casual acts of vandalism.

4.4 CCTV

- q Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- q CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- q Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- q With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- q Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- q **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- q **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The

remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- q The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main circulation routes / elevations and entrances to buildings / sheltered areas between buildings / main gathering spaces / cycle parking stands / historic features / site boundaries / Arena memorial.](#)

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety. Aspects of a development which are left to deteriorate have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, CCTV, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
- 5.1.2 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as regular security patrols. Patrols implemented to monitor behaviours in and around the site should be reviewed on a regular basis to establish the appropriate frequency of visits, in response to any incidents occurring.
- 5.1.3 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
18/07/2018	Galliford Try	CIS instruction received
20/07/2018	Galliford Try	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
26/07/2018	N/A	Site visit
06/08/2018	Galliford Try	Fee payment confirmed
28/08/2018	Galliford Try	Progress Enquiry
30/08/2018	Galliford Try	CIS version A issued
21/05/2020	Planit	Additional Information issued
05/06/2020	MCC / Planit	Meeting with design team
03/09/2020	Planit	Revised layout issued
10/09/2020	Planit	CIS version B issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
ID-006-00	Landscape Proposals for ALO review	10/07/2018	
MMQ-PLA-XX-XX-DR-L-0001	Landscape General Arrangement	17/07/2020	P06

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Amendments following revisions to proposals – sections 3, 4.5 & 5	10/09/2020

Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk