


Barclay House, Whitworth Street, Manchester.



Source: Google Earth

Crime Impact Statement

v1.0

November 2020

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1. Introduction

- 1.1.** This desk based Crime Impact Statement (CIS) (or Crime Prevention Plan, or Crime Impact Assessment) has been produced by an independent crime prevention design consultant who retired from Merseyside Police after over 26 years service as a police officer performing a variety of roles from CID, Traffic, Firearms, to Audit and Inspection, including dialogue with criminals to understand how they identify opportunities to commit crime, and also victims of crime to monitor the short and long term effects on them. Throughout the consultant's police service, crime prevention was at the forefront, the last role being that of Force Architectural Liaison Officer (ALO) for over 7 years. The consultant has been producing Crime Impact Statements for over 15 years.
- 1.2.** As Force ALO, the consultant worked with architects, designers, developers and local authority planners to design out crime and the potential for crime in new developments of varying types and sizes by way of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, and also administered the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Secured by Design (SBD) initiative, providing advice and recommendations to allow the award to be made on successful completion of some schemes, be they residential or commercial.
- 1.3.** The consultant also holds a professional qualification, Advanced Certificate in Environmental Design and Crime Prevention (Ad Cert ED&CP) awarded by Oxford Brookes University and accredited by the London City and Guilds Institute (LCGI), and is a Home Office accredited Crime Reduction and Architectural Liaison practitioner with previous experience in the built environment prior to police service. The consultant has been actively involved in many crime reduction initiatives, and was responsible for conceiving, designing and subsequently producing interactive crime reduction advice for the Merseyside Police website, which received Home Office recognition.
- 1.4.** This CIS has been prepared on behalf of Mr. Ka Fan to support a planning application for conversion to residential use of the existing internal car parking area at ground floor level, and the construction of a two storey roof top extension for residential use at Barclay House, 35 Whitworth Street, Manchester. The CIS shows how the concept of the scheme reduces its impact on and susceptibility to crime and disorder, and can be used by the Council to assess the scheme submitted for approval in this context. It will help to allay public fears about the development that could be brought about by lack of information, by providing an overview of crime levels at the site location and also in the surrounding area, and outlining the strategy which it is hoped will provide for a safe, secure and non-threatening environment both for new residents and also the existing neighbouring residents and businesses, taking cognizance of National Planning Policy, Local Planning Policy and design guidance such as SBD.
- 1.5.** Each and every building project presents the designers with a unique set of challenges to overcome and solve. This involves seeking an acceptable compromise between the aesthetics of the architectural design and landscaping, and the need for security requirements which should be robust but subtle rather than overtly offensive and perhaps creating a 'fortress type' appearance which may increase the fear of crime.
- 1.6.** The site has been subject of a recent application for change of use of the existing building from office to residential under Permitted Development, and this change of use and conversion is currently taking place.

2. Planning Policy and Design Guidance

The following policies, plans and crime prevention advice documents have been used as a source of reference in the completion of this CIS.

2.1. Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government–National Planning Policy Framework–February 2019

8. Promoting healthy and safe communities

Para 91 - Planning policies and decisions should aim to achieve healthy, inclusive and safe places which:

- a) promote social interaction, including opportunities for meetings between people who might not otherwise come into contact with each other for example through mixed-use developments, strong neighbourhood centres, street layouts that allow for easy pedestrian and cycle connections within and between neighbourhoods, and active street frontages;
- b) are safe and accessible, so that crime and disorder, and the fear of crime, do not undermine the quality of life or community cohesion for example through the use of clear and legible pedestrian routes, and high quality public space, which encourage the active and continual use of public areas; and
- c) enable and support healthy lifestyles, especially where this would address identified local health and well-being needs for example through the provision of safe and accessible green infrastructure, sports facilities, local shops, access to healthier food, allotments and layouts that encourage walking and cycling.

Para 95 - Planning policies and decisions should promote public safety and take into account wider security and defence requirements by:

- a) anticipating and addressing possible malicious threats and natural hazards, especially in locations where large numbers of people are expected to congregate. Policies for relevant areas (such as town centre and regeneration frameworks), and the layout and design of developments, should be informed by the most up-to-date information available from the police and other agencies about the nature of potential threats and their implications. This includes appropriate and proportionate steps that can be taken to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and ensure public safety and security; and
- b) recognising and supporting development required for operational defence and security purposes, and ensuring that operational sites are not affected adversely by the impact of other development proposed in the area.

Para 98 - Planning policies and decisions should protect and enhance public rights of way and access, including taking opportunities to provide better facilities for users, for example by adding links to existing rights of way networks including National Trails.

Paragraph 110 - Within this context, applications for development should:

- c) create places that are safe, secure and attractive – which minimise the scope for conflicts between pedestrians, cyclists and vehicles, avoid unnecessary street clutter, and respond to local character and design standards

Paragraph 127 - Planning policies and decisions should ensure that developments:

- d) establish or maintain a strong sense of place, using the arrangement of streets, spaces, building types and materials to create attractive, welcoming and distinctive places to live, work and visit;
- f) create places that are safe, inclusive and accessible and which promote health and well-being, with a high standard of amenity for existing and future users; and where crime and disorder, and the fear of crime, do not undermine the quality of life or community cohesion and resilience.

2.2. National Planning Practice Guidance (NPPG)

With the publication of the accompanying National Planning Practice Guidance (NPPG) (Note 7.5) the government has reiterated that designing out crime and designing in community safety should be central to the planning and delivery of new development. Specifically, the Planning Practice Guidance on Design reminds practitioners that local authorities are duty bound to adhere to Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and exercise their functions with due regard to their likely effect on crime and disorder, and do all that they reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder. Furthermore, practitioners are also reminded that the prevention of crime and the enhancement of community safety are matters that a local authority should consider when exercising its planning functions under the Town and Country Planning legislation.

2.3. National Design Guide

Objective P2: Provide well-designed spaces that are safe.

Objective H1: Healthy, comfortable and safe internal and external environment.

2.4. Manchester City Council Core Strategy 2012-2027

Manchester's Core Strategy was adopted on the 11 July 2012 and is the key document in the Manchester Local Plan. It sets out the long term strategic policies for Manchester's future development and will form the framework that planning applications will be assessed against.

2.5. Secured by Design (SBD)

Established in 1989, Secured by Design (SBD) is the title for a group of national police projects focusing on the design and security for new and refurbished homes, commercial premises and car parks as well as the acknowledgement of quality security products and crime prevention projects. It supports the principles of 'designing out crime' through physical security and processes. The principles of the scheme have been proven to reduce the risk of crime and the fear of crime.


2.6. Safer Places – The Planning System and Crime Prevention (ODPM 2004)

Though no longer referenced by government or local planning policy, but mentioned in Secured by Design New Homes 2014, this document sets out how the planning system is able to deliver well designed and safe places, challenging all those involved in the design and layout of new developments to think about appropriate crime prevention measures without compromising the quality of the local environment. It builds on and complements Government urban design and crime reduction objectives and guidance, including Secured by Design and focuses on seven attributes of sustainability that are particularly relevant to crime prevention:

- Access and movement
- Structure
- Surveillance
- Ownership
- Physical protection
- Activity
- Management and maintenance.

3. Environmental Visual Audit

- 3.1.** The development site (*indicated approximately by the * on the map opposite, Source: Google*), is located on the southern edge of Manchester city centre.
- 3.2.** Whitworth Street has good transport links, with nearby access to Deansgate and Oxford Road railway stations, and the Metrolink tram network. The Manchester inner ring road is nearby to the south of the site and provides access to the national motorway network.
- 3.3.** The wider area has been, and still is, subject to urban regeneration which has included new residential developments and conversion of older buildings to residential use. The proposed development site, currently





Pics 1 and 2 show the views looking east and west respectively along Whitworth Street. Barclay House is the building with scaffolding along its frontage in the centre of both pictures.



Pic 3 shows the view looking east from Tib Lock on the northern side of the Rochdale canal. Barclay House is again in the centre of the picture.



Pic 4 shows the view looking east from the Rochdale canal towpath along the northern perimeter of Barclay House.



Pic 5 shows the view looking west from the Rochdale Canal towpath at the eastern perimeter of Barclay House.



Pic 6 shows the view looking south towards Barclay House from Great Bridgewater Street on the northern side of the Rochdale canal.

4. Crime Statistics and Analysis

4.1. Greater Manchester Police (GMP) provides policing service to the metropolitan area of Greater Manchester. The police force area covers 493 square miles in the north west of England. Although there are areas of great affluence, Greater Manchester has a high level of poverty. Around 2.8 million people live in an urban setting. This major conurbation includes Manchester and Salford, as well as the large surrounding towns. The residential population is ethnically diverse, with 16 percent from black, Asian and minority ethnic communities, and is increased by very large numbers of university students and the large numbers who visit, socialise in, commute into, or travel through the region. The transport infrastructure includes major rail stations and a major airport.

4.2. Crime covers a wide range of offences, from the most harmful such as murder and rape through to relatively minor incidents of criminal damage or petty theft.

4.3. Crime Categories

- **Anti-social behaviour** - Includes personal, environmental and nuisance anti-social behaviour
- **All crime** - Total for all categories
- **Bicycle theft** - Includes the taking without consent or theft of a pedal cycle
- **Burglary** - Includes offences where a person enters a house or other building with the intention of stealing
- **Criminal damage and arson** - Includes damage to buildings and vehicles, and deliberate damage by fire
- **Drugs** - Includes offences related to possession, supply and production
- **Other crime** - Includes forgery, perjury and other miscellaneous crime
- **Other theft** - Includes theft by an employee, blackmail and making off without payment
- **Possession of weapons** - Includes possession of a weapon, such as a firearm or knife
- **Public disorder and weapons** - Includes offences which cause fear, alarm, distress or possession of a weapon such as a firearm
- **Public order** - Includes offences which cause fear, alarm or distress
- **Robbery** - Includes offences where a person uses force or threat of force to steal
- **Shoplifting** - Includes theft from shops or stalls
- **Theft from the person** - Includes crimes that involve theft directly from the victim (including handbag, wallet, cash, mobile phones) but without the use or threat of physical force
- **Vehicle crime** - Includes theft from or of a vehicle or interference with a vehicle
- **Violence and sexual offences** - Includes offences against the person such as common assaults, Grievous Bodily Harm and sexual offences.

4.4. The level of crime has been broadly stable in recent years; however, the latest figures from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) estimate a significant 9% reduction in the year ending March 2020. Underlying this were significant falls in theft (12%) and criminal damage (13%) and almost all other crime types saw non-significant falls. It is not possible to say whether this decrease would have come to represent a change in the trend seen in recent years, because of the expected impact of the coronavirus pandemic and the lockdown.

Total police recorded crime increased by 3% for the year ending March 2020 in England and Wales (excluding Greater Manchester Police (GMP)). The difference in trend to the CSEW is because rises in total police recorded crime were largely driven by increases in high-volume offence categories including fraud and computer misuse (12%), violence against the person (7%), particularly violence without injury (9%), and stalking and harassment (12%). Trends in these offence types are better measured by the CSEW and, apart from fraud and computer misuse, these offence categories are where improvements in police recording practices are most apparent.

Police recorded crime data are not a National Statistic, however, they provide a good measure of the crime-related demand on the police but not a reliable measure of all crime. In addition, data for Greater Manchester Police (GMP) have not been included in this release because of issues with their data supply following the implementation of new force IT systems. Any total police recorded crime data refer to England and Wales excluding GMP.

Trends in police recorded crime data for the lower volume crimes the survey does not cover or captures less well, show a mixed picture with:

- a 4% decrease in recorded offences involving firearms
- a 6% increase in the number of offences involving knives or sharp instruments
- a 10% increase in the overall number of homicides; this includes a single incident with 39 homicide victims which, if excluded, shows a 3% increase overall.

Many of these lower volume, higher harm types of violence tend to be concentrated in metropolitan areas such as London, the West Midlands and West Yorkshire.

While the total number of offences involving knives or sharp instruments in England and Wales (excluding GMP) rose by 6%, rates of increase varied across different regions. For example, there was a 7% increase in London and a 10% decrease in West Yorkshire. In addition, the number of homicides where a knife or sharp instrument was involved increased by 2%. This increase was largely driven by a 28% rise in London (from 67 to 86) whilst the rest of the country saw a 7% decrease in the number of homicides where a knife or a sharp instrument was used.

While the CSEW provides the better indication of overall trends in theft offences, police recorded crime data can help identify short-term changes in individual offences that are thought to be well reported and relatively well recorded by the police. Total theft offences recorded by the police decreased by 4% compared with the previous year, although these data show a varied picture with:

- a 9% decrease in burglary
- a 10% increase in theft from the person
- no change in vehicle offences.

A further publication explores crime in England and Wales during April and May 2020, the period when the strictest national lockdown restrictions because of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic were in place. Restrictions came into effect from 23 March 2020 and were gradually eased from 13 May 2020.

Data are presented from a new Telephone-operated Crime Survey for England and Wales (TCSEW) designed to capture trends in crime whilst normal face-to-face interviewing was suspended. Data on police recorded crime have been provided in a monthly format. These data may be subject to revision in future quarterly releases. Each data source includes additional reference periods to enable comparison with pre-lockdown months.

- Initial findings from the Telephone-operated Crime Survey for England and Wales (TCSEW) estimated a significant 32% reduction in total crime excluding fraud and computer misuse during April and May 2020 compared with a two-month average in the pre-lockdown period.
- Underlying this reduction were significant falls in theft offences, particularly domestic burglary and other theft of personal property; this reflects the increase in time people spent at home during the lockdown period, a reduction in opportunities for theft in public spaces and the closure of the night-time economy.
- Similar to findings from the TCSEW, police recorded crime levels during the lockdown period were much lower than respective months in 2019, with 25% less crime in April 2020 and 20% less crime in May 2020.
- Reductions were seen across many types of crime; in particular, theft offences fell in April and May 2020 to almost half the level recorded in April and May 2019.
- One exception were trends in drug offences, where levels rose by 22% in April 2020 and 44% in May 2020 compared with April and May 2019; this reflects proactive police activity in pursuing these crimes during lockdown.
- Police recorded crime fell by 5% in March 2020 compared with the previous month, followed by a larger 20% decrease between March and April; in contrast, crime increased by 12% from April to May, as the easing of lockdown restrictions began.
- Other findings from the TCSEW indicated that public perceptions of the police during this time were largely positive, with 91% of adults satisfied with the way local police were responding (*Source: Office for National Statistics*).

- 4.5.** The proposed development site lies within the Southern Gateway Neighbourhood policing area of the wider Manchester city Borough.
- 4.6.** Though a site visit has not recently taken place, the photographs from Google do show some graffiti on the northern retaining wall of Barclay House, however, this seems to be the norm along this towpath, and others throughout the city, wherever criminals can operate without disturbance.

- 4.7.** The following maps show the overall level of reported crime within the Southern Gateway Neighbourhood policing area and nearer to the proposed development site reported in June 2019 (*all data from Police.uk website – data from July 2019 onwards not currently available*). The total of 247 incidents is for the entire Southern Gateway Neighbourhood area and it can be seen that the majority of incidents occurred to the west, north and east of the site. Nearer to the proposed development site itself, in the area as defined in Fig. B, the majority of recorded incidents in June 2019 occurred to the north on or near the NCP Manchester Oxford Street car park, whilst those close to the site are listed alongside the map. (Police.UK disclaimer states, "Please note that not all crimes that occurred can be shown on the map").




Fig. A

Recorded crimes and incidents for the Southern Gateway Neighbourhood policing area




Fig. B

Crimes and incidents nearer to the proposed development site

O2 Ritz = 2 x violent crime
1 x ASB
1 X other theft
Nightclub = 3 x vehicle crime
2 x ASB
1 x other theft
Gt. Marlborough St = 1 x ASB
1 x bike theft
1 x vehicle crime
James Leigh Street = 1 x other theft
Sainsbury's supermarket = 2 x ASB
1 x public order
1 x shoplifting
1 x other crime
Wakefield Street = 2 x other theft
1 x ASB
1 x public order
2 x other crime

- 4.8.** The following bar chart shows a comparison of the crime types and incidents committed in the Southern Gateway Neighbourhood policing area over the past 3 years. Realistically, the chart relates to the period from August 2017 to June 2019, due to the lack of further timely information from GMP. Violence and sexual offences were the main issue and this is likely to be the case at present.



4.9. Anti-social behaviour (ASB), as in other parts of the Greater Manchester policing area, and in fact other parts of the country, was also a significant problem in the area. Anti-social behaviour is recorded and made up of 3 elements:

- Personal
- Nuisance
- Environmental

Personal ASB is incidents that are deliberately targeted at a particular individual or specific group or are aimed at having an impact on a particular individual or specific group rather than the community at large. It includes incidents that cause concern, stress, disquiet or irritation through to incidents which have a serious adverse impact on someone's quality of life. At one extreme of the spectrum it includes minor annoyance; at the other end it could result in risk of harm, deterioration of health and disruption of mental or emotional well-being, resulting in an inability to carry out normal day to day activities through fear and intimidation. It would not however include random acts of ASB which are not clearly aimed at a specific individual: e.g. the random throwing of flour or eggs at Halloween or the throwing of snowballs providing that no harm was intended or caused.

Nuisance ASB captures those incidents where an individual or group causes trouble, annoyance, inconvenience, offence or suffering to people in the local community in general rather than being deliberately targeted at specific individuals or groups. It includes incidents where behaviour goes beyond the conventional bounds of acceptability and impacts on the quality of life of individuals and communities. Just as individuals will have differing expectations and levels of tolerance so will communities have different ideas about what goes beyond tolerable or acceptable behaviour within their communities.

Environmental ASB deals with the interface between people and places. It includes incidents and inconsiderate actions which have an impact on the surroundings including the natural, built and social environments. This category is about encouraging reasonable behaviour whilst managing and protecting the various environments so that people can enjoy their own private spaces as well as shared or public spaces.


4.10. The main crime types reported in June 2019 in the wider Southern Gateway Neighbourhood policing area as defined in Fig. B earlier were ASB (15), vehicle crime (8), violent crime (8), other crime (8), other theft (5), public order (3), theft from the person (3), bicycle theft (2), shoplifting (1) and criminal damage (1), which tends to match the trend between August 2017 and June 2019 to some extent.

4.11. Between July 2018 and June 2019 or near some of the roads in the vicinity of the proposed development site, crime statistics over this period reveal the following:

	ASB	Burglary	Criminal Damage	Vehicle crime	Violent crime	Robbery	Drugs	Other theft	Bicycle theft	Other crime	Public Order	Weapons	Theft from the person	Shoplifting	Totals (no. of crimes)
On or near Cambridge Street	2	0	1	4	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	10
On or near Chepstow Street	9	2	0	2	2	3	1	1	1	1	2	0	2	0	26
On or near First Street	No recorded crimes or incidents														0
On or near Gloucester Street	No recorded crimes or incidents														0
On or near Great Bridgewater Street	No recorded crimes or incidents														0
On or near Great Marlborough Street	5	2	7	5	7	0	1	2	2	5	1	0	0	0	37
On or near Jack Rosenthal Street	No recorded crimes or incidents														0
On or near Medlock Street	No recorded crimes or incidents														0
On or near River Street	No recorded crimes or incidents														
On or near Whitworth Street	No recorded crimes or incidents														0
Total (crime types)	16	4	8	11	9	3	2	5	3	6	4	0	2	0	73

- Statistics for the two nightclubs on or near Whitworth Street, including the o2 Ritz, and previously mentioned adjacent to the Fig. B map at para 4.7 are not included, however, over the 12 month sample period the number of recorded incidents for these totaled 429 incidents and varied between 27 and 43 each month.
- The majority of recorded incidents occurred in or near to Great Marlborough Street which runs south east from Whitworth Street, opposite the o2 Ritz venue. The part nearest Whitworth Street is a tunnel and equipment vehicles for those performing at the Ritz sometimes park there which could explain the vehicle crime and criminal damage offences. The violent crimes and ASB is likely to be overspill from the Ritz as people are leaving the venue.
- Chepstow Street, on the northern side of the Rochdale Canal has suffered a high number of incidents, with ASB being the main issue. This could be attributable to the area near the junction with Oxford Street where two fast food outlets are located, or its southern end where there is a public house.
- On the whole, the majority of incidents probably occur during the night time economy and involve the consumption of alcohol and drugs, neither of which should impact on this proposed development.
- Again, ignoring the nightclub incidents, ASB and vehicle crime are the main issues, however, they are not particularly excessive for an inner city neighbourhood with a thriving night time economy.

- 4.12.** The following graph shows crimes per quarter in the Southern Gateway Neighbourhood policing area. Only the available statistics from October 2017 to June 2019 are relevant, and they show a reasonably consistent trend with a high of 1110 incidents in the final quarter of 2018, and a low of 819 incidents in the second quarter of 2019, just before timely statistics became unavailable. Unfortunately, it is not currently possible to state whether the downward trend continued, or in fact increased again.



- 4.13.** The crime statistics provided on the Police.UK website are from an official source and adequately serve the purpose of providing an oversight and overall crime risk assessment of the area surrounding the site. Figures have been provided to Police.UK by Greater Manchester Police; however, they lack some of the detail of the Force's own statistics due to the Data Protection Act 2018 and the General Data Protection Regulation. Though the statistics do not document the modus operandi (M.O. - how criminals commit offences), these do in fact tend to change regularly even if the types of crime do not, so what is current in the area at the time of compiling this CIS, for example, burglaries committed by force to a rear door, or criminal damage committed by smashing windows, would not necessarily be the M.O. in the area when the development is completed. Crime patterns change regularly, as can be seen from the previous information, so any crime prevention advice provided should always be on a 'worst case scenario' basis in order to cover all eventualities. (*N.B. Due to a change in IT systems no crime data for GMP is available from July 2019 onwards. The force is working to rectify this issue and provide the missing data over the coming months, but this issue has still not been solved after 15 months*).
- 4.14.** To summarise, crime and ASB around the immediate vicinity of the proposed development site in the 12 months to June 2019 was, in the main, attributable to the two night time economy establishments, although there were also ASB and vehicle crime incidents in the nearby streets. Discounting the statistics for the two night time economy establishments, incidents for an inner city area were not particularly excessive. The types of incidents recorded in the area between August 2017 and June 2019 tend to mirror the crime issues for the wider policing area, but it is not currently possible to say if this pattern continued, even if it is likely. This could therefore deem the proposed development itself a relatively low crime risk, whereas the area is medium to high risk. All those with an interest in the development and local area should not become complacent though because realistically, no crime is acceptable. There is no evidence to suggest that

the introduction of these new residential apartments to the area will cause an increase in crime, but it is a possibility, hence the need to plan for this and introduce effective crime prevention measures into the scheme. The types of offence previously committed in the area will probably continue and due to budgetary constraints it is more important than ever that the police are assisted in their efforts to reduce crime and anti-social behaviour. The crime prevention measures intended and recommended for this proposed development will assist in this aim.

5. Proposed Site Use

- 5.1.** The proposal is for the conversion to residential use of the existing internal car parking area at ground floor level to the rear of the building, and the construction of a two storey roof top extension at Barclay Housie.
- 5.2.** The existing building is currently subject to conversion to residential use.

6. Risk Assessment

- 6.1.** The typical security and safety issues for a development of this nature are:
 - Anti-social behaviour, violent crime and public order incidents including neighbour disputes.
 - Domestic burglary including bogus callers and distraction burglaries.
 - Theft
 - Criminal damage to apartments.
 - Lack of maintenance to access control systems.
 - Theft, criminal damage and ASB during the construction phases.
- 6.2.** It must also be borne in mind that when new developments such as this take place they sometimes act as a magnet to criminals because they often contain new furniture, electrical goods, IT equipment and other items of value, therefore providing new opportunities.
- 6.3.** Unfortunately, there are many crimes which occur during the construction phase of a development; the most significant include theft of plant equipment, materials, tools and diesel fuel. SBD recommend that security should be in place prior and during the construction phase. This should include:
 - Robust perimeter fencing of the site and a monitored alarm system (by a company or individual who can provide a response) for site cabins and those structures facilitating the storage of materials and fuel.
 - The name of the contractor and signage with an emergency contact telephone no. should be displayed at several places on the perimeter fencing which will allow the public to report suspicious circumstances.
 - Mobile or part time CCTV systems can be used as an effective aid to the security of a site and can act as a deterrent to criminal activity.

- Control of pedestrian and vehicular access.
- Maintaining a clean and tidy site so as to prevent any accessible debris being used by vandals.
- Contractors who provide site security during the construction phase should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) Approved Contractors Scheme (ACS) compliant.

7. Security Strategy

7.1. Crime Prevention advice has been provided to the designers of the scheme, in addition to the clients, by utilising SBD principles in conjunction with long term practical policing knowledge and crime pattern analysis. SBD New Homes 2019 v2 has also been used as a point of reference.

7.2. The overall aim is to achieve a suitable and sensible level of security for the entire site including the building shell, and to introduce appropriate design features that enable natural surveillance and create a sense of ownership and responsibility for every part of the development in order to deter criminal and anti-social behaviour. Although this application only relates to internal conversion to apartments and a roof top extension, it is vitally important that any crime prevention measures introduced start at the main entrance(s). The crime prevention measures listed would be considered appropriate, realistic and cost effective for such a residential scheme.

7.3. Perimeter security

- A secure, access controlled perimeter is vital to the scheme, in order to provide a safe and secure development, free from both incidents of crime and the fear of crime for residents.
- With the exception of the main entrance to the building (*see para 7.4.*), any other doors at street level e.g. fire exits, refuse and recycling store, plant room etc., should be outward opening, preferably with no external door furniture.

7.4. Access control system

- A proximity access control system for the main entrance is recommended as it provides electronic access through communal entrance doorsets and is generally by use of a card or key fob issued to an occupant or person such as a staff member, contractor or postal delivery service.
- Authorised access can be restricted to certain times of the day for some users.
- The access control system should have the facility to record and identify the location, user, type, time and date of every system event.
- Sufficient memory storage must be available for a period of not less than 30 days.
- The system should be fully programmable, with access restricted to the nominated system controller(s) who will be able to manage the system via remote access in order to expeditiously delete lost or stolen proximity cards or key fobs and any enrolled radio transmitters.

7.5. Visitor door entry system

- A door entry system capable of calling each individual apartment is recommended.
- It should allow a visitor to call any selected dwelling within the building, and hold a two way simultaneous conversation with the occupant of the dwelling.
- It should allow the occupant to see and identify the visitor and their location.
- It should enable the occupant of the dwelling to remotely operate the electric locking device on the communal entrance door(s) thus allowing the visitor access.
- This should be repeated at internal landings if compartmentalisation of the building is required.
- Visitor door entry systems shall be easy to operate and understand and have the ability to display the image of the caller before the call is answered, so the resident can choose whether to answer the call or not.

7.6. Communal and shared entrance doorset

- Communal entrance doorsets controlled by visitor door entry systems, can enable residents to gain access without the use of a key and grant entry to visitors by means of an electronic door release system.
- An increased number of dwellings results in doorsets being used more frequently. Likewise, the proximity of the development to a high crime area can subject doorsets to more abuse. A robust maintenance plan is recommended.
- Tradesperson or timed release mechanisms are not recommended as they have been proven to be the cause of anti-social behaviour and unlawful access to communal developments.

7.7. Lighting in communal areas

- 24 hour lighting (switched using a photoelectric cell) to communal parts of the apartment block is recommended.
- Dimmed lighting during hours of low occupation is recommended to save energy.
- This will normally include the communal entrance hall, lobbies, landings, corridors and stairwells and all entrance/exit points.

7.8. Utility meters

- Meters should be installed in a location so that access does not introduce security risks to residential areas.

7.9. Security compartmentalisation

- Apartment developments can suffer adversely from anti-social behaviour due to unrestricted access to all areas and floors of the building.
- Unlawful free movement throughout the building should be prevented by the use of an access control system.
- Lifts and stairwell access should be controlled separately.
- To prevent the lift and stairwell providing unrestricted access onto a residential landing, each resident should be assigned access to their floor only via the use of a security encrypted electronic key (e.g. fob, card, mobile device, key etc.) both on the stairwell/landing door and lift.
- Access to stairwells from a communal lobby should be restricted to residents to reduce the risk of anti-social behaviour or criminal activities.

- Unrestricted egress from a landing into the stairwell and from the stairwell to the communal lobby/emergency fire exit should be provided at all times.
- If lift and stairwell access is jointly controlled via an additional secure doorset, this will prevent access to each landing from both the lift and stairwell.
- Access to stairwells from a communal lobby should be restricted to residents to reduce the risk of antisocial behaviour or criminal activities.
- It is imperative that the fire service should have unrestricted access to all floors in the event of an emergency so the internal access control system utilised should incorporate either a 'firefighter's mode' for lifts or a switch within an Access Control Box (ACB) of a restricted type acceptable to the local Fire and Rescue service.
- Any electronic release system for use by the Fire and Rescue service must be weatherproof, easily identifiable and located close to the entrance they would use in the event of an emergency.

7.10. Emergency door release devices

- Break glass emergency door exit release devices (often green in colour) on communal external doors that provide an important aid to egress in the event of an emergency have proven to be abused rendering some buildings insecure for long periods of time, therefore vandal resistant stainless steel self resetting emergency exit systems should be installed as an alternative.

7.11. CCTV and intruder alarms

- CCTV cameras covering visitor door entry systems, communal entrances and internal lobby areas should be installed and be capable of providing images of persons that are clearly identifiable on smaller devices such as smart phones.
- Ideally, CCTV systems should be monitored live 24/7 giving the ability to react to a situation as it occurs.
- If CCTV is to be considered for the development then it must be fit for purpose and installed to BS EN 50132-7: 2012+A1:2013.
- An operational requirement should be used for the design, performance specification and functionality of the CCTV system, with a recording capability and format acceptable to the local police.
- At the very least, CCTV should provide coverage of the building facades, entrances and communal lobby areas.
- If intruder alarms are to be fitted they should be police approved systems, suitably designed, fit for purpose monitored systems. For a police response, the system must comply with the requirements of the Security Systems policy, which can be found at www.securedbydesign.com

7.12. Communal mail delivery

- Communal mail delivery facilities should be located at the primary entrance/exit point of the building externally at the front of the building within view of those using the building, via a 'through the wall' facility.
- If this is not possible then boxes should be located within an internal area covered by CCTV or within a secure access controlled entrance lobby.
- Boxes should be of robust construction, be fitted with anti-fishing measures, and be fire resistant.

7.13. Loft hatches in communal areas

- Loft hatches located in communal areas, such as over landings, must be locked to prevent access into a dwelling via the loft space.
- This may still be required even where the loft space has been split into compartments to prevent the spread of fire and smoke.

7.14. Lightweight framed walls

- The security of a development can be severely compromised if lightweight framed walls in communal areas do not offer sufficient resilience to withstand a criminal attack.

7.15. Apartment entrance doors and windows

- Entrance doors to individual apartments should be fitted with multipoint locking systems including anti-bump, anti-pick cylinders.
- Windows should be internally beaded and fitted with lockable handles, to provide security for lower floors and ease of maintenance at higher floors.
- Safety glass, laminated or toughened, should be fitted in any glazed window panels below 800mm and glazed door panels within 1.5m of finished floor level.

8. Conclusion

- 8.1.** This development will be consistent with current principles of the National Planning Policy Framework and has adopted the principles of Secured by Design.
- 8.2.** Analysis of crime and ASB prior to July 2020 around the immediate vicinity of the proposed development site revealed the area to be a relatively low crime risk, and, discounting the incidents at the two nearby night time economy establishments, there had also been issues of ASB and vehicle crime on nearby streets. This tended to mirror the issues for the wider policing area, and it is difficult to predict whether crime levels in the area have continued at previous levels, worsened or even reduced. Without wishing to increase the fear of crime, guarantees cannot be given that the development itself will not suffer incidents of crime and anti-social behaviour, however, all reasonable efforts to mitigate and discourage this have been taken in the design and layout, thus minimising the vulnerability of the development to crime and anti-social behaviour.
- 8.3.** The crime prevention measures recommended for this sustainable development are appropriate and adequate for the perceived crime risk and should satisfy the requirements of Manchester City Council's local planning policies and strategy because they take into account the need to reduce crime and anti-social behaviour, and the fear of it, and the high quality design of the development clearly creates a sense of place that enables people to identify with their surroundings or locality, to be and feel safe without creating a fortress type development, and maximise natural surveillance opportunities.



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