



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Renovation of grade II listed building and change of use to offices, and
erection of nine storey, residential building containing 89 apartments

Laystall Street, Manchester

FOR: McCaul Group Ltd

VERSION A: 26.08.20

2020/0477/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

The proposals are consistent with guidance set out in the HS2 Manchester Piccadilly Strategic Regeneration Framework, and will help to continue the transformation of this part of the city centre into a vibrant, mixed-use neighbourhood, which, ultimately, will feel safer for residents and others those passing through. The scheme has been well designed from a crime prevention perspective and we are happy to support it.

Positive aspects of the scheme include:

- refurbishment and re-use of an important building;
- the mix of uses within the development - promoting street activity and informal surveillance;
- slight elevation of the residential entrance emphasises the distinction between public and private space
- provision of secure entrances to the office and residential buildings in very public locations;
- controlled access into the two courtyards;
- a management presence in the residential building;
- a generous lobby space with lounge seating;
- mail boxes and parcel store located in a secure area of the apartment building; and,
- Inclusion of secure cycle parking;

To improve the scheme from a crime prevention perspective:

- ground floor windows on the Brock Street elevation must include additional, well-designed security measures;
- to deter intruders, the gates allowing access to and from the courtyards must sufficiently tall and secure;
- street level balconies must be secure;
- develop a comprehensive, access control strategy, restricting access to the buildings' cores, cycle store and courtyard spaces to office staff and residents;
- External access to the basement should be secured with a security rated door; and,
- the development should be built to Secured by Design standards.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application and seek inclusion of a condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.



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1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site, edged red on the plan, is located east of Piccadilly Station on the edge of Manchester city centre, in a mixed use area with a range of industrial, commercial, residential uses as well as surface and multi-storey car parks. Laystall Street, a one-way street with traffic flowing from west to east, defines the northern side of the site; to the east there is a serviced apartment building, to the west is a car park for use by tenants of Ducie House, whilst the yard and rear elevation of the Urban Exchange shopping and leisure development lies to the north. Brock Street, a very narrow street with pavement on the east side of the street only, adjoins the site's eastern boundary; the side elevation the serviced apartments faces the site across this narrow street. A vacant commercial unit, the entrance to the apartments' car park and a plant room occupy the ground floor on this elevation; apartment windows and balconies overlook the street from first floor upwards. The western edge of a pay and display car park adjoins the south-eastern corner of the site, south of Brock Street and Lomax Street. This car park benefits from an extant planning consent to erect a 7-8 storey residential building of 41 apartments. To the south of the site there is a whitewashed, two-storey, office premises, assumed to be B1 use, and a small plot used as a pay and display car park. Pigeon Street defines the western edge of the site. A public house occupies a small plot at the junction of Pigeon Street and Ducie Street to the south-west of the site, whilst a three-storey, auto-repair workshop is situated at the junction of Pigeon Street and Whittles Croft opposite the site. Overall, the quality of the environment around the site is poor, with little active street frontage or uses that generate visual interest or street activity. However, the site falls within the 'East Village' area of the HS2 Manchester Piccadilly Strategic Regeneration Framework. Produced by the City Council, the Framework seeks to guide future development, encouraging mixed-use developments with a residential focus.




Looking east along Laystall Street approaching the site



A westerly view along Laystall Street towards 32-34 Laystall Street, a grade II listed building, at the northern end of the site



The western flank of the site from Pigeon Street



Brock Street – a serviced apartments building on the left & the industrial buildings of the site on the right



Looking towards the buildings at the south-eastern corner of the site at the junction of Brock Street & Lomax Street



51-53 Ducie Street, a two-storey, multi-tenanted, office building & associated car park is situated to the south

On the site itself, there is a cluster of buildings, which occupy much of the eastern half of the site, and a pay and display car park, which is accessed from Pigeon Street. Number 32-34 Laystall Street, located at the northern end of the site, is the most prominent of this group of buildings. It is a grade II listed, rectangular building with a highly decorative façade. Built in 1838 and formerly used as a garment warehouse this property stands vacant; its principal entrance door is protected with roller shutter, whilst the secondary entrance doors and windows are secured with metal grilles and or metal sheet. The remaining buildings on the site are of little architectural and date from the 1800 and 1900's; they were last used for industrial or storage purposes. A pay and display car park occupies the western half of the site and it is accessed from Pigeon Street.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2018 and 30th July 2019.

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood



Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
33	100	135	479	307	112	26	333	49	55

- 2.1.1 There have been 1848 crimes committed in the neighbourhood around the site in the past 12 months. This is a very high number of crimes but is typical of neighbourhoods on the fringes of the city centre. The area analysed includes crime attractors and generators such as licensed premises, retail outlets, large car parks, transport nodes and secluded business premises. The area to the south of the site is also a focus for prostitution; such areas tend to attract criminality with drug dealing and assaults not uncommon, with many incidents likely to go unreported.
- 2.1.2 The 'stand-out' crimes in this neighbourhood are burglary of residential and business property, vehicle related crimes - particularly theft from a vehicle, theft, and robbery - from a person rather than a business.
- 2.1.3 Crimes against residential property, i.e., burglary, theft from gardens and criminal damage to dwellings accounts for around 7% of the total crimes recorded. The focus for residential crime is: Piccadilly Village; on Hilton, Newton and Dale Street in the Northern Quarter; and, in the apartment buildings on Pollard Street. The rate of burglary is, however, much lower than the Manchester rate and lower than the Greater Manchester and national rates.
- 2.1.4 Burglary of business premises is most common on Hilton Street, Lever and Little Lever Street and Great Ancoats Street; offices are most commonly targeted.
- 2.1.5 Vehicle crime is a particular issue in this neighbourhood amounting to just over half of the total crime recorded. It is most common in the public car parks, particularly the very large, long-stay car park at Sheffield Street at the rear of Piccadilly station but also in smaller car parks around the periphery of the development site.
- 2.1.6 Whilst the number of robberies is not great when compared to other crimes, robbery is relatively uncommon, so 112 such crimes in a neighbourhood is a concern. Piccadilly, Hilton, Newton and Dale Street in the Northern Quarter, Chapeltown Street and Great Ancoats Street are focal points for robbery.
- 2.1.7 Crimes involving the use of, or threat, of violence (35% of the total crime recorded) have been recorded throughout the neighbourhood but with particular hotspots at Piccadilly, Great Ancoats Street (including Urban Exchange), and the Northern Quarter. These offences have mostly taken place in the late evening and early hours of the morning, many linked to licensed premises. Such crimes are typically the most common in any neighbourhood across the conurbation.
- 2.1.8 Theft is most common at Piccadilly station and in premises, particularly licensed premises and hotels/hostels, on Piccadilly, Lever Street, Dale Street, Newton Street Great Ancoats Street (including Urban Exchange), and at Stephenson Square. Pick-pocketing and distraction methods have been used by offenders, in targeting mobile phones and bags stored under tables and on the back of chairs. Theft of bicycles from the communal cycle stores of apartment buildings is also an issue in this neighbourhood.



2.2 Crime rate comparison

Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and across England & Wales

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2019.





- 2.2.1 The rate of burglary per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **56% lower** than the Manchester rate, **24% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **3% lower** than rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding crimes per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **141% higher** than the Manchester rate, **278% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **336% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.



- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **29% higher** than the Manchester rate, **87% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **173% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **317% higher** than the Manchester rate, **333% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **1098% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.3 Residential burglary: risk analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site



- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** Although the risk is low, it is greatest on a Tuesday and Saturday, and fluctuates throughout the day

Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry




- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** The most frequently targeted points of entry during burglaries were doors, with offenders entering through unsecured doors or applying force to gain entry. As is often the case in neighbourhoods dominated by apartments, the front door (often the only external door) was the most commonly forced during a burglary; windows rarely targeted.


2.4 Burglary at office premises: risk analysis

The data below relates to burglaries at offices in Manchester.

Burglary – Day Range




Burglary – Time Range



- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday and Sunday but remains high throughout the week. The risk rises sharply in the early evening, often as staff, including front of house staff, are leaving, or have left, at the end of the working day.



Burglary – Point of Entry



- 2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the greatest number of burglaries, entry was gained by forcing entrance or fire doors. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A number of burglaries occurred during the day when offices were open. In these cases, offenders have posed as staff or visitors before stealing property, or involved employees stealing from colleagues.

2.5 Theft at office premises: risk analysis



The data below relates to theft occurring at offices within Manchester.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft is greatest during the working week and falls sharply over the weekend when many premises are closed. Risk is concentrated during standard working hours, peaking around midday. During this time staff tend to take a break and move away from their desk, leaving property unattended.

2.6 Vehicle crime: risk analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk is high throughout the week, and rises towards and over the weekend. Cars are most at risk during the late afternoon and into the evening.

2.7 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft in this area & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

- 2.7.1 **Communal entrance doors and apartment entrance doors were targeted when left insecure by residents.**

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors or entering apartments through insecure doors:

- communal entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure;
- install a secondary set of secure doors (air-lock/secure lobby), also self-closing and self-locking;
- install lifts that are operated by a fob or card access control system;
- install CCTV cameras in the entrance lobby;
- apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb-turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations, with clear, yet discreet, permanent instructions on the door to inform the resident that the door is not secure until the lock is turned; and,
- employ a concierge.

- 2.7.2 **Doors have been forced open**

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors and apartment entry doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - such doors are very difficult to force open;

- entrance doors should be prominent and easily visible on the street rather than within deep recesses - offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- CCTV should be considered, to record activity within and around exterior of the building; and,
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests a property may be occupied and may deter offenders from targeting a property. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed.

2.7.3 Ground floor windows were prised open or the glazing smashed to gain access

To minimise the risk of offenders prising open windows or breaking glass to gain entry:

- avoid installing opening windows at street level;
- install window locks and opening restrictors to any windows that are accessible from street level; and,
- use laminate glass in street level windows and doors.

2.7.4 Offenders have entered cycle stores and stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders entering the cycle store:

- cycle stores should be hidden from public view, ideally within a secure part of the proposed building rather than in the grounds;
- security-rated entry gates/doors should be installed and with fob-activated locks
- stores should be accessible to residents and tenants who cycle only;
- robust, ground anchored, cycle stands (Sheffield style stands) should be installed; and,
- CCTV and lighting should be installed.

2.7.5 Shutters and grilles on commercial properties have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters and grilles:

- only install LPS 1175 security rated shutters, grilles or doors on commercial units; and,
- avoid windows or doors in secluded, vulnerable, locations.

2.7.6 Offenders posing as legitimate visitors/customers, gaining access to staff only areas of commercial premises

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining access to staff only areas:

- an access control system should be considered in order to limit access into and through the building;
- staff should be required to wear an appropriate form of clearly visible ID;
- all doors separating public areas, from staff only areas should be monitored by CCTV; and
- lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal belongings.

2.8 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.8.1 Features of the physical environment can influence criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?

- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.8.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder on and around the site are as follows:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood where significant developments are planned or under construction, the result of which will be greater levels of activity and footfall on the streets around the site with an increase in passive surveillance from residents and staff of the planned developments. The public realm will improve and street lighting, and light spilling from buildings that are likely to be occupied well into the night area, will make the neighbourhood feel safer for pedestrians.

2.8.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located within an area where there is a high volume of recorded crime. Criminals are already attracted to this area and may exploit other criminal opportunities;
- the absence of regular street activity or passive surveillance for much of the day and night leaves the buildings and vehicles parked on the site, and pedestrians passing through the area, vulnerable to criminal and anti-social activity.
- with the exception of the listed building, the buildings that currently occupy the site and several in the vicinity are of poor quality. All of the buildings on the site have also been secured with unsightly security features, such as steel plate, window grilles and roller shutters; graffiti has also been daubed on several walls. Poor quality and insensitively fortified buildings can have a negative effect on a locality, making passers-by fearful or uncomfortable. Poor environments can also embolden offenders who may sense that a lack of care of the environment means that their actions are less likely to be challenged. Environmental decay can also deter investment in a neighbourhood;
- the site lacks defensible, leaving walls exposed to the passing public. This is likely to have contributed to the range of security measures installed and the presence of graffiti on exposed walls.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

3.1.1 McCaul Ltd propose a development comprising:

- the clearance of all non-listed buildings and other structures on the site
- retention and refurbishment of 32-34 Laystall Street - the listed building, and its conversion to office space
- construction of a 9-storey, residential building, containing 89 apartments, with cycle parking and amenity space.

The listed building

3.1.2 Number 32-34 Laystall Street will be refurbished, which will include reinstating doors, on the Laystall Street elevation, and windows, on the Brock Street elevation. The ground and upper floors will be arranged into four office suites and the basement used for storage.

3.1.3 Two of the office suites will be located on the ground floor. The entrance into these offices will be via existing, external openings, currently secured with metal sheet, on the Laystall Street elevation, one on either side of the principal entrance.

3.1.4 The main entrance to the building sits centrally on the Laystall Street elevation and is currently secured with a roller shutter. This entrance will provide access into the lobby and further two office suites that will be located on the first and second floors. The roller shutter will be removed and replaced with a pair of entrance gates, which will secure the entire opening, behind which will be a pair of doors. The doors will control access into the lobby and core of the building. Ground floor offices will have a secondary door connecting the respective office to the lobby, where toilets for use of tenants of all floors are located. The core includes stair access only to all floors; a means of escape door will connect the core to a

courtyard at the rear of the building. The courtyard will be secured with fencing and gates allowing access to Brock Street to the east and Pigeon Street to the west. Office tenants refuse bins will be stored in the courtyard.

The apartment building

- 3.1.5 The apartment building will be erected to the rear (south) of the office building. It will have nine storeys and, such is the topography of the site, a partial basement beneath the central and southern parts of the building.
- 3.1.6 The cycle store, refuse store, plant rooms and a sub-station will be located in the basement. Access to the cycle store will be gained from Brock Street via a gated entrance that opens into a landscaped courtyard. A sloping, zig-zag pathway will connect the gate to the basement lobby and, ultimately, the door to the cycle store. Cyclists also access the cycle store from the core of the building. The courtyard will be overlooked by several apartments on each floor, including the four of the nine ground floor apartments. The pathway will also be the route used to remove refuse bins on collection day. An emergency stair and door opening out onto a passageway at the southern end of the building will provide an alternative means of escape to the core from the basement and all upper floors. The sub-station will be directly accessed from the street; the plant rooms can only be accessed from the within the basement.
- 3.1.7 The, slightly elevated, main entrance to the residential building will be set back from the corner of Laystall Street and Pigeon Street. The space on the street corner will be landscaped and a series of steps will connect the street to the entrance door. A pair of hinged, entrance doors allows access into the lobby, to the side of which will be a management office. Beyond the lobby is the circulation corridor, initially lined with parcel storage and mail boxes, and buildings core with stairway and two lifts.
- 3.1.8 The apartments will be located from the ground floor up to the eighth floor and will comprise a mix of one and two bedroom units. The three ground floor apartments on the western side of the building will have an elevated terrace overlooking Pigeon Street.
- 3.1.9 Other than a seating area in the residential lobby, there is no communal amenity space and no car parking provision within the development.

3.2 Features of the development that will promote safety and security

- 3.2.1 The proposals will result in the retention, refurbishment and re-use of an important listed building. It will also bring about the redevelopment of buildings of no architectural merit, which contribute little in the way of street surveillance, and do not make a positive contribution to the vitality and viability of the neighbourhood. The buildings on the site currently contribute to the poor quality of the local environment and to the general feeling of insecurity in the area.
- 3.2.2 The mix of uses will help diversify land use in the neighbourhood.
- 3.2.3 The residential aspect to the development will help to continue to repopulate this part of the city and create activity through the day, into the evening and at weekends.
- 3.2.4 The office space will generate activity and footfall throughout the day as well as contribute to passive surveillance of the public realm through the working day.
- 3.2.5 Plant rooms and the sub-station are largely confined to the basement, maximising the active frontage to the development and, depending on the detailed design of the enclosure to the residential courtyard, confining 'dead' frontage to the minor passageway at the rear of the development.
- 3.2.6 The location of the principal entrance doors to both the office and residential buildings are prominent and logical. The slight elevation of the residential entrance emphasises the distinction between public and semi-private space, creating an area of defensible space between the entrance and the passing public, making it less likely to be targeted by offenders. The lobby will be fully glazed, which will make it and people within the space more conspicuous, and will highlight residents and visitors as they come and go. The use of 'warm' lighting will make the entrance and lobby more welcoming, whilst light spill onto the street will enhance the sense of safety of the street during the hours of darkness.
- 3.2.7 A management presence is particularly welcome as visible staff in the development will not only discourage offender attempts to gain entry to the scheme but also gives residents a readily accessible contact to whom they may report management issues. Such provision can help to instil confidence in residents that the development is secure and that maintenance issues will be dealt with promptly.

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- 3.2.8 The elevated position and provision of terraces to the ground floor apartments on the Pigeon Street side of the building will result in a greater degree of privacy and security to residents without unduly compromising natural surveillance of the public realm. However, the detailed design of the terraces must be cognisant of the security risks posed by the inclusion of low level terraces.
 - 3.2.9 Access controls can be deployed at communal entrance doors, lobby-to-core doors and entrances to the courtyards and the basement to restrict access into the development to office staff, residents and their authorised visitors.
 - 3.2.10 A mixture of apartment sizes is likely to attract a more diverse group of residents, which can help to stabilise a development, i.e. with a reduced turnover of residents, and can help to build social capital.
 - 3.2.11 The inclusion of a lounge area in the residential lobby provides an opportunity for residents to meet their neighbours and build relationships, which help to develop a community within the scheme and deter crime and anti-social behaviour.
 - 3.2.12 The landscaped approach to the residential entrance will soften the appearance of the development and reduce the risk of the gable end of the listed building from being daubed with graffiti.
 - 3.2.13 Secure cycle parking is provided. The cycle store is located in a particularly secure location in the basement, hidden from view of any passers-by, with residents having to pass through several secure doors/gates before entering the store. There have been several incidents of bicycle theft from nearby apartment buildings nearby where the cycle stores have are poorly located and designed.
 - 3.2.14 Residents' mailboxes will be located in the circulation corridor beyond the lobby reducing the risk of mail theft.
 - 3.2.15 There is a suitably secure refuse store within the apartment building, whilst the office building refuse store is located within the secure courtyard to the rear of the building.

3.3 Areas of concern and recommendations to enhance the security of the development and its surroundings

THE SITE

Streetscape

- 3.3.1 The streetscape immediately adjacent to the development must be of a suitably high environmental quality to reflect the changing nature of the area from one dominated by industrial uses and car parking to more of a residential neighbourhood.
- 3.3.2 Visitor cycle parking should be provided with stands located close to the communal entrance doors, where it will benefit from casual supervision by staff in the offices or residents coming and going. Stands should allow a cyclist to secure the wheels and the frame to the stand.
- 3.3.3 Measures to prevent unauthorised parking on the pavement around the development should be considered.
- 3.3.4 Signage on and around the development should display the development name(s) and appropriate entrance(s) for staff, visitors, residents and delivery staff. Additional signage should be introduced into the public realm to guide pedestrians to appropriate routes through the neighbourhood.

The courtyards

- 3.3.5 Both the office and residential courtyards should be enclosed with walls or railings to a height of around 3000mm. Ornate railings, or a combination of walls with railed panels, would be most appropriate, allowing views into and out of the courtyards, animating the street and allowing natural light to penetrate the ground floor windows of apartments that overlook each courtyard.
- 3.3.6 Gates should be fitted with fob operated electronic locks and be self-closing and self-locking. The gates should be set within the 3000mm high walls/railings and must not offer footholds to intruders that are intent on trespass.

APARTMENT BUILDING

Living room window to apartment 01 on Brock Street elevation

- 3.3.7 Because the relative seclusion of this elevation and absence of defensible space between the building and the street, the proposed living room window to apartment 01 is vulnerable to being targeted by offenders seeking to break and enter or cause criminal damage. In addition, residents may feel a loss or privacy, security and amenity should passers-by peer into the apartment. In similar city centre developments, residents leave blinds in the closed position in order to maintain privacy and keep any valuable belongings out of view.
- 3.3.8 Consequently, the position of the proposed window should be elevated so that is not easily accessible to the passing public, thereby preserving privacy and maintaining security whilst allowing natural light to penetrate though limited. Alternatively, the window should be protected with ornate ironwork to minimise the risk of damage and prevent breaking and entering. Such protection may also result in residents feeling more confident in the security of the apartment and not feel the need to keep blinds closed.

Street level terraces on the Pigeon Street elevation

- 3.3.9 The proposed terraces can be easily reached from street level. Incidents of burglary and theft have occurred at apartment buildings in Piccadilly Village and Ancoats where offenders have targeted balconies and terraces. The design team must consider this risk in the detailed design of the terraces. The inclusion of security rated doors and windows to the terraces and avoidance of balustrades that aid climbing are essential. Enclosed terraces with hinged/sliding shutters or glazed panels should be considered.

Means of escape door on southern elevation

- 3.3.10 Unless the passageway at the southern end of the building will be closed and secured, the use of glass panels within this escape door should be avoided unless the glass is protected with ornate ironwork. Doors in secluded locations are more likely to be targeted by offenders so should be suitably robust or relocated to less vulnerable elevations.

Communal, entrance doors

- 3.3.11 The communal entrance doors to the building must be:
- certified to a suitable security standard;
 - be fitted with an electronic lock that forms part of the door certification;
 - be capable of self-closing and locking upon closure door.
- 3.3.12 An intercom system should be installed at the entrance. It should include an audio-visual link to each apartment, to enable residents to vet visitors prior to releasing the doors' locking mechanism and allowing *bona fide* visitors entry into the secure lobby before being met by the resident and escorted to the relevant apartment.

Other external doors

- 3.3.13 The means of escape door on the southern elevation and the door connecting the courtyard to the basement lobby. The basement access door should, fitted with an electronic lock that forms part of the certification, be self-closing and lock upon closure. The means of escape door should be used in an emergency only and be self-closing and lock upon closure.
- 3.3.14 Sub-station doors should be secured with the utility company standard security doors and locks.

Internal doors

- 3.3.15 The door, ideally a single-leaf door, connecting the lobby to the core must have a fob-activated, electronic lock fitted and be self-closing, locking securely upon closure.
- 3.3.16 The doors connecting the basement lobby to the refuse store, the cycle store and the core must be at least FD30, solid core doors with a fob-activated, electronic lock fitted and be self-closing, locking securely upon closure. The door from the cycle store at the southern end of the building should be used for escape purposes only and should have a fob-activated, electronic lock fitted (for entry into the store) and be self-closing, locking securely upon closure. A push button will be acceptable for escape purposes.
- 3.3.17 Plant room doors may be secured with key operated locks.

Apartment security

- 3.3.18 Each apartment should be secured with a security-rated entrance door that has been fitted with a fixed external handle, a door viewer and opening limiter.
- 3.3.19 Terrace access doors of the ground floor apartments should be security-rated and fitted with laminate glazing.
- 3.3.20 Ground floor windows must be security rated and fitted with laminate glass.
- 3.3.21 An intruder alarm is recommended.

CCTV

- 3.3.22 A CCTV system should be installed, with cameras monitoring the communal entrance door and cyclist entry gate, means of escape doors, the lobby, cycle store, corridor containing the mail boxes and parcel store.

OFFICE BUILDING

External doors

- 3.3.23 External doors to the building should be security rated. Where existing doors are retained and re-used they should be reinforced and fitted with a suitable BS/PAS/Secured by Design accredited lock.

Gates securing the main entrance

- 3.3.24 The gates securing the principal entrance should entirely fill the opening and be fitted with a British Standard/Secured by Design accredited lock.

Access controls

- 3.3.25 An audio-visual unit should be installed at the shared entrance doors to the core to allow visitors to communicate with staff in the upper floor office suites prior to being allowed entry. Staff in the upper floor offices should be able to activate the lock to these doors from their respective office.

Internal doors

- 3.3.26 Office suite entrance doors should be security-rated, solid core or toughened-laminate glass doors.

Glazing

- 3.3.27 Glazing in new and existing doors, and in windows on the ground floor should include laminate glass.
- 3.3.28 In order to deter offenders, the use of frosted/etched glass on the lower part of the ground floor windows, to prevent views from the street into the offices, and ornate ironwork, to minimise the risk of damage or breaking and entering, should be considered on the ground floor windows. Window protection will be especially important for the ground floor windows on the Brock Street elevation.

Alarm

- 3.3.29 The building and each office suite should include provision for an intruder alarm.

CCTV

- 3.3.30 A CCTV system should be installed. It should be capable of monitoring all external entrance and escape doors, the rear courtyard, the lobby and entrance doors to the office suites.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

Residential

- ☐ The communal entrance doors, courtyard to basement access door, and the external escape door should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The following doors should be solid core (or toughened laminate glazed doors) and fitted with an electronic lock with a holding force of around 4500N:
 - inner lobby
 - cycle store x1
 - refuse store x 2
 - basement lobby to core.
- ☐ The minimum standard of security for the plant and switch room doors is a solid core door, fitted with a British Standard, 5 lever, key-operated lock.
- ☐ The sub-station doors should meet the utility company security standard and be fitted with appropriate security standard locking.
- ☐ The communal entrance doors, internal lobby doors, courtyard to basement access door, cycle store doors, refuse store doors and the external escape door should be self-closing and lock securely on closure.
- ☐ An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the communal entrance to a handset in each apartment.
- ☐ The communal entrance doors should include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Residents should be able to operate the locking mechanism of the relevant communal entrance doors remotely from within their apartments to allow *bona fide* visitors entry into the lobby.
- ☐ Apartment, entrance doors must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, include a door viewer and an opening limiter.
- ☐ Terrace access doors of the ground floor apartments must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.

Office

- ☐ The shared entrance doors, and entrance doors to office 1 and office 2, on the front elevation, and the escape door on the rear elevation must be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The following doors should be solid core (or toughened laminate glazed doors) and fitted with an electronic lock with a holding force of around 4500N:
 - inner lobby
 - lobby to office 1 and 2
 - entrance door to offices 3 and 4
 - basement lobby to core.

4.2 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within ground floor windows/curtain walling and entrance doors must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A (P1A is adequate for apartment windows) under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.3 Office entrance gates, courtyard gates and boundary details

- ☐ The gates securing the main entrance on the Laystall Street elevation of the listed building should fit the entire opening and be secured with at least one British Standard/Secured by Design accredited lock.
- ☐ Brock Street boundary to both the office and residential courtyards should be around 3000mm in height and comprise railings or brick wall with railing panels.
- ☐ The Brock Street boundary to both the office and residential courtyards should be around 3000mm in height and comprise railings or brick wall with railing panels.
- ☐ Access gates should be not lower than 3000mm. The gates may be 3000mm tall or a smaller gate set within a frame that extends to 3000mm may be used.
- ☐ Each gate must be fitted with a fob-operated, electronic lock, e.g. a maglock, with a holding force of 4500N.
- ☐ Walls, railings and gates - including handles, hinges and locking points, should be designed so that scaling the boundary is very difficult.
- ☐ A push button release to leave the courtyard is acceptable but release buttons must be concealed so that they are not able to be activated from the public side of any of the gates.
- ☐ The gates must all be self-closing and self-locking.

4.4 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting must be provided to all of the external entrance doors and the courtyard entrance gates.
- ☐ Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ The residential entrance should be particularly well lit and 'welcoming' to residents and visitors.
- ☐ Bollard lighting is not considered appropriate.

4.5 CCTV

- ☐ Cameras should be capable of monitoring:
 - ☐ the office entrance doors
 - ☐ office courtyard
 - ☐ office ground floor lobby
 - ☐ each of the three courtyard entrance gates
 - ☐ residential entrance
 - ☐ escape door
 - ☐ entrance lobby
 - ☐ basement lobby
 - ☐ cycle store.
- ☐ For the residential element of the CCTV system, monitoring and recording equipment should be stored in the management office, with a screen available to the concierge staff to monitor activity.

4.6 Intruder alarms

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each apartment (but not essential for Secured by Design accreditation). If fitted, alarms should comply with BS EN 50131 for wired systems or wireless systems, and be linked to contacts on all external doors of each apartment.
- ☐ The office building and each office suite must be fitted with an intruder alarm, although it is understood that this is likely to be a tenant item and not necessarily installed upon completion of the building.

4.7 Cycle store and office staff/visitor cycle parking

- ☐ Cycle stands/racks within the store, and the office staff and visitor parking, whether in the courtyard or on the street on the street, should allow the cyclist to secure the wheels and frame to the stand/rack.
- ☐ Cycle stands within the street or in the courtyard should be anchored within a concrete base. Those on the cycle store should be anchored within concrete base or securely bolted to the floor.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ A detailed public realm landscape plan should include: street and footpath surfacing, lighting, measures to prevent pavement parking, visitor cycle parking, and tree and shrub planting.

4.9 Signage

- ☐ Signs should indicate the name of the development and the appropriate entrance for office or residents' visitors.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address repairs to communal areas – courtyards, lobby areas, lighting, signage, access controls, and the CCTV system.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure the site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular movements in and out.
- ☐ The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved, (see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx>).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial buildings, and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
24.07.20	Tony McCaul, McCaul Group Ltd	Request for crime impact statement
28.07.20		Site visited
26.08.20	Tony McCaul, McCaul Group Ltd	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following document:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Laystall Street development MCC pre-app meeting document (OMI Architects)	Dec 2019	

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		26.08.20

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk