



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Erection of 1 no. 13 storey building and 1 no. part 4 and part 5 storey building to form purpose built student accommodation together with a single storey side and rear extension to the retained and refurbished Oakley Villa and conversion to form amenity and communal space together with associated landscaping, cycle parking, car parking and associated works following the demolition of existing office accommodation on the site

AT Oakley, 188 Wilmslow Road, Fallowfield, Manchester

FOR: Watkin Jones Group

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION A: 22.01.21

designforsecurity

2020/0600/CIS/01

Development Supported

The scheme has been well considered from a crime prevention perspective and will add activity, natural surveillance and interest to this part of Fallowfield. Design for Security are happy to support the proposals but, because this neighbourhood has one of the highest burglary rates in Greater Manchester, we recommend that a very high standard of security is set out for the development, so that the risk of the property and future residents being targeted by offenders is minimised.

Positive aspects of the scheme include:

- the facility will be managed by a company with experience and a good reputation for the management of student accommodation;
- staff will be present throughout the day;
- the density of development will generate significant activity;
- the orientation of buildings and uses within promote activity and surveillance in the most appropriate areas;
- the location of the pedestrian entrances are appropriately focussed on Wilmslow Road;
- the location of the proposed, staffed, reception desk is suitable;
- a range of residents' amenity spaces and facilities is proposed;
- secure, though limited, car parking is included; and,
- secure cycle parking is provided in each of the accommodation blocks.

To improve the scheme from a crime prevention perspective:

- prepare a security and management/maintenance plan;
- supplement the planting around the site's perimeter to ensure the boundaries with Platt Fields Park are adequately secure;
- define the Langley Road boundary with a suitable combination of wall and railings;
- erect fencing and a gate to restrict access along the western side of the L-shaped building;
- control access into the courtyard and into each building;
- install security certified doors, window frames and glazing to the accommodation blocks;
- upgrade the security of the doors and windows of Oakley Villa as necessary; and,
- relocate the external cycle store to a more secure location.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application and seek the inclusion of a condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.



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1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the western side of Wilmslow Road, Fallowfield in south Manchester. Wilmslow Road is very heavily trafficked, particularly with buses, and connects the student dominated suburbs south of the city with universities and the city centre. Just south of the site, the western side of Wilmslow Road includes Hilltop Court, a small complex of apartments, as well as a range of food and beverage outlets, retailers and property letting agencies. Adjoining the eastern boundary of the site, on Wilmslow Road, there is a concentration of bus stops, which predominantly serve the very large student population living in this part of Fallowfield. The University of Manchester's Fallowfield Campus is situated opposite the site on the eastern side of Wilmslow Road. The Campus halls of residence and support services cater for over 2000 students. South of the site, there is a cluster of streets lined with terraced houses, many of which are rented by students. Langley Road is one of these streets and has houses directly facing the site. Platt Fields Park adjoins the site's northern and western boundaries. The park is extensive and includes, *inter alia*: a boating lake, BMX track, children's playground, showgrounds and recreational pathways. Many of the facilities are concentrated centrally within the park to the west of the site. There is pedestrian entrance to the park on Wilmslow Road just north of the site, and a pedestrian and vehicle entrance on Mabfield Road, a short distance south-west of the site.




Looking toward the site from Wilmslow Road



Oakley Villa and the 1930's building from Langley Road



The main entrance to Oakley Villa is on the southern elevation facing Platt Fields Park



Well maintained grounds of the site with Oakley Villa and the 1930's building in the background



The Langley Road vehicle entrance and car park at the western end of the site



A view east along Langley Road with the site on the left and terraced housing on the right

The development site itself comprises three linked, but distinct, buildings: Oakley Villa - a 2-storey building dating from 1840 situated at the eastern end of the complex of buildings; a 3-storey office building, built in 1937 and sits at the southern edge of the site, adjacent to Langley Road; and, a 2-3 storey office building, constructed sometime in the 1970's and situated at the western part of the site. Some of the windows on the ground floor of this block have the additional security of steel bars. The buildings are occupied by the trade union, USDAW. Car parking is located at the western edge of the site and includes a number of bays within the undercroft of the 1970's building. Access into this car park is gained from Langley Road via entrance that can be secured with an automated, sliding gate. There are two further vehicle entrances one on Wilmslow Road and a second on Langley Road towards Wilmslow Road, both of which provide access to a small unused area of parking in front of Oakley Villa. There is a pedestrian gate on Langley Road close to the entrance to the 1937 building. The grounds are landscaped and well-maintained. The site perimeter is defined with walls and railings of varying heights.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 and 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary


Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
127	14	38	96	68	65	5	40	14	41

- 2.1.1 In the period analysed, there were 555 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood in which the site is located which, when compared with other neighbourhoods within Manchester, is significantly higher than the average number of crimes. The stand-out crimes in this neighbourhood are burglary, those involving the use or threat of violence, robbery and theft, particularly bicycle theft.
- 2.1.2 Comparing all streets in the neighbourhood, most crimes were recorded as having taken place on Wilmslow Road (over 150 incidents) followed by Old Hall Lane and Wilbraham Road (over 40 crimes on each). The biggest concentration of crimes was on the streets immediately south of the site, including Langley Road, Albion Road, Furness Road, Cawdor Road, Mabfield Road, and Landcross Road. There were 135 crimes recorded as having taken place on these streets of which 78 were burglary. Burglary in this neighbourhood is unusually high, accounting for one quarter of all recorded crimes. Theft is the second most common offence recorded. Hotspots for theft include Old Hall Lane, where theft of bicycles is a particular issue, and at licensed premises on Wilmslow Road, where theft or personal belongings is an issue.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime accounts for 14% of the total volume of crime recorded in the neighbourhood; it is most common around on the streets immediately south of the site and at Brighton Grove. Theft from vehicles is the most common offence.


2.2 Crime rate comparison

2.2.1 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and across England & Wales

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2018.



- 2.2.2 The rate of burglary per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **53% higher** than the Manchester rate, **167% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate, and **238% higher** than the rate for England and Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of wounding crimes per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **55% lower** than the Manchester rate, **26% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **18% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.





2.2.4 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **67% lower** than the Manchester rate, **52% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **30% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.2.5 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **40% lower** than the Manchester rate, **9% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **72% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Burglary: risk analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.




2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary fluctuates through the week but is consistently high. Saturday is the most common day for a burglary to be committed. A greater proportion of incidents occur in the late evening or at night.



2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** The most frequently targeted points of entry were doors, with offenders applying bodily force to gain entry or smashing the glazing in glazed panels. Windows were also forced open though slightly less often than were doors. Offenders often target doors and windows on secluded, side or rear elevations of houses, particularly using rear alleyways to approach a property, where they are less likely to be witnessed. In a number of cases, offenders gained entry to properties where doors or windows were left unsecured.

2.4 Vehicle crime: risk analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk fluctuates throughout the week and is greatest on a Saturday. Vehicle crime in this neighbourhood is more common in the late evening and at night.

2.5 Modus operandi used by offenders in committing burglary and theft in this neighbourhood & measures to reduce vulnerability

2.5.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools to drill locks

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

2.5.2 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors to should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors to apartments should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing.
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e. a small front garden enclosed with a 1000mm high fence. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property; and
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors. Light suggests a dwelling is occupied and highlights the actions of intruders.

2.5.3 Windows have been prised open by offenders

To minimise the risk of prising windows open:

- all ground floor windows should include key operated locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to the rear of the dwellings should be controlled by the erection of robust boundaries and locking gates. Pedestrian routes alongside the rear boundaries should be avoided. As a means to break and enter dwellings, offenders are more likely to target windows on secluded side or rear elevations.

2.5.4 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development; and,

- access to rear gardens should be restricted with the installation of high fencing and locking gates.

2.5.5 Bikes were stolen from cycle stores at halls of residence, apartments and a gym

To minimise the risk of bicycle theft:

- provide convenient, secure cycle parking in a secure store within the building, or in a store which has self-closing, self-locking doors or gates, and is only accessible to residents in possession of a programmable access control fob.

2.6 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.6.1 Features of the physical environment can influence criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.6.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site currently and in the future are as follows:

- the perimeter of the site is very well defined with boundary walls, railings and hedges
- given that some of the gates are secured, there are only two entrances to the site,
- staff within the offices are able to supervise the site and surrounding streets during office hours
- the presence of residents in the apartments and houses on the southern side of Langley Road, facing the site, offer a reasonable prospect of passive surveillance when the USDAW offices are closed
- the site is very well-maintained - offenders tend to target properties where there are signs of neglect or a lack of attention
- CCTV and lighting of the buildings on the site may help to deter offenders
- street based CCTV on Wilmslow Road may help to detect offenders operating in the neighbourhood.

2.6.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder and the fear of crime and these include:

- the level of crime, particularly burglary, vehicle crime and robbery in the immediate vicinity of the site are a concern. A development in this location is likely to attract the interest of opportunist as well as professional criminals. Burglary, criminal damage to buildings, theft and vehicle crime are all likely to affect a development on this site. Anti-social behaviour is also likely to occur;
- the site lies adjacent to Platt Fields Park with its recreational pathways. Such pathways can facilitate criminal activity as they provide a secluded, largely unsupervised, conduit for criminals used to access or escape from a target person or property;
- the lack of off-street parking in the immediate vicinity of the site and restrictions to parking on the north side of Langley Road results in on-street parking, which is being targeted by offenders. Further development in the area may lead to increase pressure for parking on the surrounding streets to the south of the site, which may lead to an increase vehicle-related crime in the neighbourhood;

- the buildings on the site have in some places been adapted to reduce the risk of being targeted by criminals. Adaptations include the addition of roller shutters and grilles/bars to windows. Such features suggest a property has been targeted in the past and can generate feelings of insecurity amongst local residents as well as being an unsightly addition to a site or building; and,
- the proximity of several food and beverage outlets attracts people to the area late at night, and also attracts offenders who target customers or premises in the neighbourhood.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development scheme will involve:

- demolition of the 1930's and 1970's buildings;
- retention, extension and refurbishment of Oakley Villa;
- construction of two accommodation blocks;
- creation of internal and external amenity spaces;
- management centre within Oakley Villa; and,
- car and cycle parking.

3.1.2 The two accommodation blocks will be located at the western side of Oakley Villa and comprise:

- a 4-storey, L-shaped building, which fronts Langley Road and includes 185 bedrooms, with a mix of studios and clusters; and,
- a 13 storey building, to be constructed to the north of the L-shaped building and containing 38 clusters with a total of 365 bedrooms and 60 studios.

3.1.3 Cluster flats range in size from 5 to 8 bedrooms per cluster, with communal kitchen/dining and lounge areas. Studios will each have a kitchen.

3.1.4 The accommodation buildings will contain three cores - two in the L-shaped building and one in the 13 storey building - each with an entrance lobby at ground floor accessed from a courtyard garden. This central courtyard will be gated, with access controls fitted at each gate. The ground floor of the accommodation blocks also includes cycle storage areas, waste facilities, laundry rooms and plant rooms.

3.1.5 Oakley Villa will be extended on its south-western side and be used for administrative, study and recreational purposes.

3.1.6 The northern, eastern and western boundaries of the site will be largely unchanged. The principal pedestrian entrance gates will be on Wilmslow Road and Langley Road. A 9 space, car park will be laid out on the site of the existing car park, on the eastern side of Oakley Villa, accessed from Langley Road.

3.1.7 As well as cycle parking facilities with the accommodation blocks, there will be a cycle store located alongside the site's eastern boundary, behind the Wilmslow Road bus shelters.

3.2 Features of the development that will promote safety and security

3.2.1 The proposals will result in the redevelopment of a building and site that when vacated by USDAW, unless re-used or redeveloped quickly, is very likely to be targeted by vandals and criminals, leading to an erosion of the quality of the local environment, attract further criminal activity to the area more widely, all of which is likely to impinge on the quality of life of nearby residents.

3.2.2 Given the proximity of the universities and student accommodation, the proposed development seems an entirely reasonable use for the site.

3.2.3 The repurposing, refurbishment and extension to Oakley Villa will secure the future of a locally important heritage asset.

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- 3.2.4 The focus for entry to the site is suitably located on the eastern side of the site at Langley Road and Wilmslow Road, the most heavily trafficked and 'active' street.
 - 3.2.5 The existing perimeter walls and railings will be largely retained or replaced with similar forms of enclosure, clearly defining the edge of the development and helping to distinguish public space from semi-private space.
 - 3.2.6 Along with the boundary treatments, there will be a degree of separation between the perimeter of the site and Oakley Villa and the proposed buildings, providing an area of defensible space between passing public and the buildings.
 - 3.2.7 Surveillance of the surrounding public realm of Langley Road and Platt Fields Park will be enhanced by the scale and orientation of the buildings and the placement of windows on each building.
 - 3.2.8 Similarly, surveillance across the site will be enhanced by the well-considered location of facilities within each building and the location of entrances to the accommodation blocks.
 - 3.2.9 Lighting from the development will contribute to public lighting around the site. Good public, and building, lighting can significantly reduce the public's fear of crime.
 - 3.2.10 The development will be managed by Fresh Student Living, a company with experience of managing similar accommodation in several locations across the UK. A management and security presence is particularly welcome as visible staff in the development will not only discourage offender attempts to gain entry to the scheme but also gives residents a readily accessible contact to whom they may report management issues. Such provision can help to instil confidence in residents that the development is secure and that maintenance issues will be dealt with promptly.
 - 3.2.11 The elevated position, relative to the public realm, of most of the residential accommodation will result in a greater degree of privacy and security for residents than might otherwise have been the case were residential use to commence at street level or without some degree of separation between the building and the surrounding streets and pathways.
 - 3.2.12 The inclusion of social spaces provides an opportunity for residents to meet and build relationships, which can help to develop a sense of community within the scheme and deters crime and anti-social behaviour.
 - 3.2.13 Secure cycle parking is provided, although I am not convinced that the store at the eastern fringe of the site is suitable.
 - 3.2.14 Refuse bins will be located within secure stores within the development.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

The site

- 3.3.1 Each entrance to the site should be defined with a gate. The gates should be self-closing.
- 3.3.2 Residents, staff and visitors should enter the site via the formal entrance gates on Wilmslow Road at the north-eastern corner of the site or the new, Langley Road pedestrian gate, at the south-east corner of the site.
- 3.3.3 The vehicle gate to the car park should be automated
- 3.3.4 The pedestrian gate on Langley Road that facilitates access to the community room should be locked, other than when the community room is used and the entrance is supervised. All other gates should be secured with manual or electronic locks and used by staff or contractors or for means of escape purposes, in which case panic hardware should be fitted such that it cannot be operated from the public side of the gate.
- 3.3.5 Wherever possible, the existing boundary walls, railings and hedges should be retained. The security of the northern and western boundary walls should be enhanced with additional, 'defensive', planting, that is, densely planted, prickly shrubs, in places where the boundary walls are not sufficiently tall enough to deter intruders, i.e. most of the northern boundary and parts of the western boundary.
- 3.3.6 Any new boundary walls and railings defining the Langley Road boundary should be around 1100-1300mm high.
- 3.3.7 The space between the western elevation of the proposed building and the western boundary of the site should be secured with 2000mm high railings and a lockable gate and used for maintenance/refuse

access only. The railings and gate should be erected as close to the Langley Road elevation as is feasible.

- 3.3.8 Access into the courtyard, via the spaces between the accommodation buildings, and between the accommodation buildings and Oakley Villa, should be controlled. Gates and fencing around 1800mm in height should be erected. An electronic lock, operated by card or fob should be fitted to each gate. Each gate should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.9 Pathways within the site, the car park, and all, peripheral and internal, entrance gates should be illuminated from dusk to dawn.
- 3.3.10 Landscaping should be managed such that the northern and western boundaries remain secure, sight lines are not compromised between the entrance gates and entrance doors of the three buildings or across the car park, and the capabilities of the CCTV system are not compromised.
- 3.3.11 Railings, bollards, benches, or similar should be installed to prevent parking in inappropriate areas around the edges of the car park.

Cycle parking

- 3.3.12 Because of the volume of cycle theft in this neighbourhood, the cycle store, adjacent to the eastern boundary, should be relocated to a position where it will benefit from passive surveillance by staff and/or residents, and be out of view or the sphere of awareness of the passing public - facing the northern elevation/entrance to Oakley Villa, for example.
- 3.3.13 The store should be very robust and accessed via a steel gate, set within a steel frame. The gate should be secured with an electronic lock that is operated by a fob or card. The gate must be self-closing and self-locking.

Oakley Villa

- 3.3.14 Staff should be present throughout the day and the night.
- 3.3.15 Where feasible, entrance and escape doors should be security-rated, with entry restricted to residents or staff holding an appropriate fob or pass card. Where existing external doors are retained, the security of the door should be enhanced with Secured by Design/British Standard rated locks. External doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.16 An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the main entrance door to staff at the reception desk to allow staff to vet visitors prior to allowing entry via a remote lock release as appropriate.
- 3.3.17 Window locks should be fitted to ground floor windows.
- 3.3.18 If any of the ground floor glazing is replaced, laminate glass should be used.
- 3.3.19 A secure, parcel store and secure, residents' mail boxes should be located in view of staff at the reception desk.

Accommodation buildings

- 3.3.20 Each entrance door should be security-rated, with entry restricted to residents or staff holding an appropriate fob or pass card. The doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.21 For added security, and to reduce the risk of tailgating, the design team should consider fitting access controls (fob operated electronic lock) to the secondary doors within the entrance lobby of each building.
- 3.3.22 An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the entrance gate securing the eastern side of the courtyard to each cluster/studio in order to allow residents to vet visitors prior to allowing entry, via a remote lock release.
- 3.3.23 Any external means of escape doors, the external doors to the plant rooms, refuse stores and cycle stores should be security-rated. All of these doors should be capable of self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.24 Escape doors should be used for escape purposes only. An alarm should sound locally and at the reception desk management office if the escape door is opened.
- 3.3.25 All glazing within external doors and the ground floor windows should include laminate glass.

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- 3.3.26 The studio and cluster flat entrance doors should be security-rated, include an electronic lock that forms part of the security certification, and a door viewer. These doors should also be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.27 Study bedroom doors should include an electronic lock and a fixed outer handle, so that entry is only possible with an appropriately programmed fob. These doors should also be self-closing.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

Oakley Villa

- ☐ External doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Where existing external doors are retained and re-used they should be reinforced and fitted with at least one, preferably two, BS/PAS/Secured by Design accredited locks.
- ☐ Inner lobby doors at the northern entrance should be fitted with access controls so that access can be restricted to staff and residents.
- ☐ An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the northern entrance door to staff at the reception desk. Staff should be able to open the outer door remotely from the desk.
- ☐ The door to the management office should be solid-core, FD30-rated, and fitted with an electronic lock. The lock should be activated with a staff fob. This door should be self-closing and lock upon closure.

Accommodation buildings

- ☐ The communal entrance doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, and include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. These doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- ☐ To minimise the risk of 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors, the door connecting the entrance lobbies to the stair/lift cores ground floor corridors should include an electronic lock activated by a residents' fob. These doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- ☐ Entrance doors to the individual studios and cluster flats should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2 and include a door viewer.
- ☐ Study bedroom doors should be solid-core, FD30-rated, and fitted with an electronic lock. The lock should be activated with a fob.
- ☐ Any external escape doors, and external doors to the cycle stores, plant rooms and refuse stores should be certified to LPS 1175 sr 2.
- ☐ Internal doors allowing access into the cycle and refuse stores should be solid-core, FD30-rated, and fitted with an electronic lock. The lock should be activated from within the store with a residents' fob, but a push-button is sufficient to access the store from the core. Panic hardware is acceptable on the outside door. Doors should also be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

4.2 Windows frames and glazing

Oakley Villa

- ☐ All ground floor windows and windows accessible from the ground should be fitted with at least one, preferably two, key-operated locks as well as restrictors that limit opening to 100mm.

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- ☐ If the glazing in any of the ground floor windows or windows accessible from the ground is replaced, laminate glass that achieves the EN 356 P1A rating should be installed.
 - ☐ If the glazing in any of the external doors is replaced, laminate glass that achieves at least a BS EN356 P1A rating should be installed.
 - ☐ Basement windows should be protected with ironwork or grilles.

Accommodation buildings

- ☐ All opening windows at ground floor level should be certified to PAS 24, have key-operated window locks and tamper-proof opening restrictors (limiting opening to 100mm) fitted.
- ☐ Glazing within ground floor windows must incorporate at least one pane of glass that achieves a BS EN356 P1A rating. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Glazing within external doors must incorporate at least one pane of glass that achieves at least a BS EN356 P1A rating.

4.3 Entrance gates, courtyard gates and boundary details

- ☐ Wherever possible, the existing boundary walls, railings and hedges should be retained.
- ☐ Prickly, dense shrubs should be introduced to prevent intruders gaining access to the development from the Platt Fields Park where the boundary walls are not sufficiently high as to prevent entry.
- ☐ The Langley Road boundary should be defined with a wall and railing around 1100-1300mm high.
- ☐ Fencing and gates securing the south-western corner of the site and between Oakley Villa and the L-shaped building should be 2000mm high.
- ☐ Railings and gates securing the access to the courtyard from Oakley Villa pathway should be 1800mm high. The gate should be fitted with a fob-operated, electronic lock, e.g. a maglock, with a holding force of 4500N. The gate should be self-closing and lock upon closure.
- ☐ The vehicle gate to the car park should be automated and activated on entry with a fob.

4.4 Access controls

- ☐ To restrict access to authorised staff, residents and contractors, access controls should be installed at the following:
 - Car park entry gate
 - Northern entrance doors to Oakley Villa
 - Accommodation courtyard entry gates
 - Communal entrance doors to the accommodation blocks
 - Inner lobby doors to the accommodation blocks
 - Studio and cluster flat entrance doors
 - Study bedroom entrance doors
 - External doors to the cycle stores
- ☐ Electronic locks should have a holding force of around 4500N.
- ☐ Refuse store doors, plant room doors and the pedestrian gates used for access for maintenance staff or the community room may be fitted with mechanical locks that meet BS3621 or BS8621, or padlocks that meet the Sold Secure standard.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all external doors of all buildings, to the pathways and the car parking and external cycle store. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor. The cycle store lights should be activated by movement sensors.
- ☐ The Wilmslow Road and Langley Road entrance gates, the car park and the pathways that connect the entrance gates to Oakley Villa should be particularly well-lit and 'welcoming' to residents and visitors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.6 Intruder alarm

- ☐ If Oakley Villa is not staffed 24/7 it should be fitted with an intruder alarm that has contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors in all accessible rooms that have windows.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ The proposed CCTV system should be capable of monitoring the following:
 - the approaches to the pedestrian and vehicle entrance gates;
 - the Oakley Villa entrance doors;
 - Oakley Villa reception area including mail boxes;
 - the gates securing the courtyard;
 - the external entrance doors and lobbies of the accommodation blocks;
 - the cycle stores - internal stores and the external store;
 - any external means of escape doors; and
 - external doors to the refuse stores and plant rooms.

- 4.7.1 Monitors should be placed at reception desk and the management office to allow staff to review images.
- 4.7.2 Images should be recorded with recording equipment securely located in the management office or transmitted to a suitable off-site, CCTV monitoring/recording centre.

4.8 Cycle stores

- ☐ The external cycle store should be robust and secured with a door or gate fitted with a fob-activated electronic lock that meets 'Secured by Design' standards. The door or gate must be self-closing and self-locking.
- ☐ A single entry door or gate is generally more secure than double doors/gates.
- ☐ Cycle stands/racks in all stores should allow the cyclist to secure the wheels and frame to the stand/rack.

4.9 Signage

- ☐ Signage to indicate the name and address of the development, identify the name of the individual buildings, contact details of the management company and informing residents staff and visitors that CCTV is in operation should be erected at the vehicle and pedestrian entrances to the site, the courtyard gates and at the entrance doors to each building.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A security plan should be prepared. It should set out the details of: the staffing of the development; the site-wide CCTV and alarm systems; procedures for programming, issuing and cancelling door entry fobs/cards; procedures for parcel and other mail delivery; procedures for managing visitors to the development; and, address maintenance and repairs to:
 - perimeter walls, gates and fencing
 - access control systems
 - communal areas
 - lighting
 - signage
 - the CCTV and alarm systems.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure the site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved, (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of a development and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
15.12.20	Emer Cunningham, Watkin Jones	Request for crime impact statement
17.12.20		Site visited
22.01.21	Emer Cunningham, Watkin Jones	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and documents:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Existing Basement		
	Existing Ground		
	Existing First Floor		
	Existing Second Floor		
	Existing Attic		
	Watts Existing plans and section document		
	Existing Ground		
1093-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03000	GA Ground floor	02.06.19	D
1093-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03001	GA 1st floor	16.06.20	C
1093-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03002	GA 2 nd floor	16.06.20	C
1093-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03003	GA 3 rd floor	16.06.20	C
1093-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03004	GA 4 th floor	16.06.20	C
1093-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03005	GA 5 th floor	16.06.20	C
1093-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03006	GA 6 th floor	16.06.20	C
1093-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03007	GA 7 th floor	16.06.20	C
1093-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03008	GA 8 th floor	16.06.20	C
1093-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03009	GA 9 th floor	20.11.20	
1093-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03010	GA 10 th floor	20.11.20	
1093-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03011	GA 11 th floor	20.11.20	
1093-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03012	GA 12 th floor	20.11.20	
	Landscape Design Development (D & AS)	Dec 2020	
2004-LYR-XX-ZZ-DWG-L-2000	Site wide sections		2
2004-LYR-XX-ZZ-DWG-L-1001	Landscape GA		7
2004-LYR-XX-ZZ-DWG-L-1002	Softworks		5
2004-LYR-XX-ZZ-DWG-L-1003	Tree constraints		1

In the event of any significant changes to the scheme, it may be necessary to review the recommendations made in the report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		22.01.21

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk