



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Collyhurst Village, Rochdale Road

168 Houses, 76 Apartments and commercial
space (163m²)

for: Northern Gateway (FEC) No 10 Ltd

version B: 3rd February 2021

URN: 2020/0598/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Collyhurst Village, Rochdale Road, Manchester

2020/0598/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes / security additions advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to expose any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime within the proposal.

Overall, the proposed scheme has been found acceptable in principle, but further consideration of some aspects is recommended as stated in section 3.3 of this report in order to gain our full support for this development at planning stage. These include:-

- Definition of boundaries
- Cycle storage (houses)
- Communal entrance layout and access controls within the apartments

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issues being satisfactorily addressed, as described within the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Michael Craig DipLD CMLI
DfS Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors - Residential	
	2.4 Risk Factors – Commercial / Retail	
	2.5 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales	
	2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
	2.8 Theft (Retail Facilities): Risk Analysis	
	2.9 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail Facilities): Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	11
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security (Residential).....	13
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.5 Access Controls (Apartments)	
	4.6 Boundaries	
	4.7 Landscaping	
	4.8 Lighting	
	4.9 CCTV	
	4.10 Other	
5	Physical Security (Non-residential).....	17
	5.1 Doors	
	5.2 Windows and Shutters	
	5.3 Glazing	
	5.4 Alarms	
	5.5 Lighting	
	5.6 CCTV	
	5.7 Other	
	5.8 Fit Out	
6	Management & Maintenance	19
7	Construction.....	19
8	Useful References	19
	8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix




A	Contact register	20
B	Associated Documents	20
C	CIS Version History.....	21
D	Glossary	22

1 Visual Audit

The site shown red on plan lies in the Collyhurst district of north Manchester, about 3km from the city centre. Much of the neighbourhood was redeveloped in the 20th century with social housing, designed to separate vehicular and pedestrian routes. This resulted in an overly-permeable layout which included pockets of public open space and passageways that benefit from little natural surveillance, allowing criminal and antisocial activity to proliferate without being witnessed by residents.

Rochdale Road passes the west side of the site and forms a major route into central Manchester. The other roads around the site are much quieter and distribute traffic within the estate. There is a bus stop and shelter adjacent to the western boundary of the site. Collyhurst Park, a formal recreation ground lies to the south east and a war memorial is located to the southwest.

All major structures from former uses of the site have been cleared and the principal features that remain are established specimen trees & dense unmanaged vegetation. There are various formal footpaths and informal routes across the site. There is a change in level. Evidence of criminal damage and fly-tipping is present in many parts of the site.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
31	7	77	161	12	16	6	25	14	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is average for the Manchester district, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and vehicle crime being the highest recorded offences. The proposed site is located within a residential area where these crime types are commonly reported.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly to the east and south of the proposed site, around the residential estate and educational facility. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings, with domestic disputes and incidents between known associates being the most common M.O (modus operandi).
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage against dwellings and vehicles has accounted for 73% of criminal damage offences in the local area. Offenders have targeted glazing in windows and doors of both dwellings and vehicles. Offenders have also targeted internal doors and scratched paint work / damaged tyres. Offences have often been as a result of a domestic dispute.
- 2.1.4 Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime taking place in the local area, with offences mostly taking place to the north of the proposed site, around Collyhurst Road. Offenders have smashed glazing using objects, in order to gain access to the vehicle and remove items from within. Offenders have also removed vehicle registration plates and vehicle parts.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 or equivalent security standard - these doors are very difficult to force open. Front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the street - offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed. Back / side doors should be located within a secure rear garden space.

- 2.2.2 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - A robust boundary treatment should be installed to discourage unauthorised access to back gardens. Gates should be lockable from both sides, and any back allies should include a self-closing gating scheme so that only residents can gain entry. Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key. Front gardens should include defined boundaries to discourage offenders from approaching the doors.

- 2.2.3 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to BS PAS 24 or equivalent security standard. All ground floor or otherwise accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. As above, the rear garden space should be securely enclosed. As above, a robust boundary treatment should be installed to enclose the back garden areas.

- 2.2.4 Commercial / Retail: Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.

Possible Solution - Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2. Shutters should be mounted integrally, so that boxes are less vulnerable to tampering. Use of shutters in more concealed areas, where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed or detected, should be of a higher security certification, or consider use of additional protection such as internal security blinds or grilles,

together with alarms and CCTV. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals.

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems





2.4 Risk Factors – Commercial / Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces / Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2019.



- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **34% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **15% higher** than Greater Manchester and **46% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **30% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **104% higher** than Greater Manchester and **136% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **17% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **70% higher** than Greater Manchester and **148% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **9% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **65% higher** than Greater Manchester and **161% higher** than England & Wales.

2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.6.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Monday, Thursday and Sunday during the afternoon (12pm - 2pm) and into the early hours of the morning (12am - 5am). Offenders often target properties during the day when residents are likely to be away from the property, attending work, giving offenders the perception that they are unlikely to be seen or identified. Offenders also target properties in the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area.

2.6.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Using implements in order to remove roof tiles and gain access to the property.
- Posing as a legitimate resident/ visitor and gaining access to communal areas by means of insecure doors / tailgating residents.

2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.7.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is consistently high throughout the week, with an exception to Friday. Vehicle offences have peaked during the afternoon and into the evening period (3:30pm - 6:30pm).

2.8 Theft (Retail Facilities): Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.8.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

2.9 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



2.9.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.9.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves removal of all existing features on the site and construction of a residential development of 244 dwellings, including 76 apartments in two 5 / 6-storey blocks, and 168 houses arranged in terraces of dual and single-aspect properties.
- 3.1.2 An area of commercial space forms part of the ground floor of one of the apartment blocks.
- 3.1.3 The proposal also includes creation of an area of public open space adjacent to Collyhurst Park.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring legitimate activity to a currently-vacant site that is a generator of disorder. Redevelopment with housing and population of the site should help to create a sense of ownership and responsibility, and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will help to improve natural surveillance along parts of Rochdale Road where currently the existing housing provides little overlooking of the street and public realm.
- 3.2.3 Car parking provision for the houses is located within the curtilage of the property. The parking spaces for apartment residents are located where vehicles can be observed from within the block, ideally directly from the owner's apartment. Competition for parking spaces can cause confrontation that often results in criminal behaviour, and the developer must make adequate provision for the anticipated parking requirement, both for residents and their visitors. Enclosure / signage may help to discourage fly parking in the private bays.
- 3.2.4 Communal Bin and cycle / scooter stores will be provided within the buildings rather than in a separate structure. Entry to cycle / scooter stores should be access-controlled and be available for genuine cyclists / scooter users only on application to the building managers. Cycle stands should enable bikes to be secured by the frame and both wheels.
- 3.2.5 Apartments. The internal areas of the blocks appear to be free of obstacles so an intruder would find difficulty in hiding within the communal parts of the buildings. Doors to individual apartments should be positioned flush with the corridor walls. All communal doors within the corridors should include glazed elements to improve sight lines.
- 3.2.6 Maisonettes within the apartment blocks appear to be self-contained with no direct access to internal corridors.
- 3.2.7 Houses will have windows of routinely-occupied rooms on the front elevation (at ground floor level) which helps to maximise informal surveillance opportunities of the adjacent public realm.
- 3.2.8 Houses. Alleys serving the rear gardens of mid-terraced houses will be gated in line with front elevation of properties. It is recommended that such alleyways serve a maximum of 10 properties to limit the number of people who have legitimate access to the route.
- 3.2.9 The residential and commercial functions will be kept separate from each other and not involve shared facilities or entrances that would allow customers and staff to access residential parts of the building and vice versa. Servicing for the commercial areas must not require external storage of bins or other equipment.
- 3.2.10 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme. The supplied plan contains little detail of the proposals. The following matters should be considered when refining the layout of the proposed development:-

- 3.3.1 Apartment Entrances. In order to discourage tailgating, the residents' entrances should be laid out with a double door entry system, creating a secure lobby area and inner, access-controlled doors to restrict further entry to the stair well or lifts. This arrangement helps to reduce potential for tailgating, which is the most common means of entry for an intruder into apartment blocks. Postal delivery should not require delivery staff to have access to communal corridors inside the building, and either "through the wall" letter boxes, located on the outer face of the building with internal collection, or a rack of letterboxes in a secure lobby area should be provided. Entrance doors should not be recessed by more than 600mm from the elevation of the building.
- 3.3.2 Houses. Front doors to properties should not be recessed by more than 600mm, in order to allow visitors (or intruders) to be more easily observed from the public roads and neighbouring properties – appears to apply to house types 2, 3 & 5.
- 3.3.3 Houses. Bin and cycle storage in the front garden must not obstruct sight lines or provide potential hiding places close to the entrance to the property. The cycle store will need to be particularly robust, lockable, and include a ground-fixed cycle stand. It is preferable for cycle storage to be accommodated inside the dwelling, and most residents are likely to do this in practice.
- 3.3.4 Houses. Blank gable walls directly adjacent to public space or footways can generate nuisance for residents and have no scope to include windows that could improve natural surveillance of the adjacent public realm. These should be avoided.
- 3.3.5 The cladding / facing materials should not provide any external aids to climbing that could allow an intruder to gain access to any 1st floor balconies or windows. The detailing of the façade and the relationship between the building and any other external landscape features / street furniture will need to be carefully planned to avoid inadvertently introducing this kind of vulnerability.
- 3.3.6 Boundary treatments. Front and side garden boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings and parked vehicles, or taking short cuts.



-
- 3.3.7 Street Design. The layout of the streets should be designed to reduce traffic speeds and include traffic-calming measures to discourage joyriding within the estate.
- 3.3.8 Vehicle parking / competition. The level of vehicle-related crime in the area is above the average for Greater Manchester and England & Wales. It is important that residents can overlook their vehicles and that bays are within sight of the owner's premises (the plans indicate that in many cases, this is not achieved). Competition for parking spaces can cause confrontation that often results in criminal behaviour, and the developer must make adequate provision for the anticipated parking requirement, both for residents and their visitors. Enclosure / signage may help to discourage fly parking in the private bays.
- 3.3.9 Level changes. There are some changes in level across and around the site, and the developer should be careful not to allow any retaining structures or terrace features to facilitate climbing aids that would allow easy access into otherwise-secure areas or onto upper floors of the buildings.
- 3.3.10 Substations. These features can provide nuisance for neighbouring residents if they are not effectively enclosed. Boundary treatments should not obscure site lines or provide climbing aids that could undermine the integrity of adjacent secure fencing to back gardens.
- 3.3.11 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for larger vehicles.
- 3.3.12 Communal space maintenance. The robust management of such spaces is essential as poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.13 Bus stop. The proximity of the bus stop / shelter to the proposed apartment block and houses facing Rochdale Road could create potential nuisance to residents of the new properties. The developer must look carefully at their relationship to the new properties, in particular, the entrances, fencing and gates. Boundary treatments should be designed to discourage use as informal seating.
- 3.3.14 Phasing of works. It is probable that the site will be redeveloped in phases, and it is crucial that the treatment of the edges of each section is not left vulnerable. It may be necessary to install interim boundary treatments in order to provide a robust level of security in such locations. The phasing should also be considered in relation to the creation of hidden or concealed areas where disorder could occur unseen, which may cause nuisance to existing and new occupants of the site. Any roads installed in advance of redevelopment should be capable of being barriered off, and measures to discourage traveller access should be installed.
- 3.3.15 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklists (sections 4 & 5) form the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- Front and rear doors to houses, including must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- French / double doors and folding or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- Front doors to houses should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.

- Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- Garage doors to integral / attached garages (if there is a connecting internal door with the dwelling) must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, the internal connecting door must be to the same burglary resistant specification as the front door (normally BS PAS 24). If there is to be no internal connecting door or the garage is detached, the garage door should be of robust construction, with a multi-point locking mechanism.
- External communal access doors to apartment blocks must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system - these features should be permitted under the scope of the security certification. Secondary doors off the internal lobby should be the same standard.
- Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.

4.2 Windows

- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors in to garages and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Controls (Apartments)

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrance doors to apartments and entrances to the blocks
 - Internal communal doors off entrance lobby / lifts
 - Cycle stores
 - Any bin stores

4.6 Boundaries

- Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.

- Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- Gates in to the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
 - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock
- If residents are likely to use these gates when leaving their property, then the gates must be lockable from both sides.

4.7 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots close to housing (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- Street furniture (for example bollards, cycle stands, trees, retaining walls, planters, steps or kerbs) should be judiciously included within the layout to remove opportunities for vehicles to gain access to the pedestrian routes across the public open space. Any street furniture specifically intended for this purpose should be certified to BS PAS 68.
- Street furniture should be designed to withstand casual acts of vandalism. When selecting or designing street furniture, consider how easily and quickly items can be repaired or replaced following damage. When commissioning bespoke street furniture and public artworks it is also important to be mindful of the potential for attack and ease of repair. These features are best positioned where there is plenty of formal and informal surveillance, so any criminal acts are more likely to be witnessed.
- Tree Establishment. Avoid the use of tree stakes by using an underground guying system. Irrigation systems / pipes should include tamper proof coverings to avoid potential criminal damage / blockage.
- Surfaces that could be vulnerable to graffiti should be formed of a resistant material or have a resistant coating applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal, e.g. 'easy-on' (see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).
- Cycle stands intended for short-stay use should enable cyclists to secure both wheels and the frame.

4.8 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- Lighting in parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 lux with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- Lighting to pedestrian routes through the site should be in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting to public areas (footpaths and roads) should be evenly distributed and not create areas of shadowing or pooling. Any low level lighting should be positioned to avoid creating glare.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **Apartment block Main entrances, foyers, stairs, cycle stores, bin store entrances.**

4.10 Other

- Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas. Smart meters are acceptable.
- Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- There have been incidents involving metal theft from the area. Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and metal pipework and wiring should not be visible.

- Any garden sheds must be securely fixed to a concrete foundation and the shed door fitted with a certificated 'Sold Secure' Silver Standard padlock, hasp and staple (coach bolted through the shed structure). The shed door should be at least 44mm thick so that the door can be locked into the doorframe using either a mortise deadlock or mortise sash lock certificated to BS 3621: 2007.
- Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- Cycle stands and mail boxes for the apartments should be from a supplier approved by Secured by Design (see www.securedbydesign.com).

5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

5.1 Doors

- All external door-sets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- All back-of-house / staff areas to any retail units, licensed premises or restaurants should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms and offices should be solid-core and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times). Any cash offices should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false / suspended ceilings and a certified door-set to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

5.2 Windows and Shutters

- All windows should be certificated to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950. Where this is not possible for dimensional reasons, window construction should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can be limited to standard dimension sizes.
- Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).
- Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

5.3 Glazing

- All glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- All glazed elevations of the building fronting directly onto the street should ideally be protected by re-enforced stall risers, or bollards (at 1400mm centres), to deter ram-raid type attacks.

5.4 Alarms

- A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover each of the premises, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

5.5 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to the main entrances of the units, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

5.6 CCTV

- See section 4.7

5.7 Other

- Any bollards or other street furniture included specifically to prevent ram-raiding should be certified to BS PAS 68-1:2013.
- Metal theft from buildings is a significant issue and consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction. Metal pipework and cabling should be concealed.

5.8 Fit Out

- Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:
 - Internal doors and access controls to staff areas / offices / stores
 - Cash management offices and safes, as well as cash-in-transit arrangements
 - Internal layout - including pay-point positions, aisles and product displays, arrangement of internal furnishings etc.
 - Alarms
 - CCTV
 - ATM cash dispensers
- These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide further advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews / exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 6.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, alarms, CCTV).
 - Regular security patrols of communal areas in and around the site.
- 6.1.3 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
25/06/2020	Avison Young	Initial meeting with design team
22/09/2020	Avison Young	CIS instruction received
15/10/2020	Avison Young	Commission Confirmed / fee agreed
29/10/2020	N/A	Site visit
18/12/2020	Avison Young	Site plan received
22/12/2020	FEC	Payment received
30/12/2020	Avison Young	CIS version A issued
21/01/2021	Avison Young	Revised plans received
03/02/2021	Avison Young	CIS version B issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
8871-BA-MP-XX-DR-A- (01)100	Site Location Plan	18/03/20	P1
8871-BA-MP-00-DR-A- (04)706	Site Layout Plan	04/12/20	P7
1994-EXA-00-GF-DR-L-100	general arrangement plan	15/01/21	
1994-EXA-00-GF-DR-L-102	Collyhurst Park GA Plan	15/01/21	
1994-EXA-00-GF-DR-L-104	GA Plan 1 of 3	15/01/21	
1994-EXA-00-GF-DR-L-105 GA	GA Plan 2 of 3	15/01/21	
1994-EXA-00-GF-DR-L-106 GA	GA Plan 3 of 3	15/01/21	
8871-BA-A1-00-DR-A-(04)050	Apartment Block 1 ground floor	19/01/21	P7
8871-BA-A1-01-DR-A-(04)051	Apartment Block 1 first floor	19/01/21	P7
8871-BA-A1-02-DR-A-(04)052	Apartment Block 1 second floor	19/01/21	P7
8871-BA-A1-04-DR-A-(04)054	Apartment Block 1 fifth floor	19/01/21	P5
8871-BA-A1-XX-DR-A-(05)050	Block 1 – north and west elevations	19/01/21	P5
8871-BA-A1-XX-DR-A-(05)051	Block 1 – south and east elevations	19/01/21	P5
8871-BA-A3-00-DR-A-(04)250	Apartment Block 3 – ground floor	19/01/21	P7
8871-BA-A3-01-DR-A-(04)251	Apartment Block 3 – first floor	18/12/20	P6
8871-BA-A3-02-DR-A-(04)252	Typical Floor Level 2-4	18/12/20	P6
8871-BA-A3-XX-DR-A-(05)250	Apartment Block 3 - elevations	19/01/21	P6
8871-BA-AD-XX-DR-A-(07)306	ENW Substation Details	19/01/21	P1
8871-BA-H1-XX-DR-A-(04)500-2B4P	Proposed Floor plans HT 101	11/12/20	P7
8871-BA-H2-XX-DR-A-(04)550-3B5P	Proposed Floor Plans HT 102	11/12/20	P9
8871-BA-H2-XX-DR-A-(04)575-3B5P	Proposed Floor Plans HT 102_S	11/12/20	P5
8871-BA-H3-XX-DR-A-(04)600-4B6P	Proposed Floor Plans HT 103	11/12/20	P9
8871-BA-H4-XX-DR-A-(04)650-4B6P	Proposed Floor Plans HT 104	11/12/20	P5
8871-BA-H4-XX-DR-A-(04)675-4B6P	Proposed Floor Plans HT 104_S	11/12/20	P5
8871-BA-H5-XX-DR-A-(04)700-5B7P	Proposed Floor Plans HT 105_S	11/12/20	P7
8871-BA-H6-XX-DR-A-(04)850-3B5P	Proposed Floor Plans HT 106_S	10/01/21	P5

8871-BA-MP-00-DR-A-(04)706	Site Layout Plan	11/12/20	P8
8871-BA-MP-00-DR-A-(04)721	Plot Arrangement Plan	18/12/20	P1
8871-BA-MP-XX-DR-A-(04)702	House type Plan	18/12/20	P7
8871-BA-PA-00-DR-A-(04)000	Plot A GA Ground Floor Plan	18/12/20	P5
8871-BA-PB-00-DR-A-(04)100	Plot B GA Ground Floor Plan	18/12/20	P6
8871-BA-PC-00-DR-A-(04)200	Plot C GA Ground Floor Plan	18/12/20	P6
8871-BA-PD-00-DR-A-(04)300	Plot D GA Ground Floor Plan	18/12/20	P6

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Revisions to all sections following receipt of drawings / plans	03/02/2021

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French / double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglary resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk