



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Phoenix House, Ellesmere Street
237 Dwellings, 573m² Commercial floor-
space and Public Realm

for: DeTrafford

version B: 25th November 2020

URN: 2020/0624/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

Phoenix House, Ellesmere Street,
Manchester M15 4LN
2020/0624/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor Design Changes Advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. Overall, the proposed scheme has been found acceptable in principle, but further consideration of some minor aspects is recommended as stated in section 3.3 of this report in order to gain our full support for this development at planning stage. These include:-

- *Access control arrangements*
- *Communal Entrance lobby*
- *Car Parking Provision*

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specifications listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



Michael Craig DipLD CMLI
DfS Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors - Residential	
	2.5 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales	
	2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
	2.8 Theft at Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis	
	2.9 Non-Domestic Burglary at Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal	11
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security	
4	Physical Security (Residential).....	12
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.5 Alarms	
	4.7 Landscaping	
	4.8 Lighting	
	4.9 CCTV	
	4.10 Residents' Car Park	
	4.11 Other	
5	Physical Security (Non-residential)	16
	5.1 Doors	
	5.2 Windows	
	5.3 Glazing	
	5.4 Alarms	
	5.5 Lighting	
	5.6 CCTV	
	5.7 Other	
	5.8 Fit Out	
6	Management & Maintenance	17
7	Construction.....	18
8	Useful References	18
	8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix


A	Contact register.....	19
B	Associated Documents	19
C	CIS Version History.....	19
D	Glossary.....	20

1 Visual Audit

The site, shown red on plan, is located in the St George's / Castlefield district on the southwestern edge of central Manchester. The neighbourhood is a former industrial district, and remnants of this remain in the form of small commercial premises, but most of the area has been transformed with former industrial buildings either converted or replaced to create a residential district in a mix of new buildings and conversions. There are still some vacant plots in the vicinity.

Chester Road to the south of the site forms a boundary between the regeneration area and the more established social housing in Hulme. The Mancunian Way separates the site from the city centre, but connections have been improved with pedestrian and cycle routes recently upgraded over St George's traffic island.


There is considerable demand for car parking in the neighbourhood from commuters, residents and their visitors (and construction workers). This can overflow into the neighbourhoods south of A56, generating conflicts with residents. The project is the final phase of the masterplan which has redeveloped the entire block bounded by Ellesmere St / Chester Rd / Hulme Hall Rd & Arundel St. Phoenix House is currently in use as the site office.




Bentinck Street



The site is on the corner of Bentinck St and Ellesmere St




Ellesmere St frontage of Phoenix House



Ellesmere St looking northeast towards Phoenix House



Protection for street level windows, Ellesmere St



Car parking on adjacent site pending redevelopment

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
24	13	88	186	47	68	<5	90	14	18

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the general volume of crime experienced over the previous 12 months has been relatively low for the Manchester district, with the most commonly occurring offences being less serious wounding, criminal damage (primarily against vehicles) and vehicle crime. Crimes in the neighbourhood most pertinent to residential properties include burglary of houses and apartments and several instances of cycle theft from apartment blocks.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with hotspots occurring in the south of the proposed site around Tatton Street, which is a largely residential area. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings, with domestic disputes and incidents between known associates being the most commonly reported M.O (modus operandi).
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime in the local area is higher than the national average by 44%. Offences have mostly taken place around the ring road near Chester Road and Dawson Street, to the east of the proposed site. Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime type, with offenders smashing glazing in windows in order to gain access, and using tools to remove vehicle parts and vehicle registration plates.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Residential - Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. The main entrances should be located in a highly visible position and well-lit to deter offenders from trying to break-in. Apartment doors should not be positioned in recesses and should be readily-visible along the internal corridors / landing.

- 2.2.2 Residential - Exploitation of insecure windows and doors (mostly to the front of the property).

Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to prevent tailgating by intruders. The main entrances should be located in a highly visible position and well-lit to deter offenders from trying to break-in. Apartment doors should not be positioned in recesses and should be readily visible along the internal corridors. Additionally, where postal deliveries are made to an internal rack of mailboxes, a double door entry system should be used and the secondary door set should also be certified to recognised security standard (see section 4) and include a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system (N.B it is not acceptable for postal / delivery personnel to have free access inside the block). French windows / sliding doors opening on to insecure space at ground level should be avoided.

- 2.2.3 Residential - Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors and tailgating residents and entering communal areas (mostly corridors and bicycle storage areas).

Possible Solution - Internally, a secure lobby arrangement should be introduced at the entrance(s) to the block in order to reduce potential tailgating opportunities. This would require additional, access-controlled doors to prevent unauthorised entry to the stairs and residential corridors. Apartments should not be directly accessed off the lobby. Installation of a monitored CCTV can also assist in identification of intruders.

2.2.4 Residential & Commercial - Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Sections 4 & 5). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Doors / windows in secluded elevations may benefit from additional security measures such as shutters / grilles – these should be certified to recognised security standards

2.2.5 Commercial / Retail - Offenders posing as legitimate customers and entering restricted areas.

Possible Solution - Back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

2.2.6 Retail - Offenders entering retail premises and removing items belonging to the business as well as customers.

Possible Solution - The internal layout of the premises can increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems





2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2019.



- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **89% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **80% lower** than Greater Manchester and **75% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **65% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **45% lower** than Greater Manchester and **36% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **70% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **57% lower** than Greater Manchester and **37% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **50% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **9% lower** than Greater Manchester and **44% higher** than England & Wales.

2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks over the weekend period, with offences peaking in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties in the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as a legitimate resident / visitor as entering the apartment building by means of insecure doors and tailgating residents, accessing communal areas.
- In cases where the entry point is unknown offenders have likely targeted insecure windows and doors.

2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.7.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Saturday, during the evening (6pm - 11:59pm). Offenders often target vehicles using on street parking and private car parking facilities as they are not over looked, reducing the likelihood that the offender(s) will be seen.

2.8 Theft at Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.




- 2.8.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.


2.9 Non-Domestic Burglary at Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.


Retail Burglary – Day Range



Retail Burglary – Time Range



Retail Burglary – Point of Entry



2.9.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.9.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises demolition of the existing building on the site and construction of a block of apartments and townhouses, with 237 dwellings provided over 13 levels.
- 3.1.2 Two commercial units are located on the ground floor facing an area of public realm.
- 3.1.3 Townhouses will have individual entrances at ground floor level, and a single communal entrance lobby provides access to upper floor properties.
- 3.1.4 An area of the ground floor will provide limited under-croft car parking.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The exterior of the building at ground level has a relatively simple footprint containing few recesses that could be exploited by potential offenders.
- 3.2.2 Town houses will have an area of defensible space to define the private frontage and separate front doors and living rooms from the public footway along Ellesmere Street.
- 3.2.3 The layout of internal corridors and spaces is generally free of projections or recesses that could impede sight lines. Doors within communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve informal surveillance.
- 3.2.4 Individual apartment entrance doors appear to be flush with the corridor walls.
- 3.2.5 Cycle parking for residents is contained in a dedicated room on the ground floor of the building. Entry should be strictly controlled by the building managers, so that only genuine cyclists can gain access. Racks within the enclosure should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels, and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details). Consideration should be given to subdividing the cycle store into smaller enclosures to reduce the numbers of people who have access. Cycle stores should be fitted with self-closing, PAS 24 rated doors operated using fob-activated access controls.
- 3.2.6 The residential and commercial functions of the development appear to be kept separate and operate independently of each other, having no shared facilities within the buildings that could compromise security. Servicing for the commercial areas must not require external storage of bins or other equipment.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Townhouse access to internal areas. Provision of internal access from the upper floor of the townhouses to the internal communal amenity space creates a weakness in the security of the block, as a potential intruder, having accessed one of the townhouses, can then reach all internal areas. It is advised that this feature be removed, but can be acceptable if further access-controlled doors are included to restrict movement internally. Access to any upper floor communal rooms must be controlled by the building managers.
- 3.3.2 The layout of the entrance lobby should create a secure foyer space with controlled access to the lifts and stairs, thus reducing opportunities for tailgating. Arrangements for delivery of post should not require postal delivery staff to have unrestricted access to internal areas of the residential blocks. Any

mail boxes for residents should be located within the lobby areas. Consideration for how the secure storage of parcels for residents can be facilitated.

- 3.3.3 Access to ground floor internal parking area. The entrance to the residents' car park must be secured in line with the outer face of the building, providing no shelter or cover that could be exploited by an offender. The entrance should have high-speed automatic shutters or gates (to reduce the potential for tailgating), certified to LPS 1175. The car park shutter / gate should be operated by fob or swipe card, both on access and egress (i.e. no automatic egress). A separate entrance for cyclists / pedestrians should be included so that they do not need to fully activate the vehicular gates, reducing tailgating opportunities.
- 3.3.4 Internal zoning / compartmentalisation. The scale of the proposed development requires subdivision so that occupiers only have access to the zone where they live and do not have unrestricted entry to all residential floors.
- 3.3.5 Short-stay cycle parking. Any cycle parking intended for visitors and customers should be located within sight of entrances and / or well-overlooked from inside the buildings / concierge offices. Cycle stands should be specifically covered by any CCTV system in place.
- 3.3.6 Parking generally. Competition for parking spaces can cause confrontation that may result in antisocial or criminal behaviour, and the developer must ensure that adequate provision is made for the anticipated parking requirement, both for residents and their visitors.
- 3.3.7 A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed to allow building managers to monitor movement in the communal spaces, and assist in identification of intruders (see section 4.9).
- 3.3.8 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.9 Lighting to access road and pedestrian routes around the site. Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness.
- 3.3.10 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in Sections 4 & 5 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

The following checklists form the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Revolving doors should meet ENV 1627 standard.
- All communal entrance doors, cycle store doors, plant and store room doors and escape doors be self-closing and lock securely on closure.
- Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves, visitors to be greeted in reception by the resident.
- Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

- Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- Internal doors / frames to all offices, security rooms, stores and plant rooms should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff key-fob. Similarly, the basement cycle stores should be enclosed within secure rooms or railing enclosures, fitted with gates or solid-core doors (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by resident / staff key-fob.
- Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- Any ground or first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- Any louvres to servicing areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows.

4.3 Glazing

- Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Curtain Walling

Glazed curtain walling and window walls

- Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:
 - Large glazed units connected by 'spider clamp' system.
 - Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
 - Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.
 - Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.
- Glazed curtain walling must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:
 - Security glazing tape
 - Dedicated security sealant or gasket
 - A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)
- Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:
 - BS PAS 24:2016
 - STS 204 Issue 3: 2012
 - LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1

4.5 Alarms

- If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.6 Access Control

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas / doors should operate on access control:
 - Main communal entrance doors
 - Inner doors off lobby / access to stairs and lifts
 - Doors separating different zones of the building
 - Doors on to and off the communal amenity space
 - Bin stores
 - Cycle stores
 - Staff-only areas
 - Doors from basement into lift / stair cores
 - Car park entrances

4.7 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used.

4.9 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [All access-controlled doors including main entrance, foyer, stairs, lift lobbies, landings, car park entrance, amenity space entrance, cycle stores, bin store entrance.](#)

4.10 Residents' Car Park

- Inward opening automatic gates, roller shutters or grilles to parking areas must be certified to one of the following standards:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
 - PAS 68: 2013
- Lighting to basement level car park areas should display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%.
- Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes / directions clearly signed.
- Electronic car park exit gates should not be on an induction loop (open automatically). All gates to car parks should be fob-in and fob-out.
- Pedestrian / cycle gates in to car parks should also be fob in and fob out only

4.11 Other

- Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- Graffiti on surfaces. This kind of abuse is particularly prevalent in the vicinity of the site. Expanses of blank wall exposed to public areas should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface or have a resistant coating applied at the outset to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings.

- Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.
- Mail boxes and cycle stands should be obtained from a supplier approved by Secured by Design and installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions (see www.securedbydesign.com).

5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

5.1 Doors

- All external door-sets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- All back-of-house / staff areas to any retail units, licensed premises or restaurants should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms and offices should be solid-core and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times). Any cash offices should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false / suspended ceilings and a certified door-set to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

5.2 Windows

- All windows should be certificated to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950. Where this is not possible for dimensional reasons, window construction should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can be limited to standard dimension sizes.
- Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

5.3 Glazing

- All glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- All glazed elevations of the building fronting directly onto the street should ideally be protected by re-enforced stall risers, or bollards (at 1400mm centres), to deter ram-raid type attacks.

5.4 Alarms

- A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover each of the premises, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

5.5 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to the main entrances of the unit, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

5.6 CCTV

- As section 4.9

5.7 Other

- Any bollards or other street furniture included specifically to prevent ram-raiding should be certified to BS PAS 68-1:2013.

5.8 Fit Out

- Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:
 - Internal doors and access controls to staff areas/offices/stores
 - Cash management offices and safes, as well as cash-in-transit arrangements
 - Internal layout - including pay-point positions, aisles and product displays, arrangement of internal furnishings etc.
 - Alarms
 - CCTV
 - ATM cash dispensers

These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide further advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 6.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, alarms, CCTV)
- 6.1.3 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- 6.1.4 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
06/10/2020	DeTrafford	CIS instruction received
08/10/2020	DeTrafford	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
22/10/2020	DeTrafford	Site visit
04/11/2020	DeTrafford	Progress update
11/11/2020	DeTrafford	Payment received
12/11/2020	DeTrafford	CIS version A issued
24/11/2020	DeTrafford	Amendments requested
25/11/2020	DeTrafford	CIS version B issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
20098-0001-01-A3	Site Plan	06/10/20	02
2200	Ground Floor Plan	16/07/20	-
2201	First Floor Plan	23/09/20	00
2202	Second Floor Plan	16/07/20	-
2203	Third Floor Plan	23/09/20	00
2204	Fourth Floor Plan	16/07/20	-
2205	Fifth Floor Plan	23/09/20	00
2206	Sixth Floor Plan	16/07/20	-
2207	Seventh Floor Plan	23/09/20	00
2208	Eight Floor Plan	16/07/20	-
2209	Ninth Floor Plan	23/09/20	00
2210	Tenth Floor Plan	16/07/20	-
2211	Eleventh Floor Plan	16/07/20	-
2212	Twelfth Floor Plan	16/07/20	-
2030	Elevation – South East	08/10/20	P01
2031	Elevation – South West	08/10/20	P01
2032	Elevation – North West	08/10/20	P01
2033	Elevation – North East	08/10/20	P01

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Changes to title page, site description and section 3.3.3 following comment from client	25/11/2020

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French / double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglary resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk